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ABSTRACT 
This  study  investigates  accountability  of  the  judiciary  for  its  role  in 
authoritarianism as an integral part of accountability in transitions. It argues this is 
an important but relatively neglected aspect of transitional justice theory and state 
practice.  The  thesis  of  the  research  is  that  the  judicial  institution,  as  the  third 
branch of government ought to be held accountable for its role in past governance 
in transitional societies. This is particularly important to obtain comprehensive 
accountability. It is also relevant to the crucial task of institutional transformation 
which is a key objective of transitional justice. 
   The paucity of critical perspectives on the role of the judiciary during a society’s 
troubled period would appear to be because of the view that it lacks a distinct role 
in  governance.  This  suggests  that  the  judicial  function  was  inconsequential  or 
judicial  outcomes  were  invariably  imposed.  In  view  of  the  acknowledged 
important role of the judiciary in both liberal and democratising polities all over 
the world, it is argued that the purview of transitional justice mechanisms should, 
as a matter of policy, be extended to scrutiny of the judicial role in the past.  
   There is the need to publicly scrutinise the course of judicial governance in post-
authoritarian  societies  as  a  cardinal  measure  of  institutional  transformation. 
Following on the recognition that the judiciary in post-authoritarian contexts will 
be faced with enormous challenges of dispute resolution, restoration of the rule of 
law, as well as a key role in policy determination and governance, its institutional 
transformation following a period of siege is critical to the survival of democracy 
and the rule of law.  
   The mechanism of choice identified in this research for scrutiny of the judicial 
function in transitional societies is the truth commission. The research proposes 
extending  the  purview  of  truth-telling  processes  as  a  measure  of  public 
accountability to the judiciary in post-authoritarian contexts. The research adopts 
a  comparative  perspective  but  to  contextualise  the  argument,  it  focuses 
specifically on judicial governance and accountability for the past in Nigeria’s 
transition to democracy after three decades of authoritarian rule. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE RULE 
OF LAW - A Nigerian Case Study 
 
   This research investigates accountability of the judiciary for the past in political 
transitions  from  authoritarian  rule.  The  inquiry  into  the  role  of  the  judicial 
function sets out to demonstrate the relevance of incorporating accountability of 
the  judiciary  for  the  past  into  the  transitional  justice  project  through  a  public 
mechanism; the truth-seeking process. This study advances a robust argument that 
comprehensive accountability in the transition to democracy and the rule of law 
should be a key objective in transitional societies. It argues that scrutiny of the 
role of the judiciary for past governance is an important but relatively neglected 
area of transitional justice theory and state practice. Such scrutiny of the judicial 
role  in  the  past  ought  to  be  pursued  as  a  matter  of  public  accountability.  To 
contextualize the research, it focuses on judicial governance and accountability in 
Nigeria’s transition to democracy after decades of authoritarian rule.  
   The thesis of this research is that the judicial institution, as the third branch of 
government ought to be held accountable for its role in governance during the 
period of authoritarianism. This is particularly important to obtain comprehensive 
accountability. It is also relevant to the crucial task of institutional transformation 
which is a key objective of transitional justice. 
   The research argues that critical scrutiny of the judicial function for its previous 
exercise of power, specifically in an authoritarian context, is made all the more 
important by the critical role the judiciary plays in post-authoritarian societies all 
over  the  world.  This  is  especially  the  case  with  the  growing  incidence  of 
judicialisation of politics and the increasing visibility of the judicial function in 
governance.  
   The paucity of critical perspectives on the role of the judiciary during a society’s 
experience of authoritarian rule may be because of the view that it lacks a distinct 
role in governance. The lack of focus on accountability for the judicial role during 
an authoritarian period of a society’s history suggests that the judicial function 
was inconsequential, non-definitive or judicial outcomes were invariably imposed 
at the time. Yet, in view of the acknowledged central role of the judiciary in both 
liberal and democratising polities all over the world, it is argued that the purview 
of transitional justice mechanisms should, as a matter of principle and policy, be 
extended to scrutiny of the judicial role in the past.    9 
   In  particular,  it  will  be  argued  that  there  is  the  need  in  post-authoritarian 
societies to publicly scrutinise the course of past judicial governance as a cardinal 
measure  of  institutional  transformation.  Such  institutional  transformation  is 
particularly important because the judiciary in post-authoritarian contexts will be 
faced with enormous challenges of dispute resolution, restoration of the rule of 
law,  participation  in  policy  determination  and  governance.  In  other  words, 
transformation of the judiciary following a period of authoritarian rule is critical 
to  the  survival  of  democracy  and  the  rule  of  law.  The  mechanism  of  choice 
identified  in  this  research  for  scrutiny  of  the  judicial  function  in  transitional 
societies is the truth commission which has become an important feature of most 
transitional justice processes in post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies.  
RESEARCH AIMS 
   The following are the aims of this research: 
 
￿  To  demonstrate  the  relevance  of  incorporating  accountability  for  the 
judicial role in governance during an authoritarian period into transitional 
justice processes at times of political change.  
￿  To show that the role of the judiciary in transitional societies is of a nature 
that can not and should not be ignored. 
￿   To demonstrate that public accountability of the judiciary in transitional 
societies  through  the  mechanism  of  the  truth-seeking  process  provides 
opportunity for securing comprehensive accountability of governance in a 
society’s authoritarian period. 
￿  To demonstrate that across-the-board transformation of state institutions, 
an  important  aspiration  of  transitional  processes,  would  be  virtually 
impossible  without  incorporating  the  third  branch  of  government,  the 
judiciary, into the accountability process. 
￿  To make an original contribution to the fledgling but multi-dimensional 
field of transitional justice and the rule of law.  
STRUCTURE 
   Considering the various meanings the concept of transition evokes, it is germane 
to clarify what this thesis will not be doing. This thesis is not concerned with 
transitional justice in the abstract. Rather, it is concerned with evaluating what it 
means to engage with the judiciary as the third and vital branch of government in   10 
societies experiencing political change. In other words, this study explores the 
nature  of  transitions  through  concrete  and  time-bound  analysis  of  specific 
institutional  dynamics  and  social  expectations  with  particular  reference  to  the 
judiciary.  Proceeding on this approach, this study emphasises the point that the 
judiciary wields considerable power and is an integral part of government in the 
modern state.  
   Similarly,  it  is  relevant  to  clarify  the  sense  in  which  this  study  explores 
accountability of the judiciary. In this regard, it is important to state from the 
outset that while the relevance of traditional mechanisms for accountability of the 
judiciary (including congressional hearings, parliamentary sovereignty, appellate 
jurisdiction, removal of judges, etc) are important to foster the proper functioning 
of the judiciary, they are not the route explored here. Rather, this thesis proposes a 
fundamental  departure  from  these  institutionalised  forms  principally  on  the 
argument that transitional societies are not normal societies. In any event, a major 
premise of the thesis is that these traditional mechanisms for accountability of the 
judiciary (for any of a myriad of reasons) did not, at the time of authoritarian rule, 
do what they were designed to do. Thus, there is the need to reach beyond them 
for an  effective accountability mechanism in the context of political transition 
from authoritarian rule.  
   In similar vein, this thesis will not subscribe to the current transitional justice 
approach  to  judicial  transformation.  This  approach,  reflected  in  the  attitude  of 
international agencies’ to judicial transformation in post-authoritarian and post-
conflict societies emphasises training of old and new judges, provision of support 
infrastructure for courts (human and material), passing of laws and constitutional 
provisions for judicial integrity and so on characteristic of. It is not the argument 
that  these  measures  are  irrelevant  to  attaining  the  objective  of  institutional 
transformation.  They  clearly  are  required  depending  on  the  particular 
circumstances of the relevant society.  
   However,  the  argument  pursued  here  is  that  the  objective  of  institutional 
transformation of the judiciary can only be achieved where there has been public 
accountability, in the first instance, for the specific role the judiciary played as a 
branch of government in the pre-transition period. Public accountability for the 
judicial role in governance during the authoritarian period (offered through the 
truth-seeking mechanism), it is contended, provides opportunity to obtain clarity 
on  the  nature  of  judicial  governance  in  the  past.  Acknowledgement  of  the 
propriety or otherwise of the overall exercise of judicial power, provided through   11 
the truth-seeking process, is a critical step towards institutional transformation in 
the way it ventilates what went wrong in the past.  
   The  preferred  approach  of  this  study  is  to  provide  a  context  to  ground  the 
arguments  advanced  on  the  salience  of  accountability  of  the  judiciary  in 
transitional societies for past governance. This approach is adopted because of the 
position  taken  in  the  study  that  the  current  attitude  to  accountability  of  the 
judiciary (for the past) in transitional societies is based on traditional notions on 
the judicial function in liberal democratic systems. Thus, there is a need to draw 
attention to a specific societal context in which to embed the arguments for the 
validity of a more critical approach to the judicial role in governance at all times 
and  especially  during  periods  of  political  change.  It  is  anticipated  that  the 
contextual  approach  draws  attention  to  the  needs  and  expectations  of  the 
transitional society which existing paradigms in democratic societies may fail to 
capture. 
   In line with the above-stated approach, Chapter One opens with the historical, 
political, social and economic factors that set the stage for political change in 
Nigeria. The chapter traces the circumstances that led to the truth-seeking process 
as part of the transition from military to civil democratic rule in the country.  The 
focus  here  is  on  the  work  of  the  Human  Rights  Violations  Investigation 
Commission,  (the  Oputa  Panel)  established  by  the  government  of  President 
Olusegun Obasanjo shortly after his inauguration in 1999. The chapter examines 
the formation, mandate and legislation of the truth-commission, the Oputa Panel. 
The Oputa Panel was established as the main transitional justice mechanism to 
recover the truth and obtain redress for victims of almost three decades of gross 
human rights violations committed by successive military regimes in the country. 
There is specific reference to the role of the press, the conduct of public hearings 
and the recommendations of the Panel. There is also reference to the Oputa Panel 
Case. 
   The  case  challenged  the  legality  and  powers  of  the  Oputa  Panel  as  a  truth-
seeking process. It played a significant part in the eventual refusal of the initiating 
administration not to implement the Panel’s recommendations is highlighted here 
though dealt with in greater detail later in the study. The chapter also describes the 
problems that the truth-seeking process contended with as well as the aftermath. 
Specifically,  it  speaks  to  the  public  reaction  to  the  non-publication  and  non-
implementation of the Oputa Panel’s Report. It emerges that the Oputa Panel, in 
as much as it attempted to establish accountability for gross violations of human   12 
rights in the country, to make recommendations for avoiding a recurrence and to 
propose  important  institutional  reforms  for  creating  a  new  society,  did  a 
commendable job and was well-received in the country.  
   However, a significant issue that emerges, and with which there is substantive 
engagement in this study, is the critical gap in the work of the Oputa Panel. In 
particular, like virtually every other truth-commission before it (with the notable 
exception of the South Africa TRC), it failed to engage directly and specifically 
with the role of the judiciary in the suffering that military rule brought on the 
Nigerian society. This was despite the fact that the judicial institution was at all 
times an active participant in governance in the country and the only one with a 
continuous  and  unabridged  institutional  memory  or  existence  in  the  country’s 
post-independence history which is of temporal relevance in this research. 
   Ironically, the Oputa Panel itself as a transitional justice mechanism did not get 
away lightly with its perpetuation of neglecting accountability of the judiciary for 
the past. The judiciary provided (presumably unwittingly) the excuse for the non-
implementation  of  the  Oputa  Panel’s  otherwise  laudable  work.  Thus,  critical 
evaluation of the Oputa Panel’s work provides an essential context for the need 
for new thinking on the significance of integrating accountability for the judicial 
role in the past into transitional justice processes. Such integration is required to 
achieve comprehensive accountability and vindicate the right of society to truth.        
   In Chapter Two, the study moves from the contextual examination of the truth-
seeking  process  in  the  Nigerian  experience  to  the  normative  and  theoretical 
consideration of the central theme of the research, accountability of the judiciary 
for the past. It examines the accountability gap stemming from the lack of focus 
on the role of the judiciary in the past. The chapter lays out the theoretical basis 
for  the  main  argument  on  accountability  of  the  judiciary  for  its  role  in  past 
governance in transitional societies. It argues a case for extending the purview of 
truth-seeking processes to the judiciary in post-authoritarian contexts.  
   The  discussion  in  the  chapter  highlights  the  existence  of  a  tension  in  the 
interface  between  the  truth-seeking  process  and  efforts  to  call  the  judiciary  to 
account.  The  tension  originates  from  the  view  that  such  accountability 
normatively undermines the integrity of the judiciary as a key institution of the 
state (particularly in transitional societies), while the path of non-accountability 
challenges the viability of the truth-seeking mechanism in achieving transitional 
justice.  It  is  argued  that  the  adoption  of  an  approach  that  accords  proper 
appreciation of the transitional context and fundamental principles of international   13 
law (specifically in the area of human rights and humanitarian law) significantly 
eases the tension. More importantly, the chapter further contends that inherent in 
this approach is the potential for institutional transformation and relegitimisation 
of  the  judiciary  which  had  become  delegitimised  by  years  of  acquiescence  to 
authoritarianism.  
   The  chapter  goes  on  to  challenge  arguments  based  on  traditional  notions  of 
judicial independence and allied principles (designed for the proper conduct of the 
judicial function), advanced to repel the case for accountability of the judiciary for 
the past. While conceding the relevance of the principle of judicial independence, 
it is argued this principle (or any other for that matter) should not constitute a 
shield against accountability of the judiciary in any social milieu. It is further 
advanced that the principle is especially not sufficient to ward off accountability 
of the judiciary for its role in governance in formerly authoritarian societies. This 
is because governance during the authoritarian period brought untold suffering on 
the society for which full institutional accounts are required at the time of political 
transition to achieve institutional transformation.  
   Utilising the earlier stated contextual approach, Chapter Three seeks to embed 
the theoretical framework for accountability of the judiciary for the past (set up in 
Chapter Two) in the transition experience of Nigeria. The chapter introduces an 
additional foundational argument for accountability of the judiciary for its role in 
a period of authoritarianism by suggesting a constitutional premise for it. This 
additional premise is principally informed by the deliberate adoption of a written 
constitution  as  the  fundamental  instrument  for  delimiting  the  institutional 
infrastructure  of  the  heterogeneous  post-colonial  state.  Chapter  Three  also 
presents  critical  analysis  of  the  bi-dimensional  issues  that  necessitate 
accountability  of  the  transition  judiciary  in  the  context  of  Nigeria’s  political 
transition. These are of a legal-jurisprudential and sociological nature. The chapter 
concludes  that  the  accountability  gap  with  respect  to  the  role  of  the  judiciary 
saddles the transitioning society with an untransformed judiciary. The absence of 
transformation in the wake of political transition in the country threatens not only 
the rule of law, but also the transition project as a whole. 
   Chapter Four reflects an important shift in the focus of this thesis. Up to this 
point,  the  focus  is  on  the  past.  A  major  premise  for  the  imperative  of 
accountability  of  the  judiciary  for  the  past,  it  is  argued,  is  the  need  for 
comprehensible accountability. The existence and functioning of the judiciary as 
the third arm of government when accountability for governance is in issue makes   14 
it an indispensable candidate for scrutiny.  However, from here onwards, attention 
is  directed  to  another  compelling  reason  for  demanding  accountability  of  the 
judiciary  for  the  past,  namely  the  effect  of  unaccountability  on  the  judicial 
function in the present. To demonstrate the claim in this research that the judiciary 
plays a critical role in governance, there is an analysis of the role of the Nigerian 
courts in mediating tensions that have emerged in the post-authoritarian transition 
period.  
   The  significance  of  the  post-authoritarian  role  of  the  judiciary  is  explored 
through the analysis of its mediation of crucial constitutional issues attached to the 
process of political change. Specifically, the chapter examines the jurisprudence 
emanating from the courts on some serious inter-governmental disputes as well as 
decisions that touch upon individual and collective rights particularly connected to 
the transition process. It finds that the judiciary has recently been the focus of 
both  national  and  international  attention  as  a  forum  that  offers  hope  for  the 
resolution  of  ongoing  disputes  and  contestations  in  the  public  arena.  Has  the 
judiciary been instrumental to furthering or impeding the transition to democratic 
rule, and respect for human rights and upholding the rule of law? What has been 
the  nature  of  judicial  intervention  in  ongoing  tensions  that  emerge  from  the 
interplay  of  a  centrifugal  federalism  and  dynamics  of  political  transition  in  a 
heterogeneous, resource-rich but impoverished polity? These questions constitute 
the foci of Chapter Four. 
   There is an incremental resort, by the political branches of government as well 
as  individuals,  to  the  judiciary  for  the  resolution  of  administrative  and  policy 
disputes  as  well  as  rights  claims  in  post-  authoritarian  transitions.  The 
examination of this phenomenon is the focus of Chapter Five. Progressing on the 
foregoing  theme,  it  is  argued  that  the  increasing  incidence  of  direct  judicial 
participation  in  policy-making,  in  transitioning  polities  in  particular,  further 
validates the case for institutional accountability of the judiciary (along with other 
institutions  of  the  state)  in  a  post-conflict  or  post-authoritarian  polity.  The 
argument is made that accountability of the judiciary for the past in transitions is 
crucial, in view of the increasingly decisive role the exercise of judicial power 
tends to play in policy-formulation and governance in the present.  
   Chapter Six presents a critical evaluation of the prevalence of the judicialisation 
of  politics  in  Nigeria.  The  chapter  highlights  public  as  well  as  institutional 
responses to this phenomenon as it takes centre-stage in the country’s transition to 
democratic  rule.  The  Nigerian  experience,  it  is  argued,  provides  contextual   15 
foundation for suggesting the need for more attention by legal theorists to the 
relevance of public opinion in theoretical analyses of the judicial function. Such 
closer attention, it is contended, can only enrich the legal academy. This account 
of the Nigerian experience also suggests that a number of situational dynamics, 
prominent among which is the ceding of power to the judicial branch by political 
actors for strategic reasons situate the judiciary as a powerful  force for social 
reconstruction,  entrenchment  and  stabilization  of  democratic  ethos  in  post-
authoritarian transitions.  
   It is important to make clear that this study does not generally take issue with 
the propriety of the judiciary taking on overly political questions, as does the work 
of some leading legal, political and constitutional theorists. If anything, it supports 
it particularly in the context of transitional societies. What it challenges is the 
narrower issue of the propriety of the judiciary taking on such a critical role in 
governance where it bears complicity for the authoritarian aspect of a society’s 
history for which it is not held accountable. As the preceding overview of the 
research  suggests,  the  challenge  derives  from  moral  as  well  as  transformative 
perspectives. The Nigerian experience of the pre- and post- authoritarian judicial 
role  in  governance  strongly  commends  the  view  that  accountability  of  the 
judiciary for the past at times of political change ought to form a critical and 
integral aspect of transitional justice processes. Such incorporation is crucial both 
for comprehensive institutional accountability and transformation. 
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Chapter One 
THE OPUTA PANEL: TRANSITION, TRUTH AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF 
THE JUDICIARY IN NIGERIA 
 
1.    INTRODUCTION 
   In many ways, Nigeria typifies the legacy of British colonialism in sub-Sahara 
Africa.  In  the  region,  the  country’s  heterogeneity,  deriving  from  its  colonial 
founding, is unique.  Nigeria’s huge natural resources have not been translated 
into  development  for  its  teeming  population.  Despite  being  one  of  the  first 
countries to gain independence in West Africa, it has had a severely chequered 
history of sustained development and democratic governance.  Most of its post-
independence experience of statehood has been under authoritarian military (mis) 
rule. Successive military regimes perfected plunder, compromised all institutions 
of state and generally directed them towards flagrant violations of human rights of 
the people.
 1 
    At the dawn of its transition to civil rule, the Federal Government of Nigeria 
attempted to engage with this past. The main mechanism for this purpose was the 
establishment of the Oputa Panel. A substantive overview of the state of Nigerian 
society  and institutions is required for setting out a situational context for the 
thesis on the salience of accountability of the judiciary for the past in societies in 
transition.  An  examination  of  the  truth-seeking  process  provides  a  composite 
overview of governance in the pre-transition period.    
   This chapter introduces the background to the truth-seeking process in Nigeria. 
The discussion draws attention to the formation, mandate and legislation of the 
Oputa Panel and its work. Special mention is made of the petition on the murder 
of Dele Giwa. This petition resonated during the life of the Oputa Panel and the 
litigation  that  arose  from  it  played  a  central  role  in  the  non-release  and  non-
implementation of its recommendations. The focus then turns to an analysis of the 
problems that challenged the work of the Oputa Panel. The chapter also provides 
an  evaluation  of  the  aftermath  of  the  truth-seeking  process.  The  discussion 
concludes that the truth-seeking process, like many others in transitioning polities, 
did  not  extend  its  focus  to  accountability  of  the  judiciary  for  its  role  in  past 
governance. The process thus left a significant gap in the accountability process 
for which truth-seeking was commissioned. 
                                                 
1 Foreword by the Chairman, Synoptic Overview Oputa Panel Report: Summary, Conclusions and   
Recommendations  (2004)  available  at:    http://www.nigerianmuse.com/nigeriawatch/oputa/  (13 
July 2008). The site also has the full report.   17 
 2.   THE CONTEXT 
   It has been recognised that complexities of the environment which led to the 
establishment  of  any  Truth  Commission  will  impact  on  how  that  commission 
addresses its mandate. Andrew argues that Truth Commissions not only produce, 
but are also products of ‘grand national narratives’ in the first place.
2 On this 
view, it is germane to examine the background to the establishment of any truth-
seeking process. In the context of this research, an examination of the context of 
the work of the Oputa Panel facilitates an understanding of the dynamics of the 
environment  within  which  it  carried  out  its  assignment.  This  understanding  is 
important to the case this research makes for the relevance of the inquiry into 
accountability of the judiciary for the past in transitioning polities.  
   Nigeria is a multi-religious and multi-ethnic country.
 3 It achieved independence 
from British colonial rule on 1 October 1960. On 15 January 1966, the country 
experienced a military take over that was followed by another, six months later. 
The events that followed the second military coup led to a thirty-month civil war 
from 1967 to 1970. Subsequently, the country was subjected to nearly thirty years 
of  authoritarian  rule  under  seven  military  regimes  and  numerous  failed  coup 
attempts. Military regimes in Nigeria commonly imposed emergency rule. Human 
rights abuses were prevalent.
4 The population suffered repression, state-sponsored 
murder, restrictions on civil liberties and other forms of human rights violations. 
There was widespread use of lethal force by security agents and the police against 
the  civilian  populace.  Cases  of  public  execution  in  defiance  of  due  process 
included that of Ogoni Rights activist and renowned author, Kenule Saro-Wiwa 
and some other members of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 
(MOSOP) referred to as the ‘Ogoni nine.’
5  
                                                 
2 M Andrews “Grand National Narratives and the Project of Truth Commissions: A Comparative 
Analysis” (2003) 25.1 Media, Culture and Society 46. 
3 There are reputedly over 250 ethnic groups in the country. See for example J Morris “Nigeria” 
available  at:  http://www.redress.org/studies/Nigeria.pdf  (10
  January  2006),  United  Nations 
Development  Programme  “General  Information:  Nigeria”  available  at: 
http://www.ng.undp.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=25 (14
 March 2006) and C 
Obiagwu and C A Odinkalu “Nigeria: Combating Legacies of Colonialism and Militarism” in A A 
An-Naim  Human  Rights  under  African  Constitutions:  Realizing  the  Promise  for  Ourselves 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 2003) 211 at 212.   
4 See generally note 2  supra.   
5  Amnesty  International  “Nigeria:  Time  for  Justice  and  Accountability”.  Available  at: 
http://www.amnestyinternational.org/library/print/ENGAFR440142000 (10 February 2006). For a 
more detailed account of the judicial murder of the Ken Saro-Wiwa and some members of the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) see A Maja-Pearce From Khaki to 
Agbada: A Handbook for the February 1999 Elections in Nigeria (Civil Liberties Organisation 
Lagos 1999) 12-17.   18 
   The  Hobbesian  dialectic  of  the  pre-social  contract  period  appeared  to  have 
found expression in the country in not a few instances. The rule of law took flight 
in  the  emergent  breakdown  of  law  and  order.  The  administration  of  General 
Abacha (November 1993-June 1998) gained notoriety for been the most brutish.
6 
The  rule  of  law  had  become  so  severely  compromised  that  Justice  Olajide 
Olatawura whose judicial career was largely spent under military authoritarian 
rule, observed that                 
               During the Military regime, the law became weak as a result of ouster  
               and suspensions of the constitution and existing laws which gave us  
               liberty and freedom. The constitutional duty to protect the liberty and  
               freedom of the citizens by the state was regularly breached by those  
   entrusted with that sacred duty…The rights of citizens were not only   
   ignored but trampled on.
7 
 
Significantly, he made this observation in his capacity as the Administrator of the 
National Judicial Institute, the body responsible for the continuing professional 
education of judges in the country shortly after the transition to civil rule in the 
country. The occasion was the most important annual convocation of Nigerian 
judges. Thus, the judiciary, as one of those ‘entrusted with that sacred duty,’ as 
would be argued in this research, was much implicated in and bears complicity for 
the violation of human rights and misgovernance in the country.  
   A  number  of  issues  call  for  accountability  of  the  judiciary  for  its  role  in 
governance during the authoritarian period. Thousands of citizens languished in 
prisons  awaiting  trials  for  years  on  remand  warrants  signed  by  judges.  The 
criminal justice administration system, of which the judiciary formed an important 
part, was in shambles. As will be seen in the admission of the judiciary in some of 
the cases discussed later in this thesis, civil matters sometimes took decades to get 
to conclusion.
 8 Many died awaiting justice without official acknowledgment or 
compensation. Military legislation made in violation of due process and human 
rights were validated by the judiciary. The military subverted and subjugated the 
                                                 
6 P C Aka “Nigeria since May 1999: Understanding the Paradox of Civil Rule and Human Rights 
Violations in Nigeria under President Olusegun Obasanjo” (2003) 4 San Diego International Law 
Journal 209, 223. 
7  Justice  Olajide  Olatawura,  retired  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Nigeria  and  erstwhile 
administrator  of  the  National  Judicial  Institute,  Welcome  Address  at  the  1999  All  Nigeria 
Conference of /Judges’ Conference (1 November 1999) in National Judicial Institute, 1999 All 
Judges Conference xxv (2000) quoted in O Oko “Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An 
Analysis of the Problems and Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria” (2006) 9 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 10, 11.    
8 See Oputa Panel Report Vol.3 Chapter 7, Oko supra at 39 and O Osinbajo “Lessons Learned 
about Fighting Judicial Corruption” in Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in Judicial 
Systems. (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2007) 146, 147.   19 
constitution and received judicial sanction in many cases. Thus, the judiciary was 
meant to respond to these and other allegations bearing on human rights violations 
and misgovernance. Significantly, the findings of the Oputa Panel supported the 
jurist’s observations yet the former neglected accountability of the judiciary for 
the past in the truth-seeking process.  
   On the economic front, the country’s dependence on oil had not helped matters. 
The  country’s  35.9  billion  barrels  of  proven  reserves  places  it  at  the  vantage 
position of being the largest producer of oil in Africa and tenth largest in the 
world.
9 Seizing on soaring oil prices in the late 1960s and early 1970s, successive 
military  regimes  quickly  shifted  emphasis  from  agriculture  to  crude  oil 
exploitation. The government replaced agriculture as the leading foreign exchange 
earner; a situation which has persisted since then. Crude oil has come to account 
for over 90% of the country’s total foreign earnings.
10 Most of the oil reserves are 
located within the country’s Niger Delta area, in the south. But most of the area 
lacked basic infrastructure.
11 It struggled with a myriad of problems.  In order to 
contain expressions of social discontent, successive military regimes in Nigeria 
militarised  the  Niger  Delta.  Ethnic  and  regional  militia  sprung  up  and  have 
remained in this area especially and the country as a whole. The ethnic militias 
mainly demand more autonomy for their respective areas in the virtually military 
unitarised federal polity. 
   The military hegemony regarded the country as ‘conquered territory,’ and its 
vast resources as ‘spoils of war.’
12 Under their reckless governance, the country 
transformed  rapidly  from  one  of  the  richest  nations,  to  one  of  the  poorest.
13 
Although  military  incursions  into  power  were  proclaimed  to  be  in  pursuit  of 
economic rectitude, unity and peace of the country,
14 arguably none of these was 
achieved by the numerous military regimes.
15 Rather, as will be discussed further 
                                                 
9  Energy  Information  Administration  Country  Analysis  Briefs:  Nigeria  available  at: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Nigeria/pdf.pdf   (13 July 2008) 4. 
10 World Bank  Nigeria Country Brief  available at:  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/NIGERIAEXTN/0,
,menuPK:368906~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:368896,00.html (13 July 2008).   
11 UNDP- Nigeria Niger Delta Human Development Report p.14 (United Nations Development 
Programme Abuja 2006) available at: http://hdr.undp.org/. (7 November 2006).  
12 Foreword by the Chairman note 1 supra at 2-3. 
13 Ibid. 
14 See for example the Coup speech that heralded the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida on 27  
August  1985  available  at  Againstbabangida.org:  http://againstbabangida.com/docs/ibb_coup-
speech.htm (7 November 2006) and G N K Vukor-Quarshie “Criminal Justice Administration in 
Nigeria: Saro-Wiwa in Review (1997) 8 Criminal Law Forum 87, 104. 
15 T I Ogowewo “Why the Judicial Annulment of the Constitution of 1999 is Imperative to the 
Survival of Nigeria’s Democracy” (2000) 44 Journal of African Law 135, 141   20 
in subsequent chapters, corruption was institutionalised by the military
16 and has 
remained  a  formidable  challenge  to  development  and  good  governance  in  the 
country.  
   Quite  apart  from  these  internal  factors,  the  Oputa  Panel  also  had  an 
‘international dimension’ to its establishment.
17 The violations of human rights in 
the country were incompatible with various international human rights covenants 
and instruments to which Nigeria was a party. During the military era, the country 
had ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
18 
and  the  International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights 
(ICESCR). Other international human rights instruments the country had signed 
up to and ratified included the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 
the  Convention  on  the  Elimination  of  Racial  Discrimination  (CERD),  the 
Convention  on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  Genocide,  the  Slavery 
Convention of 1926 and the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees.  
   The  country’s  obligations  to  investigate  and  compensate  victims  of  gross 
violations of human rights derived from the foregoing instruments and others, like 
the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officers and UN Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. At the regional 
level, the country was one of the first to sign and ratify the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights (African Charter).
19 Nigeria had signed the African 
Charter in 1982 and enacted it as municipal legislation in 1983.  In their combined 
effects, these instruments require that the country observes the highest standards 
of respect for individual, child, gender, solidarity and group rights among others. 
This contrasted sharply with the wanton disregard and violations of human rights 
that was a permanent feature of successive military regimes in the country.   
   At various times, the country came under international censure for its appalling 
human rights record. The UN Commission on Human Rights found ‘fundamental 
inconsistencies between the obligations undertaken by Nigeria under the covenant 
                                                 
16 The country ranked as the fifth most corrupt country in a worldwide survey of 85 countries in 
1998  during  the  last  few  months  of  military  rule.  Transparency  International:  Transparency 
International Corruption Index 1998 available at:  
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/1998/1998_09_22_cpi  (7  
November 2006). 
17Human Rights Violations Investigations Commission Report (Oputa Panel Report) Volume 2. 
18 Adopted 16 December 1966 and entered into force 23 March 1976 (1966) 999 UNTS 171.  
19  Adopted  27  June  1981  and  entered  into  force  on  21  October  1986  21  International  Legal 
Materials (1982) 58.     21 
to respect, promote, protect and ensure the rights guaranteed under the covenant 
and the implementation of those rights in Nigeria.’
20 From the prevailing state of 
affairs,  the  country  acquired  pariah  status  with  attendant  negative  economic, 
social and political consequences. 
   It  is  thus  understandable  that  a  groundswell  of  discontent  developed  against 
military regimes in the country particularly in the 1990s. In the summary of its 
Report, the Oputa Panel rightly noted that  
               It is in the struggle against military rule that the more immediate origin  
               of the Commission is to be sought, for the democratic struggle kept the  
               issue of arbitrary rule and state-sponsored violence, exemplified in many  
               cases by gross violations and abuses of human rights, on the agenda of  
               political discourse in the country…the military leadership and culpable  
               state functionaries must ultimately be held accountable…the transition  
               would be incomplete…if the past was not confronted.
21   
 
 3. THE OPUTA PANEL: FORMATION, LEGISLATION AND MANDATE 
   The mysterious death of General Sanni Abacha (then military Head of State) in 
June  1998,  translated  into  a  fortuitous  opportunity  for  new  beginnings  in  the 
country.  It  led  to  the  emergence  of  Abacha’s  Chief  of  Defence,  General 
Abdusalam Abubakar as the Head of State. The latter was unequivocal in his plan 
to return the country to civil rule without further delay. As an important part of the 
process, General Abubakar retired some
 prominent members of the military who 
had held political office
 and repealed a number of military decrees. The country 
also
 adopted a new constitution. 
   Nigeria  returned  to  civil  rule  on  29  May  1999,  following
  the  successful 
completion of the transition program initiated
 by General Abdusalam Abubakar in 
his less than one year in office. The handover ended years of
 authoritarian military 
rule and several aborted civil transition programmes. Chief Olusegun
 Obasanjo, a 
retired general and former head of state emerged as President. His election was 
accepted
 internationally, though largely criticized at home. It was felt that he was 
a candidate of the old guard in the military. The election was marred in some 
cases  by  fraud  and  it  received  knocks  from  local  observer  groups  and  few 
international ones too. His opponents headed for the courts though his victory was 
                                                 
20 Oputa Panel Report note 17 supra. Chapter 3, p. 12. Chapter 6 of the same volume provides 
concise  details  of  various  international  human  rights  over-sight  bodies’  findings  and 
recommendations  on  flagrant  human  rights  violations  in  the  country  (at  21-58).    See  also 
Economic and Social Council Commission on Human Rights Fifty-third session Items 8 and 10 of 
the provisional agenda E/CN.4/1997/62 (4 February 1997). 
21 Oputa Panel Report Volume 1 Chapter 2, 24   22 
upheld by the Supreme Court of Nigeria. It would appear the world was however 
relieved the military was on its way out and thus the relatively high support for 
the flawed elections. 
   With the advent of civil governance and democracy, it was only natural that 
some  measures  would  be  required  to  redress  the  serious  feelings  of  social 
discontent in the country. The truth-seeking process was the principal mechanism, 
the only other measure been the largely symbolic lustration of ‘political’ military 
officers. One of the very first executive declarations made by President Olusegun 
Obasanjo was his decision to set up a truth and reconciliation commission. The 
Human  Rights  Violations  Investigation  Commission  (the  Oputa  Panel)
22  was 
established by Statutory Instrument No.8 of 1999
23 under the hand of President 
Obasanjo. The statutory instrument was made pursuant to Tribunals of Inquiry 
Act (TIA).
24 The Oputa Panel’s mandate as amended was to: 
a)  ascertain or establish the causes, nature and extent of all gross violations of 
human rights committed in Nigeria between the 15
th day of  January 1966 and 
the 28
th day of May 1996; 
b)   identify the person or persons, authorities institutions or organizations which 
may  be  held  accountable  for  such  gross  violations  of  human  rights  and 
determine  the  motives  for  the  violations  or  abuses,  the  victims  and 
circumstances  thereof  and  the  effect  on  such  victims  and  the  society 
generally; 
c)   determine whether such abuses or violations were the product of deliberate 
state policy or the policy of any of its organs or institutions or whether they 
arose from abuses by state officials of their office or whether they were the 
acts  of  any  political  organization,  liberation  movement  or  other  groups  or 
individuals; 
d)  recommend measures which may be taken whether judicial, administrative, 
legislative or institutional to redress past injustices and to prevent or forestall 
future violations or abuses of human rights; 
                                                 
22 This is the official title adopted by the body and under which its report was submitted. Initially 
styled “The Human Rights Investigation Panel”, it was later renamed “The Judicial Commission 
for the Investigation of Human Rights Violations in Nigeria”. See Oputa Panel Report, note 17 
supra at 19.  
23 As amended by Statutory Instrument No.13 of 1999. 
24 No. 447, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990.    23 
e)  make any other recommendations which are, in the opinion of the Judicial 
Commission, in the public interest and are necessitated by the evidence; 
f)  receive  any  legitimate  financial  or  other  assistance  from  whatever  source 
which may aid and facilitate the realisation of its objectives.
 25       
   The Oputa Panel was initially to investigate human rights abuses from 1983 to 
1998. This initial mandate was viewed as limited and was strongly criticised by 
the human rights community, politicians and the public at large. It was viewed as 
been  unduly  restrictive  for  a  number  of  reasons.  These  included  the  fact  the 
mandate did not cover the period of Nigerian Civil War. It also excluded several 
periods of military rule. The Oputa Panel’s mandate was extended to cover the 
period from 15 January 1966 (when the first military coup took place) and 28 May 
1999 (the eve of the inauguration of the current civilian administration) itself. 
Further, the Oputa Panel also requested for the amendment to the original terms of 
reference  that  restricted  its  purview  to  ‘…all  known  or  suspected  cases  of 
mysterious  deaths  and  assassinations.’  The  inclusion  of  paragraphs  (e)  and  (f) 
above were also at the request of the Oputa Panel. These were with a view to 
ensuring  that  it  acquired  the  full-fledged  status  of  a  truth  and  reconciliation 
commission.
26  
   One important feature of the enabling statute of the Oputa Panel, the TIA, is that 
it gave the Oputa Panel coercive powers to subpoena witnesses and documents. 
The  Oputa  Panel  also  had  powers  to  order  the  arrest  of  any  individual  it 
determined was or had acted in contempt of the Oputa Panel. These powers, as 
will  be  highlighted  below  and  further  discussed  in  Chapter  Four,  led  to 
contentious  litigation  against  the  Panel  by  former  military  rulers  wary  of  the 
accountability process.  
3.1   A Truth Commission and Interpretation of its Mandate 
      At the inauguration of the Oputa Panel on 14 June 1999, President Olusegun 
Obasanjo  declared  that  it  was  established  to  demonstrate  his  administration’s 
‘determination to heal the wounds of the past… for complete reconciliation based 
on truth and knowledge of the truth in our land.’
 He went on to affirm that the 
government will do ‘everything possible to address all issues that tend to bring 
                                                 
25 Statutory Instrument No.8 1999 as amended by Statutory Instrument 9 of 1999. 
26 Oputa Panel Report, note 17 supra at 29-31.   24 
our  country  into  dispute,  or  perpetuate  injustice,  conflict  and  the  violation  of 
human rights.’ 
27  
   On its part, there is little doubt that the Oputa Panel viewed its status as one 
beyond  a  Commission  of  Inquiry  though  it  was  established  pursuant  to  the 
Tribunals  of  Inquiry  Act.  Thus,  while  addressing  the  issue  of  reparation  and 
compensation for victims, it expressly referred to itself as a ‘truth commission.’
28 
It  is  to  be  expected  that  the  mandate  of  any  commission  will  be  pursued  in 
accordance with the perception or interpretation of it by the members. The Oputa 
Panel viewed its key mandate as Reconciliation. In the words of the Chairman, 
‘Our quo warranto is the search for this reconciliation.’
29   
   Perhaps as  a result of the primacy placed on this reconciliatory posture, the 
Oputa  Panel  never  invoked  its  power  to  order  the  arrest  of  any  witnesses.  It 
maintained this position even when faced with the defiance of three past military 
rulers and some of their security chiefs to attend on its summons, a development 
that tested the will, if not the credibility of the Oputa Panel in the public eye. 
Ironically reconciliation was not a formal part of the Oputa Panel’s mandate. In its 
narrow pursuit of reconciliation, the Oputa Panel essentially allowed contempt for 
it own authority. Commendable as the approach may have been in principle, in 
practice,  it  left  the  process  open  to  criticism  regarding  its  effectiveness  and 
brought  to  the  fore  a  tension  between  reconciliation  and  accountability  that 
plagued the work of the body. The emphasis of the Oputa Panel on reconciliation 
notwithstanding, its terms of reference clearly required it to play a pivotal role in 
achieving truth and accountability for victims of gross human rights violations 
during the decades of military authoritarian rule. This aspect of its mandate, in 
spite of its reconciliatory posture was not lost on the Oputa Panel as reflected in 
the summary of its report.
30  
   The  Oputa  panel  was  expected  to  suggest  measures  for  deterrence  of  future 
violations  and  foster  restoration  of  the  rule  of  law  which  had  been  violently 
displaced during the years of military dictatorship. This can be ascertained from 
the  broad  terms  of  reference  that  mandated  the  Oputa  Panel  to  ‘recommend 
                                                 
27 “Address by His Excellency the President, Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces, Chief 
Olusegun  Obasanjo,  G.C.F.R  at  the  Inauguration  Ceremony  of  the  Human  Rights  Violations 
Investigations Panel on Monday 14 June 1999”.available at:  
http://ww.nopa.net/Useful_Information/Presidential_Speeches/14june99.html (26 February 2006)  
Emphasis mine.    
28 Oputa Panel Report, Volume 6, Chapter 1, 1.  
29 Synoptic Overview note 1 supra at 8. 
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measures  which  may  be  taken  whether  judicial,  administrative,  legislative  or 
institutional to redress past injustices and to prevent or forestall future violations 
or abuses of human rights.’ In this way, the framers of the mandate expected the 
Oputa Panel to recommend further investigations of alleged violations, as well as 
outright prosecution of alleged perpetrators of criminal violations of human rights. 
It did both, though more of the former than the latter. An analysis of the findings 
and recommendations of the Panel suggests it was caught between the desire to 
foster reconciliation - between persecutors and the persecuted - and the desire to 
achieve  justice  for  victims  of  impunity,  through  recommendations  of 
compensation and in some cases, criminal trials. 
   Expectations were high that the Oputa Panel would contribute extensively to 
social reconstruction in Nigeria. This was reflected in the Oputa Panel’s mandate 
which urged it to ‘make any other recommendations which are, in the opinion of 
the  Judicial  Commission,  in  the  public  interest  and  are  necessitated  by  the 
evidence.’ In pursuit of this, the Oputa Panel’s recommendations went beyond 
investigations  of  alleged  violations  of  human  rights  to  setting  an  agenda  for 
transformation of Nigerian society.  
   The  foregoing  suggests  the  truth-seeking  process  was  expected  to  make 
substantial contributions to the restoration and promotion of the rule of law in 
Nigeria following years of due process and human rights violations. The Oputa 
Panel on its part approached its mandate from a perspective that emphasised a 
broad  and  flexible  conception  of  its  terms  of  reference.  The  Oputa  Panel 
proceeded on the premise that the truth-seeking process provided an opportunity 
to lay the foundations for social reconstruction and reconciliation. But as would 
become obvious later, this aspiration was hardly met. With the notable exception 
of its lack of engagement with the issue of accountability of the judiciary for past 
(mis) conduct, the most decisive factor for this failure was a lack of sincerity on 
the part of the initiating regime in setting up the Oputa Panel.   
4. THE WORK AND FINDINGS OF THE OPUTA PANEL 
   The South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
31 by the Oputa Panel’s 
admission,  constituted  the  model  for  the  Oputa  Panel.
32  But  there  were 
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fundamental  differences  in  their  structures.  The  Oputa  Panel  did  not  have  the 
specialised units provided for by the law establishing the TRC, and through which 
it operated. It also worked as a ‘general purpose’ commission without the benefit 
of specialised committees. The Oputa Panel was not institutionally designed to 
play  a  critical  role  in  the  rehabilitation  of  victims  either,  though  a  liberal 
interpretation of the Oputa Panel’s mandate would have allowed for this. Nor was 
it granted the power of amnesty. However, a significant feature it did share with 
the South Africa TRC is the naming of alleged perpetrators of gross violations of 
human rights. 
  The  Oputa  Panel  received  over  10,000  petitions  within  a  few  months  of  its 
establishment;  evidence,  perhaps,  not  just  of  the  level  of  rights  violations 
committed during the period of military rule but also of the need of the Nigerian 
people for a truth-seeking process which would serve as a means for obtaining 
justice  and  redress  for  gross  violations  of  human  rights  by  the  state.  It  also 
demonstrated the widespread confidence with which people welcomed the Oputa 
Penal. The nature of the violations disclosed in the petitions centred principally on 
the right to life, the right to personal liberty and the right to human dignity.
33 In 
line with these criteria, petitions were further scrutinised to determine whether the 
alleged infringement was ‘gross.’ What constituted ‘gross violations’ of human 
rights  was  nowhere  defined  in  the  terms  of  reference  or  legislation  which 
established the Oputa Panel. The Oputa Panel had recourse among others to the 
definition of the term in section 1 of the South Africa TRC Act, international 
human  rights  instruments  and  the  Nigerian  constitution  which  guaranteed  the 
rights identified by the Oputa Panel as been in issue.  
   Constrained by factors like limited personnel, time and financial resources, the 
Oputa Panel decided to hear only 200 petitions at its public hearings. According to 
the Oputa Panel, the criteria for hearing the chosen petitions were consideration of 
the nature of the rights involved and the extent or degree of the infringement(s) 
alleged.
34 There was thus a great disparity between the petitions submitted to the 
Oputa  Panel  and  those  actually  heard  in  public.  While  the  number  of  cases 
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selected  for the public  hearings was limited, the Oputa Panel heard testimony 
from some 2,000 witnesses and received 1,750 exhibits related to these selected 
cases.
35 
   One  of  the  ways  the  Oputa  Panel  sought  to  deal  with  the  large  number  of 
violations that occurred during the period of authoritarian rule, was to commission 
research  reports  by  experts.  The  rationale  for  the  research  reports  was  the 
limitations  of  public  hearings  as  a  forum  to  ventilate  the  scale  of  the  gross 
violations of human rights that had taken place in the country in a period covering 
over three decades. The research work by experts was also expected to provide a 
valuable background of human rights violations in the country and thus assist the 
Oputa Panel to contextualise its work. The research reports played an important 
part in the work of the Oputa Panel. We consider them in some detail below.
36 
   However, it is important to observe that virtually all Truth Commissions in the 
past and present have been inundated by thousands of petitions through which 
they sift and most drastically prune down the number they actually take on. The 
need to eliminate repetitive petitions for more representative and ‘serious’ ones 
are  cited  in  justification  of  the  process  of  ‘scaling  down.’  Thus  discretion,  a 
feature of every criminal justice system in the world rears its head in the truth 
telling process as well. However, not much of an issue has been made of it by 
proponents of the latter mechanism.
37  In the discharge of its mandate, the Oputa 
Panel  organised  public  hearings,  as  the  platform  for  ventilation  of  various 
violations of human rights and the misuse of state powers in the years of military 
rule in Nigeria. It is to these that we should now turn.  
4.1   Public Hearings: General  
   The  public  hearings  of  the  Oputa  Panel  were  of  two  types.  There  was  the 
general or ‘zonal’ public hearing which was geared towards giving a voice to 
victims of rights violations who may otherwise remain voiceless. These were held 
in five notable zonal capitals and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.
38 There 
were also the special or ‘institutional’ hearings. The sessions of the Oputa Panel 
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were held in public between 24 October 2000 and 9 November 2001
39 (its work 
lasted  three  years,  three  weeks  and  6  days  in  total).
40  There  was  considerable 
national coverage of the public hearings of the Oputa Panel by the media. The 
most popular public and private television stations in the country provided daily 
coverage  of  the  public  hearings  shortly  after  they  began.  The  public  hearings 
acquired the status of a popular national ‘soap,’ generating intense public interest. 
Nigerians were ‘glued to their television sets five nights a week, stunned by their 
country’s sordid past dragged before the commission.’
41 Suffice to say that the 
press coverage was acknowledged and strongly commended by the Chairman as a 
major contributor to the ‘success’ of the Panel.
42  
   Although  the  findings  of  the  Oputa  Panel  on  the  petitions  it  heard  were 
contained in its final report, it also made some preliminary findings at its public 
hearings. These were usually in cases where it demanded further investigations 
into  violations  of  human  rights  bordering  on  criminal  culpability  of  security 
agencies. Remarkably however, not in one instance did the Oputa Panel engage 
with accountability of the judiciary in this way. 
   President Olusegun Obasanjo appeared twice before the Oputa Panel. His first 
appearance was as a victim. The second was on the summons of the Oputa Panel. 
He was required to respond to allegations of human rights violations during his 
tenure as military Head of State. His obvious discomfiture on the latter occasion 
not withstanding, it gave impetus to the proceedings of the Oputa Panel.  
   Victims of rights violations included the first executive president of the country, 
Alhaji Shehu Shagari. He ruled the country between October 1979 and December 
1983.
43 It is noteworthy that he was not summoned to appear before the Oputa 
Panel as no petition was filed against him.
44 The visibility of the Oputa Panel 
grew with petitions and testimonies of leading lawyers, former political officer 
holders (who fell into the bad books of the military), and civil society leaders. 
Others  who  came  before  the  Oputa  Panel  included  human  rights  advocates, 
leaders of workers unions and students, all of whom were active in the movement 
against military rule. Many had one experience of gross human rights violations to 
share.  
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   According to the Oputa Panel, the causes of the human rights violations were 
neither ‘simple’ nor ‘straightforward.’
45 The violations were allegedly perpetrated 
by the army, the security agencies and the police.
46 There were some instances of 
corporate  or  individual  violations  of  rights  too.  In  some  cases,  unpopular 
economic  policies  precipitated  the  deprivation  of  the  right  to  life.  This  was 
manifested  in  the  shooting  and  killing  of  demonstrators  at  public  protests,  a 
common incidence in the 1990s, when military rule was at its most atrocious in 
the country. By the time it left office, the military establishment had instituted a 
‘vicious  cycle’  of  violence  exhibited  in  domestic  violence,  armed  robbery, 
brigandage, religious riots, impunity and lawlessness in the polity.   
4.2   Public Hearings: Special and Institutional 
   Paragraphs b and c of the terms of reference of the Oputa Panel provided ample 
basis  for  institutional  hearings  along  with  public  hearings  that  centred  on 
individual complaints. Thus, there were also ‘special’ hearings organised for civil 
society,  human  rights  groups  and  specialised  professional  organisations.
47  The 
special and institutional public hearings featured submissions from the National 
Human Rights Commission, the Armed Forces, the Police, State Security Service, 
the Nigeria Prisons, about ten civil society and human rights organisations and a 
few individuals.
48  
   The  choice  of  state  institutions,  with  the  notable  exception  of  the  National 
Human Rights Commission, may have been informed by the popular view that 
they constitute notorious sources of human rights violations. The National Human 
Rights  Commission  for  its  part  was  set  up  precisely  to  monitor  human  rights 
implementation in various aspects of national life, ironically by the Abacha junta 
noted  for  its  record  of  gross  human  rights  violations.  In  view  of  their  close 
connection  with  the  judiciary,  particularly,  the  criminal  justice  system,  it  is 
instructive to examine the special hearings on the prisons and the police.   
4.2.1   The Prisons 
 The  Oputa  Panel’s  special  hearings  on  the  Nigerian  Prisons  were  based  on 
submissions made by the Prisons Service and non-governmental organisations. 
The major sources and nature of human rights violations in Nigerian Prisons are 
succinctly  articulated  in  the  submission  of  the  Nigerian  Prison  Service  to  the 
Oputa Panel  
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               …under the conditions of chronic prison congestion, perennial neglect  
               of the services and delay in justice delivery, certain basic rights of  
               prisoners are violated. The right to life and integrity of the person, to  
               health and respect for human dignity are largely un-guaranteed.
49 
     
The Nigeria Prisons Service, like many other civil institutions of the Nigerian 
society, suffered serious neglect during the period of military rule. New prisons 
were not built for decades. Yet, as mentioned earlier, there was a phenomenal 
increase  in  the  number  of  inmates,  especially  suspects  awaiting  trial.  Prison 
authorities lacked medical facilities and were required to seek leave of the military 
authorities before obtaining medical attention for inmates. On many occasions, 
inmates died before such clearances were obtained.
50 
   Illegal detention was the order of the day. Suspects awaiting trial not only out-
numbered convicts, but many had to wait for over ten years for trial.
51 Detained 
persons lacked practically every basic necessity required for day-to-day living.
52 
In  addition,  juveniles  were  lumped  with  adult  detainees  and  suffered  similar 
deprivations.
53  The  special  needs  of  female  detainees  were  not  met.  Their 
reproductive rights were violated in addition to the violations suffered by their 
male  counterparts.  Some  female  inmates  had  babies  in  custody.  Some  were 
sexually assaulted.
54 
4.2.2    The Police 
   In similar vein, the special public hearings on violations of human rights by the 
Police formed an important aspect of the Panel’s work. The Oputa Panel found 
that there is an historical perspective to human rights violations by the Nigerian 
Police.  The Nigeria Police Force was a creation of colonial hegemony. It was 
designed as an agent of repression and coercion. The research report on the Police 
found that in furtherance of the colonial divide and rule system, the recruitment 
policy  was  to  employ  individuals  to  police  ethnic  groups  whose  language  the 
policemen  did  not  understand  and  who  were  in  fact  historically  hostile  to  the 
latter’s places of origin.  
   The inherited recruitment strategy effectively secured the loyalty of the Police 
as an occupational force, rather than one for social service. At independence, the 
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national  government  found  it  expedient  to  maintain  the  status  quo.
55  This 
impacted negatively on police-public relations. The Police had continued to act as 
an imperial force. A careful audit of the petitions on violations of human rights by 
the Police, notably on extra-judicial killings, revealed that most policemen alleged 
to have been involved, were indeed from ethnic groups different from those of 
victims.  
   Further,  the  incorporation  of  some  police  officers  by  the  early  military 
administrations into governance, as a matter of political expedience, also played a 
notable  role  in  police  violations  of  human  rights.  However,  the  relationship 
between  the  military  and  the  Police  went  awry,  with  the  latter  becoming  the 
under-dogs.  The  Police  as  an  institution  was  neglected  by  successive  military 
regimes just as its officers were no longer included in the distribution of plum 
political  positions.  The  Police  was  starved  of  funds,  training,  promotions  and 
development.  In  frustration,  the  Police  took  vengeance  against  the  civil 
populace.
56  
   Violations  of  rights  by  the  Police  included  illegal  arrests,  detention  without 
trial,
57  and  various  forms  of  torture  in  the  course  of  investigations  to  elicit 
‘confessions.’
58 Extra-judicial killings of suspects in custody, hapless motorists, 
passengers and pedestrians on the roads, were also common.
59 In the course of the 
public hearings, the Oputa Panel found the Police were in the habit of killing 
people unlawfully and in the bid to cover up, they usually alleged such victims 
were armed robbers.
60 The Oputa Panel identified several structural factors that 
predisposed the Nigerian Police to gross violations of human rights.
61 Notable 
among  them  were  laws  which  precluded  judicial  review  of  executive  action, 
corruption, low qualification requirements for enrolment and deficient training. 
4.2.3   Mind the Gap: Whither Accountability of the Judiciary? 
  As stated earlier, the absence of accountability of the judiciary for the past was a 
marked feature of the truth-seeking process in Nigeria. Despite the close working 
relationship between the institutions which were subjects of the special hearings 
of the Oputa Panel, it did not advert to the need for including the judiciary in 
those  hearings.  It  is  important  to  note  in  this  regard  that  there  were  obvious 
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references to the judicial role by the respective institutions involved in the special 
hearings.  
   It was impossible for example to discuss the work of the prisons and the police 
without reference to the role of the judiciary in the criminal justice system. In fact, 
as stated above with reference to the Prisons, the hearings revealed that delays in 
the  criminal  trial  process  were  implicated  in  the  congestion  of  the  prisons. 
Awaiting-Trial inmates (in their tens of thousands), far out-numbered convicts 
and were all remanded on the orders of judges and magistrates. This was largely 
responsible for prison congestion and in turn, the deplorable state of custodial 
facilities. It was also a notorious and acknowledged fact that criminal and civil 
trials (and appeals) went on in many cases for years and sometimes decades, a fact 
that was readily acknowledged by the judiciary and to which reference will be 
made later in this research.
62  
   Apart from the foregoing, there are the more fundamental matters of judicial 
acquiescence to and legitimation of military usurpation of power, constitutional 
distortions,  gross  misgovernance  and  violation  of  human  rights  also  discussed 
later  in  this  research.
63  Thus,  it  was  logical  to  expect  that  the  truth-seeking 
process, on what went wrong in the polity, could only be regarded as complete 
and  objective  if  it  focused  on  the  judiciary  as  an  important  institution  of 
governance during the authoritarian period under review.  
   However, the Oputa Panel scarcely made reference to the role of the courts in 
the violations of human rights in the country. It failed to engage with the judicial 
function in governance during the decades of authoritarian military rule. As will 
be  argued  later,  the  judiciary  wielded  considerable  and  continues  to  exercise 
immense  powers  in  governance  as  the  third  arm  of  government.  The  lack  of 
reference  to,  or  engagement  with  the  judicial  institution  in  the  period  of 
authoritarian rule in Nigeria created a glaring accountability gap with regards to 
that  key  institution  of  state.  It  is  a  neglect  which  has  become  (with  few 
exceptions), a recurring feature of transitional justice processes. In the Nigerian 
context, the failure of the Oputa Panel in this regard, in virtually karmic style, has 
continued to haunt the Oputa Panel itself.  
   Specifically, it is a major factor that has ensured the report of the Oputa Panel 
remains suspended in an undesirable and undeserved limbo. How this has worked 
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out will be discussed briefly below
64 and in further detail in the course of this 
research.
65 Beyond the later uncomfortable interaction between the truth-seeking 
process and the judiciary, it will be argued that the deficit in accountability of the 
judiciary  has  continued  to  haunt  the  judicial  function  and  its  attempts  at  self-
redemption  in  particular,  and  the  post-authoritarian  governance  and 
democratisation in general.
66 
4.3.   The Three ‘Rs’: Reparation, Restitution and Reconciliation 
   Justice Oputa made the important observation that while establishing the Oputa 
Panel the government appeared to have been more interested in finding out the 
truth  and  facilitating  reconciliation.  At  least,  President  Obasanjo  emphasised 
reconciliation  in  his  speech  at  the  inauguration  of  the  Oputa  Panel.  A  close 
reading  of  the  Oputa  Panel’s  mandate  clearly  envisaged  it  would  focus  on 
discovering  the  truth  and  it  can  be  imputed  that  the  remit  did  not  rule  out 
reconciliation measures too. The Oputa Panel however noted that the demands by 
almost  all  the  victims  at  the  public  hearings  made  it  imperative  that  the 
government    should  allocate  some  resources  to  the  three  ‘Rs,’  Reparation, 
Restitution and Reconciliation.
67  
   In the Panel’s opinion, it was not possible to achieve national reconciliation in 
the complete absence of some measure of reparation. It found that in the aftermath 
of  widespread  gross  violations  of  human  rights,  victims  usually  demand 
reparations to assist them to get on with their lives.
68 A ‘modest payment’ at least, 
represents  a  form  of  ‘acknowledgement’  and  ‘official  apology’.
69  While 
acknowledging  the  difficulties  associated  with  achieving  reconciliation  at  the 
individual  level,  the  Panel  outlined  at  least  ten  steps  that  are  relevant  to  the 
process: 
               i. Revealing the truth 
               ii. Acknowledging the harm done 
               iii. Showing remorse for the pain suffered by the victim                
               iv. Apologising for the wrongs done 
               v. Holding perpetrators accountable 
               vi. Healing the injuries caused 
               vii. Rehabilitating those with disabilities 
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               vii. Restitution and rehabilitation for wrongs that can not be replaced 
               ix. Forgiveness and closure by victims 
               x.  Preventing  future  occurrences  through  establishing  institutional 
reforms.
70 
   According  to  the  Oputa  Panel,  the  relationship  between  reparation  and 
reconciliation  is  so  important  that  the  latter  can  not  be  achieved  without  the 
former.
71 Beyond this utilitarian function of reparations, the dictates of justice for 
victims require it.
72 The Oputa Panel noted that reparation is ‘part of what needs 
to  be  done  to  earn  justice.’
73  It  may  involve  restitution,  compensation  and 
rehabilitation,  as  may  be  appropriate  to  the  particular  circumstances.  Another 
dimension to it is what the panel termed ‘Non-Monetary Reparation’ which is 
essentially ‘satisfaction and guarantee of non-repetition.’
74 
   The Panel examined the law and practice of the right to reparations in several 
countries.
75 In affirming the need for reparations, the Panel cited the fact that it is 
a right recognised and imposed on the state for victims of gross human rights 
violations under international law. Nigeria had acceded to various international 
treaties  which  provide  for  the  right  to  reparations  and  is  bound  to  fulfil  its 
contractual obligations under them.
76 The Panel considered the nature and scope 
of the duty.
77 It also noted that Nigerian municipal law (especially torts) and the 
constitution similarly provide for the prevention, abatement of, and damages for 
rights violations.
78  
   The  Oputa  Panel  presented  a  ‘policy  framework’  for  Nigeria’s  reparation 
programme. For the Panel, the wishes of victims ought to be a guide on the form 
reparations should take. However, while many petitioners stated the relief they 
sought,  a  significant  number  did  not.
79  The  Panel  further  considered  whether 
violators of human rights should be made to pay reparations to victims of gross 
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violations of human rights.
80 It however, only recommended that the government 
should compensate victims.  
   The  work  of  the  Oputa  Panel  saw  it  traverse  the  length  and  breadth  of  the 
country to investigate gross violations. Its activities centred on establishing the 
truth  about  the  people’s  lives  under  the  military  jackboot.  During  its  public 
hearings, the Oputa Panel actually accepted invitations to mediate in on-going 
conflicts in the country, achieving some remarkable success in the endeavour. The 
reconciliation  brought  by  the  Oputa  Panel  to  the  hitherto  intractable,  almost 
century  old,  internecine  dispute  between  the  people  of  Ife  and  Modakeke 
communities  in  the  South-West  of  the  country  stands  out  in  this  regard.  The 
‘Ogoni Peace Accord’ between the two factions in Ogoniland which was widely 
reported  and  commended  as  a  ‘landmark  achievement,’  was  another  good 
example of this aspect of the Oputa Panel’s work.
81  
   As  stated  above,  the  Oputa  Panel  was  greatly  assisted  by  the  work  of 
commissioned experts in its bid to obtain a fuller picture of the extent of human 
rights violations in the  country. The reports of the research offer  a composite 
picture of the spread and nature of human rights abuses in relation to specific 
geographical areas of the country. Their relatively wider reach than the public 
hearings of the Oputa Panel offered more comprehensive insights into the extent 
of gross violations of human rights during the authoritarian period in Nigeria. It is 
thus germane to consider this aspect of the truth-seeking process for the way it 
strengthens  the  case  for  accountability  of  the  judiciary  for  past  governance  in 
Nigeria’s transition experience. 
4.4   The Research Reports: Giving Voice to the Voiceless 
  For purposes of the research, the country was divided into geo-political zones. 
The six zones, North-East, North-Central, North-West, South-East, South- South 
and South-West (each comprising six states), have since acquired semi-official 
recognition in the Nigerian polity.  
4.4.1   The North-East and North-West 
   The  research  report  on  the  North-West  and  the  North-East  showed  that  the 
nature  and  pattern  of  gross  human  rights  violations  in  the  two  zones  were 
similar.
82 There were common incidence of compulsory acquisition of land from 
individuals  and  communities  by  the  state  and  ‘powerful’  individuals,  without 
                                                 
80 Ibid. Chapter 1 at 3-4. 
81 See for example ‘Editorial: The Ogoni Peace Accord’ The New Nigerian (Kaduna, Nigeria 16 
February 2001) 
82 Oputa Panel note 68 supra Chapters 1 and 4    36 
consultation  or  compensation.  Unlawful  arrests,  detentions  and  extra-judicial 
killings  by  the  Police  and  other  security  agencies  of  the  state  constituted  the 
predominant features of rights violations in the two zones.     
   Arbitrary  dismissal  and  retirement  of  workers  by  government  without 
appropriate compensation, discrimination against ‘non-indigenes’ and extortion of 
peasant  farmers  by  traditional  rulers  were  also  frequent.
83  The  Oputa  Panel 
emphasised the need to thoroughly investigate the cases to establish ‘who played 
what role’ and the need to either restore illegally acquired land or ensure payment 
of adequate compensation.
84  
4.4.2. The South-South 
   The South-South zone covers the states of the Niger Delta. As noted above, the 
zone  produces  the  oil  that  constitutes  about  90%  of  the  country’s  foreign 
exchange earnings. But it lacked basic infrastructure like electricity, health care 
facilities,  potable  water,  roads  and  unemployment  was  high.  As  noted  by  the 
Oputa  Panel,  ‘it  is  this  paradox  and  apparent  tragedy  that  forms  the  political 
economy of human rights violations in the area.’
85 The nature of gross violations 
of rights in the area varied from the right to life, social rights, cultural rights, to 
environmental  rights.  But  most  human  rights  violations  in  the  Niger  Delta 
involved communities.
86 A classic example is the environmental degradation of 
Ogoniland  and  violation  of  group  rights  in  the  oil  producing  community.  The 
situation  in  Ogoniland  attracted  international  attention  and  was  subject  of  The 
Social  and  Economic  Rights  Action  Centre  for  Economic  and  Social  Rights  v 
Nigeria
87 a communication to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.  The  applicants  alleged  that  the  oil  exploration  activities  of  Shell  have 
caused  environmental  degradation  and  health  problems  resulting  from  the 
contamination of the environment among the Ogoni People.
88 
   The research also identified multinational oil corporations as one of the major 
culprits for the deplorable state of affairs in the Niger Delta. This is especially 
with regard to ecological devastation and degradation occasioned by their neglect 
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of international standards in oil exploration activities.
89 Deep-seated feelings of 
alienation  and  neglect  led  to  the  emergence  of  ethnic  and  minority  groups 
agitating for the rights of the peoples of the area. The response of the Nigerian 
military-dominated political scene was to unleash repression on the leaders and 
members of such groups.  
   The  Oputa  Panel  concluded  that  the  extent  of  the  crisis  and  human  rights 
violations  in  the  Niger  Delta  was  so  profound  that  it  ‘touches  on  the  moral 
conscience  of  the  Nigerian  state.’
90  Despite  the  damning  situation,  researchers 
confronted  apathy  from  some  respondents.  There  was  the  preference  in  some 
quarters  to  forget  the  past.  The  Oputa  Panel’s  researchers  also  confronted  the 
challenge of bureaucratic responses from government agencies and officials and 
inadequate information in respect of rights violations during the Nigerian civil 
war.
91  
4.4.3   The North-Central  
   The research conducted on human rights violations in the North-Central zone 
revealed  that  contestations  over  traditional  institutions  and  practices,  land, 
resources,  systemic  deprivation  and  discrimination,  feelings  of  marginalisation 
(indigene, non-indigene dichotomy) and neglect were the major sources of human 
rights violations. So were the excesses of law enforcement agents and partisanship 
on the part of public office holders in the discharge of their duties.
92  
   It emerged that strong attachments to traditional institutions and practices were 
at the root of violent riots and conflict across religious and ethnic divides. There 
were also numerous cases of discrimination against women, deprivation of child 
rights, ethnic and tribal minorities as well as other vulnerable groups in various 
communities in the zone. The researchers also found that due to the dearth of civil 
society  and  pro-democracy  groups  in  the  zone  (agitating  for  human  rights)  in 
comparison with others, there were few cases of state sponsored extra-judicial 
killings.  
   However,  the  zone  had  its  ‘fair  share’  of  ‘state  terrorism’  in  the  number  of 
military officers and civilians executed for alleged coup plots.
93 Uniquely, one of 
the  states  in  the  zone,  Kogi,  submitted  a  memorandum  to  the  Panel  alleging 
deliberate neglect and marginalisation by the federal authorities. It demanded a 
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ten-year ‘federal equalization development plan’ to redress the situation.
94 There 
were  many  instances  of  overzealousness  and  abuse  of  office  by  public-office 
holders in the zone too. A curious instance was the state-ordered arrest of 27 
school children for jubilation at the reported death of the country’s most notorious 
ruler.
95  
4.4.4    The South-West 
   In the South-West, the research reviewed 568 cases of human rights violations. 
The  research  report  on  the  zone  relied  substantially  on  data  garnered  from 
secondary sources. These included media reports, annual reports of official bodies 
and non-governmental organisations. It also benefited from informal sessions with 
some human rights organisations.  
   Violations  of  the  right  to  life  and  respect  for  human  dignity,  freedom  of 
expression,  social  and  economic  rights  all  featured  prominently  in  the  report. 
Extra-judicial  killings  and  alleged  state-sponsored,  politically  motivated 
assassinations were markedly common in the zone from 1984 to1999, the second 
spell  of  military  rule  in  the  country.  Extra-judicial  killings  were  allegedly 
perpetrated  largely  by  the  police  and  other  security  agencies  in  the  course  of 
official engagements or otherwise. Politically motivated murder was directed at 
various leading political figures.
96 Virtually all such cases remain unresolved to 
date. In some cases perpetrators have not been identified. In others, they have not 
been prosecuted, despite identification. In yet others, the prosecutions have been 
stalled. Notable in this last category is the trial of some very high-ranking military 
officers for murder and attempted murder of some leading political figures in the 
zone.
97 
   Cases of unlawful arrest and detention as well as inhuman treatment, brutality, 
torture (sometimes resulting in death) and extortion were also recorded. In the 
zone, renowned for its vibrant media, freedom of expression came under severe 
attack during the long years of military rule. The violations in this regard ranged 
from arrests and detention of journalists, arraignment for serious but unfounded 
offences, arson attacks on media houses, to proscription of publications.  
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   Periods of military organised political transition programmes were particularly 
traumatic in the zone. A crisis was engendered by the death of Chief MKO Abiola 
in custody in 1998 following the annulment of the presidential election he had 
won.
98 
   On  the  economic  and  social  fronts,  workers  were  victimised  for  their 
membership  of  workers’  unions  and  some  were  illegally  dismissed.  Also,  the 
introduction of high school fees, violations of academic freedom, deterioration in 
educational  facilities,  forceful  evictions  as  well  as  demolition  of  homes  and 
shelter of the poor without alternative accommodation or compensation, all made 
the list of violations of human rights in the zone. As in some other parts of the 
country, many cases of rights violations were not reported for fear of reprisals. 
This was also due to ignorance, poverty, or sheer apathy.  
4.4.5   The South-East 
   The report on the relatively homogenous South-East zone cited the Nigerian 
civil war as the major ‘backdrop’ for analyzing human rights violations in the 
country in  general and  the zone in particular.  The Oputa Panel noted  that the 
research report on the zone relied mainly on secondary sources (books and panel 
of enquiry reports), a fact that raised some concerns on its objectivity.
99 
   The principal complaints on gross violations of rights in the South-East zone 
were  essentially  of  a  group  nature.  They  were  either  in  connection  with  the 
conduct  of  the  civil  war,  to  which  the  zone  was  theatre,  or  the  aftermath.  A 
common complaint was that of marginalisation. It was alleged that the federal 
government actively pursued a programme of exclusion and marginalisation of the 
zone, in virtually every aspect of national life and socio-economic development.  
   At  the  individual  level,  violations  of  the  right  to  life  and  fair  hearing  were 
reportedly the most common. On this score, the complaints followed the pattern in 
the other five zones of the country, principally the South-West. Thus, the report 
cited a number of cases of extra-judicial killings, unlawful arrests and detentions, 
extortion and labour related violations.
100 
   It is important to note that the report of the research experts that worked for the 
Oputa Panel as incorporated into its recommendations, as well as those arising 
from  the  public  hearings,  have  however,  hardly  been  subject  of  positive 
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government action. This is connected with the Dele Giwa petition which led to 
litigation that seriously challenged the work of the truth commission in Nigeria. 
 
5.  THE  DELE  GIWA  PETITION:  TRUTH-SEEKING  AND  THE  JUDICIARY  IN  NIGERIA’S 
TRANSITION 
   It is relevant to comment briefly on the petition on the murder of Dele Giwa at 
this point. An analysis of the litigation it generated constitutes a case study of a 
tension  that  exists  between  truth-seeking  processes,  the  judiciary,  and  judicial 
accountability  for  the  past  in  transitions.  These  are  issues  at  the  core  of  our 
research  and  will  be  more  fully  examined  later.
101  However,  it  is  germane  to 
examine the public hearing of the petition at the Oputa Panel in as much as it 
relates to laying out the context of the research. Of all the petitions heard at the 
public hearings, the Dele Giwa murder-petition was the most controversial. Dele 
Giwa was a prominent and fearless journalist, editor and publisher of Newswatch, 
a  leading  newsmagazine  in  Lagos.  He  was  allegedly  murdered  by  military 
intelligence through a letter-bomb on the orders of the General Ibrahim Babangida 
then Head of state, on 19
 October, 1986. Efforts by his solicitor, Gani Fawehinmi, 
to investigate and prosecute those responsible were frustrated by the military.
102 
   The struggle to establish the truth about the murder shifted to the Oputa Panel 
following the inauguration of the Oputa Panel. Fawehinmi submitted a petition 
against General Babangida and his two security chiefs in which he made a case 
for  the  matter  to  be  reopened.  The  Oputa  Panel  issued  summons  for  the 
appearance  of  the  ex-Military  ruler  and  his  two  security  chiefs  accused  of 
complicity in the matter. None obeyed. Rather, the trio went to the High Court 
with an ex parte application to restrain the Oputa Panel from summoning them.  
   This led to the case, Gani Fawehinmi, Justice Chukwudifu Oputa (Rtd.) and 
Human  Rights  Violations  Investigation  Commission  v  General  Ibrahim 
Babangida, Brigadier Halilu Akilu and Brigadier Kunle Togun (the Oputa Panel 
Case).
103 The generals sought, among other things, a declaration that the President 
lacked the powers to act under the existing law to establish a body like the Oputa 
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Panel for the whole country. They also asked the court to stop the Oputa Panel 
from exercising the power to summon them. They claimed it contravened their 
right to liberty. 
   Meanwhile, a legal team applied to represent the generals at the Oputa Panel’s 
public hearing. That did not go down well with the Oputa Panel. Fawehinmi and 
other counsel also opposed their appearance. The contentious issue was whether 
the Oputa Panel, acting under Section 5 of the TIA, had the power to issue and 
serve summonses on three ex-military rulers. Could a summoned witness who 
failed to appear give evidence by proxy, namely through legal counsel? Whether 
having disobeyed the summons to appear in person, could they be  allowed to 
cross examine witnesses of the Oputa Panel? The foregoing questions tasked the 
Oputa Panel. The TIA did not provide for proxy representation of witnesses.  
   If  the  settled  position  of  the  law  (at  least  in  common  law  jurisdictions)  on 
witnesses in civil and criminal litigation can be extrapolated, legal counsel can not 
take the place of witnesses. In other words, testimony is a personal issue that can 
not  be  delegated  and  stands  apart  from  the  right  to  legal  representation.  This 
position is consistent with practice elsewhere. For example Legal Notice No.5 of 
1986 in Uganda which created the country’s second Truth Commission provides 
that ‘…any person desiring to give evidence to the Commission shall do so in 
person’.
104 Not only would it have undermined the rule of law to hold otherwise, 
it arguably would have amounted to a fundamental contradiction in terms in a 
truth  telling  process  for  alleged  perpetrators  of  rights  violations  to  testify  by 
proxy. 
   In  addressing  the  matter,  the  Panel  framed  a  single  issue  to  be  addressed: 
whether  proceedings  before  a  truth  commission  constituted  a  suit  at  law  or  a 
judicial  proceeding?  The  Oputa  Panel  decided  that  personal  attendance  of  the 
summoned generals was required for the proper fulfilment of the Oputa Panel’s 
mandate.  Specifically, the Panel in its ‘ruling’ insisted that witnesses were bound 
to attend in person in order to be entitled to the rights of legal representation, and 
(cross) examination.  
   Although many petitioners or witnesses were represented by counsel, they were 
in attendance to be examined themselves. Justice Oputa emphasised that military 
officers were not above the law. The Oputa Panel also took the position that a 
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proceeding  before  a  commission  of  its  nature  did  not  constitute  adversarial 
proceedings.  For  failing  to  appear,  the  Oputa  Panel  recommended  that  the 
generals be deemed to have forfeited their right to govern the country in future.
105 
The strong determination of the generals not to appear before the Oputa Panel 
introduced a twist to the truth-seeking process in Nigeria from which it never 
recovered.  
   Contestations around the legality of the Oputa Panel in various suits and appeals 
on them, instigated by the generals in their attempt at self preservation, introduced 
another dimension to the operation of Truth Commissions in transitional societies. 
They brought to the fore the tensions that may arise between the truth-seeking 
process and the judiciary in transition. They also offer valuable insights on some 
of the consequences of the accountability gap for the conduct of its role in the past 
on the part of the transitional judiciary. The Supreme Court decision in the matter, 
delivered well after the submission of the Panel’s Report, forms the bedrock of 
government’s decision not to implement the recommendations of the Oputa Panel.  
   The Supreme Court held that the President lacked the powers to set up a body 
like the Oputa Panel with a remit that extended to the whole country to enquire 
into  human  rights  violations.  Further,  it  held  that  the  powers  of  the  Panel  to 
summon  the  Plaintiffs  were  a  violation  of  their  right  to  liberty.  As  will  be 
discussed in greater detail later in this study, the decision of the Supreme Court 
placed premium on the rights of the generals to liberty. This was to the detriment 
of and disregard for the wider rights of victims of gross human rights violations to 
truth and acknowledgement of their suffering under the country’s laws and its 
treaty obligations under international law referred to earlier.   
 
6.    PERCEPTIONS: THE OPUTA PANEL AND THE PUBLIC 
   The  Nigerian  public  seemed  to  have  viewed  the  Oputa  Panel  as  more  of  a 
juridical forum, than an unencumbered avenue for investigating the past. This is 
reflected in the fact that so many petitioners, respondents and witnesses, were 
represented by legal practitioners at the public hearings. The ‘crème de la crème’ 
of the Nigerian legal profession attended the proceedings on behalf of clients.  
   Thirty  three  Senior  Advocates  of  Nigeria  are  on  record  to  have  represented 
petitioners and witnesses at the public hearings. The list included the foremost 
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legal practitioner in the country at the time, Chief Frederick Rotimi Williams. 
Over  four  hundred  lawyers  also  appeared  before  the  Panel.  Although  a  few 
attended on summons of the Panel (some law officers) most appeared on behalf of 
clients.
 106 Even those who took serious exception to participating in the public 
hearings (sections of the elite who felt threatened by the truth) ensured appearance 
by legal proxy. Prominent in that category were three former military Heads of 
State and some key military security functionaries.
107 This juridicalisation of the 
truth-seeking process in Nigeria may not be unconnected with the composition of 
the Panel itself. Not only was it headed by one of the most brilliant and well 
respected  jurists  in  the  country,  almost  half  of  its  membership  were  legal 
practitioners. One of these was a reputable Senior Advocate of Nigeria. 
   But  an  overt  juridicalisation  in  appointment  to  the  membership  of  a  truth-
seeking  process  fosters  a  sense  of  adversarial  contestation.  This  does  little  to 
advance the core function of the truth-seeking process, a search for the truth. If 
anything, it may detract from it. In recognition of the heavy presence of legal 
practitioners at the public hearings, lead counsel to one of the former military 
rulers (General Ibrahim Babangida, who defied the summons of the Panel thrice 
over), observed that ‘the atmosphere at the panel was too adversarial.’
108 This is 
despite the fact that he did himself appear with a battery of lawyers and made a 
case  to  cross  examine  witnesses,  while  not  presenting  his  client  for  similar 
purpose.  Notwithstanding  the  juridicalisation  of  the  Oputa  Panel,  it  made  far 
reaching recommendations for achieving justice for victims of gross human rights 
violations, reconstructing the society and restoring the rule of law in Nigeria.    
 
7.    RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE OPUTA PANEL 
   The general tenor of the Oputa Panel’s recommendation was for institutional 
transformation.  This  was  with  particular  reference  to  the  Prisons,  Police,  the 
security  agencies  and  the  Armed  Forces.  Law  enforcement  and  state  security 
services should be given a re-orientation to recognise and accord citizens their 
human rights as a matter of course. It called for the introduction of human rights 
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awareness  training  for  the  Police  and  other  security  agencies.  To  combat  the 
appalling  human  rights  record  of  the  Nigerian  Police,  the  Oputa  Panel 
recommended structural reforms in the nation as a whole. As part of the initiative 
towards institutional transformation, it called on the National Assembly to repeal 
all obnoxious legislation in the country and facilitate law reform.  It advocated 
institutional  reform  of  the  Police  and  legislative  initiative  to  ‘promote  police 
effectiveness, civility and accountability, and reduce police violation of human 
rights.’
109  
   Disturbed by the spate of deaths in custody, the Oputa Panel recommended the 
establishment of an autonomous inquest system to investigate deaths in custody. 
This is presently still missing in the prison system. It proposed the establishment 
or  designation  of  separate  detention  facilities  for  persons  waiting  trial  and  a 
powerful autonomous monitoring agency to oversight all custodial centres. The 
Panel  called  for  a  viable  prison  decongestion  programme  and  provision  of 
adequate medical facilities in the prisons. It concluded that the reformation of the 
criminal  justice  system  as  a  whole  was  the  only  way  to  secure  the  rights  of 
detainees.
110      
   It  suggested  lustration  and  disbarment  from  public  office,  of  those  found 
culpable of gross violations of human rights.
111 The state should take steps to 
compensate  victims  of  rights  violations,  and  investigation  and  prosecution  of 
culpable officials should be undertaken where appropriate. Apart from financial 
and  material  reparations,  it  also  recommended  that  government  carries  out 
symbolic reparations for victims. These could take the form of public holidays 
and establishment of monuments in recognition of the violations they suffered.  
   The Panel specifically recommended demilitarization of the South-South zone, 
compensation for victims of rights abuses including families of victims of the civil 
war  and review of the  regulatory  framework  for the oil industry.  This  was in 
addition to its advocacy for a ‘locally driven’ comprehensive plan to develop the 
zone.
112 
   One  of  the  general  recommendations  of  the  Oputa  Panel  was  the  need  to 
integrate  human  rights  education  into  the  academic  curricula  at  all  levels  of 
education in the country. It called for the promotion of human rights studies to 
promote inter-ethnic harmony. The Oputa Panel also recommended measures to 
                                                 
109 Oputa Panel Report note 93 supra Chapter 4 at 241.  
110  Oputa Panel Report note 93 supra Chapter 4 at 202-207. 
111  Ibid. at 45-51 
112 Ibid. at 64-66.    45 
address the imbalance in Igbo representation at all levels of national life. This was 
necessary to assuage feelings of discrimination and marginalisation of the zone. 
    The  Oputa  Panel  further  recommended  a  re-conceptualisation  of  what 
constitutes  human  rights  violations  in  the  country.  In  apparent  reference  to 
political  and  civil  rights,  it  criticised  what  it  viewed  as  an  over-emphasis  on 
‘elitist- driven’ notions of rights like freedom of speech, association and so on, on 
the part of rights advocates and activists.
113 It called on human rights activists to 
devote reasonable attention to the advocacy and defence of economic, social and 
cultural  rights.  The  call  was  important  considering  that  social,  economic  and 
cultural rights unlike civil and political rights are still non-justiciable in Nigeria.   
It is relevant to note at this point that apart from the Oputa Panel Case, the truth-
seeking  process  in  Nigeria,  like  others,  did  not  go  without  its  fair  share  of 
challenges and problems. It would have been unusual otherwise, given its terms of 
reference  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other,  the  tendency  for  virtually  every 
human endeavour to be subject to challenge.  
 
8.    CHALLENGES TO TRUTH 
   The task of truth commissions involves an interrogation of the past and making 
value judgments. This expectedly attracts challenges of various types. In the case 
of the Oputa Panel however, there were some avoidable problems thrown in its 
way from its inception. This part will examine the challenges faced by the Truth 
Commission in Nigeria other than the litigation on its legality and powers which 
will be considered later. 
 8.1. Composition of the Panel 
   As stated earlier, the seven-member panel was headed by Chukwudifu Oputa, a 
retired and respected Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria. That from the onset 
gave the panel much credibility amongst a highly sceptical populace as to the true 
intentions of the new government. However, the composition of the panel was 
strongly challenged for been unrepresentative of the heterogeneous nature of the 
country.  Some  segments  of  the  country,  specifically  the  Muslims  (North  and 
South)  felt  alienated  by  the  constitution  of  the  membership.  Although  Rev. 
Matthew Kukah, a Catholic priest, is a minority Christian from the North, he was 
viewed  as  a  vociferous,  anti-establishment,  anti-Muslim  socio-political 
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commentator and opinion leader. Oputa himself is a Catholic from the South East 
and four of the other five members were Christians. The secretary, though not 
regarded as a member, was a Christian. Only one member was confirmed to be a 
Muslim.   In a country where more than half the population is Muslim, and where 
religion  is  a  sensitive  and  divisive  issue,  that  was  problematic.  Moreover, 
considering  the  size  of  the  country,  the  scope  of  the  mandate  and  the 
heterogeneous  nature  of  its  population,  a  seven-member  panel  was  rather 
restrictive. It was not sufficient to effectively cover the shades of interests in the 
country.  
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  Oputa  Panel,  following  pre-commencement 
deliberations with civil society groups, specifically requested an increase in the 
number  of  its  Commissioners  but  this  was  not  implemented.
114  Voicing  the 
feelings of the northern Muslim elite, Mohammed Haruna, a seasoned journalist, 
media and public affairs commentator, faulted the lopsided composition of the 
Oputa  Panel.  He  dismissed  the  Oputa  Panel  as  a  witch-hunt.  The  Panel’s 
‘unrepresentative  composition,’  Haruna  argued,  was  responsible  for  its 
highlighting  the  complaint  of  some  petitioners  while  neglecting  others.
115  The 
Nigerian  government  did  not  pay  any  serious  heed  to  the  concerns  expressed 
about the composition of the Oputa Panel.  
8.2   Timing, Commencement and Resource Constraints 
   The Oputa Panel was established by President Olusegun Obasanjo in June 1999 
barely  two  weeks  after  he  had  assumed  office.  This  was  similar  to  the  Truth 
Commission in Argentina set up by President Raul Alfonsin a few days after he 
assumed office in December 1982.
116 At the time, President Obasanjo was highly 
commended  by  one  of  his  otherwise  ardent  critics,  humanist,  playwright  and 
Nobel Laureate, Prof. Wole Soyinka who enthused 
   Obasanjo has got this one right. Its timing is laudable – human rights 
               commission, truth tribunal or whatever it is as we have repeatedly  
               stressed, is the priority of priorities after the experience under recent  
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               dictatorships.
117 
  
  With the benefit of hindsight, such optimism now seems misplaced and this 
early promise by the Nigerian government to facilitate justice and reconciliation 
through a truth commission now appears suspect. By comparative standards the 
Nigerian truth commission was a modest undertaking, yet the Oputa Panel was 
poorly funded. As such, it took over a year before the Oputa Panel began sitting, 
and at one point it was forced to practically suspend its work because of financial 
difficulties.
 118 In fact, it was only able to commence work with a take-off grant of 
$400, 000 by the Ford Foundation as the Federal Government failed to make any 
budgetary allocation for it in its first year of operation.
119 
   Haruna contends that  there was deliberate financial strangulation in order to 
ensure the Panel became a political weapon in the hands of the President against 
potential  contenders  for  the  presidency  in  the  2003  elections.
  120  Whether  the 
under-funding of the Oputa Panel occurred with deliberate political motives in 
mind is impossible to establish, however, largely as a result of this lack of funds 
the Oputa Panel was unable to submit its report until May 2002; barely ten months 
before the 2003 elections. There may therefore be some substance in Haruna’s 
charge  that  ‘Obasanjo  created  [the]  Oputa  [Panel]  essentially  for  politics  and 
vengeance.’
 121 The submission of the Panel’s report was effected only ten months 
to the 2003 general elections for which the incumbent had signified his intention 
to re-contest.  At least two notable ex-military rulers had also openly declared 
their interest in the presidency. These were Generals Buhari and Babangida who 
had openly contested attempts to have them testify before the Oputa Panel.  
      Subsequent events in the Nigerian polity seem to support the view that the 
truth-seeking process was set up essentially as a talk-shop. The Oputa Panel for its 
part did a commendable and largely well received job. While it is important to 
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note that the work of the Panel assisted the bid to legitimise the post-authoritarian 
civilian administration, any other successes recorded by the process would appear 
to  have  been  overshadowed  by  the  failure  of  the  Obasanjo  administration  to 
implement its recommendations.  
8.3 Doubtful Legal Basis  
   Unwillingness to cooperate with the Oputa Panel by alleged violators ought to 
have been anticipated.  It has been recognised in any case that prosecuting the 
military for past human rights violations is fraught with serious difficulties. The 
associates of the slain journalist, the press and the Nigerian public in general, have 
insisted  on  the  implementation  of  the  recommendation  that  the  truth  on  the 
circumstances  of  Dele  Giwa’s  death  be  established,  and  those  involved  in  the 
murder brought to justice. Their position has remained fortified by the fact that 
over  two  decades  after  the  dastardly  act,  the  witnesses  and  suspects  are  all 
alive.
122  
   Truth  Commissions  have,  as  in  this  case,  been  known  to  recommend  the 
prosecution  of  former  military  leaders  for  human  rights  violations.  Such 
recommendations  resulted  in  the  prosecution  of  erstwhile  military  officers  of 
juntas in Latin America. This reality has obviously remained stark in the minds of 
General Babangida, other ex-military leaders in Nigeria and their cohorts hence 
the resistance to an already shaky attempt to call them to account.  
   On  this  issue  of  shaky  legal  foundations  of  the  truth-seeking  process,  it  is 
significant that Justice Oputa made a demand following the inauguration of the 
Oputa Panel for a tailor-made legislation for the HRIVC. His call went unheeded. 
It is not clear why he back-tracked on the issue and proceeded on what turned out 
to be a shaky foundation for such a crucial engagement. The work of the Oputa 
Panel was affected by the fact that it was not established pursuant to a tailor-made 
law by the post-authoritarian parliament. Rather, it was established under existing 
legislation designed essentially for specialised inquiries and which stopped short 
of the more extensive remit of Truth Commissions. This was probably a trap. The 
lesson to be learnt is not to proceed with the delicate process of truth-seeking 
without specific ‘made-to-fit’ legislation. Such legislation is required to clearly 
spell out the powers and limits of the process.  
  8.4   Feeble International Support 
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   The Oputa Panel did not generate much international interest. While there may 
have been some international attention in the initial stages of the Oputa Panel, this 
did not translate into positive advantage for the Panel’s work and was certainly 
not sustained during its most crucial stages. For example, the non-implementation 
of the final report and recommendations, including reparations for victims, has 
hardly attracted international censure. Likewise, the Oputa Panel received neither 
the  attention  nor  support  of  the  official  organs  of  the  United  Nations,  unlike 
previous  domestic  truth-seeking  initiatives  elsewhere.  The  exception  to  this 
international  ‘blackout’  was  the  financial  lifeline  extended  by  the  Ford 
Foundation, which provided the Oputa Panel with a start-up grant when funding 
from the government was not forthcoming. 
   Although now  a matter for conjecture, it is  quite plausible that international 
attention, monitoring and support for the truth-seeking process in Nigeria may 
well have changed the course of its work. If the international spotlight had been 
focused  on  the  work  of  the  Oputa  Panel  and  its  constraints,  all  arms  of 
government, particularly the executive and judiciary, would likely have been more 
proactive in ensuring the Oputa Panel’s success, knowing that it would constitute 
a  litmus  test  for  the  commitment  and  sincerity  of  the  Obasanjo  regime  to 
democratic values and the rule of law. Unfortunately, the important moment of 
transition now appears irretrievably lost. 
 
9.   THE AFTERMATH: TRUTH IN LIMBO 
   The Obasanjo administration garnered positive public acclaim when it set up the 
Oputa  Panel.  The  work  of  the  Panel  has  been  described  as  ‘so  thorough,  so 
profound, so well-conducted, so conclusive and so painstaking that it probably 
had  no  rival  in  the  country’s  history’.
123  In  similar  vein,  President  Obasanjo 
commended the Oputa Panel for its job well done, noting that the public hearings 
had the strong potential to serve as a deterrent to the violations of human rights in 
the country.
124  
   However,  till  the  end  of  its  tenure,  the  Obasanjo  administration  refused  to 
publish  or  implement  the  Oputa  Panel  Report.  Victims  have  remained 
uncompensated.  The  Obasanjo  administration  anchored  its  decision  on  the 
Supreme  Court  in  the  Oputa  Panel  case  mentioned  above.  The  issue  of 
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implementation  of  the  recommendations  of  truth-seeking  processes  is  multi-
layered and complex. Nonetheless, the refusal of the government to publish the 
report  of  the  Oputa  Panel  (which  it  had  in  fact  accepted  and  set  up  a  review 
committee  to  work  on  before  the  Supreme  Court  decision)  is  a  singularly 
significant one. Although the government maintained that it was constrained from 
taking the Report further as a result of the judgement
125 it failed to provide a basis 
for  its  decision  from  any  part  of  the  judgement.  Thus,  the  premise  for  the 
government’s position remains vague.  
   The  administration’s  refusal  to  publish  and  implement  the  Report  and 
recommendations of the Panel attracted widespread condemnation. The action of 
the government has been described as ‘one of the most unfortunate actions’ of the 
regime.
126  It  has  also  been  cited  as  one  of  the  country’s  attempts  at  political 
reform that has been dumped midstream.
127 Many groups and individuals have 
made repeated requests for the release and or implementation of the Report.
128 
The calls for positive action by the government have however been consistently 
ignored. Critics of the government position have noted that the Supreme Court did 
not ‘bar’ the government from releasing the Report.
129  
   There  is  no  unanimity  on  the  effect  of  the  Supreme  Court  judgement  on 
enforceability of the recommendations. While some agree that the decision may 
have  rendered  nugatory  aspects  of  the  recommendations  that  related  to  the 
plaintiffs,  they  contend  that  the  Supreme  Court  judgement  was  no  excuse  to 
‘suppress the truth.’
130 Others, including the President of the West Africa Bar 
Association,  insist  the  Supreme  Court  in  fact  endorsed  the  Panel  and  that  its 
creation  was  in  any  case  valid  under  international  conventions  to  which  the 
country  is  party.
131  Thus  the  government  ought  to  implement  the 
recommendations. The latter view would appear to be strengthened by the failure 
of the government to offer an explanation on the specific aspects of the judgement 
which prohibited it from publishing and implementing the decision. The failure of 
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the  Obasanjo  administration  and  the  continued  silence  of  the  successor 
government on the matter has been telling. The non release of the Report has been 
viewed  as  one  of  the  cardinal  reasons  for  the  continued  agitation  by  some 
segments of the country on a number of issues.
132   
   In  the  face  of  government  refusal  to  publish  the  Report,  some  civil  society 
groups, including one which consulted for the Oputa Panel, proceeded to publish 
it  on  the  internet.
133  Another  coalition  known  as  Civil  Society  Forum  has 
commenced the publication in bound form with the publication of ‘The Executive 
Summary, Recommendations and Conclusions.’ The group observes that in all 
events, the Supreme Court judgement does not bar publication of the Report.
134 
They consider that the people can find other ways of getting the recommendations 
of the Panel implemented, despite the intransigence of government. Organising a 
referendum on them is one such way. This informs their determination to ensure 
the full publication of the Report for mass education and action.
135 
   Since 1999, there has been an upsurge in violent property crimes and inter-
communal and ethnic conflicts in the country. The view has been expressed in 
some quarters that not only has the transition to democracy failed to deliver on 
justice and restoration of the rule of law, but that impunity and state-sponsored 
violence have remained unchecked, if not increased, in the country. 
136 Hopes for a 
new  dawn  in  the  wake  of  the  transition  have  gone  largely  unfulfilled.
137  The 
Nigerian government, in jettisoning the Oputa Panel Report with its wide-ranging 
recommendations  for  accountability  and  institutional  reforms,  has  likely 
contributed to the current state of affairs. 
   On the whole, it  can  nonetheless be  fairly asserted that in the pursuit of its 
mandate, the Oputa Panel did a commendable job of seeking to establish the truth 
about  the  course  of  executive  and  legislative  governance  in  the  pre-transition 
period  in  the  country.    The  aftermath  of  the  truth-seeking-process  in  Nigeria, 
particularly as it relates to the non-implementation of the recommendations of the 
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Panel, strikes an observer as an inherent defect that undermined its well-received 
work.  
 
CONCLUSION 
   The work of the Oputa Panel provides ample justification for its establishment. 
The popular acclaim it received testifies to its relevance and acceptability as an 
apposite  transitional  justice  measure  in  post-authoritarian  Nigeria.  However,  a 
combination of factors, including poor planning and deficit of sincerity on the part 
of the government that established it, as well as lack of political will, played out to 
frustrate transitional justice efforts in the country.   
   It  has  been  argued  that  Truth  Commissions  face  two  types  of  challenges: 
avoidable  and  inherent.  The  former  derive  from  issues  surrounding  their 
establishment, conduct and follow up, while the latter has to do with the very 
nature  of  the  enterprise.
138  The  search  for  truth  and  reconciliation  in  Nigeria 
through the Oputa Panel suffered a fundamental set back in its lack of tailor-made 
legislation.  
   One of the crucial issues that ought to be addressed by such legislation, as the 
legal  challenge  to  the  Oputa  Panel  showed,  is  the  jurisdictional  scope  of  the 
process  within  a  federal  polity  like  Nigeria.  The  incident  of  power-sharing 
between the central and state governments dictated the need for legislation that 
validly defined the scope of the powers of a truth commission.  This is critical 
where the truth commission is established by a central government with limited 
territorial and issue-jurisdiction, characteristic of federal polities. It is significant 
to note in this respect for instance, that state governments had powers similar to 
that of the president to establish a commission along the lines of the Oputa Panel 
in their states under various (though similar) Tribunals of Inquiry Laws.   
   It will be argued, essentially on consequentialist grounds, that the neglect of 
accountability of a public nature for the judicial role in the period of authoritarian 
rule is fatal to the transitional polity. It will be contended later on, that neglecting 
accountability  of  the  judiciary  as  an  integral  part  of  the  transition  process  is 
largely responsible for the ensuing state of judicial insensitivity to the dynamics of 
law and adjudication in such societies. As will become obvious from this study, 
the seeming faux pas in the conduct of the Nigerian truth-seeking process in this 
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regard, has serious implications for the important role the judiciary plays in a 
transitioning polity.  
   The negative impact of the unaccountability of the judiciary for past governance 
as part of a transitional justice process is more conspicuous in a society seriously 
challenged  by  a  legacy  of  dysfunctional  institutions.  The  fragile  institutional 
structures that characterise societies in transition engender substantial reliance on 
the judiciary as the major force to stabilise and foster the democratisation process 
and uphold rule of law. Such critical functions can only be appropriately taken up 
by  an  accountable  and  transformed  judiciary.  It  is  thus  to  the  case  for 
accountability of the judiciary in transitions that we should now turn.   
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Chapter Two 
THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN TRANSITIONS 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
   The discussion in Chapter One highlighted how the Oputa Panel  as a truth-
seeking process in the context of Nigeria’s transition failed to address the role of 
the judiciary in the period of military rule. The otherwise laudable work of the 
Oputa Panel left a critical gap in accountability  for misgovernance. While the 
Panel  conducted  a  laudable  enquiry  into  the  activities  of  the  executive  and 
legislature  as  constituted  at  various  times  by  a  number  of  successive  military 
regimes, it failed to engage with the role of the judiciary in governance in almost 
three decades of authoritarian rule. It was almost as if the judicial branch was in 
complete abeyance or indeed, non-existent in the country during the period. But, 
even as the special or institutional hearings of the Oputa Panel revealed, this was 
factually not the case. The current chapter argues a case for the judiciary to be 
made to give an account of its role in governance in the period of authoritarian 
rule through a truth-seeking process as part of transitional justice measures. This 
is  based  on  the  position  that  the  judiciary  as  the  third  branch  of  government, 
participates in governance at all times. 
   The gap in the conduct of the Oputa Panel earlier discussed raises the relevance 
of  accountability  for  the  judicial  role  in  past  governance  at  times  of  political 
change.  I  intend  to  critically  examine  the  salience  of  such  institutional 
accountability  in  this  study.  This  is  partly  because  the  Oputa  Panel,  as  a 
transitional justice measure, more specifically, truth-seeking process in  a post-
authoritarian context, is not alone. There is an existing gap in transitional justice 
research on the role of the judicial institution in governance in post-authoritarian 
societies. The present inquiry seeks to generate scholarly interest in an otherwise 
neglected aspect of transitional justice theory and state practice. The paucity of 
critical perspectives on the role of the judiciary during a society’s authoritarian 
period could lead to the view that it lacks a distinct role in governance. In the 
alternative, it suggests that the judicial function was inconsequential or judicial 
outcomes  were  invariably  imposed  during  the  relevant  period.  The  chapter 
attempts to address the  gap in existing transitional justice research on judicial 
governance  in  authoritarian  societies.  It  presents  a  general  case  for  judicial 
accountability  for  the  past  in  transitions.  Thus,  this  chapter  is  conceived  as  a   55 
theoretical  framework  for  the  case  for  accountability  of  the  judiciary  for  past 
governance. The framework developed here will be applied to the analysis of the 
Nigerian context in Chapter Three. 
    Historically,  Nigeria  started  out  its  post-independence  existence  as  a 
Westminster-type  political  arrangement  but  subsequently  translated  into  an 
American-styled federation. The course of governance (including the judicial) in 
the country has been shaped not only by its current political leanings, but also, 
historical antecedents. In view of these factors, comparative insights from both the 
British and American legal and political experiences are germane to a discussion 
of  Nigeria’s  judicial  institution.  Thus,  I  draw  on  Anglo-American  judicial 
traditions  and  experiences  in  articulating  the  case  for  accountability  of  the 
judiciary for the past in the context of the country’s transition. In this regard it is 
relevant to add that later parts of this thesis equally benefit from comparative 
insights. 
   In articulating a theoretical framework, the chapter considers two critical issues 
framed as queries. First, to what extent ought the role of the judiciary to be held 
up to public scrutiny as part of the transitional justice process? In the alternative, 
should it not be the case that the judiciary is held to account for its role in societal 
experience of gross violations of human rights and impunity? Secondly, what is 
the relevance of such inquiry? It is anticipated that the inquiry will unearth the 
significance of the role played by the judiciary in post-authoritarian societies in 
particular and rifted societies in general. Further, it should also throw some light 
on the circumstances underlying judicial choices in the task of adjudication. 
   The chapter locates uneasiness in the interaction of the truth-seeking process 
with  the  initiative  to  bring  the  judiciary  to  account  for  its  role  in  governance 
through a public mechanism. The uneasy relationship derives from reconciling the 
imperative of judicial accountability for the past with the important doctrine of 
judicial independence. There is the view that public accountability of this nature 
inherently challenges, if not critically subvert the integrity of the judiciary, one of 
the important institutions of the state (particularly in transitional societies). On the 
other hand, there is the position that non-accountability of any institution that was 
involved in governance, including the judiciary, weakens the viability of the truth-
seeking mechanism which in some instances (like the Nigerian situation), is the 
main agent for achieving transitional justice.  
   I  advance  the  argument  that  the  adoption  of a  course  of  action  which  takes 
cognisance of the context of societal transition is the appropriate approach. The   56 
strategy must also incorporate relevant principles of international law, especially 
rights  and  humanitarian  law.  This  course  of  action  will  smoothen,  to  a  large 
extent,  the  rough  edges  of  the  uneasy  interaction  between  accountability  and 
institutional  independence.  Perhaps  more  importantly,  the  approach  offers 
opportunity to transform and secure new legitimacy for the judiciary which has 
become complicit for misgovernance through quiescence to authoritarian military 
misrule.  
   Section II examines the nature of state powers and the role of the judiciary in 
governance.  Section  III  focuses  on  the  implications  of  accountability  of  the 
judiciary for the rule of law. Section IV argues the view that judicial governance 
constitutes a distinct mode of exercise of power and this provides justification for 
the  imperative  of  accountability  of  the  judiciary.  It  advances  a  case  for 
accountability  of  the  judiciary  for  its  past  role  in  governance  in  transitional 
contexts  with  particular  reference  to  post-authoritarian  societies.  The  analyses 
brings to the fore that public accountability of the judiciary for the past is a key 
factor in the aspiration for transformed and sustainable institutions of the state.  
 
2. STATE POWERS AND THE JUDICIARY  
   Governance has become one of the most complex problems of human existence 
in modern times. Wesson’s view that the complexities of governance constitute ‘a 
monumental short-coming’ that threatens all advancement in human development
1 
could be regarded as an overstatement of the dilemmas of power-politics. It is 
nonetheless a view that signposts the intricacies of the phenomenon of power in 
modern society. 
  State powers in legal and political conceptions are divided between the three 
institutions of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary.
2 According to one 
prominent  way  of  thinking,  government  as  delegated  powers  are  vested  by  a 
collective (the people) in the modern state. Thus, government is custodian of the 
common interest. The people however retain ‘popular sovereignty’ and demand 
accountability from rulers.
3  
   Any  institution  or  group  that  has  the  capacity  to  influence  how  others 
experience the ‘vulnerabilities’ of existence, both as individuals and groups, Poggi 
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notes, wield ‘social power.’
 4 This ability to change an existing state of affairs is 
the cardinal feature of power. It entails the capacity to have others act or refrain 
from acting in a particular manner. Power in our context is what MacCormick 
refers to as ‘power-in-fact’ as opposed to mechanical power that inheres in nature 
like the power of gravity or interpersonal power that is of a more esoteric nature, 
like charisma.
5 In the power game, there are different groups in active contest for 
dominance  each  utilising  specific  inherent  advantages  to  achieve  supremacy. 
However, the different power bases in the struggle to undermine the influence of 
others become constrained in that quest by certain self-limiting factors.
6  
   Notwithstanding the ‘self-limiting’ factor of the judiciary, namely that it does 
not  initiate  the  process  for  the  exercise  of  its  power,  contemporary  social 
experience clearly shows it is endowed with the resources with which it can and 
does influence society. Two contemporary examples lend credence to this view. 
One is the significant decision of the United States Supreme Court in Bush v. 
Gore
7  that  proved  decisive  in  the  election  to  the  coveted  position  of  the  US 
president  in  rather  controversial  circumstances.  The  other  is  the  same  court’s 
decision in Hamdan v Rumsfeld, Secretary of State for Defense
8 in which (by a 
slim majority of 5 to 4), it decried the Bush administration’s detention of ‘terror 
suspects’ in Guantanamo Bay. The US Supreme Court declared illegal, the plan to 
prosecute  them  before  military  commissions  under  the  Presidential  Military 
Orders 2001. The first secured George Bush’s entry into the White House on an 
otherwise shaky electoral victory. The other gave judicial fillip to international 
clamours for the release of the detainees in ‘Camp Delta,’ Guantanamo Bay. The 
US  Supreme  Court’s  decision  was  acknowledged  as  an  important  national 
complement  to  the  finding  of  the  UN  Commission  on  Human  Rights  that  the 
detention facility was illegal and should be closed.
9  
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Yale Law Journal 1407. 
8 126 S. Crt  2749 [2006]. 
9  United  Nations  Press  Release  “UN  Experts  Ask  International  Community  to  Aid  with 
Expeditious Closure of Guantanamo Detention Centre” (6 July 2003) available at:    58 
   It  is  pertinent  to  acknowledge  that  the  Bush  administration  continued  the 
detentions under the Military Commissions Act 2006 (clearly following the lead 
of the dissenting justices) that substantially validates the actions of the executive 
in Guantanamo Bay. But, quite apart from ongoing litigation challenging trials 
under the Act, it is noteworthy that the judiciary left the executive with no choice 
but to have recourse to the legislature in conformity with democratic principles 
and the rule of law. Many commentators have hailed Hamdan as a victory for the 
rule of law.
10   
   Nor are Bush and Hamdan isolated instantiations of the influence of judicial 
decisions on the course of societal action or power of the judiciary on society. 
There are other precedents perhaps with more resonance within American legal 
tradition in the same direction. Take Dred Scott v Sandford for instance.
11 The 
decision has been identified as one of the major precipitators of the civil war in 
that country, with significant historic consequences.
12 Another is Roe v Wade.
 13 It 
has been noted that support for or opposition to the decision in Roe continues to 
influence, if not define, the political fortunes of aspiring public office holders in 
the United States.
14  
   The foregoing highlights the fact that judicial decisions in specific cases affect 
not only the parties in litigation before the courts. They impact on others in the 
wider  society  who,  in  most  instances,  will  never  subject  themselves  to  direct 
jurisdiction of the courts by way of litigation. Judicial determinations affect civil 
rights, individual freedoms and property rights (at the micro-level) and influence, 
or  in  some  cases,  dictate  outright,  the  course  of  political,  social,  cultural  and 
economic  development  (at  the  macro-level).  It  has  been  recognised  that  when 
judges  ‘whisper,’  their  voices  are  ‘transmitted  through  a  thousand  amplifiers 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/CDAFC9022C2E0078C12571A30058B866?opend
ocument (22 October 2007).   
10 These include American Bar Association “Statement of Michael S. Greco, President, American 
Bar Association Regarding U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld” (29 June 2006) 
available  at:  http://www.abanet.org/op/greco/statements/hamdan.shtml,  Editorial  “A  Victory  for 
Law: The Supreme Court Checks the Bush Administration's Attempt to Invent its Own Rules for 
War” Washington Post (Friday June 30 2006) A26. See however D A Martin “Judicial Review and 
the MCA: On Striking the Right Balance” (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 344 
which examined the merits and shortcomings of the decision. 
11 60 US (19 How.) 393 (1857).  
12  For  a  recent  analysis  of  how  the  decision  impacted  on  US  legal  and  political  history,  see 
generally P Finkelman “Scott V. Sandford: The Court’s Most Dreadful Case and How it Changed 
the Course of History” (2007) 82 Chicago Kent Law Review 1. (‘…a catalyst in creating the crisis 
that would lead to Lincolns’ election, secession, civil war and the end of slavery’). 
13 410 US 113 (1973).  
14 Finkelman note 12 supra at 10.   59 
throughout the system.’
15 In that way the judiciary perforce plays a significant 
role in governance. It follows that the subversion of the judicial institution by 
incidence  of  social  dislocations  of  conflict  or  authoritarianism,  justifies  public 
scrutiny  in  post-authoritarian  contexts  not  so  much  as  an  indictment  on  the 
institution,  but  more  importantly,  to  draw  out  relevant  lessons  for  desired 
transformation.  
   It hardly stands to contest that the executive and legislature exercise political 
power. In similar vein however, the judiciary, in furtherance of its interpretational 
role  mediates  political  power.  In  the  mediatory  function,  the  judiciary  stands 
between the executive and the citizen in resolving conflicts in the same way it 
adjudicates between individuals. The judiciary is empowered to review the actions 
of  the  executive  to  determine  their  legality.
16  For  the  most  part  however, 
transitional  justice  research,  particularly  with  reference  to  institutional 
accountability,  has  focused  on  the  role  of  the  executive  and  the  legislature  in 
societies that have witnessed gross violations of human rights and impunity with 
scarce attention paid to the judicial function. Yet, so critical is the role of the 
judiciary in the exercise of powers in the modern state that ‘…a government is not 
a government without courts.’
17 
   Law, along with politics, according to Loughlin, constitute ‘critical aspects of 
the normative world that we have assembled for the purpose of living a relatively 
ordered existence and through which we are able to manage our differences.’
18 It 
follows that the institution charged with the interpretation of law plays a critical 
role in society. The nature of the role constitutes the judiciary as a major element 
in the machinery of the state. In that vantage position, Griffith notes, the judiciary 
‘can not avoid the making of political decisions.’
19 
   In  the  contemporary  period,  the  judiciary  is  constitutionally  established  as  a 
bulwark against executive arbitrariness and legislative excess.
20 The powers of 
judicial review of executive and legislative actions may however be limited by the 
historical and political specificities of the state. Thus, the normative jurisprudence 
                                                 
15 Barak “A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy” (2003) 116/1 
Harvard Law Review 19, 63.  
16 M Gleeson “Public Confidence in the Judiciary” (Judicial Conference of Australia, Launceston, 
27 April 2002) available at: http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/cj/cj_jca.htm   (7 March 2007) 5. 
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York Foundation Press Inc.  1973) 6 
18 M Loughlin Sword & Scales- An Examination of the Relationship between Law and Politics 
(Hart Publishing Oxford 2003) 31 
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of judicial review of executive and parliamentary actions in the federal political 
context of the United States contrasts with the more restricted approach to judicial 
review of legislative action in the unitary system of the United Kingdom. The 
attitude of the courts in the United Kingdom is conditioned by its deference to the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty. There is thus, some variation in the extent 
of  judicial  policy-making  powers  or  what  I  choose  to  refer  to  as  ‘judicial 
governance’
21deriving from historical and political factors.  
   Judicial power has been defined as the power which every sovereign authority    
must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between 
itself  and  its  subjects,  whether  the  rights  relate  to  life,  liberty  or  property.
22 
Judicial  powers  are  conferred  to  effect  peaceful  resolution  of  disputes  and 
adjudication of rights infringement, public and private. Conflict, with its positive 
and negative aspects, is endemic in human society
23 and so its resolution is of 
primary concern. So critical is the role of the judicial institution to society that it 
has rightly been argued that society ‘can not function’ in the absence of a dispute-
resolution institution.
24  
   In recent times, the powers of the judiciary have become incrementally visible, 
owing  particularly  to  the  ‘rights  revolution  of  the  twentieth  century.’  ‘Courts’ 
Loughlin affirms, ‘are becoming increasingly more important…their power has 
increased dramatically.’ The situation has led to concerns about ‘the emergence of 
government by judiciary.’
25 The growth of judicial powers in relation to the other 
arms of government has become more noticeable in the post-second world war 
period.
26 The growing importance of the judiciary should be expected granted that 
it is one of the institutions of the state; wielding some of the powers of the state in 
the task of ensuring ‘effective public regulation, equal liberty and social justice.’
27 
Such  considerable  powers  impact  on  all  aspects  of  societal  development  and 
interaction. It ought not to be left unaccounted for in the context of transitions.    
                                                 
21 This coinage differs ever so slightly from the recent reference to the same issue as ‘judicial 
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    Ogowewo advocates that the process of development of a state devolves not 
only on the executive and legislature, but also the judiciary. The executive and the 
legislature (even if with differing emphasis) have been viewed as prime movers of 
the process of development and assessed along those lines. But the role of the 
judicial institution as an integral part of and key contributor to governance and 
development has been largely unacknowledged and ignored.
28 This may be due in 
part  to  the  contestable  notion  that  it  is  the  least  ‘dangerous  branch  of 
government.’
29  The  lack  of  initiative  to  exercise  its  institutional  power  unless 
moved  by  an  aggrieved  party  may  be  another  contributory  factor.
30  Yet, 
dependent  on  socio-political  factors,  the  powers  wielded  by  the  courts
31  may 
expand  in  dimensions  that  substantially  ‘diminishes’  powers  exercised  by  the 
other two branches of government.
32  
   In a democracy, a correlate of the exercise of powers by any institution is the 
requirement of accountability. As Theberge argues with reference to the Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States,  the  immense  powers  wielded  by  the  judiciary 
necessitates  its  been  subjected  to  similar  objective  and  informed  scrutiny 
applicable to the executive and the legislative branches. This is more particularly 
pertinent in jurisdictions where judicial tenure is for life.
33 
   The exercise of power in democratic societies involves a measure of developing 
accounts. Such accounts serve to define the past and choices made in the course of 
it. An important utilitarian function of democratic accounting is the promise it 
holds for establishing trust between the people and the government.
34 Governance 
through authoritarianism (with the attendant incidence of egregious violations of 
human rights and the rule of law) results in social displacement and distortions 
between  the  government  and  the  governed.  It  is  accordingly  arguable  that 
comprehensive accountability in the transition to democracy and the rule of law is 
a key requisite for addressing the resultant disequilibrium in society. 
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   Pound’s
35 concise but incisive contribution on the concept of judicial power is 
as apt today as it was over eight decades ago when it was made. For him, the 
principle  of  separation  of  powers  does  not  require  a  water-tight 
compartmentalisation of the three arms of government, even in a federation like 
the United States. In spite of this, commenting on what the role of judges ought to 
be in society, he insisted that ‘Courts cannot be made tame  cats either of the 
executive or the legislative power except as they themselves yearn for a warm 
place by the fire.’
36 Such ‘yearning’, even where reasonably suspected, ought to 
be subject of some accounting, much as executive and legislative (mis) actions 
are.   
   In discussing judicial accountability, the system of appeals to superior courts no 
doubt constitutes a form of accountability of the judiciary, and some argue an 
adequate one at that.
37 Appeals as a form of accountability may be sufficient in 
societies where the rule of law is entrenched with a well developed democratic 
culture. This is particularly the case in view of the existence of other forms of 
public accountability like congressional hearings, professional censor and critical 
media focus. All of the foregoing no doubt play crucial roles in ensuring public 
engagement  with  the  judiciary  in  particular  and  government  in  general  in 
advanced and stable democracies.
38 
   Some  factors  may  however  militate  against  appeals  as  an  adequate  form  of 
judicial accountability. The complex web of legal processes, social and economic 
costs of litigation,
39 absence or inadequacy of legal aid, and the limitations of 
educational development in developing countries in general (by and large the sites 
of transitional justice processes) and Nigeria, in particular suggest the need for an 
alternative  system  of  checks  directly  and  easily  accessible  to  the  public  at 
transitional  moments.  Further,  it  is  plausible  to  argue  that  the  fundamental 
premise  of  the  appeal  paradigm  as  well  as  the  other  forms  of  judicial 
accountability referred to above above, is the presumption of democracy and good 
governance,  the  absence  of  which  is  precisely  in  issue  in  post-authoritarian 
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societies.  Authoritarian  rule  is  not  noted  for  tolerating  such  refined  and 
sophisticated mechanisms for accountability. Mechanisms for the accountability 
of state institutions were either muted, barely in existence or completely absent. 
Given that state of affairs, it is apposite in the context of transition to adopt other 
mechanisms like the truth-seeking process to secure accountability for the judicial 
role in the past. 
 
3. JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 
   The ability of citizens to enforce their rights against the state (as well as other 
individuals) is critical to the modern conception of the rule of law.
40 The case for 
accountability of the judiciary is reinforced by this need since the judicial function 
is central to the realisation of the right. There must be no doubts as to the integrity 
and  commitment  of  the  judicial  institution  to  ensuring  the  rule  of  law  in 
furtherance of the public interest and popular sovereignty. 
   Under the concept of popular sovereignty, the three arms of government hold 
power as agents of the people.
41 The US Supreme Court in the classic formulation 
of  this  view  of  sovereignty  in  Marbury  v  Madison,  Secretary  of  State  of  the 
United States
42 asserted that the people possess an incontestable right to determine 
the course of their future governance.
43 The will of the people is not only supreme 
but dictates the powers of the different arms of government and delineates the 
limits of those respective powers.
44 The foregoing understanding of the rule of 
law adopted in this study, as against other contending views,
45 assumes a more 
relevant position in societies in transition from an authoritarian past, where there 
is predictably, a common aspiration for societal rebirth. There is usually an urgent 
need  for  across-the-board  reconfiguration  of  state  institutions  and  public 
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participation in social reconstruction to forestall a return to authoritarianism or 
even conflict.  
   Transformation of the judicial agency is central to the repositioning of rule of 
law as a beneficial rather than exploitative principle for the organisation of society 
as a whole. It is certainly the case that some understandings of the rule of law 
were deployed by erstwhile tyrannical regimes in the exercise of power. This was 
certainly  the  case  in  Nazi  Germany,  apartheid  South  Africa  and  authoritarian 
military regimes in Africa and Latin America. In each case, specific instrumental 
understandings  of  law  were  deployed  to  foster  morally  and  democratically 
unacceptable  policies  of  discrimination  and  gross  violations  of  human  rights. 
Discrimination  laws  for  example  were  institutionalised  in  Nazi  Germany  and 
apartheid South Africa and held out as legitimate.    
   It would appear that a conception of the rule of law that emphasises or relies on 
‘people-power’  or  in  more  formal  terms,  popular  sovereignty  holds  strong 
promise for enduring fundamental changes aspired for in transitioning societies. 
The  American  transition  from  colonialism,  struggle  for  independence  and  the 
pivotal role of the people in its constitutional development in the late 18
th century 
in  particular,  provide  strong  precedent  for  societies  seeking  to  assert  popular 
power in transitioning states.
 46  
   Proceeding on our adopted view of the rule of law, a publicly accessible process 
of scrutiny offered by the truth-seeking mechanism, can be expected to restore 
some measure of judicial credibility and public confidence in the judiciary in such 
post-authoritarian  contexts.  To  insist  otherwise  namely  that  any  institution  is 
beyond public scrutiny conducted in a plainly public manner afforded by a truth-
seeking  process  amounts  to  conceding  to  the  judiciary  ‘a  real  omnipotence.’
47 
This  is  precisely  a  privilege  the  judiciary  has  been  all  too  ready  to  deny  the 
political branches of government through the instrumentality of judicial review. 
More crucially, such a proposition is tantamount to a direct inversion of popular 
sovereignty and the imposition of ‘judicial supremacy.’
48 
 
4. THE CASE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE JUDICIARY IN TRANSITIONS 
   Murray  Gleeson,  Chief  Justice  of  Australia,  while  discussing  the  theme  of 
public confidence in and criticism of the judiciary observed that 
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               …we live in an age when the attitude of the general community towards  
               authority, and institutions, is more consistently questioning, and even  
               challenging, than the past. This is a good thing. It is better that people  
               who exercise authority feel uncomfortable than they feel complacent.
49 
 
Implicit  in  Murray’s  position  is  the  recognition  of  judicial  governance.  His 
observation  on  current  trends  on  accountability  is  even  more  apposite  in 
transitional  contexts  where  there  is  explicit  recognition  that  there  has  been  a 
systemic dysfunction in society. Yet, this imperative faces the challenge of an 
extant  tension  between  it  and  the  principle  of  judicial  independence,  another 
imperative of the rule of law.
50  
   In setting a normative framework  for  reckoning  with the past in transitional 
contexts,  Crocker  rightly  identifies  unveiling  truth,  accountability  and 
punishment, pursuing institutional reform and long-term development as well as 
providing the opportunity for public deliberation as some of the central goals of 
transitional justice.
51 But as Oko has noted, democratic transitions usually focus 
on establishment of formal structures with scarce attention to ridding transition 
societies  of  ‘anti-democratic’  attitudes  that  had  taken  root  during  years  of 
authoritarian rule. This neglect threatens the whole transition process.
52  
   The  commonly  articulated  transition  reform  agenda  focused  on  the  political 
branches of government at the expense of attention to the judicial situation in 
transitioning  polities,  is  one  of  the  marked  failures  of  the  current  transition 
paradigm.
53 It can be argued that institutional accountability for past misconduct 
with a view to strengthening weak or transforming derelict state structures is one 
of the fundamental ways to foster the viability of democracy and the rule of law. 
Such  accountability  facilitates  acknowledgement  of  institutional  shortcomings 
crucial  to  achieving  transformation  of  state  institutions.  It  also  constitutes  a 
definitive  progression  to  democratic  governance  and  movement  away  from 
repression.
54 
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   In general terms, an accountability relationship exists where a group or other 
entity  demands  an  agent  to  report  on  the  agent’s  activities.
55  It  has  also  been 
considered  to  be  the  right  to  hold  an  agent  ‘to  answer  for  performance  that 
involves some delegation of power.’
56 Accountability issues commonly  evolve 
from the delegation of power in the public context by virtue of legislation. Both 
public and private actors are similarly obliged, through various instrumentalities, 
including  contractual  agreements,  to  render  accounts.
57  Political  accountability 
proceeds on the precept that individual or institutional actors who act on behalf of 
the  community  and  are  funded  from  public  resources,  be  accountable  to  the 
ordinary citizens.  
   The democratic accountability process requires a record of not only individual 
and  institutional  roles  in  governance,  but  also,  responsibility  for  the  results 
achieved and the means deployed in the process.
58 The judiciary as one of a tripod 
of state institutions can not be excused from accountability. This is certainly the 
case if it is conceded that the judicial function is exercised in a general sense as a 
form of delegated power from the people. But while accountability in the case of 
the  political  branches  may  be  individual  as  well  as  collective,  what  is  been 
advocated  in  this  study  is  institutional  (or  collective)  accountability  of  the 
judiciary.  
   A number of mundane objections may be canvassed for the futility of a case for 
accountability of the judiciary, especially considering the level of education in 
developing countries that form the bulk of transitional societies, particularly in 
Africa. One is that a sizeable number of the population are excluded by a legal 
system  that  is  at  once  culturally  alien  and  commonly  conducted  in  a  foreign 
language.  Related  to  this  is  the  fact  that  the  intricacies  of  the  merits  of  the 
jurisprudence  to  which  the  judiciary  subscribed  in  particular  cases  is  typically 
beyond  the  grasp  of  the  generality  of  the  people  (even  those  who  have  an 
appreciable level of education). Thus, the outcome of the accountability process 
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may  only  be  accessible  to  a  privileged  class  of,  largely,  legally  trained 
technocrats.
 59  
   In  response,  it  can  be  posited  that  avenues  for  public  education  and 
enlightenment by those who can access the information to overcome the barrier 
can be created to further the course of the fundamental objectives of transitional 
justice  and  accountability.  In  any  case,  it  can  not  be  the  argument  that  the 
incidence  of  language  barriers  should  be  allowed  to  deprive  a  people  of  their 
rights. On the contrary, the opposite may be the more plausible argument- namely 
that the existence of language barriers is reflective of the denial of such rights.  
   Another possible objection is the perspective that the judiciary was itself victim 
of the socio-political system that disempowered the institution in the face of a 
sovereign parliament. I will deal with this below in the context of what I consider 
to  be  institutional  objections.  A  further  objection  is  the  need  to  maintain  and 
protect the collegiality of the judiciary in the period of transition. At the heart of 
the collegiality argument is the need to maintain a rancour-free atmosphere for 
judicial officers who had served in the old order (and are, at the least, tainted with 
complicity for human rights violations) and those newly appointed by the post-
authoritarian government following transition to ensure institutional cohesion and 
stability.  
   In countering this objection, it is possible to argue that the narrow objective of 
individual collegiality ought not to be allowed to frustrate the wider claims of the 
society at large to institutional rectitude and transformation that accountability is 
expected to foster. If anything, the need for such accountability becomes acute 
when it is considered that untransformed elements of the old order can negatively 
impact on the new and expectedly, progressive elements appointed as part of the 
transition  process.  Having  disposed  of  what  I  refer  to  above  as  mundane 
objections, it is relevant to examine in some detail, the institutional objections to 
the case for accountability of the judiciary in transitional contexts.  
4.1    Judicial Independence
60 
   The need for judicial independence constitutes a potent argument for critics of a 
call for public accountability of the judicial role. However, the call is based on 
what  can  be  regarded  as  an  overarching  and  implied  legitimate  political 
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expectation  of  the  people  within  the  legal  and  political  paradigm  of  popular 
sovereignty as developed by Locke.
61 The people are empowered to demand an 
account from their agent as constituted by the government of which the judiciary 
forms a part. In any event, as Karlan notes, ‘Judicial independence is… not an end 
in itself;’
62 rather, as one of the most renowned English jurists admitted, it confers 
great responsibility on judges.
63  
   It is conceded that the principle of judicial independence is crucial to the judicial 
function. The principle is enshrined in most modern constitutions and in countries 
with unwritten constitutions, like Britain, the principle has by convention been 
entrenched  sometimes  over  centuries  of  practice.
64  The  nature  of  judicial 
independence, it has been asserted, sets it ‘a place apart’ in the scheme of state 
institutions. The principle is supported by ‘a solid historical foundation and a fine 
edifice.’
65 The critical question however is whether that privileged position and 
strong foundation ought to shield the institution (or even individual judges) from 
public scrutiny? The principle, in all of its importance for the adjudicatory role, 
and  dispensation  of  justice,  ought  not  to  be  allowed  to  override  the  need  for 
accountability  for powers conferred on  any institution of state in terms  of the 
process and outcomes of the exercise of such powers. 
   Justification  for  the  foregoing  position  includes  the  fact  that  judicial 
independence is not a perquisite of judicial office. It is commonly recognised that 
respect for courts is essentially directed at the institution and not the person of the 
individual  judge.  In  its  conception,  the  principle  is,  like  judicial  power  itself, 
designed for the benefit of citizens.
66   
   Respect for and compliance with judicial decisions is fostered by the belief in 
the impartiality of the judiciary. It is not designed to cast a sanctimonious cloak 
around individual judges. This is central to any power the judiciary can aspire to 
have in society. It accords with the warning of the late Thurgood Marshall of the 
                                                 
61 Loughlin note 18 supra at 162-175: ‘Locke makes an important innovation in asserting that 
political power rests in individuals and that this power is delegated through their consent to an 
institution (whether monarch or parliament or both) which, in some form or the other, can be taken 
to be representative of the people.’ (at 165)  
62  P  S  Karlan  “Two  Concepts  of  Judicial  Independence”  (1999)  72  Southern  California  Law 
Review 535, 536. 
63 Denning L J “The Independence of Judges” in B W Harvey The Lawyer and Justice (Sweet and 
Maxwell London 1978) 55, 63 
64 Ibid.at 55-102. 
65 M L Friedland “Judicial Independence and Accountability-A Canadian Perspective” (1996) 7(3) 
Criminal Law Forum 605, 637. 
66 Gleeson note 22 supra at 1   69 
U.S Supreme Court to the judiciary that ‘We must never forget that the only real 
source of power we as judges can tap is the respect of the people.’
67 
   The fundamental doctrinal basis of the principle of judicial independence is the 
desire  to  obviate  potential  constraints  to  the  exercise  of  the  judicial  function. 
Institutional independence is necessary to secure the role of the judiciary as the 
institution charged with protection of the individual from oppression.  
   So profound is the consensus on the need for judicial independence that it has 
become  ‘all  but  universally  recognised  as  a  necessary  feature  of  the  rule  of 
law.’
68The  principle,  guaranteed  not  only  by  national  but  also  a  considerable 
number  of  significant  international  human  rights  instruments,
69  entails  both 
‘negative’ and ‘positive’ aspects. The negative conception of the principle turns 
on  the  need  to  pre-empt  all  sources  of  coercion  that  may  interfere  in  the 
adjudicatory  process  and  are  by  nature  beyond  the  individual  judge’s  control. 
Judicial officers in the course of their duties are to be protected from all external 
constraints that may constrain or influence the judicial function. Such protection 
includes  measures  to  secure  their  physical  safety,  freedom  from  pecuniary 
worries, apprehensions on career advancement and job security. It further includes 
freedom from political considerations in systems where judicial office is elective. 
   The positive aspect relates to the facilitation of the judicial officer’s ability to 
freely come to a decision based on personal conviction about and understanding 
of the law.
70 The main constraints to judicial independence on the positive view of 
the  matter  are  jurisdictional  doctrine  and  judicial  precedent;  products  of  the 
judicial system itself. Thus, it is of an internal nature. Both principles help to 
ensure certainty in the law in some way but could also constrain lower courts in 
the proper exercise of their discretion.
71 Thus the two sides consist of measures 
designed to afford the judge ‘freedoms from’
72 external constraints and ‘freedoms 
to’
73 follow their conscience in their just adjudication of disputes. 
74 
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   Delgado’s sceptical appraisal of judicial independence
75 similarly fortifies the 
argument for non-immutability of the concept and advances a case for judicial 
accountability of a public nature advocated here. He argues that there is a sense in 
which exponents of judicial independence have sought to weave an impenetrable 
mesh  around  judges  to  the  detriment  of  other  professions,  groups  and 
organisations in society. This is not only unfair but essentially to the purpose of 
‘legitimizing a myth.’
76 He raises several  challenges to the normative view of 
judicial independence as a sacrosanct doctrine for the preservation of the judiciary 
in a democracy.  
    Delgado  contends  that  judicial  independence  has  been  utilised  to  distract 
attention  from  many  other  inbuilt  factors  (within  the  judicial  institution)  that 
detracts from a purist perspective of the doctrine. Some of these factors, including 
race,  class  and  gender,  influence  to  some  extent,  the  decisions  of  individual 
judges, a fact he contends, has attracted little attention. He further argues that 
‘[T]he  entire  structure  of  the  legal  system,  from  stare  decisis  to  judicial 
demography  to  judicial  ethics  and  socialization’
77  prevents  judges  from  acting 
independently. He notes that the concept may be viewed as a ‘platitude’ and (like 
all  platitudes)  can  be  ‘perfectly  indeterminate.’  Whereas  ‘real  judicial 
independence’ provides judges the latitude to decide cases outside of what may be 
considered  as  the  conventional,  or  what  Delgado  refers  to  as  ‘structural  due 
process’, they rarely do. 
78    
   In  another  assessment  of  judicial  independence  within  the  context  of 
contemporary American society, Zemans makes the point that traditional notions 
of judicial independence that precludes judges from public accountability have 
been and continues to be progressively eroded. ‘Political scrutiny of judges’ he 
confidently asserts ‘will also continue if not increase, at least in the immediate 
future.’
 79  While his specific focus was on elected state judges, he considered the 
arguments  as  largely  apposite  to  the  situation  of  non-elected  (federal)  judicial 
officers. He affirms that accountability of the individual judge and the judiciary 
constitute the best guarantee for (rather than an affront to) judicial independence.  
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   Judges,  in  order  to  assure  society  they  are  ‘appropriately  accountable’  and 
worthy of independence required for fostering the rule of law, have to take on a 
pro-active  and  public  role  in  performance  of  the  judicial  function.
80  Zemans 
further makes the crucial point that while public accountability of the judiciary 
may carry with it some form of institutional restraint (and this is not altogether 
undesirable), it does not necessarily interfere with decisional independence that 
has to be maintained in the interest of judicial integrity.
81   
   In his reflections on the situation in England, Stevens draws similar conclusions. 
He  argues  that  judicial  independence,  much  like  academic  freedom,  is  not 
absolute. It must ‘defer to judicial accountability.’ Public accountability of the 
judicial function he notes has been increased by various administrative reforms.
82 
There  is  thus  recognition  of  the  need  for  continued  scrutiny  of  the  role  and 
legitimacy of judicial action in democratic societies (with the marked absence of 
serious social upheaval) and calls for reform. The need for scrutiny for the judicial 
function is even more so in transitional societies.  
   The implication of the right to accountability as belonging to citizens is that it is 
in the nature of a public right. There is judicial support for the proposition that 
public rights, unlike private rights, provided for in the constitution can-not be 
waived. R. Ariori & Ors. v Muraino B O Elemo & Ors.
83 a Nigerian case provides 
judicial support for this proposition. In the case, parties purported to waive their 
right to speedy hearing of the title to land, which was in issue in the matter. The 
Nigerian  Supreme  Court  held  that  speedy  trial,  a  component  of  the 
constitutionally  guaranteed right to  fair hearing, was in the nature of a public 
right.  It  rejected  claims  of  waiver  by  consent  of  the  litigating  parties  on  the 
premise that it fell outside the ambit of their private rights or prerogatives.  
   The position of the law on public rights as stated above was recently reaffirmed 
in  the  decision  in  Rt.  Hon.  Rotimi  Chibuike  Amaechi  v  Independent  National 
Electoral  Commission  (INEC)  &  2  Ors.
84  Citing  Ariori  with  approval,  the 
Supreme Court reiterated that  
               A right that inures to the benefit of the entire public can never be   
               waived. Nobody, not even the state can waive the right entrenched in  
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               statutory or constitutional provisions which have been made in favour of  
               the whole country. It is clearly not Pro Publico, but Contra Publico to  
               introduce the doctrine of waiver to such right.  
 
In the same way, the right to public scrutiny or demand for accountability of the 
judiciary  being  in  the  nature  of  a  public  right,  can  not  be  interfered  with  nor 
waived. It is a right vested in society at all times and arguably ought to come into 
sharper focus in transitional contexts. The right to accountability being a public 
one,  any  institutional  attempt  at,  or  claim  to  waiver  of  the  right  is  not  only 
counterintuitive but ought to be rejected for being patently unconstitutional and in 
violation of the rule of law. 
   The security of tenure, a near-universal feature of appointive judicial office (and 
thus the exercise of judicial power), save in the cases of lustration of judicial 
officers  (as  witnessed  in  Bosnia  Herzegovina  and  the  German  Democratic 
Republic post-reunification),
85 ensures the continuance in office of judges who 
have been part of  an old order with which there is much dissatisfaction. This 
unique feature of judicial power reinforces the imperative for accountability of the 
judiciary to ensure judicial transition and that the third realm of the estate moves 
along the lines of societal aspirations. Notwithstanding transition to democratic 
rule, the judiciary may in practice remain static and in the state of injudicious 
ineptitude where deliberate and far-reaching efforts are not instituted to set it on 
the part of rectitude through an accounting of its role in the period of conflict or 
authoritarian rule.  
   The Nigerian judiciary, in which judicial offices normally hold office until a 
constitutionally stipulated retirement, is again a reference point. The adoption of 
the  pre-transition  constitutional  arrangements  coupled  with  the  absence  of  an 
interim constitution (which could have stipulated otherwise) ensured that judges 
appointed in the period of authoritarian rule continued in office by default. One 
consequence  of  this  has  been  that  the  judiciary  has  been  criticised  for  a 
jurisprudential  outlook  that  continues  to  accord  an  instinctive,  ‘spurious  and 
simplistic’  recognition  and  validation  of  authoritarian  rule  and  the  legacy  of 
decrees made by the military despite the transition to civil rule and in spite of the 
untold suffering and distortion authoritarian rule has foisted on the country.
 86  
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   Law  as  a  tool  of  ‘social  engineering,’
87  constitutes  a  medium  for  the 
achievement of other social goals. On this view of the role of law, the judiciary is 
required  to  dissociate  itself  from  the  formalist  interpretation  of  judicial 
independence as an impregnable fortress that sets the institution on a pedestal 
beyond the reach of society. The normative account of judicial independence that 
seeks  to  oust  the  judiciary  from  public  accountability  for  its  role  in 
authoritarianism should be rejected. Such an approach to the function or purpose 
of  the  principle  runs  contrary  to  transparency  in  governance,  an  essential 
democratic value. 
   Barak  argues  that  while  it  is  pertinent  the  judiciary  earn  and  retain  public 
confidence that objective is not to be pursued through the type of accountability 
process required of the legislative and executive branches of government. It is to 
be achieved through - to use Dyzenhaus’ terminology, ‘fidelity to the law’
88 rather 
than seeking to ‘bring about a result the public desires.’
89 Premised on the distinct 
character of the judicial function and the manner of composition of its offices 
which advises more circumspection in matters (including accountability) relating 
to  the  judiciary,  Barak’s  observation  is  well  made.  However,  Barak  fails  to 
articulate what constitutes law that the judiciary is expected to uphold. Would the 
judiciary  be  in  breach  of  its  duty  when  it  refuses  to  apply  law  lacking 
substantively  in  morality  though  enacted  in  compliance  with  procedural 
requirements?  It can be argued that law would only be law if it reflects the moral 
conscience of society.  
   In the pursuit of judicial accountability, it is useful to approach the matter on the 
premise that the institutions of state are bound by law which stands outside of and 
above all institutions. The political branches are to be held up to scrutiny through 
the instrumentality of democratic accountability. The judicial branch on the other 
hand is to be held up to scrutiny through its allegiance to law. This is what the 
judicial  oaths  of  office  require.  This  comes  through  in  the  insight  offered  by 
Dyzenhaus  on  the  legal  hearings  of  the  TRC  in  South  Africa.  What  is  to  be 
considered as law and fidelity, to which judges are bound, is an approach that 
accords recognition to reciprocity between the rulers and the ruled.’
90  
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   Law must be in accord with the will of society and the judge can only be true to 
the discharge of his duty if he is not withdrawn from society while maintaining an 
objective distance from it in his judicial determinations. Again, Barak seems to 
have conceded this point (albeit in a limited sense) when he states that ‘there 
should be no wall between the judge and the society in which he operates.’
91 The 
challenge would appear to be what constitutes appropriate distance.  
   The  point  then  is  that  judicial  independence  ought  not  to  serve  as  a  shield 
against giving public accountability of the judicial role for its conduct during an 
authoritarian period. An account of the judicial role during the period provides 
opportunity  for  an  assessment  of  whether  the  judiciary  did  maintain  its 
independence  at  the  relevant  time.  In  other  words,  was  the  judicial  function 
performed in a manner that accorded primacy to law as required by judicial (oath 
of)  office?  Or,  in  the  converse  (and  this  is  the  crux  of  the  matter),  did  any 
extraneous but contextual factor intervene to compromise judicial independence 
properly conceived? The necessity for this would appear self-evident. 
   Judicial immunity is closely tied to the independence of the judiciary and is 
usually regarded as an integral part of the latter. I consider it separately to allow 
for  more  focus  on  why  it  should  not  stand  in  the  way  of  judicial  scrutiny  in 
transitions.  
4.2   Judicial Immunity 
   Judicial  immunity  from  suit  probably  represents  the  boldest  measure  for 
securing the independence of judicial officers. Although judges are not the only 
officers  of  state  invested  with  immunity  from  suit  for  official  acts,  the 
ramifications for judges are the most extensive taking into consideration their near 
permanent and all embracing dimensions. The nature of judicial immunity from 
suit has led to the view in some quarters that it is in tension with the rule of law.
92 
This may well be an overstatement of the matter. However, there is cause for 
certain concern underlying the position.  
   In this regard, it serves to recall that members of the executive and legislature 
are  almost  always  liable  to  prosecution  (at  least  on  expiry  of  their  electoral 
mandate)  for  corrupt  practices  in  office.  But  judges  are  usually  permanently 
immune from prosecution or civil suits in the conduct of their office and exercise 
of their judicial powers. This is attributed to the need to extinguish any threat of 
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litigation  on  the  judge  for  performing  the  normal  functions  of  the  office.  The 
position  is  based  on  the  proposition  that  the  appropriate  remedies  for  judicial 
misconduct  are  ‘structural,’  namely  through  appeals  and  in  extreme  cases, 
dismissal from office.
93  
   In  essence,  the  nature  of  the  judicial  function  confers  a  duty  on  judges  that 
requires  an  independence  of  ‘mind’  that  addresses  itself  to  ensuring  justice 
according to law. It rises above the whims of individuals as well as institutions 
and particularly one that trumps the common weal. However, the allegation that 
the judiciary has been complicit in the violations of human rights by the state (to 
which I return later) under an illiberal regime, supports a case for accountability 
for what could well amount to judicial abdication of its role. By this is meant a 
situation where the judges had deviated from keeping fate with their judicial oaths 
of office which required the discharge of the functions of their high office in a 
manner that upheld the constitutional values of the country as against the wishes 
of authoritarian rulers. Whether this is factually the case or otherwise has to be 
tested  through  a  process  of  public  accounting,  at  the  least,  to  set  the  records 
straight.  
   Scrutiny  of  the  judiciary  through  a  truth-seeking  process  during  a  period  of 
fundamental political change as proposed in this study is distinct from subjecting 
individual judges to the indignity of civil suits for their judgements. The positive 
values of judicial immunity (and more broadly, independence) notwithstanding, 
an absolutist interpretation of it could seriously undermine other equally important 
societal values.
94 
   Accountability for the role of the judiciary in governance during an authoritarian 
period is also relevant because of certain standards and societal expectations of 
the institution. Where such expectations are not met, it leads to the lack of public 
trust and confidence in the judicial system which is fatal to societal cohesion, 
peace  and  development.  Since  the  judiciary  commands  neither  the  money 
controlled by the legislature nor the force at the service of the executive, public 
confidence is at the heart of obedience to judicial decisions.
95 In particular, the 
dynamics of transitional justice lends itself to Karlan’s argument that the claim to 
judicial independence must be balanced against actual judicial outcomes.
96 In the 
event  there  is  some  measure  of  consensus  that  the  judicial  function  has  been 
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conducted in some inappropriate manner, the need to reach beyond the shield of 
judicial  immunity  assumes  an  imperative.  It  is  hardly  a  task  undertaken  to 
establish such a state of affairs in transitional societies that had laboured under 
authoritarian  rule,  war,  institutionalised  discrimination  like  apartheid  or  other 
forms of substantial social displacement.  
   The  jurisprudence  of  transitional  justice  revolves  around  the  restoration  of 
rights, justice and the rule of law. Teitel has noted that one of the key features of 
transitional societies is a fundamental inquiry into the legitimacy of existing and 
inherited societal institutions including the judiciary.
97 Such an inquiry is not the 
least  bit  compelling  where  any  of  the  institutions  is  viewed  as  victims  of  the  
authoritarian period. 
4.3   The Judiciary as Victim 
   The judiciary as an institution, much like other arms of a democratic society, 
may  be  a  victim  of  authoritarian  rule  in  the  same  way  political  institutions 
(executive and legislative) were displaced by military rule in Africa and Latin 
America. It may even suffer in more individualised ways like the fate of judicial 
officers in Rwanda in the course of the genocide in that country. As a result, it is 
possible to take the position that the judicial institution ought to be excused from 
accountability  in transition as a victim. But the victim-argument quickly  loses 
force when it is considered that a truth-seeking process is basically designed in 
part (if not essentially), to ease the burden of victims- individuals and groups (it is 
not been suggested that institutional victims are precluded) - of rights violations 
by providing a forum for a narration and acknowledgement of their sufferings.        
   Further, where the choice of the truth-seeking process is made to establish a 
credible record of violations of human rights violations and subversion of the rule 
of law with a possible view to social acknowledgement, reconciliation, reparation, 
and fostering rule of law, no institution of state, least that avowed to upholding the 
rule  of  law,  should  be  insulated  from  scrutiny.  This  is  imperative,  if  only  to 
ascertain  that  the  judiciary,  like  other  institutions  that  have  functioned  under 
abnormal conditions
98 is retuned to the aspirations of society in the transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy.          
    An inquiry into the propriety of the judicial role or the judiciary being required 
to tell its truths in a transition process is germane to obtaining a complete record 
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of a period of gross violations of human rights and impunity in a nation’s history. 
It could possibly achieve more. Such endeavour has the potential to ascertain the 
justification (some insist in the face of insurmountable constraints) for the course 
of judicial governance in the period. This perspective is relevant in view of the 
concession  by  a  notable  protagonist  of  the  relevance  of  truth  commissions  in 
transition  that  ‘moral  or  meta-ethical  debates  feed  directly  into  jurisprudential 
questions  about  whether  and  to  what  extent  law-  even  in  domestic  systems- 
provides meaningful guidance for the judges who implement it.’
99 
  What  is  the  role  of  judges  in  authoritarianism  or  dictatorship?  Are  they 
‘unconstrained  moral  actors  or  bureaucratic  functionaries  effectively  bereft  of 
discretion, because the law tells them what to do and leaves them no choice to do 
otherwise?’
100  Should  the  judicial  function  be  insulated  from  the  dictates  of 
changes in society? Or should the judicial role be in a state of flux, subject to the 
vagaries of its environment?
101 These are by no means easy questions to answer 
and there have been ongoing debates on them and related issues on the judicial 
function, all emphasising the crucial role of the judiciary in society.  A process of 
scrutiny is arguably well positioned to address these concerns.  
   Scrutiny of the role of the judiciary in the period of democratisation has the 
potential to promote the realisation of institutional transformation at the heart of 
the  transition  process.  The  South  Africa  transition  process  attempted  such 
scrutiny. Happily, the precedent set by the South Africa Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission  (TRC)  in  this  regard  is  the  subject  of  an  incisive  evaluation  by 
Dyzenhaus. In his aptly titled book, Judging the Judges,
102 he has addressed the 
response of the judiciary to the truth-seeking process that was at the centre of the 
country’s efforts to recover justice for victims and achieve reconciliation in its 
transition to popular democracy. 
4.4    Judging the Judges? 
    The  South  Africa  TRC  blazed  the  trail  in  requesting  the  judiciary  in  a 
transitional society to give a public account of its institutional role in the period of 
its  mandate.  That  attempt  was  all  but  roundly  rebuffed  by  the  South  African 
judiciary. Unlike the various professional bodies representing lawyers (barristers, 
advocates and solicitors) no serving judge, despite repeated requests, turned up at 
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the scheduled three-day public ‘Legal Hearing’. The judiciary contended in the 
written  memorandum  submitted-  ostensibly  on  its  behalf-  by  Justice  Michael 
Corbett (then Chief Justice of the apartheid era), that the proposition was plainly 
unworkable and in outright violation of the much-coveted principle of judicial 
independence. The argument was further advanced by the judiciary that a past-
focused enquiry threatened progress and could disrupt the march into the future. 
Thus, the judges stayed away and their failure to attend was strongly deprecated 
by Dyzenhaus who described it as the ‘most conspicuous feature’ of the special 
three-day public hearings.
103  
   It was also argued for the judiciary that it was impracticable for the TRC to 
embark on the exercise that would require a case-by-case assessment of records in 
the absence of counsel. In all events, the record had been impressive particularly 
in  view  of  parliamentary  supremacy.  ‘There  was  little  to  be  gained  from 
lamenting  the  past.’
104  This  position,  canvassed  by  Chief  Justice  Corbett, 
Dyzenhaus notes, is clearly in ‘tension’ with the reliance on the same records by 
Corbett as the basis  for his contention that public accountability of the judiciary 
in South Africa was not necessary since they reveal that the judiciary had in fact 
performed creditably. 
   The TRC Legal Hearings were regarded by the Commission itself as the most 
crucial of a series of special hearings in view of the place of law under apartheid. 
Lawyers and the judges were brought under scrutiny for their role in applying 
apartheid law. Lawyers and more so judges, it was alleged, failed to exercise their 
discretion when they could have in their interpretation and daily application of 
discriminatory  laws.  For  Dyzenhaus,  the  judges  had  no  excuse  for  upholding 
unconscionable apartheid laws. He challenged the view, canvassed in the written 
submission  of  the  judiciary,  that  judges  were  ‘disempowered’  in  the  face  of 
parliamentary sovereignty.  
   Support for the position of the judges is located in the plain-fact approach to 
judicial interpretation. The plain fact approach as an interpretive approach to law 
states that ‘the judicial duty when interpreting a statute is always to look to those 
parts of the public record that make it clear what the legislators, as a matter of fact 
intended.’ In other words, judges are to determine the law on the letters ‘without 
permitting their substantive convictions about justice to interfere.’
105  
                                                 
103 Dyzenhaus note 88 supra at 30.  
104 Ibid. at 46. 
105 Dyzenhaus note 88 supra at 16.   79 
   Judges who subscribed to this view under the principle of the plain fact rule of 
interpretation were guilty of ‘judicial dereliction of duty.’ He insists that the duty 
of judges is to maintain the rule of law that requires justice to be done at all times. 
Faced with the option of participation as against rejecting or relinquishing judicial 
office, he takes the position that opting out of the judicial function by reformist 
(liberal minded) judges was not to be preferred. 
   According to Dyzenhaus, it is the duty of judges to uphold ‘moral ideals’
106 
even in the event that they may have their decisions overturned by appeals or 
trumped by countermanding legislation. That was in reality, the practice of the 
legislature during the apartheid era. Nonetheless, judicial resistance to apartheid 
laws through a purposive approach that gave primacy to common law principles 
of  equality,  equity  and  fairness  could  at  least  place  the  government  in  a  very 
uncomfortable position though it was most unlikely to alter government policy. 
Such  conscientious  objections  had  the  potential  to  place  the  government  in  a 
position where it would, through legislation have had to admit it was operating 
outside rather than within the confines of the rule of law. 
   Countermanding judicial decisions by legislation, a potent challenge to judicial 
conscientiousness in this way, he insists,  would have better exposed the system of 
apartheid for what it really was; the antithesis to the rule of law. It amounted to a 
lack of ‘fidelity to law’ to enforce discriminatory legislation which were against 
morality or good conscience because that would be antithetical to law. This is the 
proper course for judges to follow even in the face of obvious defiance by the 
other arms of government, if judges were to be loyal to their oaths of office and 
the course of justice.  
   Dyzenhaus  argues  further  that  where  the  historical  record  strongly  suggests 
judges have failed in upholding their oaths of office to maintain fidelity to law 
(and his conception of law is one indivisible from morals), they ought to be called 
to account for their failure. He posits that in such situations, recourse can not be 
had to judicial independence as a shield. Independence of judges he maintains will 
not  be  compromised  by  an  ‘account…  of  conduct  which  compromised  their 
independence.’
107      
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   Interestingly,  the  truth  commission  in  Ghana
108  (one  of  the  immediate 
successors of the Oputa Panel in truth-seeking in Africa) did hold special hearings 
for  the  Legal  Profession.  The  country’s  experience  provides  support  for  the 
proposition  that  whether  or  not  the  judiciary  is  considered  a  victim  of  gross 
violations  of  human  rights  in  conflicted  societies  should  not  preclude  an 
examination of its role in governance in the period of conflict or authoritarian 
rule.  
   While it is largely true that the specifics of the experiences of no two societies 
are  exactly  the  same,  it  is  significant  to  note  that  Ghana  shares  more  than  a 
passing  similarity  with  Nigeria  in  many  ways.  These  include  the  fact  of 
heterogeneity characteristic of many of post- British colonial states. There is also 
the  fact  of  the  experience  of  authoritarian  rule  for  the  better  part  of  its  post-
independence period. Close scrutiny further disclose similar political and social 
conditions  as  well  as  justification  advanced  by  the  military  class  for  political 
intervention in the two countries.  
   Providing  additional  empirical  bases    for  analytical  comparison,  Ghana’s 
judicial and constitutional arrangements during the period were not only similar to 
Nigeria’s, the judiciary in both countries faced similar challenges of adjudicating 
in  the  context  of  military  authoritarian  rule  for  extended  periods.
109  Like  the 
Nigerian truth-seeking process, the nine-member commission was chaired by a 
retired Supreme Court Justice, K. E. Amua-Sekyi. That Commission made the 
significant  finding  that  the  judiciary  at  some  points  in  the  country’s  post-
independence  history  was  intimidated  into  giving  up  its  role  in  restoring  the 
violated rights of citizens.
110  
   In  sum  them,  it  is  useful  to  clarify  that  what  is  being  advocated  on  public 
accountability of the judiciary is a full account of their judicial role in the past. 
Even as a close reading of Dyzenhaus on the Legal Hearings of the TRC shows, 
the inquiry is not sought on an accusatory or judgemental premise. It is not so 
much to ‘judge the judges’ as been wrong in their actions or judgements (even 
                                                 
108  Established  as  the  National  Reconciliation  Commission  by  the  National  Reconciliation 
Commission Act of 2002 (Act 611), entered into force on January 11, 2002. 
109 Prempeh note 38 supra at 1244. See also F Oduro “Reconciling a Divided Nation through a 
Non-Retributive  Justice  Approach:  Ghana’s  Reconciliation  Initiative”  (2005)  9  (1)  The 
International Journal of Human Rights 327, 334-339. See also C Ogbondah “Democratization and 
the Media in West Africa: An Analysis of Recent Constitutional and Legislative Reforms for Press 
Freedom in Ghana and Nigeria” (2004) 6 West Africa Review 1. 
110 Report of the National Reconciliation Commission (Ghana) Volume Chapter 2, 77, 83 (October 
2004) hereafter Ghana NRC Report. 
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though there may be many or some instances of these). Rather, the objective is to 
achieve  two  important  aims  in  the  context  of  transition.  The  two  objectives 
marginally appear correlative but are indeed distinct. 
   The  first  is  to  obtain  a  record  of  judicial  activity  during  a  period  of 
misgovernance and gross violations of human rights as an institution of state. In 
this  regard,  obtaining  an  account  of  the  judicial  role  serves  to  provide  ‘as 
complete a picture as possible’ of past governance. This may of course disclose in 
part that the judiciary itself was a victim of violations of human rights and the rule 
of law and such disclosure is itself relevant. But it is only an accounting in the 
first place that can lead to such a finding and not an a priori position that the state 
of victim-hood should be assumed or justifies unaccountability of any institution 
of the state, in this case, the judiciary. The second aspect is the potential for the 
scrutiny of the judicial role in the past to facilitate transformation of the institution 
in the context of a new resolve to move society in the direction of change and new 
beginnings. While this second aspect of the matter may be incidental (at least, 
indirectly) to the first point, it is a separate one. The one looks at the past, the 
other projects reflexively, into the future. Thus, that there is ‘nothing to learn’ 
from the past does not detract from the societal right to know in the present. But 
an  important  dynamic  is  that  when  the  two  issues  are  taken  together,  judicial 
accountability  for  past  conduct  can  be  considered  at  being  directed  at 
strengthening,  rather  than  undermining  judicial  independence,  as  argued  by 
objectors  to  a  public  accountability  of  the  judicial  role  as  advocated  in  South 
Africa.      
 
CONCLUSION 
   The  purview  of  accountability  in  transitions  ought  to  be  extended  to  the 
judiciary in recognition of its role in governance as the third arm in the tripod of 
state  institutions.  Public  accountability  ensures  comprehensive  accounts  of 
governance  in  post-authoritarian  societies  that  is  essential  to  charting  a 
transformative agenda for all the institutions of state. Institutional transformation 
is at the heart of the aspiration to reinstitute the rule of law in post-authoritarian 
contexts. Further, it is recognised as a component of the right to restitution for 
victims of gross violations of human rights in post-authoritarian and post-conflict 
societies.   
    Traditional  notions  of  judicial  independence  gird  objections  to  public 
accountability  of  the  judiciary,  setting  it  apart  in  the  accountability  paradigms   82 
applied to the other arms of government. Objections to judicial accountability are 
rooted in conceptions of the judicial function in liberal democracies (distinguished 
by the absence of social upheavals) to the neglect of the dynamics of law and 
justice in transitional contexts.  
   In  view  of  the  concession  that  the  interpretive  role  of  the  judiciary  is  not 
immune to the vagaries of time and place but rather contingent on it,
111 fixation on 
a univocal judicial paradigm for all climes and periods is misplaced at best. The 
case for public accountability of the judiciary is further accentuated in transitional 
societies where there is (as is usually the case) direct, or implicit complicity on the 
part of the judiciary for gross violations of human rights violations. A study of the 
judicial function in such societies serves to advance our position on the salience of 
accountability  of  the  judiciary  for  the  past  in  such  societies.  The  Nigerian 
transition to civil rule after decades of military authoritarianism provides just the 
context for such a study. 
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Chapter Three 
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: THE NIGERIAN 
CONTEXT 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
   It  is  utopian  to  expect  that  the  judiciary  is  capable  of  curing  all  the  ills  of 
society.
1 Conceding the reality does not detract in anyway from its potential role 
as an important agent for social change. It is highly unlikely that any of the other 
branches of  government can independently  cure every ill of society.  It  is also 
doubtful  that  the  collaboration  of  the  three  branches  can  (even  with  the  best 
intentions) lead to the realisation of that aspiration considering the complexities of 
social arrangements in contemporary society. However it should be safe to posit 
that effective cooperation of all three branches would likely enhance the quality of 
individual and collective social well-being.  
    A critical assessment of judicial impact on the course of governance and the 
exercise of state powers ensures that the judiciary is confronted with its role in 
governance  and  facilitate  its  institutional  transformation  where  required.  In 
Chapter Two, I argued a case for the relevance and merits of accountability for the 
judicial role in previous governance in transitions generally. The basic premise for 
that argument is the proposition that the judiciary as one of the institutions of the 
state participates in governance at all times and in transitions where accountability 
of governance is pursued, it should extend as a matter of principle to the judiciary. 
   In this chapter,  I  evaluate the impact of the judicial function on governance 
utilising some of the theoretical principles set out in Chapter Two. The utilitarian 
value of such assessment lies in ensuring that ‘the judiciary takes its fair share of 
the credit’ for the state of affairs in society. The judicial ‘fair share’ on close 
scrutiny  could  be  on  the  debit  side.
2  More  than  that,  it  provides  the  basis  for 
articulating a programmatic transformation of the judicial institution, where such 
is  established,  in  line  with  the  recognised  need  for  societal  reconstruction  of 
                                                 
1A  Barak  “The  Supreme  Court,  2001  Term-  Foreword:  A  Judge  on  Judging:  The  Role  of  a 
Supreme Court in a Democracy” (2003) 116 (1) Harvard Law Review 19, 46. But Compare O Oko 
“Consolidating Democracy on a Troubled Continent: A Challenge for Lawyers in Africa” (2000) 
33 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 573. He argues with much vigour, the rather suspect 
proposition  that  lawyers  are  ‘well  suited  to  solve  the  problems  that  the  transition  from 
authoritarianism presents.’  
2 T I Ogowewo  “Self-Inflicted Constraints on Judicial Government in Nigeria” (2005) 49 (1) 
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complicit pre-transition state institutions.
3 To contextualize the argument, I focus 
on  judicial  governance  and  accountability  within  the  paradigms  of  Nigeria’s 
transition  to  democracy  after  decades  of  authoritarian  rule.  I  analyse  specific 
issues that necessitate accountability of the judiciary in the context of Nigeria’s 
political transition. It has been stated earlier that there were unresolved allegations 
of  complicity  for  violations  of  human  rights  against  the  judiciary  in  Nigeria 
because the Oputa Panel omitted to engage with that aspect of accountability for 
the past in its work. 
  The judiciary like any other institution ought not to loathe taking the credit for its 
positive  contributions  to  the  course  of  governance  and  the  exercise  of  state 
powers. In the same way, basic principles of equity and commonsense dictate that 
it should submit itself to criticisms for its failures. Accountability of the judiciary 
is relevant at all times. However, it assumes the nature of a compelling obligation 
in  transitional  contexts,  particularly  where  there  is  substantial  basis  to  adduce 
complicity to the judiciary for a situation of subversion of democratic governance, 
sustained, gross violations of human rights and impunity on the part of the state.  
   In proceeding, I set out a legal premise for accountability of the judiciary for the 
past  in  the  Nigerian  context.  I  then  discuss  the  accountability  gap  in  judicial 
governance  in  Nigeria’s  transition.  This  is  followed  by  an  examination  of  the 
judicial  function  in  authoritarian  contexts.  I  then  move  on  to  analyse  the  bi-
dimensional issues that necessitate accountability of the judiciary in the context of 
Nigeria’s political transition. These are of a legal-jurisprudential and sociological 
nature.  I  conclude  that  the  accountability  gap  with  respect  to  the  role  of  the 
judiciary saddles the transitioning society with an untransformed judiciary. The 
absence of transformation in the wake of the political transition in the country 
threatens not only the rule of law, but also the transition project as a whole. 
 
2. THE TRANSITION JUDICIARY: A LEGAL PREMISE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
   Scott has noted that in discussing accountability issues, it is germane to address 
three distinct questions. These are identification of who is to be held accountable, 
to  who  is  it  due,  and  for  what?
4  Call  these  the  ‘premise  or  basis  for 
accountability.’  The  case  for  accountability  of  the  judiciary  in  transitional 
contexts benefits from the adoption of Scott’s model. Failure to delimit the scope 
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and process of desired accounts potentially impedes the clarity of the discussion. 
Thus, perhaps by far the most challenging aspect of accountability of the judiciary 
in the context of transitions is delineation of what is to be accounted, by whom 
and for what? There is yet little by way of state practice to assist the formulation 
of conceptual responses to the foregoing critical issues.  
  That  said,  however  attractive  it  may  seem,  in  the  age  of  globalisation,  to 
articulate a universal model for accountability of the judiciary, prescription of a 
model for such accountability in societies in transitions is potentially a difficulty 
endeavour. Societies in transition from one form of troubled past or the other 
predictably have varied experiences. Local dynamics and national specificities do 
not encourage prescriptive models for accountability of the judiciary for the past 
in  transitional  contexts.  Experiential  accounts  of  the  implementation  of 
prescriptive  economic  ‘restructuring’  programmes  like  the  Bretton  Woods 
institutions imposed Structural Adjustments Programmes in Africa as against Asia 
aptly demonstrates this point.
5 Clearly, the development of international norms 
and standards are commendable. They establish benchmarks of best practices and 
set  out  evaluative  standards  for  national  development.  However,  in  addressing 
transitional justice issues, it has been recognised and conceded at the highest level 
of  the  international  system,  that  the  imposition  of  ‘model’  approaches  to  the 
neglect of contextual peculiarities may be counter-productive.
6  
   Further,  the  complexities  that  attach  to  the  judicial  institution  suggest 
prescriptive or imposed models may unravel, rather than advance the quest for 
accountability of the judiciary for its past role in governance. It is arguable that 
the role of the judiciary and the constraints it may have had to operate with in 
large-scale and high-intensity armed conflict like a civil war (as was the case in 
Liberia  and  Sierra  Leone)  may  significantly  differ  in  a  low-intensity  armed 
conflict  in  apartheid  South  Africa.  The  dynamics  of  both  cases  may  yet  be 
different  from  the  judicial  circumstances  under  authoritarian  regimes  in  Latin 
America, Ghana and Nigeria for instance. The fact of genocide in Rwanda (which 
also  targeted  the  judiciary  and  the  legal  profession  as  a  whole)  would  likely 
impact in a marked way on judicial accounts in that country. Notwithstanding 
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(IDRC/CODESRIA/Africa World Press Ottawa 2002). 
6 UN Security Council Document No.S/2004/616, Report of the Secretary –General, The Rule of 
Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies 1at17 available at:  
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these problems, general principles may be outlined for the contentious process. 
One  such  key  principle  should  be  that  the  approach  to  be  adopted  for 
accountability of the judiciary be context-driven rather than a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
model.    
   Related to the above is that judicial accountability of a public nature ought to 
take in to consideration the level of development of the legal institution in relation 
to other arms of government. Here, the training of judicial officials, the reliance or 
otherwise of the citizenry on judicial processes, available judicial resources, the 
operative  judicial  environment,  the  tenure  of  judges,  etc,  could  have  some 
resonance  for  judicial  output  and  the  role  the  judiciary  played  (or  was 
incapacitated from playing), in authoritarian and conflicted societies. Was there 
judicial independence (or an appreciable level of judicial independence)? Were 
judges adequately trained? Was the judiciary adequately funded and judges secure 
in their tenure? All of these are issues relevant to the disposition of the judicial 
function. Setting evaluative criteria a priori for otherwise largely context-driven 
dynamics can be as problematic as to be unproductive.  
   It may not be impossible to determine or ascertain the state of relevant factors in 
a  pre-accountability  environment.  However,  the  point  remains  that  a  relativist 
approach may better serve the process of accountability in general and judicial 
accounting  in  particular.  It  is  plausible  to  suggest  that  relevant  factors  to  be 
considered in an inquiry in to the judicial role ought to include the incidence of 
wide  spread  corruption,  lack  of  independence,  legitimation  of  authoritarian, 
despotic or discriminatory rule (as was the case in South Africa), all of which 
were the norm for the most part of Nigeria’s post-independence history.  
   In  view  of  the  centrality  of  constitutions  in  articulating  socio-political  and 
economic  reconstruction  in  democratisation  and  transition  arrangements, 
constitutional supremacy commends itself as a viable basis for accountability of 
the  judiciary  for  the  past.  In  the  Nigerian  context,  constitutional  supremacy 
provides a functional approach to the issue of judicial accounting for its role in 
governance  during  the  pre-transition  period.  The  basic  premise  for  this  is  the 
centrality of the constitution to the existence of the country as a nation state. In 
reality, the Nigerian polity is a nation of ‘nations.’ Like many other post-colonial 
African countries, it is an amalgam of largely historically independent, sometimes 
hostile ethnicities within a geographical territory involuntarily ‘united’ by British   87 
colonial  power.
7  Thus  a  viable  basis  for  normative  accountability  of  all  state 
institutions must be neutral in both origin and content to ground and sustain its 
legitimacy. 
   In terms of its constitutional history, the Independence Constitution of 1960 in 
particular (and its successors in varying degrees) aspired to provide a rallying 
point for establishing a functional state comprising heterogeneous ethnic identities 
and diverse interests. Specifically, fears of domination by ethnic minority interests 
led  to  the  setting  up  of  the  Sir  Henry  Willinck  Commission  in  1956,  its 
recommendation  and  ultimate  inclusion  of  fundamental  human  rights  in  the 
Independence Constitution of 1960.
8 It similarly led to the adoption of a federal 
political arrangement.
9  
   Nigerian  society  has  always  expressed  a  foundational  preference  for  express 
constitutional guarantee of rights, justice and accountability. This is reflected in a 
preference for constitutional supremacy as soon as the country attained republican 
status in 1963. It could be hardly otherwise, given the absence of a historical sense 
or culture of shared nationhood which could have generated or institutionalised 
political and legal conventions for a modern state.  
   In this regard, it is significant to note that in the political transition away from 
authoritarian military rule, the judiciary, particularly at the highest levels, has had 
constant resort to the concept of constitutional supremacy. In several cases (some 
of  which  are  discussed  subsequently  in  this  study),  the  Supreme  Court  has 
asserted the supremacy of the constitution as a fundamental principle for resolving 
inter-institutional conflicts in the Nigerian state.
 10   
   Thus, in addition to the principle of comprehensive accountability enunciated in 
Chapter  Two,  the  arguments  here  adopt  constitutional  supremacy  as  the  legal 
basis for judicial accounts for past judicial conduct in the country in the country as 
part of transitional justice measures. As stated earlier, this is in recognition of the 
                                                 
7 F R A Williams “Fundamental Rights and the Prospects for Democracy in Nigeria” (1967) 115 
(7) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1073, 1074-1076.  
8 P C Aka “Nigeria since May 1999: Understanding the Paradox of Civil Rule and Human Rights 
Violations in Nigeria under President Olusegun Obasanjo” (2003) 4 San Diego International Law 
Journal 209, 215-216. 
9  IDEA  The  Role  of  State  Constitutions  in  Protecting  Minority  Rights  under  Federalism: 
Dialogues in Support of a Democratic Transition in Burma (International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance) 46-52. 
10 See for instance Attorney-General of Abia State & 2 Ors v Attorney-General of the Federation 
& 33 Ors (2006) 7 NILR 71, 1 available at: http://www.nigeria-law.org/LawReporting2006.htm 
and Attorney-General of Ondo State v Attorney-General of the Federation (2002) 6 S.C Pt I, 1. In 
both cases the Supreme Court affirmed the centrality of constitutional provisions as the normative 
precept for ensuring legitimate exercise of power by the respective levels of governance and 
institutions in the country. 
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primacy  of  constitutional  supremacy  as  a  fundamental  foundational  and 
organisational  principle  of  governance  in  pre-and  post-authoritarian  military 
period  in  Nigeria.  It  must  be  acknowledged  though,  that  the  very  concept  of 
constitutional  supremacy,  central  to  Nigerian  post-independent  statehood  and 
subsequent  republicanism,  was  violently  displaced  and  distorted  by  military 
adventurism and authoritarian rule. The operations of state institutions, including 
the  judiciary,  came  to  be  defined  in  terms  of  the  prevailing  socio-political 
displacement. This, it will be argued below, was done with the acquiescence of 
the judicial institution. Significantly however, the rehabilitation of the principle 
(alluded to above) as an integral part of the political transition invests it with 
considerable promise as a basis for accountability of all state institutions.    
    
3.   THE JUDICIARY IN AUTHORITARIAN CONTEXTS  
    The judiciary can to some extent be insulated from the vagaries of institutional 
displacement  that  result  from  authoritarian  rule.  The  regular  if  not  immediate 
casualties of military rule in democratic states are the executive, the legislature 
and  popular  sovereignty.
11The  continued  existence  of  the  political  branches  is 
incompatible  with  military  intrusion  into  governance.  To  a  large  extent,  the 
military leaves the judiciary nominally intact, but usually severely compromised.    
   Why  do  military  usurpers  of  the  democratic-will  sack  the  executive  and 
legislature but leave the judicial institution intact? Two factors can be advanced 
for this. The first is the legitimating function that the judiciary accords military 
usurpation  of  power.
12  The  self-serving  motive  has  been  aptly  described  by 
Mahmud 
               Usurpers appear to recognize that judicial pronouncements about the  
               nature and merits of the change and quantum of their legislative capacity  
               have an impact on the legitimacy of the new regime, because words like  
               “law” and “legality” function as titles of honor…Securing judicial  
               recognition appears to be the key to gaining political legitimacy.
13  
 
   Conscious of the constitutional breach its claim to and hold on political power 
constitute, ruling military elites are usually anxious to secure some measure of 
popular acceptability in order to gain a semblance of legitimacy and mitigate their 
wanton illegality. Legitimacy is central to governance. From dual perspectives, 
                                                 
11 Ogowewo note 2 supra at 42. See also D O Aihe “Fundamental Human Rights and the Military 
Regime in Nigeria: What did the Court Say” (1971) 15(2) Journal of African Law 213, 214-215. 
12 Ogowewo note 2 supra at 43. See also T Mahmud “Jurisprudence of Successful Treason: Coup 
d’etat & Common Law” (1994) 27 Cornell International Law Journal 49, at 103. 
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normative and descriptive, legitimacy is crucial to the ability of the ruling elite to 
make valid political decisions and orders as well as to the societal acceptance of 
such  orders  and  decisions.
14  Thus  even  the  military  class  in  its  foray  into 
governance is obliged to secure a veneer of legitimacy for the effective exercise of 
political power. 
   Besides the aspiration to legitimacy is the rather unavoidable necessity for the 
judicial  institution.  It  is  arguable  that  in  contrast  to  executive  and  legislative 
governance,  the  more  nuanced  requirements  of  adjudication  or  judicial 
governance are well beyond the disposition or capacity of military adventurers in 
power.  The  incapacity  on  the  part  of  the  military  to  administer  the  judicial 
function dictates the need to retain the judiciary in governance. This specialised 
nature  of  the  judicial  function  constitutes  a  positive  force  which  the  judiciary 
ought to have utilised in the quest to maintain its institutional integrity, uphold 
human  rights  and  the  rule  of  law  irrespective  of  the  duress  constituted  by 
authoritarian military rule.
15  
   According to Mahmud, there are four possible options for the judiciary faced 
with the challenge of a coup d’etat. The options are (i) validating the usurpation, 
(ii) declaring the usurpation unconstitutional and hence invalid, (iii) resignation, 
thereby refusing to adjudicate the legality of the demise of the very constitution 
under which the court was established or (iv)declaring the issue a non-justiciable 
political  question.
16  The  Courts  in  Nigeria  chose  the  option  of  validating  and 
legitimating the rebellious act, a choice Mahmud has asserted is only pragmatic in 
the  circumstance  of  military  authoritarianism.
17  Ogowewo  shares  this  view, 
insisting  though  on  a  post  hoc  judicial  invalidation  of  legislative  and 
constitutional acts of military usurpers.
18   
   Military regimes, perhaps more than any other form of government, invariably 
desire a judiciary that is ‘pliant and which remains attentive to their interest.’ 
Despite  that,  military  autocrats  ‘in  order  to  be  able  to  project  an  image  of 
legitimate political order’ aspire that the judiciary as well as judges ‘be seen to be 
independent and to be operating at one remove from politics.’
19 Thus it may be 
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rather simplistic to justify judicial acquiescence to military authoritarianism (as 
some constitutional law scholars have sought to do) on the basis of the latter’s 
complete control of the powers of coercion and perceived self-sufficiency.
20 The 
recurring  preference  of  usurpers  for  preserving  the  judiciary  in  virtually  all 
instances of military incursion into power in post-colonial commonwealth states
21 
suggests the self-sufficiency claim is at best overrated. Following this situational 
analysis of the judiciary in authoritarian contexts, we should now turn attention to 
the judiciary in Nigeria’s transition.  
 
4.   THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP 
   In spite of the precedent set by the South Africa TRC and its aspiration to be 
seen  as  modelled  after  it,  the  Nigeria  truth-seeking  process,  the  Oputa  Panel, 
neglected  to  focus  attention  on  the  judiciary.  Through  that  failure  (with  the 
seeming acquiescence of civil society), human rights groups, the legal profession 
and  the  Nigerian  public  missed  the  opportunity  to  develop  the  theme  of 
establishing the truth about judicial governance in the country. The failure of the 
Oputa Panel in this regard is rather intriguing, considering the Panel held special 
hearings  for  the  Police  and  the  Prisons  Service;  institutions  that  constitute  an 
integral part of the criminal justice system. 
   As  noted  in  Chapter  One,  the  Nigeria  Police  Force  and  the  Nigeria  Prisons 
Service had the legal profession, lawyers, magistrates and judges, to contend with 
in  the  execution  of  their  duties.  With  regard  to  the  notorious  phenomenon  of 
prison congestion as stated in Chapter One, the Nigeria Prisons Service was quick 
to point out that it was a hapless victim of the remand orders of magistrates and 
judges.  Notwithstanding,  the  Oputa  Panel  (presumably  to  investigate  petitions 
alleging gross violations of human rights of detained individuals in the various 
prisons),  summoned  the  Prisons  Service  to  give  an  account  of  its  role  in  the 
violations of human rights in the country. Yet the judiciary and the broader family 
of the legal profession were not.   
   Was  it  the  consensus  that  the  judiciary  was  also  a  victim  of  military 
authoritarianism? Could it be a deliberate attempt to shield the constituency of the 
majority of the Panel’s members including the chairman, from possible unsavoury 
public scrutiny? This last, suggesting the possibility of institutional loyalty or bias 
on the part of the panel members appears unlikely, in view of the unquestioned 
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integrity of the members as a whole and the chairman in particular. There is the 
additional fact that at inception, the Oputa Panel held consultative forums with 
diverse  interests  in  the  Nigerian  society  including  human  rights  and  non-
governmental organisations to articulate an agenda for its work.  
   From a comparative perspective, it is relevant to recall that the chain of events 
leading  to  the  South  Africa  TRC  Legal  Hearing  was  set  in  motion  by  the 
submission made to the TRC by a human rights lawyer alleging injustice on the 
part of the judiciary in the apartheid era.
22 No petition or submission of similar 
purport directly challenging the judiciary is on record to have been made to the 
Oputa Panel. But should the omission on the part of the Oputa Panel be excused? 
This is an important question considering that the Ghana National Reconciliation 
Commission (instituted after the Nigerian process), as alluded to earlier, held a 
Legal Hearing similar to the South Africa TRC. The Ghana NRC Legal Hearing 
was conducted without a petition of the nature that spurred the latter’s inquiry.   
   It  would  appear  the  Oputa  Panel  maintained  a  deafening  silence  on  judicial 
governance as a deliberate policy. It may have felt satisfied that the report of an 
earlier inquiry on the state of the Nigerian judiciary constituted sufficient scrutiny 
of  the  institution.
23  The  inquiry,  instituted  by  the  late  dictator,  General  Sanni 
Abacha was headed by another respected retired Supreme Court Justice, Kayode 
Eso, with the report named after him. It did expose some unsavoury details about 
the judicial institution in the country. Suffice to say however that the inquiry was 
about  the  state  rather  than  the  role  of  the  judiciary  during  years  of  military 
authoritarian rule in the country. It was by no means an attempt at public scrutiny 
of the judiciary for its past conduct.  In any case, the latter remit was temporally 
beyond the purview of the Eso Panel that was constituted by and conducted under 
military rule. Thus, satisfaction on the part of the Oputa Panel in this regard could 
be regarded as misplaced and out of tune with transitional justice considerations.  
   It could also be argued for the Oputa Panel that there was not in fact a public 
demand for the inclusion of the judiciary in the truth-seeking process. This is 
however due, not so much to the fact that the judiciary enjoys a reputation of 
probity. Nor is the exclusion a definitive indicator of public satisfaction with the 
existence of judicial independence, its accountability or lack of complicity for the 
suffering  inflicted  on  the  Nigerian  society  by  decades  of  authoritarian  rule. 
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Rather, the absence of such a public challenge or demand for the truth-seeking 
process to involve the judiciary would appear to be connected (at least in part) 
with the origins of the predominant segment of the institution (the common law 
courts) and perceptions of it in Nigerian society.  
   To the average citizen, the judiciary, to a large extent, constitutes one of the 
most prominent symbols of a colonial heritage. It is usually considered as being at 
some remove from the regular day-to-day activities of the common folk. Even in 
the  post-authoritarian  period  in  Nigeria  (as  elsewhere  in  Africa),  the  courts 
continue to suffer from a serious ‘social legitimacy’ deficit enjoying recognition 
within a much circumscribed segment of society
24 and certainly much less than 
the  two  political  branches  of  government.  The  judicialisation  of  politics 
(discussed later)
25 would appear to have generated a newfound bonding between 
the ‘ordinary’ citizen and the judiciary. But as will become evident, the turn to the 
judicial moderation of the turbulent political process has been largely a matter of 
expedience. From a pragmatic point of view, there is no other institution to turn to 
in order to salvage the polity from descent in to chaos. The fear is rife in the 
country that socio-political chaos will provide an excuse for the military to return 
to power. In any event, the current recourse to the judicial intervention in the 
political process does not account for the judicial years of the locust in which the 
judiciary was largely a distant institution from the man on the streets, enforcing 
laws that were considered at best alien to the majority.  
   Beyond localised and society-specific perceptions of the judiciary as an alien-
imposed elitist institution, the failure of the Oputa Panel to focus on the judiciary 
may be situated within the trend of political transition agenda in general. There is 
a general tendency to elide the critical issue of accountability of the judiciary in 
political transitions. State practice and to some extent, theoretical conceptions of 
democratic  transitions  in  post-authoritarian  societies  in  particular  (where  the 
judiciary survives military or one party rule), project a ‘let-the courts-be’ attitude. 
As far as the proper functioning of the judiciary in the post-authoritarian period is 
concerned, proponents of the democratic agenda usually content themselves with 
making textual constitutional provisions stipulating (or in cases where such had 
existed in suspension like Nigeria, reaffirming) judicial power and independence. 
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They do so in the belief that such steps are adequate for the judiciary to take on 
the enormous challenge of upholding the constitution.
26   
   The practice of incomprehensive accountability as described above is similarly 
discernible  in  the  approach  of  international  bodies  whose  remit  commends 
efficient and independent judicial practices. Their institutional focus compels, or 
at  least,  encourages  them  to  get  involved  in  judicial  reformation  as  part  of 
institutional restoration processes required in transitional societies. An apposite 
case in point is the ongoing collaboration of the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) with the Nigerian judiciary and law enforcement agencies. 
The UNODC programme being implemented for ensuring judicial integrity and 
capacity in the country has conspicuously neglected accountability of the judiciary 
for past misgovernance.
27 The approach is rather ironic because careful reflection 
on  the  judicial  record,  both  operational  and  jurisprudential,  discloses  several 
issues that justify a public accounting for the judicial role in governance during 
the period of authoritarian rule in the country to achieve the laudable aims of the 
programme.  Thus,  the  accountability  gap  remains.  The  issues  around  the 
accountability  gap  can  be  broadly  categorised  into  two.  One  is  the  legal-
jurisprudential dimension. The other is socio-political in nature. 
 
5. LEGAL-JURISPRUDENTIAL DIMENSION 
 5.1 Legitimising Military Rule 
   In  constitutionalism, judicial review of legislation is usually  conceived of in 
terms of its restraint on legislative and executive action. But there is  also the 
crucial aspect of its legitimation of laws and decisions of the political branches of 
government.  Absent  judicial  declarations  of  unconstitutionality  of  such  acts  in 
legal challenges to them, they are contra-wise invested with constitutional validity 
by  the  courts.
28  In  that  respect,  judicial  review  is  potentially  a  double-edged 
sword.     
   In  Nigeria,  the  highest  court,  the  Supreme  Court  (the  Court)  maintained  an 
ambivalent  attitude  to  the  legitimacy  of  military  rule,  right  from  the  onset  of 
military  intervention  in  the  country’s  politics.  The  judiciary  had  legitimised 
military adventurism at the earliest opportunity to pronounce on the rebellion that 
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brought the military to power in 1966. This it did in Isaac Boro v Republic
29 the 
first case that tested the waters of judicial attitude towards military rule. It came 
before the Court in December 1966, barely six months after the second military 
coup
30 in the country. 
   In the subsequent case of Council of the University of Ibadan v Adamolekun, 
31 
the court decided inter alia that the mutiny that resulted in the military usurpation 
of executive and legislative powers was a ‘military take over of the Government 
of Nigeria.’ Significantly, it went further to hold that the take over was of a nature 
that kept ‘the Constitution of the Federation alive subject to the suspensions and 
modifications  made  by  the  Decree.’
32    It  thus  legitimised  the  unconstitutional, 
purported ‘transfer’ of power by the Council of Ministers to the mutinous soldiers 
who  had  murdered  some  key  political  figures  including  the  Prime  Minister, 
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. 
   The  foundations  of  judicial  obeisance  to  authoritarian  military  rule  in  the 
country, which became an imprimatur of most judicial decisions bearing on the 
constitutionality  and  legitimacy  of  military  rule  in  the  country,  was  however 
irretrievably laid by the Court’s decision in E O Lakanmi and Kikelomo Ola v The 
Attorney –General (Western State), The Secretary to the Tribunal (Investigation 
of  Assets  Tribunal)  and  the  Counsel  to  the  Tribunal  (Lakanmi  Case).
  33  The 
substantive issue in the Lakanmi case was the constitutionality of Decree No. 45 
of  1968-  Forfeiture  of  Assets  Validation  Decree-  promulgated  by  the  Federal 
Military Government (FMG). It had among others, directed the forfeiture of the 
assets  of  the  Plaintiffs/Appellants  for  alleged  corruption  in  public  office.  The 
Plaintiffs contended that the decree was null and void for been in violation of their 
property rights guaranteed by the 1963 Republican Constitution operative in the 
country at the time.    
   The Attorney-General argued on behalf of the Defendants that the events of 16 
January 1966 that brought the FMG into power amounted to a revolution of the 
Kelsenian type that destroyed the legal system. The FMG had then become the 
supreme legislative authority in the country and its legislative powers could not be 
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assailed in any way. The Attorney-General placed much store on the provisions of 
Decree  No.1  of  1966-  Constitution  Suspension  and  Modification  Decree,  that 
provided inter alia that ‘the  Federal Military Government shall have powers to 
make  laws  for  the  peace,  order  and  good  government  of  Nigeria  or  any  part 
thereof with respect to any matter whatsoever.’ He further relied on section 1(1) 
of the Decree which modified the 1963 Republican Constitution in these terms 
               This constitution shall have force throughout Nigeria and if any other  
               law…is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution, this  
               Constitution shall prevail and the other law shall, to the extent of the  
               inconsistency, be void. Provided that this Constitution shall not prevail  
               over a decree, and nothing in this Constitution shall render any  
               provision of a decree void to any extent whatsoever.
34 
 
The Court agreed with the submission of counsel for the Plaintiffs that it was 
vested with powers of judicial review of executive action. It rejected the purported 
ouster  of  its  jurisdiction  by  the  decree,  declaring  it  a  piece  of  legislative 
judgement. But the Court, per Chief Justice Adetokunbo Ademola, nonetheless 
accorded recognition to the Federal Military Government not only as one deriving 
from ‘necessity’ and thus a ‘constitutional government’ within the contemplation 
of  the  1963  Republican  Constitution,  but  also  affirmed  the  FMG  was  ‘the 
Supreme Legislative body’ in the country. This recognition was in spite of the fact 
that it rejected the argument of the Federal Military Government that it had come 
into power through a revolution.  
   Although the Court mustered some courage to insist on judicial review of the 
executive  and  legislative  actions  of  the  federal  military  government  in  the 
Lakanmi  case,  it  capitulated  in  Adejumo  v  Johnson.
35  In  Adejumo  the  Court 
implicitly  overruled  even  the  limited  recognition  it  had  accorded  the  military 
usurpation of power in the Lakanmi Case. In its place, the Court substituted an 
unqualified acknowledgement of the events of January 16 1966 as a revolution. 
The decision in the Adejumo case was sequel to the promulgation by the FMG of 
the  Federal  Military  Government  (Supremacy  and  Enforcement  of  Powers) 
Decree No.28 of 1970,
36 barely two weeks after the decision in the Lakanmi case. 
Thus, the Court adopted and went on to retain, the plain-fact jurisprudence in the 
interpretation of military decrees in much the same way as the courts in apartheid 
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South Africa did apartheid laws.
37 The decision in the Adejumo case gave effect to 
the provisions of not only Decree No.28 but that of Section 1(1) of Decree No.1 
of 1966 that it had hitherto partly rebuffed in the Lakanmi case.  
   The plain-fact jurisprudential approach adopted by the judiciary was applied to 
its  interpretation  to  all  manner  of  legislation  promulgated  by  successive 
authoritarian  regimes  in  Nigeria.  The  duplicitous  effect  of  the  plain-fact 
jurisprudence came to the fore in the interpretation of military decrees that sought 
to suspend parts of the constitution, curtail fundamental human rights and oust the 
jurisdiction of the courts by subsequent military administrations in the country. 
The legitimation of military usurpation of power underlies the jurisprudence of 
the Nigerian judiciary in the judicial review of the fused executive and legislative 
action of the military throughout their authoritarian hold on power.  
   Mahmud  rightly  rejects  this  conflation  of  a  revolution  with  a  coup  d’état. 
According  to  him,  a  revolution  leads  to  a  complete  disintegration  of  existing 
societal structures and the establishment of a new legal order that is ‘autonomous’ 
of the previous order. A coup d’etat on the other hand has the limited aim of 
capturing political power within the framework of the existing legal structures but 
in an illegal manner. It proceeds to seek legitimacy and recognition within or from 
the (pre) existing order. 
38  
   Mahmud’s position on the nature of revolutions as against coup d’etat ought to 
be preferred on cursory assessment of political experience of authoritarianism. It 
has been demonstrated by the attitude of military usurpers in Africa, Asia and 
parts of the Middle East over time, notably in the common practice of leaving the 
judicial institution intact and seeking judicial approbation of its legitimacy. It is 
further  reflected  in  lip-service  claims  to  upholding  the  rule  of  law  and 
constitutional  arrangements  (with  certain  caveats)  by  even  some  of  the  most 
notorious dictators. 
   No  doubt  the  question  of  the  appropriate  judicial  approach  to  military 
authoritarianism is a much contested one. The merits or propriety of one or the 
other  approach  constitute  contentious  issues  that  have  attracted  scholarly 
attention. The fine points of the complex debates involved are outside the scope of 
this work. It is relevant to note in this regard that even Dyzenhaus cautioned in 
further reflections on the role of judges in the apartheid legal order that ‘one must 
be careful not to err on the side of over- or underestimation’ of what judges can do 
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within an unjust or authoritarian legal order.
39 In the case of authoritarian military 
regimes, there is little doubt the response of the military as indeed demonstrated 
by the enactment of the ‘Supremacy Decree’ following the half-hearted decision 
of the Nigerian Supreme Court in the Lakanmi Case, is to override such decisions. 
However, that state of affairs does not detract from the case for accountability of 
the judiciary. 
   Providing an account of judicial governance accords popular supremacy to the 
people and promotes the rule of law by demonstrating that the judiciary itself is 
subject  to  law.  It  also  reflects  the  responsiveness  of  the  judiciary  to  societal 
sensitivities  both  of  which  are  critical  to  its  institutional  viability.  Events  in 
Pakistan  in  2007  where  the  public  rallied  behind  the  Chief  Justice,  Iftikhar 
Muhammad  Chaudry  as  a  symbol  of  democracy  against  the  usurper,  General 
Pervez Musharraf demonstrates the point quite well.
40 
   The question of judicial accountability in transitions seeks the production of a 
record of judicial governance to highlight the nature, course and impact of the 
judicial  function  in  the  period  of  social  displacement  occasioned  by 
authoritarianism or violent conflict. It may include considering such questions as: 
Is  it  not  the  case  that  the  judiciary  served  to  perpetuate  subversion  of  the 
constitution  that  established  it  and  to  which  it  was  sworn  to  protect?  What 
considerations  conditioned  the  jurisprudence  of  the  courts?  In  the  Nigerian 
context, the question can be raised as to why for instance did the Supreme Court 
not give consideration to the question of the origin or nature of its judicial powers 
in  the  foregoing  cases?  Why  did  it  jettison  the  supremacy  clause  in  the 
constitution? 
   According  to  Mahmud,  any  court  that  evinces  a  serious  inclination  towards 
‘strict constitutionalism’ in the aftermath of a coup d’etat is ab initio obliged to 
consider the source of its own powers to determine whether they are derived from 
the ‘old’ or ‘new’ constitutional arrangement.
41 Following on Mahmud’s position, 
it can be argued that consideration of the basis of judicial powers after the military 
putsch may have proven decisive to the course of jurisprudence in the period of 
authoritarian military  rule in Nigeria. This is particularly important when it is 
considered that the Republican Constitution of 1963 in operation before military 
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incursion  into  governance  in  the  country  (unlike  the  South  African  apartheid 
constitutions)  had  an  unequivocal  constitutional  supremacy  clause  as  the  first 
substantive provision. 
    The supremacy clause has been replicated in all subsequent constitutions in the 
country.  Significantly,  unlike  the  case  in  Ghana  and  Pakistan  that  similarly 
witnessed military incursions into governance, justices of the Nigerian Supreme 
Court (and for that matter, all other judges in the country then) were not required 
to take new judicial oaths by successive regimes of military usurpers to retain 
their offices. In that way, their personal offices were hardly threatened and they 
were thus saved the moral dilemma of the propriety of publicly examining the 
basis of their power.  
   No doubt writing from the vantage position of the pinnacle of a judiciary that 
was established and continues to operate within the most controversial and longest 
ongoing conflict in the post-second world-war era, Barak asserts that  
               The democratic nature of a regime shapes the role of all branches of the  
               state. It also directly affects the judiciary…the character of the regime  
               affects the interpretive system that the judge should adopt…With a  
               regime change, the view of the judge’s role and the way it is exercised  
               also change.
42 
 
On this view, the absence of democracy impacts on the role of the judiciary and 
its institutional claims to independence. The truth-seeking process in the context 
of the political transition in Nigeria provided an opportunity for exploring the 
workings of the legal order and the judiciary. It provided a viable forum for the 
clarification of the legal or other considerations that conditioned the jurisprudence 
of the courts in jettisoning the supremacy clause in the constitution at the relevant 
period.  But  the  opportunity  for  public  accountability  of  the  course  of  judicial 
governance was frittered away. This missed opportunity raises the important issue 
of the place of popular sovereignty in the adoption of accountability measures in 
transitional contexts. 
 5.2   Imperatives of Popular Sovereignty 
    Section 14 (2) (a) of the Nigerian constitutions of 1979 and 1999 (the latter 
constitutes the transition some critics insist interim, constitution of Nigeria) lend 
constitutional support to the case for accountability of the judiciary in Nigeria to 
the  people.  Both  constitutions,  fairly  representative  of  the  dynamics  of 
constitutionalism  in  the  Nigerian  polity  in  the  post-independence  period, 
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specifically entrench popular sovereignty, providing that ‘sovereignty belongs to 
the people of Nigeria from whom government through this Constitution derives 
all  its  powers  and  authority.’  The  illegality  constituted  by  the  subversion  and 
impairment of the popular will of the people as embodied in the constitution, 
through the use of ‘superior force’, by the military according to Ogowewo, alters 
their expressed wishes on how they prefer to be governed.
43  
   Further, the unequivocal provisions of the constitution provide support for the 
proposition  that  all  institutions  of  the  Nigerian  state  owe  a  duty  of  public 
accountability  to  the  people,  the  source  of  all  governmental  powers.  This  is 
implicit in the specific vesting of sovereignty in the people of Nigeria by the 1979 
constitution  which  Ogowewo  argues  is  the  legitimate  and  validly  subsisting 
constitution of the country
44 and the transition constitution of 1999 now operative 
in the country.  
   It may be the case that there is a need to protect the judiciary from been made 
pliant  to  unbridled  subjection  to  common  public  opinion  and  that  it  maintains 
some respectable distance from the flux of (sometimes indeterminate) popular 
opinion.  It  is  however  in  the  interest  of  the  judiciary  that  such  autonomy  be 
conditioned by the realities of the society from which it derives authority if it 
hopes  to  establish  and  maintain  relevance  or  even  more  fundamentally, 
legitimacy.  The  demands  of  the  period  of  transition  when  the  need  for  social 
restructuring is more imperative than at any other are the most momentous for the 
exercise of such recognition. As stated above, a legal basis for accountability of 
the judiciary in the Nigerian context can be located in constitutional supremacy 
and with reference to Scott’s paradigm set out earlier, it is owed to the people. 
Such accountability which requires all institutions to be equally made to answer to 
the people is what Smulovitz and Peruzzoti refers to as ‘societal accountability.’
45 
    In the Nigerian situation, the case for accountability of the judiciary is made 
stronger by the fact that judicial officers are unelected. They are thus immune 
from the democratic check on public office-holders characteristic of the executive 
and  legislature.  The  public  is  precluded  from  directly  participating  in  and 
imposing  sanctions  on  perceived  improper  or  perverse  use  of  power  by  the 
judiciary  in  the  way  it  generally  does  with  politicians  in  the  executive  and 
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legislative branches of government through elections, recall, judicial review, etc. 
Even  military  adventurers  in  power  have  been  known  not  to  be  completely 
immune from one or the other form of public sanction or accountability, as the 
trials of Haile Mengistu and Hissen Habre of Ethiopia and Chad respectively have 
shown.  Such  trials  reinforce  the  imperative  of  popular  sovereignty  in 
accountability for the exercise, or more appropriately, abuse of power.  
 
6. SOCIO-POLITICAL DIMENSION 
 6.1   Corrupt and Compromised 
   There is consensus within and outside legal circles in Nigeria that the judiciary 
had been palpably corrupt. It had become a notorious fact that in the period of 
authoritarian  military  rule  in  the  country,  justice  was  available  for  sale  to  the 
highest bidder. The situation in the courts had become so bad that ‘Trials often 
turn  into  charades  where  powerful  litigants,  aided  by  unethical  lawyers  and 
faithless  judges,  manipulate  the  judicial  process  to  achieve  pre-ordained 
outcomes.’
46  Reflecting  on  the  disturbing  level  of  corruption  in  the  Nigerian 
judiciary,  Justice  Oputa  who  was  later  to  head  Oputa  Panel,  had  lamented 
rhetorically, almost two decades earlier 
               What is it that in present day Nigerian society tarnishes, desecrates and  
               disfigures the solemn, sacred and beautiful image of justice and the  
               judiciary? The answer is not far to seek. It is the cancer of bribery and  
               corruption…one is faced with the stark and naked reality that some  
               judicial officers are corrupt.
47 
   
The judiciary itself is aware of this continuing unwholesome state of affairs. Two 
leading judicial officers recently warned of dire consequences  awaiting judges 
who engage in corruption in the discharge of their duties.
48 The perception that 
corruption  exists  in  the  judiciary  has  not  changed  though  a  recent  assessment 
suggests it has been reduced.
49  
                                                 
46 A A Olowofoyeku “The Beleaguered Fortress: Reflections of the Independence of Nigeria’s 
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   Apart from corruption, by several accounts, the judiciary had become severely 
compromised in the important task of upholding human rights.
50 The nature of 
military  rule  in  the  country  led  to  severe  haemorrhaging  of  human  rights  of 
citizens. It is relevant to recall Justice Olajide Olatawura’s comments referred to 
earlier, on how the law became weak as result of military ouster clauses.
51 The 
observation justifies the case for some form of accountability by the judiciary, at 
the  very  least,  to  highlight  whether  there  was  dereliction  on  the  part  of  the 
institution entrusted with the duty of enforcing those rights.  
   The need for public judicial accounting for the past in the context of Nigeria’s 
transition is also heightened by the fact that the military scarcely showed interest 
in the enterprise of law reform, notwithstanding the plethora of decrees it passed 
in  the  course  of  its  hold  on  power.  Although  a  law  reform  commission  was 
established for the country, this was in form rather than substance. Not only was it 
poorly funded, proposals for reforms in existing legislation were largely ignored. 
As a result, the country was saddled with considerable obsolete and anachronistic 
laws even in vital areas like criminal law, evidence and commercial law. Thus for 
example,  a  1987  survey  discovered  that  pre-1900  ‘received’  English  statutes 
numbering 195 were still applicable in Nigeria.
52 Laws governing matrimonial 
causes, probate, litigation practice and procedure hardly fared better. In not a few 
instances,  the  laws  remained  (with  cosmetic  amendments  in  few  cases)  in  the 
form they were inherited from the colonial period. These were laws designed for 
the imposition of colonial authority
53 and well suited to the command-structure 
governance of military rulers. The judiciary in the period of authoritarian rule and 
beyond has been party to the enforcement of laws many of which are in clear 
violation of human rights and the spirit of successive constitutions of the country 
in the post-independence period. The situation, yet to be satisfactorily remedied, 
was lamented in recent times by no less a legal personage than a recently retired 
Chief Justice of Nigeria.
54  
   One reason for the persisting judicial attitude to authoritarian legislation is the 
adoption of the English common law jurisprudence of legislative supremacy in the 
interpretive  function  of  the  courts,  even  in  legal  systems  (like  Nigeria)  with 
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express constitutional-supremacy provisions. This is itself rooted in the training of 
Nigerian lawyers and judges in the Anglo-common law tradition which conceives 
a limited role for the interpretive role. It is a heritage that sometimes constitutes a 
burden  for  an  activist  and  transformative  judicial  agenda  desirable  for 
transitioning societies.
55 The clear preference of the jurisprudence of that legal 
tradition  for  the  plain-fact  interpretation  of  statutes  has  assisted,  if  not  the 
imposition, but certainly the sustenance of a ‘rule by law state’ as against the ideal 
of a ‘rule of law state.’
56   
   Successive military administrations foisted untold hardship and suffering on the 
mass of the people.
57 What role did or could have the judiciary played in that 
suffering? This ought to have constituted an important thematic focus of the truth-
seeking process in Nigeria in view of its broad terms of reference. Part of its remit 
was to ‘identify the person or persons, authorities, institutions or organizations 
which  may  be  held  accountable’  for  gross  violations  of  human  rights  and 
determine the motives for the violations or abuses.  
   The empirical record of the Nigerian judiciary in the period of authoritarian rule 
commends the imperative of accountability for the performance of the judicial 
function.  The  finding  of  the  Oputa  Panel  that  the  courts,  faced  with  decrees 
ousting their jurisdiction in many cases, had become ‘toothless bull dogs’ in the 
years of military rule,
58 strengthens the case for accountability of the judiciary. It 
ought  to  have  led  to  an  enquiry  on  why  the  judiciary  took  to  the  path  of 
compromise when their judicial oaths of office require fidelity to law as stated by 
the Constitution rather than military legislation. It is significant for instance that 
the judicial oaths of office were contained in the Constitution at all times. All the 
constitutions, as stated above, contained supremacy clauses. No judge was sworn 
on  military  legislation.  The  compromised  status  of  the  Nigerian  judiciary  is 
further  exacerbated by  a legacy  of questionable appointments characterised by 
nepotism  and  prebendalism.
59  The  compromised  and  corrupt  judicial  function 
generated a lacklustre attitude within the public for recourse to due process of law 
in the resolution of disputes.  
    
 6.2 Public Apathy for Due Process of Law 
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   Public mistrust of the judiciary constitutes a danger to societal cohesion and 
respect  for  the  rule  of  law.  Citizens  may  resort  to  self  help  rather  than  have 
recourse to the law and the judicial institution to resolve disputes. The effect of 
resultant distortions for the choice is fraught with serious negative consequences 
for hitherto authoritarian societies. Oftentimes, a considerable number of citizens 
are already confronted with the challenges of coming to terms with the harm they 
have suffered in the past that still remain with them.   
   Calls for transformation of the judiciary as a measure to check public apathy for 
due process of law is important for the transitioning society. Thus, calls for reform 
of  the  judiciary  have  been  particularly  strident  from  stakeholders  even  in  the 
transition  period.  Voicing  the  concern  of  civil  society  groups,  Joseph  Otteh, 
Executive Director of Access to Justice, a leading non-governmental organisation 
focused on the justice sector, stated that the judiciary required a ‘full turn around 
maintenance’
60  in  view  of  the  perversion  of  the  rule  of  law  occasioned  by 
structural deficiencies of that branch of government. His observations explain the 
considerable public mistrust of the judiciary and the whole institution of law in 
the country.   
   Cynicism about the role of judicial governance had developed in Nigeria. This 
was due in part to the dysfunctional judiciary that was steeped in corruption.
61 In 
turn, the public attacked the judicial institution. Judicial decisions became highly 
suspect sometimes without justification but owing to the persistent institutional 
reputation for corruption. The perception has been carried over into the transition 
period.
62 How did the judiciary come to such infamy as a largely failed institution 
in  the  Nigerian  polity?  This  is  a  critical  issue  that  should  have  been  given  a 
hearing by the truth-seeking process in the country.  
   It has been recognised that public accountability ‘... helps to insure that judges 
perform  their  duties  disinterestedly  and  conscientiously.’
63  This  is  in  itself 
necessary for building, restoring or ensuring public confidence in the judiciary. It 
is  also  needed  to  promote  individual  recourse  to  law  rather  than  self-help. 
Ensuring such trust is reposed in the judiciary can only be negotiated away with 
dire consequences for a fragile polity as obtains in a transitioning society.  
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    An account of the circumstances under which the judicial role was performed is 
required not only for its historical value though this may be value enough. Rather, 
it ought to be produced for its potential of providing a viable prognosis for the 
way forward in the quest for justice and reinstitution of the rule of law in the 
emerging democratic society. Transitional justice theory recognises the right of 
individuals and society to the reform of compromised and deficient institutions. 
The right to transformation of afflicted institutions can only be properly realised 
where  opportunity  is  provided  for  developing  and  scrutinising  accounts  of  the 
conduct of the institutions in the troubled period.  This remains the case even 
where the concerned institution can be considered a victim of the period. 
 6.3 Unacknowledged Victims? 
   It is something of a paradox that the Oputa Panel neglected to hold a hearing on 
the legal profession and the judiciary for an account of its governance during the 
period  of  military  authoritarian  rule  in  Nigeria.  This  is  the  case  because  the 
judiciary  itself  could  be  considered  a  victim  of  military  rule.  The  paradox  is 
heightened by the poignant description of the institution during the military era as 
a ‘beleaguered fortress.’
64 That description notwithstanding, could it be that the 
judiciary felt itself under such a heavy burden of complicity for misgovernance 
which  surpassed  (and  thus  precluded)  any  sense  of  victim-hood  during  the 
decades of military authoritarian rule? A host of questions regarding the course of 
judicial governance in the authoritarian period in the country remain unaccounted 
for. 
   The experience of the judiciary during the years of authoritarian rule in Nigeria 
was quite different from that of South Africa in a number of ways. Unlike the 
South African judiciary, the judges in Nigeria could themselves be considered, 
though  in  a  limited  sense,  victims  of  human  rights  violations.  As  Dyzenhaus 
pointed out, post–appointment, South African judges were secure in their tenure 
during the apartheid era and they  enjoyed relatively comfortable conditions of 
service.  In  Nigeria,  the  security  of  tenure  was  breached  and  judges  were 
unceremoniously dismissed or retired in a good number of cases during the years 
of military rule sometimes without any reason given.
65 A good case in point was 
in 1975 when the Chief Justice of the country, Justices of the Supreme Court, the 
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Western  State  Court  of  Appeal  and  High  Court  Judges  were  removed  by  the 
military government.
66 
   Judicial pay was poor
67 particularly when compared with the salaries paid to 
military  officers  in  executive  positions.  The  tenure  of  judges  was  on  many 
occasions violated in contravention of the Basic Principles of the Independence of 
the Judiciary
68 and the Montreal Declaration on the Independence of Judges.
69 
They lacked proper housing, worked under strained conditions, took notes in long 
hand, administered justice in ill-equipped court rooms and chambers, worked with 
ill-trained  and  unmotivated  support  staff,  etc.
70  Cases  of  violations  of  judicial 
tenure must however be qualified in one respect. The military regimes were not 
noted for interfering with the tenure of judges on the basis of (adverse) judicial 
review  of  executive  (and  or  legislative)  actions.  Rather,  judicial  purges  were 
invariably premised on allegations of corruption, even if, as in many other aspects 
of  military  conduct  of  power,  such  purges  were  carried  out  in  breach  of  due 
process.  
   It is nonetheless plausible in the Nigerian context to contend (like Dyzenhaus 
did in the case of South Africa) that the people were entitled to know why ‘men in 
so privileged position, with such an important role, and with so much space to do 
other than they did, made the wrong moral choice’ in the performance of their 
duties. This is the case because like in South Africa, Nigerian judges could have 
maintained fidelity to law (and it is again crucial to note that a few did), ‘without 
fear of serious personal repercussions’ since they were not required to follow the 
orders of the power-usurpers.
71 
                                                 
66 K Eso Thoughts on Law and Jurisprudence (MIJ Professional Publishers Limited Lagos 1990) 
25. 
67 Olowofoyeku note 46 supra at 64. It is worth noting that the situation has changed dramatically 
since the transition to democracy in the country. Judges are now some of the best paid public 
officers in the country though they still lag behind members of the executive and legislature of the 
state and federal governments. 
68 Adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment 
of  Offenders  held  at  Milan  from  26  August  to  6  September  1985  and  endorsed  by  General 
Assembly Resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985. 
69 Adopted at the First Plenary Session of the World Conference on the Independence of Judges 
held at Montreal Canada, 10 June 1983.  
70 Oko note 44 supra at 42-48. 
71 Dyzenhaus note 19 supra at 89-90.   106 
   In  manifestation  of  what  has  been  referred  to  as  ‘the  strange  irony  that 
sometimes  characterizes  the  conduct  of  public  affairs  in  Nigeria,’
72  the  post-
transition period has witnessed alleged threats to the safety  and well being of 
some judges in the conduct of their legitimate judicial functions.
 73 In contrast, for 
all  of  the  reported  cases  of  state-sponsored  murder  during  various  military 
regimes,  not  even  in  the  case  of  the  most  notorious  Generals  Babangida  and 
Abacha
74  were  judicial  officers  targeted.  Nigerian  judges  are  thus  obliged  to 
account for why they sought ‘a warm place by the fire’
75 rather than uphold the 
law for which they were specially prepared by their training and entrusted by their 
oath of office. 
   Curiously,  no  judge  is  on  record  to  have  petitioned  or  attended  the  public 
hearings of the Oputa Panel. The reason for the non-participation remains  unclear 
given that even military officers who had either participated in governance (and 
took  active  or  passive  roles  in  the  gross  violations  of  human  rights)  not  only 
petitioned the Panel on violations of their rights but were at the centre of some of 
the most dramatic sessions of the public hearings. The public hearings on petitions 
by General Oladipo Diya, (formerly No.2 man to General Sanni Abacha), General 
Abdul-Kareem Adisa (one of his key ministers), General Abacha’s Chief Security 
Officer,  Major  Hamza  Al-Mustapha  and  a  good  number  of  mandarins  in  that 
regime readily come to mind. 
   So why didn’t the judges come forward as victims? Did they feel it was below 
their office to do so? Could it be a result of some resentment and contempt for the 
truth-seeking process, similar to the response of the judiciary in South Africa to 
the TRC? One thing is for sure, judges in Nigeria have now dropped their lethargy 
to combat perceived unjust treatment in the hands of the executive that was at play 
under military authoritarian rule. Unlike in the past when dismissal and retirement 
of judges went virtually unchallenged, in the wake of the transition to democratic 
governance,  a  number  of  judges  have  challenged  their  perceived  wrongful 
dismissal  or  retirement  from  the  bench  in  the  courts  of  law.  At  least  in  one 
instance, a dismissed judge has been ordered reinstated following successful legal 
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challenge of his sack for corruption almost three years on.
76 In all events, that 
dismissed judicial officers seemed to have resigned to ‘fate’ under military rule in 
the past speaks volumes of their self-perception and the institution of the judiciary 
at that period of Nigerian socio-political and legal history. 
   In view of the of foregoing discussion, the failure of the Oputa Panel to call the 
Nigerian  judiciary  to  account  for  its  role  in  governance  in  the  period  of 
authoritarian military rule in the country can by no means be regarded as a faux 
pas. Even if arguably there is a good case to be made for the judiciary as victim of 
authoritarian rule, the truth-seeking process in Ghana clearly demonstrates that 
such a finding does not preclude the conclusion that the judiciary was complicit 
for executive (and sometimes legislative) actions that deprived citizens of their 
fundamental rights.
77 Thus, there is the need to publicly scrutinise the course of 
judicial  governance  in  post-conflict  societies  as  a  principal  measure  for 
institutional  transformation.  It  has  been  recognised  that  the  judiciary  in  post-
conflict contexts will be faced with enormous challenges of dispute resolution.
78 
Institutional transformation of the judiciary following a period of siege is critical 
to the survival of democracy and the rule of law.  This applies with equal force to 
post-authoritarian societies. 
  
CONCLUSION 
   The iconography of Justitia, the familiar symbol of law and justice, is one of the 
few that has continued to survive Renaissance art. Both the citizen and the state 
remain in obeisance to the image of the female, regally-robed and impersonal 
goddess. The reason for this, as succinctly stated by Loughlin is          
               …a rather functional one. The fact of the matter is that the State remains  
               in need of a corps of officials able to enforce and authorize the  
               imposition of violence over its citizens. Although politics, broadly  
               conceived involves a process of world-building, the State ultimately  
               exists to maintain a particular form of order, and the special task of the  
               judge lies at the sharp end of that process. As the consequence of the  
               decision of a judge, citizens lose their liberties, their property and their  
               children. This is indeed an awesome  power…
79 
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   While Loughlin’s position is arguably more apposite in a democratic society, it 
nonetheless has resonance in authoritarian societies as the Nigerian experience has 
shown. The military at no point in the course of its hold on political power in the 
country lay claim to judicial capability in the way it was quick at emphasising its 
leadership abilities derived from military training in justification of its hold on 
power where the political class had failed. This state of affairs constituted a potent 
weapon for the defence of the rule of law and human rights by the judiciary and 
for our purposes, stronger justification for insisting that the judicial institution 
maintain an unwavering fidelity to law in all circumstances.  
   Some scholars insist there are  grave limitations to or even no latitude at all 
available for affecting the state of affairs against a military regime bent on having 
its way.
80 While this may be tenable in certain circumstances, I have argued (like 
Dyzenhaus) that the ‘tales of disempowerment’ such a position portends may not 
be adequately represented in the totality of judicial experience in illiberal regimes. 
In any case there is much to be said for the need for accountability of the judiciary 
in the post-conflict period for the tacit admission of complicity in governance 
inherent in the position.  
  The crux of Dyzenhaus’ position on the Legal Hearings of the TRC appears to be 
that the institutionalisation of apartheid and the violation of human rights of a 
large  segment  of  South  African  society  which  violations  were  aided  by  the 
judiciary, made accountability of the judiciary in South Africa a moral, if not a 
legal imperative, in the country’s transition to popular democracy. It can similarly 
be argued that the existence of a nascent democracy in post-colonial Nigeria cut 
short barely six years after independence by mutinous soldiers whose adventurism 
led to the subsequent take-over of power by the military leadership (that was in 
turn)  legitimized  by  the  judiciary,  also  justifies  a  requirement  for  public 
accountability of the judiciary in the country’s transition to democracy.  
   The  case  for  such  a  process  is  arguably  stronger  if  it  is  considered  that  the 
Nigerian judiciary was a creation of a democratic constitution.
81 The antecedents 
of the Nigerian judiciary impose a heavier moral burden of public accountability 
on it. This is because of its key role in legitimising what in retrospect, was to be a 
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string of authoritarian regimes that committed a range of atrocities on the people. 
The military thus legitimated by judicial sanction, deprived Nigerian society of 
the right to determine how they were governed for about three decades. In this 
way, the judiciary played an indirect but critical role in legitimising the military’s 
plunder of the country’s resources in the process of which the later left not a few 
in misery. 
   The  Nigerian  experience  of  military  authoritarianism  has  not  been  one  of 
physical decimation of the judiciary. Rather, the judiciary acquiesced (with few 
notable exceptions)
82 to the rule of force in many cases and to the suspension, 
abridgement  or  outright  abrogation  of  human  rights  and  constitutionalism  by 
successive military regimes. Years of military dictatorship thus bequeathed the 
country  with a conservative and compromised judiciary. The versatility of the 
judiciary in making an expeditious transformation could have notable impact on 
the course of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in transitional societies.  
In this regard Ogowewo has noted that  
               ….the true test of the judiciary does not lie in its approach to the rule of  
               law when democracy is not under attack; instead, the test will be its  
               approach when democracy is severely assaulted by usurpers- when the  
               challenge to the rule of law is greatest.
 83    
 
   It is widely accepted that ‘an independent judiciary is a central pillar of the rule 
of law and in many ways a guarantor of fundamental rights of individuals and 
groups.’
84 But the very proposition presupposes an independent judiciary, not one 
that  acquiesces  to  the  subversion  of  the  rule  of  law,  a  charge  at  the  door  of 
judiciaries  that  give  effect  to  military  authoritarian  rule  like  the  Nigerian 
experience.  
   The judiciary demonstrated a lack of independence in the pre-transition period. 
This has arguably continued to feature in its recognition of questionable decrees 
(now styled Acts) including those introduced on the very eve of the hand-over that 
were unconnected to the hand-over, but instead dealt with the regulation of the 
capital market. In other words, the military were purporting to legislate for the 
civilian government, a few hours before the civilian government took over. The 
courts in true fashion never questioned this.
85 Such judicial posturing constitutes 
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eloquent testimony to the need for public accountability as a tool for effecting 
institutional transformation of the judiciary in the ensuing political transition.
86  
   The  retention  of  repressive  authoritarian  legislations  in  the  post-transition 
period, as Prempeh notes, is not peculiar to Nigeria. The neglect to effect required 
changes  as  part  of  the  transition  process  has  now,  rather  ironically,  placed  a 
disproportionate burden on the judiciary to sustain constitutionalism and human 
rights.
87 Ogowewo on his part advocates a radical judicial delegitimation of such 
statutes.  This  is  no  doubt  an  uphill  task  in  the  Nigerian  situation  where  they 
constitute a sizeable component of the statues in the books.
88 Barak supports the 
more  nuanced  approach  of  judicial  substitution  of  the  legislative  intent  of  the 
‘undemocratic  legislature’  in  such  statutes  with  that  of  the  ‘democratic 
legislator.’
89 Whatever approach is to be adopted, it can be asserted with some 
measure  of  confidence  that  only  an  accountable,  credible  and  progressive 
judiciary would be strategically positioned to discharge the onerous responsibility 
of judicial governance. The peculiar circumstance of transitioning states with its 
common incidence of ‘democratic deficit’
90 and tenuous political representation 
strongly  suggests  the  need  for  a  transformed  judicial  institution  to  secure  the 
transition in the public interest.  
   The  failure  of  the  truth-seeking  process  to  challenge  the  judiciary  to  tell  its 
truths in governance during the period of authoritarian rule in Nigeria constitutes 
a  major  flaw  in  the  otherwise  laudable  conduct  of  the  truth-seeking  process 
represented by the Oputa Panel. In the aftermath of that failure, there is much to 
be said for the apprehension that the Nigerian judiciary, still considerably staffed 
and  controlled  by  judicial  officers  appointed  by  successive  military  regimes, 
remains untransformed in the transition from authoritarian rule. As noted above, 
an ambivalent disposition suffused judicial attitudes to repressive legislations in 
Nigeria during the era of military authoritarian rule.  
                                                 
86 Not a few observers regard the country as still being in a process of transition to democracy and 
concede only the fact of civil as opposed to military but not democratic rule. See for instance E 
Madunagu  “Reviewing  the  Past,  Facing  Tomorrow”  The  Guardian  Online  Edition  (Lagos 
Thursday 17 May 2007) “By the term transition…I meant that its foundations been weak, the 
administration would be an unstable regime which would move more or less rapidly towards either 
popular democracy, neoliberal democracy, fascism (or neo fascism , if you wish), or anarchy.’ See 
also Aka note 8 supra. 
87 Prempeh note 21 supra at 1316-1320. 
88 Ogowewo note 15 supra. 
89 Barak note 1 supra at 80.  
90 A Moravcsik “Is there a ‘Democratic Deficit’ in World Politics? - A Framework for Analysis” 
(2004) 39 (2) Government and Opposition 338.   111 
   Critics have asserted that in the aftermath of the transition to civil rule in the 
country, ‘The Nigerian judiciary is still in disarray.’
91 This is due at least in part, 
to the  yawning accountability  gap on judicial  governance in the period of the 
country’s experience of authoritarian rule. That gap is still a threat to democracy 
and the rule of law in the country. It is a critical failure that currently constitutes a 
veritable  challenge  to  the  transition  in  the  country.  The  process  of  transition 
requires an independent and formidable judiciary to deepen democracy and rule of 
law, after decades of authoritarian rule. The neglect may continue to haunt the 
Nigerian society in the foreseeable future. Worse still, it could engender a reversal 
of  the  landmarks  achieved  in  the  country’s  transition.  The  accountability  gap 
identified in the foregoing analysis has had a marked effect on the judiciary in the 
post-authoritarian period. The impact of the gap in accountability of the judiciary 
for its role during the period of authoritarianism on judicial governance in Nigeria 
in the political transition will be evaluated in subsequent parts of this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91 Oko note 44 supra at 46.   112 
 
Chapter Four 
  THE JUDICIARY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN NIGERIA’S TRANSITION 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
   In previous chapters, this study focused on accountability of the judiciary for its 
role  in  governance  and  gross  violations  of  human  rights  during  the  period  of 
authoritarianism in Nigeria. It has been argued that this ought to form part of the 
transitional justice measures in the process of political change in the country. I 
sought to show that unaccountability for the judicial role in the past has created a 
gap on its institutional exercise of power during the period. However, from this 
point,  attention  shifts  to  the  impact  of  the  judicial  accountability  gap  on  the 
judicial role in the present and (presumably), the future. The remaining chapters 
will discuss the resonance of the gap on the judicial function which, in the context 
of the political transition, it will be argued, has become quite strategic.    
   In this chapter, I critically analyse the role of the Nigerian courts in mediating 
tensions that have emerged in the post-authoritarian transition period. In doing 
this, I examine jurisprudence emanating from the courts on some serious inter-
governmental  disputes  as  well  as  decisions  that  touch  upon  individual  and 
collective rights particularly connected to the transition process. The dynamics of 
democratic  transition  in  Nigeria  after  decades  of  military  rule,  dictate  the 
inevitability of these disputes. The military left a legacy of institutional distortion 
and  dysfunctions  the  result  of  which  is  a  series  of  ongoing  and  formidable 
challenges to the transitioning society. The societal distortions and dysfunctions 
extend beyond the economic, social and political sectors to the constitutional and 
legal order. This is due in part to the nature of military rule with its legendary 
disregard of the rule of law, constitutionalism and due process.  
   The Nigerian experience is complicated by the predilection of military rulers for 
a unified command-structure approach to governance in a heterogeneous society. 
Rhetorically, successive military governments paid lip-service to the preservation 
of the federal character of the country
1 but in practice, the command-structured 
                                                 
1 That is with the notable exception of the short-lived regime of Major-General John Thomas 
Aguiyi-Ironsi  from  January-July  1966  that  pioneered  military  incursion  into  governance  in 
Nigeria. He abolished the regions and the federal structure of the country. His unification policy 
was one of the major causes of the rebellion by officers from the Northern part of the country, a 
bloody coup leading to his death and Nigeria’s four-year civil war. See A Ojo “The Search for a 
Grundnorm in Nigeria: The Lakanmi Case” (1971) 20 (1) The International Comparative Law   113 
governance that characterised military rule saddled it with a caricature federation. 
Analysts have noted that such unification or ‘high degree of uniformity in the 
nature of political arrangements’ is second nature to authoritarianism.
2  
   The military legacy has predictably generated considerable tension between the 
federal (central) government and the states. The tension has brought about critical 
consequences for constitutionalism and the rule of law in Nigeria. In particular, 
the  legislature  and  largely,  the  judiciary  have  been  tasked  with  resolving  the 
executive impasse that has been the fall-out of the tension in the transition period. 
Despite the growing importance of the judicial function in transitioning polities,
3 
scant  attention  has  been  paid  to  judicial  activity  in  contemporary  African 
democratisation processes.
4 There is thus reason to critically evaluate the nature of 
judicial government in Nigeria in view of recent socio-political developments in 
the period of transition to civil rule in the country.  
   The  discussion  in  this  chapter  is  set  against  the  backdrop  of  several 
complexities.  These  include  unresolved  issues  of  transitional  justice  and 
reparations for victims of gross abuses of human rights from decades of military 
authoritarian rule discussed in Chapter One,
5 and concerns regarding the alarming 
levels  of  insecurity  in  the  Niger  Delta  (source  of  oil,  the  main-stay  of  the 
country’s economy). Other prevailing concerns are the control of the political and 
economic sectors of the country by erstwhile military rulers (or their acolytes). 
Many political office holders in the political transition have strong links to, are 
sponsored by or are actually former military officers who held political power 
during  the  authoritarian  period.  Many  erstwhile  ex-military  rulers  have 
accumulated  immense  wealth  and  either  directly  or  through  fronts,  acquired 
substantial  control  of  the  national  economy  partly  through  the  acquisition  of 
former  state-controlled  enterprises  through  privatisation  and  trade-liberalisation 
programmes. There is also the issue of continued violations of human rights in the 
post-authoritarian  period  by  a  democratic  government;  growing  poverty 
                                                                                                                                      
Quarterly 117 and A Jackson “Nigeria: A Security Overview” (2007) 96 (392) The Round Table 
587, 590-591.  
2 F Ni Aolain and C Campbell “The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted Democracies” (2005) 27 
Human Rights Quarterly 172, 182. 
3 T Ginsburg “Constitutional Courts in New Democracies: Understanding Variations in East Asia” 
(2002) 2 (1) Global Jurist 1. 
4  H  K  Prempeh  “African  Judges  in  their  Own  Cause:  Reconstituting  Independent  Courts  in 
Contemporary Africa” (2006) 4 (3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 592, 592-593. 
5 See also H O Yusuf “Travails of Truth: Achieving Justice for Victims of Impunity in Nigeria” 
(2007)1(2) International Journal of Transitional Justice 268.   114 
(associated with IMF/ World Bank economic structural adjustment programmes);
6 
electoral manipulation and political violence, etc.  
   Framing issues around constitutionalism, human rights and the critical nature of 
the role of the judiciary in contemporary Nigerian society indicates there is indeed 
an onerous responsibility on the judicial function. How the judiciary has played its 
role  in  the  post-authoritarian  period,  particularly  in  the  exercise  of  its 
constitutional powers of judiciary review can be gleaned from the jurisprudence 
emanating from decisions relating to these and sundry issues. 
  The analysis will be conducted within two politically significant period-frames; 
the transition to civil from authoritarian rule (1999-2003) and the post 2003 period 
leading to the ‘civil-civil’ transition achieved in 2007 as well as the immediate 
period  after.  This  periodisation  is  adopted  with  the  aim  of  presenting  a 
constructive template for critical evaluation of the consequences of the judicial 
accountability gap discussed in Chapters One and Three
7 on judicial governance 
in the country. The focus in this chapter is on the first period. However, as is the 
wont of on-going activities, it may sometimes inevitably overlap with the second 
period just as the evaluation of that period in Chapter Six also sometimes looks 
backwards.     
   The  adopted  framework  is  consistent  with  transitional  justice  theory. 
Transitional justice theory recognises that while a single ‘transitional moment’
8 
can  be  identified  in  ‘paradigmatic  transitions,’
9  a  number  of  transitions  (or 
transition milestones) may in fact be discernible within the process of political 
change.
10  In the context of the Nigerian transition, I argue in what follows that 
there are discernibly distinct strands in judicial governance that can be evaluated 
through  the  prisms  of  the  ‘transitions-within-a  transition’  experience  of  the 
country.   
   The  Nigerian  judiciary  has  recently  been  the  focus  of  both  national  and 
international attention as a forum that offers hope for the resolution of ongoing 
disputes and contestations in the country’s troubled political transition. Has the 
                                                 
6  O  C  Okafor  “The  Precarious  Place  of  Labour  Rights  and  Movements  in  Nigeria’s  Dual 
Transition, 1999-2005” (2007) 51 Journal of African Law 68. 
7 See also Yusuf Hakeem O “Calling the Judiciary to Account for the Past: Transitional Justice and 
Judicial Accountability in Nigeria” Law and Policy 30 (2) (2008) 194-226. 
8 Ni Aolain and Campbell note 2 supra at 181. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. at 183 (‘...we argue for the need to conceive of transitional situations not as involving one 
single transition, but in terms of  at least two primary sets…This is not to suggest that there may 
not be other co-terminus primary transitions occurring’).  
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judiciary been instrumental to furthering or impeding the transition to democratic 
rule, and the respect for human rights and upholding the rule of law? What has 
been the nature of judicial intervention in ongoing tensions that emerge from the 
interplay of a centrifugal federalism
11 and dynamics of political transition in a 
heterogeneous, resource-rich but impoverished polity? These questions constitute 
the foci of this chapter. We return to some detailed consideration of these issues 
after  a  brief  consideration  of  the  nature  of  judicial  review  in  Nigeria’s  legal 
system. 
 
2.   JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE NIGERIAN COURTS SYSTEM 
   On a prefatory note, it is relevant to identify the nature of judicial review in the 
Nigerian court system. The significance of such identification derives from the 
realisation that the concept lies at the heart of evaluations of constitutionalisation 
discussed here and the judicialisation of politics later in this research. Adopting 
Epstein  et  al’s  characterisation  of  constitutional  courts,  judicial  review  in  the 
country’s  court  system,  though  very  close  to  the  American  system,  is  best 
described as a hybrid.
12  
   Like the American system, the Nigerian court system features a diffusion of the 
power of judicial review. It is marked by the absence of a constitutional court and 
a general power of judicial review vested on all courts of superior record. These 
are the high courts (usually, but not always), the court of first instance, the Court 
of Appeal and the Supreme Court. The courts possess only concrete, as against 
abstract judicial review powers and the locus required to initiate the process are 
basically closeted, vested in individuals or groups that can establish a real stake in 
the outcome of the process. However, from judicial practice and a close reading of 
the provisions of Sections 6 and 46 of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1999, it is 
apparent that the Nigerian system of judicial review accommodates both ex ante 
and ex post facto judicial review. This is a feature it shares with some European 
constitutional courts.
13 In addition, Section 315 (3) of the Constitution provides 
for extensive judicial powers for review of legislation. It states that nothing in the 
Constitution shall be construed as affecting the power of a court of law or any 
tribunal established by law to declare invalid any existing law in the country, and 
                                                 
11 Nigeria is the fifth largest federation after India, United States, Brazil and Russia.  
12 L Epstein et al “The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of 
Democratic Systems of Government” (2001) 35 (1) Law & Society Review 117, 121. 
13 Ibid.  
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perhaps more importantly, any provisions of the Constitution. It is now apt to 
direct attention to the issues of constitutionalism and Nigeria’s transition.   
 
3. BACKWARDS WITH PLAIN-FACT JURISPRUDENCE: THE OPUTA PANEL CASE 
   Barak  contends  that  the  primary  role  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  democratic 
governance is ‘corrective’ in nature. In the discharge of this corrective function, 
the judge is expected to bridge ‘the gap between law and society as well protect 
democracy in cooperation with the other branches of government.’
14 If we agree 
with Barak on the primary duty of a supreme court, it can be argued that the 
Supreme  Court  of  Nigeria  fell  short  of  this  role  in  its  decision  in  Justice 
Chukwudifu Oputa (Rtd.) and Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission 
and Gani Fawehinmi v General Ibrahim Babangida, Brigadier Halilu Akilu and 
Brigadier  Kunle  Togun  (the  Oputa  Panel  Case).
15  In  view  of  the  resounding 
impact of the case on Nigeria’s choice of transitional justice mechanism and the 
evaluation  proposed  on  the  judicial  role  in  transitional  contexts  below,  it  is 
germane to set out the facts of the case in some detail. 
 3.1   The Facts, the Decision   
   As stated in Chapter One, the desire of former military heads of state and their 
security functionaries to resist the summons of the Oputa Panel on the Dele Giwa 
murder led to their institution of the case at the Federal High Court. The case of 
the generals is that the Tribunal of Inquiries Act (TIA) under which the Oputa 
Panel was established was not an existing law within the meaning of section 315 
of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.  Section 315 makes 
provisions  for  savings  and  modification  provisions  for  existing  laws  in  the 
country.  
   They further sought a declaration that the compulsive powers granted the Oputa 
Panel under the TIA are in breach of fundamental rights guaranteed by sections 35 
and 36 of the 1999 Constitution. Section 35 of the Constitution provides for the 
right  to  liberty  while  section  36  concerns  the  right  to  fair  hearing.  With  the 
concurrence of the parties, the Federal High Court, a superior court of record of 
                                                 
14 A Barak “The Supreme Court, 2001 Term –Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a 
Supreme Court in a Democracy” (2003) 116 (1) Harvard Law Review 19. 28. 
15 [2003] M.J.S.C 63. This is the report of the defendants’ appeal to the Supreme Court following 
the  victory  of  ‘the  Generals’  at  the  Court  of  Appeal.  Reference  will  however  be  made  in  a 
composite manner to the matter through the court of first instance (Federal High Court) through to 
the Supreme Court. Reference to ‘Courts’ in the following context  will cover all three courts 
except as specifically stated. 
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first instance, referred constitutional issues arising from the case for determination 
by the Court of Appeal.  
   On 31st October 2001, precisely ten days before the close of public hearings by 
the Oputa Panel, the Court of Appeal ruled on the issues. The Court of Appeal 
declared the ‘compulsive’ powers of the 2nd Appellant unconstitutional and in 
violation of the Respondents’ fundamental rights contained in sections 35 and 36 
of the constitution. Dissatisfied, the Appellants appealed to the Supreme Court 
and this enabled the Panel to proceed with the public hearings. The Respondents, 
also dissatisfied with the decision, cross-appealed. 
   The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal of Inquiry Act was existing law under 
section 315 of the 1999 Constitution. It also however held that the Constitution 
does  not  confer  powers  on  the  National  Assembly  to  enact  a  general  law  on 
tribunals of inquiry for the whole country. The Court also held that tribunals of 
inquiry fall within the residual powers of both the National Assembly (for the 
Federal Capital Territory) and State Houses of Assembly for the respective States. 
The Tribunal of Inquiry Act of 1966 under which the Oputa Panel was established 
therefore  took  effect  under  the  1999  Constitution  as  an  Act  of  the  National 
Assembly for the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, only. In essence, the president 
had exceeded his jurisdiction in establishing the Oputa Panel with a remit to carry 
out  a  national  inquiry  into  the  violations  of  human  rights  in  all  parts  of  the 
country. 
 3.2   Between Executive Failure and Judicial Complacency 
   The  Oputa  Panel  Case  eloquently  presents  two  of  a  number  of  unsettling 
features in the legal and statutory framework of governance in Nigeria’s political 
transition.  First,  is  the  extensive  reliance  by  all  branches  of  government  on 
autocratic legislation deriving from the colonial past and authoritarian military 
regimes. Second, is a customary, uncritical judicial adherence to precedent based 
on  principles  of  the  common  law.  Deriving  from  the  first  feature,  an  elected 
democratic transition government placed reliance on the TIA, a pre-republican 
legislation, to set up a truth commission by executive fiat at a time when it had 
become standard practice to do so elsewhere under purpose-specific legislation.
16  
                                                 
16 Thus, the South-Africa and Ghana truth commissions which in temporality closely preceded and 
succeeded the Nigerian truth process respectively were set up pursuant to tailor-made legislation. 
For  a  fairly  comprehensive  and  representative  discussion  of  the  establishment  and  conduct  of 
truth-seeking  processes  in  different  parts  of  the  world,  see  P  B  Hayner  Unspeakable  Truths: 
Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions (Routledge New York 2002) 94.    118 
   Proceeding on the second feature, the judiciary relied extensively on the case of 
Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa & Others v Doherty &Others
17 in the Oputa Panel 
Case. In the former case, the then Federal Supreme Court and the Privy Council 
both upheld objections to the compulsive powers and the jurisdictional reach of 
the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1961, which had similar provisions to the TIA. 
Without delving into the contentious value of judicial precedent, particularly in 
the common law legal tradition, it is important to make the point that the post-
republican  Nigerian  Supreme  Court  is  bound  neither  in  fact,  nor  law,  by  the 
decisions of both authorities. This is because the Federal Supreme Court was not 
the highest court for Nigeria at the time since, (as in this case) final appeals still 
lay  to  the  Privy  Council  in  London.  The  subsequent  republican  status  of  the 
country saw to the end of precisely that. Thus there was no compelling legal basis 
to rely on the case in the circumstances of political change and especially in light 
of the imperatives of transitional justice.      
   The Obasanjo administration relied on shaky legal foundations for addressing 
crucial transitional justice issues. Such reliance in the aftermath of three decades 
of authoritarian rule that earned the country international censor
18 clearly places a 
question  mark  over  the  administration’s  sincerity  and  the  degree  of  its 
commitment to justice, human rights and the rule of law in the country.  In this 
regard, the  action of the elected  executive seriously impaired the fulcrum and 
raison  d’être  of  the  transition.  However,  the  faltering  premises  of  executive 
initiative  notwithstanding,  the  transition  judiciary  can  not  be  excused  for  its 
fixation  on  a  rational  legal  formalism  that  is  impoverished  by  its  lack  of 
engagement  with  the  socio-political  circumstances  of  the  country  and  the 
developments in the international arena.   
   In  coming  to  a  decision  that  struck  at  the  root  of  the  truth-seeking  process 
epitomised by the Oputa Panel, the Nigerian judiciary in the Oputa Panel Case 
arguably undermined the rule of law (even if not deliberately), in the course of the 
country’s transition from authoritarian rule. The attitude of the Court derives from 
an entrenched judicial tradition of plain-fact jurisprudence. The Court obviously 
accorded primacy to protecting the federal character of the Nigerian polity over 
the rights of victims of gross violations of human rights.  
                                                 
17(1963) 1 WLR 949. 
18 S Mole “The 2003 Nigerian Elections: A Democratic Settlement?” (2003) 370 The Round Table 
423,424. 
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   It is noteworthy that the violations in issue were largely committed by military 
regimes that paid no more than rhetorical heed to the country’s federal character 
(like most other established aspects of the country’s law and politics) and (mis) 
ruled it in a virtually unitary fashion. In deference to the supremacy of military 
laws (decrees), the judiciary hardly intervened to check the various violations of 
the constitution in this regard. It is thus ironic that the transitional judiciary at the 
highest levels will advert to the territoriality argument as justification to shield 
alleged perpetrators from accountability and transitional justice claims.  
    Further, the Supreme Court  upheld the Court of Appeal’s position that Sections 
5(d),  11(1)  (b),  11  (4)  and  12(2)  of  the  Tribunals  of  Inquiry  Act  were 
unconstitutional  and  invalid  because  they    empower  a  tribunal  of  inquiry  to 
compel  attendance  or  impose  a  sentence  of  fine  or  imprisonment  for  non-
attendance  to  its  summons.    According  to  the  Court,  the  sections  contravene 
sections 35 and 36 of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 that provide for the right to 
liberty and fair hearing respectively. It viewed mandatory attendance at a truth 
commission as contrary to the right to personal liberty. The Court insisted that 
under the Constitution, only a court of law can make an order to deprive a citizen 
of his fundamental right to personal liberty. While this position of the Court is 
attractive, it is arguably not sustainable considering the provisions of section 35 
(1) (b) that  
               Every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty and no person shall    
               be deprived of such liberty save in the following cases and in accordance  
               with a procedure permitted by law… by reason of his failure to comply  
               with the order of court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any  
               obligation imposed upon him by law
19 
 
The Court placed reliance on section 35 (1) that provides for deprivation of liberty 
in execution of the judgement of a court, as if it were the only derogative clause to 
individual liberty in the constitution. Such an interpretive approach is, it is humbly 
submitted, in view of section 35 (1) (b), erroneous.  
   Surely, the Court could have upheld, on the basis of the proviso in section 35 (1) 
(b), the ‘coercive’ powers of the Oputa Panel under the 1999 Constitution. The 
Court is well situated to do so from its vantage position as the judicial forum of 
last resort even without recourse to comparative legislation and jurisprudence in 
South  Africa,  another  common  law  jurisdiction  with  relevant  (and  at  least 
                                                 
19 Emphasis mine. 
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persuasive)  precedent  on  the  issue.  After  all,  the  Oputa  Panel  was  constituted 
under a law and the duty to attend the summons of the Oputa Panel challenged by 
the Plaintiffs was imposed by the TIA.  
   Curious and more objectionable still, is the finding that the powers of the Oputa 
Panel  contravened  fair-hearing  provisions  of  section  36  of  the  Nigerian 
constitution. It is a basic procedural practice that has been upheld by the courts (in 
Nigeria and elsewhere) that evidentiary rules weigh against a party who fails to 
utilise reasonable opportunity provided to air the party’s side of a case, as a result 
of which such party can not be heard to complain about lack of fair hearing. In 
vindication of this position, the Court was to hold in a later case that               
               ...the duty of the court, trial and appellate, is to create the atmosphere or  
               environment for a fair hearing of a case but it is not the duty of the court   
               to make sure that a party takes advantage of the atmosphere or  
               environment by involving himself in the fair hearing of the case. A party  
               who refuses or fails to take advantage of the fair hearing process  
               created by the court can not turn around to accuse the court of denying  
               him fair hearing.
 20 
 
   On  the  facts  in  the  Oputa  Panel  case,  the  provisions  of  section  36,  it  is 
respectfully submitted should not have inured to the benefit of the generals. They 
were summoned as witnesses before the Oputa Panel and the case was initiated by 
them to obtain judicial sanction for depriving the petitioners and the  Nigerian 
society  the  benefit  of  the  facts  peculiarly  within  their  knowledge  relating  to 
serious allegations of wrong doing.    
   Contestations around the legality of the Oputa Panel in various suits and appeals 
on them instigated by the generals in an attempt at self preservation brought to the 
fore the tension that may arise between the truth-seeking process and the judiciary 
in  transition.  More  importantly,  the  Oputa  Panel  case  in  the  context  of  a 
transitioning polity arguably demonstrates the dangers inherent in the existence of 
an  accountability  gap  with  respect  to  the  judiciary  which  has  been  earlier 
identified in Chapters One, Two and Three. Such an accountability gap bequeaths 
a polity with a judiciary that may be immune to the changes taking place in the 
transition environment all around it.
21  
 3.3   Again, the Rule of Law Dilemma 
                                                 
20 See in this regard, the position of the Court in Hon. Muyiwa Inakoju & 17 Ors v Hon. Abraham 
Adeolu Adeleke & 3 Ors [2007] 4 NWLR pt. 1025 p.423 and (2007) 7 NILR 136. Available at: 
http://www.nigeria-http://www.nigeria-law.org/LawReporting.htm (25 December 2007) per Niki 
Tobi JSC at 35. Emphasis mine. 
21 See generally, Chapter Three and Yusuf note 7 supra.    121 
   Former authoritarian military rulers are reputedly difficult to bring to accounts. 
Roehrig  has  noted  that  any  attempt  to  ensure  accountability  for  violations  of 
human rights by past military regimes in post-authoritarian societies is fraught 
with complexities.
22 There is some convergence  of opinion on this view. This 
does  not,  however,  provide  justification  for  avoiding  the  challenge  of  re-
establishing the supremacy of law over the authoritarian exercise of power that 
had deprived individuals, groups and society in general, of their rights. Supreme 
Courts  in  particular  have  a  unique  role  in  a  constitutional  democracy
23  in  the 
pursuit of this objective.  
   The  decision  of  the  Court  in  the  Oputa  Panel  Case  calls  into  question  its 
commitment  to  the  duty  to  bring  alive  the  law  as  an  agent  of  positive 
transformation (largely viewed as essentially revolving around the executive and 
the legislature). The phenomenon at play in cases like the Oputa Panel in the 
context of Nigeria’s transition has been aptly described by Teitel as ‘the rule of 
law  dilemma.’
24  Teitel  has  criticised  accounts  of  the  role  of  law  and  legal 
institutions  in  transitional  contexts  that  do  not  take  cognisance  of  the 
circumstances of political change. Adopting existing conceptions of the role of 
law, she argues, restricts the potential transformative capacity of law in hitherto 
conflicted  societies.
25  In  assessments  of  what  now  constitutes  pioneering 
experiences in the ‘contemporary wave of political change’ in diverse regions of 
the world (Eastern Europe through Latin America to Africa), she identifies the 
judiciary as a powerful institutional agent for transformation. But as she further 
notes, the judiciary is itself faced with enormous challenges in the mediation of 
ensuing  transitional  tensions.  Teitel  locates  the  major  reason  for  this  in  the 
distinctive nature of law and justice in transitional contexts. Law and justice as 
handmaidens of change make a paradigm shift in transitions. Law is moulded by 
and  also  remoulds  the  society  in  the  flux  of  transition.  The  exigencies  of  the 
transition context demand new conceptions of law and justice that are at once 
‘transformative…extraordinary and constructivist.’
26  
                                                 
22 T Roehrig The Prosecution of Military Leaders in Newly Democratic Nations: The Cases of 
Argentina,  Greece  and  South  Korea  (McFarland  &  Company  Inc.  Publishers  North  Carolina 
2002). 
23 See generally Barak note 14 supra. 
24 R G Teitel “Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation” (1996-7) 
106 (7) Yale L.J 2009, at 2018-2022. 
25 Ibid.   
26 Ibid. at 2014   122 
   The foregoing formulation constitutes what can be considered a historication of 
law and justice within the context of transitions. Adjudication by a ‘transitional 
judiciary’
27 in neglect of the sui generis role of law and thus, the adjudicatory 
function, positively threatens the aspirations for change constitutive of the whole 
process  of  political  transition.  Further,  it  raises  the  question  of  the  continued 
relevance of that arm of government in the post-conflict era and its  ability to 
foster the rule of law.   
 3.4   The Judiciary, Transition and the Transformative Agenda 
   The  gap  in  governance  created  by  a  transition’s  peculiar  political  power-
dynamics  accentuates  the  need  for  a  judiciary  committed  to  constructively 
‘engage  with  the  transformative  agenda,’
28  ideally  the  hallmark  of  and 
legitimising justification for the transition in the first place. This is particularly 
relevant in the context of a transition that has resulted not in a real (as is the 
aspiration  of  the  people  and  mantra  of  the  elites  now  in  power)  but  a  virtual 
democracy: in other words, a situational dynamic in which the ruling elite have 
perfected the art of manipulating the transition process in a way that does not 
dislocate  their  hold  on  power  and  yet  creates  the  impression  that  liberal 
democracy  has  been  instituted.
  29  The  transition  to  democratic  rule  in  Nigeria 
presents a good example of this socio-political dynamic.  
   The elections in the political transition from over three decades of authoritarian 
rule were strongly contested or influenced by civilians who had held offices under 
the past military governments or were actually  retired military officers in past 
military  regimes.
30  Ex-President  Olusegun  Obasanjo  epitomised  this  dynamic. 
The former army general and military head of state is generally believed to have 
been tipped and largely sponsored for president in 1999 by the country’s former 
self-styled ‘military president’, General Ibrahim Babangida. General Muhammadu 
Buhari,  himself  a  former  military  head  of  state  remains  one  of  the  frontline 
contenders  to  the  presidency  while  General  Babangida  only  dropped  his 
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presidential ambitions shortly before the April 2007 elections. During the 2003 
elections, three generals had been front runners.
31 They had all ruled the country 
as military heads of state at one time or the other. It remains an irony of the 
democratic transition in Nigeria that military officers who ran the country aground 
still occupy the most prominent positions in elite power contestations.  
   The current president of the Nigerian Senate (the upper house in the two-tier 
legislature,  the  National  Assembly),  is  also  a  retired  general  and  ex-military 
governor of a state, just as the longest-serving chairman of the ruling People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP), Ahmadu Ali, is a retired army general and one time 
Minister for Education.
32 A number of state governors, law makers in the federal 
and state legislatures, ministers and other key public office holders are ex-military 
men, who held strategic public positions under various military regimes in the 
country.
33  The  phenomenon  aptly  referred  to  as  ‘feigned’  ruler  conversion
34 
situates  the  judiciary  as  the  unlikely  institution  of  state  for  holding  out  the 
prospect of a genuine realisation of democracy and rule of law commitment as 
underpinning the political transition.  
   The situation in Nigeria is not unique as the experience in Ghana (embodied in 
what has been referred to as the ‘Rawlings factor’) has shown. Jerry Rawlings’ 
hold on power in Ghana in the post-authoritarian transition period was so potent 
that it staved off accountability for human rights violations for eight years after 
the transition to democracy. This was no surprise considering he got elected as 
civilian president under the transition programme he instituted and supervised.  
Beyond that, the ‘Rawlings factor’ also reputedly conditioned largely, the choice 
of  transitional  justice  mechanism  eventually  adopted  by  the  successor 
administration to achieve accountability for human rights violations.
35 The politics 
of transitions in post-communist Eastern Europe and Latin America have often 
followed  a  similar  course.
36  The  reason  for  this  may  not  be  far-fetched; 
democratic politics, for all of its merits, is after all a game played with resources 
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(financial  and  material)  often  in  abundance  in  the  arsenals  of  erstwhile 
authoritarian rulers, often privileged by plundered state resources amassed during 
their tenures. Against this backdrop, it is little wonder that the political dividend 
the transition process has delivered is a quasi-democracy.
37  
    Again, the formidable challenges posed by powerful ex-military rulers against 
efforts to obtain justice in the transition period are largely consistent with the 
mixed results and varied experience of attempts elsewhere. While in some Latin 
American  countries  like  Argentina,  prosecutions  were  later  ‘rolled  back’  in 
deference  to  military  take-over  threats,
38  the  judiciary  in  Greece  contributed 
positively and directly to the restoration of the rule of law by way of fearless 
adjudication in prosecutions involving erstwhile military rulers in the country.  
   According to Teitel, twice over confronted with the dilemma of the rule of law, 
the courts in Unified Germany adopted a jurisprudence in which ‘moral right’ 
trumped a formalist (plain-fact) approach to law, lending credence to the view that 
transitional justice necessitates a sui generis conception of law. In the context of 
post-communist Eastern Europe’s experience in transition to liberal democracy, 
the Hungarian judiciary similarly opted for a transition-sensitive response to the 
rule of law dilemma by protecting the individual’s right to security. Teitel posits 
that conditioned by different ‘historical and political legacies’, both judiciaries 
arrived  at similar results of ‘transformative understandings’ of the rule of law 
despite charting different courses.
39 
   The judiciary at all times, but especially in the flux of the transition context, 
must be wary of the designs of any individual or group to have recourse to judicial 
process as a shield against justice. This is particularly important for the restoration 
and  fortification  of  the  rule  of  law  in  a  transitional  setting.  Such  awareness 
appears to have been lost on the Nigerian Courts in the Oputa Panel Case. It is a 
paradox that the military would have recourse to the rights-regime and the courts 
to stave off accountability. While in power, when it was not busy corrupting or 
trying to subvert the judiciary through bribery and exclusion clauses, it treated its 
efforts at independence with contempt at best. Military governance is unarguably 
a violation of the rule of law. It violates the constitution of virtually every modern 
state.    
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   The  judiciary  had  become  largely  impotent  in  upholding  the  rights  of 
individuals in the era of military rule in the country. In the appeal case of Nwosu v 
Environmental Sanitation Authority,
40 to take but one example, a Justice of the 
Supreme  Court  boldly  advised  victims  of  rights  violations  to  seek  redress 
elsewhere.  He  concluded  that  the  Military  left  no  one  in  doubt  as  to  the 
inviolability of their decrees. This apologia was borne as much out of a sense of 
frustration  of  the  courts  with  the  importunate  and  contemptuous  treatment  of 
judicial  decisions  (and  the  institution  as  a  whole)  by  successive  military 
administrations  as  from  an  attempt  at  self-preservation.  In  a  way  though,  it 
reinforces the need for accountability for the nature of judicial governance during 
the years of authoritarian rule. How or why was this situation possible? Clearly, 
considered against the background of the intransigence of the Nigerian military 
class  towards  the  judicial  institution  and  rule  of  law  while  in  power,  it  is 
paradoxical that the military would turn to the courts ostensibly to protect their 
rights.  
   However,  the  recourse  of  the  Nigerian  generals  to  the  courts  reinforces  the 
proposition that a virile, dynamic, independent judiciary is central to the nurture 
of  democracy  and  human  rights.  If  the  courts  maintain  their  independence, 
ultimately, both the rulers and the ruled are always protected. The virility of the 
judiciary goes a long way to ensure good governance at all times. The guarantee 
of judicial independence and justice through due process of the law constitutes a 
check on the inordinate exercise of political power. 
   The decisions of the Nigerian courts in the legal challenges to the Oputa Panel, 
the key mechanism in the process of restoring human rights and achieving justice 
for  victims  of  impunity  in  the  transition  to  democratic  rule,  raises  concerns 
regarding  how  the  courts  intend  to  respond  to  the  demands  for  justice  and 
acknowledge violations of human rights. This also extends to what the role of the 
courts will be in mediating critical conflicts in the transition era and beyond. One 
of the concerns is that it appears the courts are pliant to the wishes of the ex-
military  rulers  (who  appointed  most  of them)  and  who  continue  to  participate 
directly, by proxies or hover visibly in the background of socio-political life in the 
country. This leaves a question mark over their required decisional independence.  
   Another is the fact that despite the recourse of the plaintiffs to human rights 
provisions as one of the twin bases of their case, none of the Courts, not even the 
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Supreme Court, seized on the opportunity to invoke the obligations of the country 
under  international  human  rights  law.  Significantly,  counsel  to  one  of  the 
Appellants/Defendants  had  canvassed  that  ‘…the  Tribunal  of  Inquiry  (the 
HRVIC)  was  set  up  in  connection  with  violation  of  human  rights…  for  the 
purpose of implementing a treaty.’
41This provided the Court with the opportunity 
for  advertence  to  the  treaty  obligations  of  the  country  under  the  Universal 
Declaration  of  Human  Rights  (UDHR),
42  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and customary international law.  
  But while the Court conceded that the Oputa Panel was set up in connection with 
human rights violations, it rejected out of hand any link with the country’s treaty 
obligations. In the view of the Court, there was nothing in the enabling law (the 
TIA) to validate that proposition. It thus rejected one of the mediating forces in 
transition as theorised by Teitel. That line of reasoning also deprived the Court of 
a core value of international law in providing stable understandings of the rule of 
law in transitional contexts.
43  
  Taken together, the two issues raise a third and one perhaps more profound: 
judges continue to apply and interpret the unreformed set of laws inherited from 
the authoritarian period with ‘uncritical vigour’
44 that was the hallmark of their 
decisions at the time the laws were handed down by dictatorial regimes. While it 
is not argued that all the laws passed during the authoritarian period are bad with 
reference  to  their  content,  as  discussed  earlier,  there  are  substantive  and 
procedural reasons for viewing a good deal of military made legislation in the 
country with suspicion. Further, it is interesting to note that it was not an issue of 
debate  nor  was  it  suggested  as  to  whether  judges  invariably  appointed  by  the 
authoritarian  military  regimes
45  should  resign  given  the  questionable  role  the 
judiciary played in the pre-transition period. None did. Again, this followed the 
pattern  elsewhere.
46  The  oversight  that  has  left  the  judiciary  intact,  no  doubt 
strengthened  in  the  Nigerian  experience  by  a  tradition  of  military-imposed 
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constitutionalism,  may  be  partly  responsible  for  judicial  apathy  to  the  policy 
issues surrounding the Oputa Panel Case. 
   It is arguable that the judiciary is obliged to resolve the issues at stake in the 
Oputa Panel Case from the perspective of its national as well as international 
significance. From the national perspective, the country is in search of a lasting 
transition to a democratic society where the rule of law will substitute whimsical, 
authoritarian  and  usually  brutish  deprivation  of  political,  economic,  social  and 
cultural rights. Not a few Nigerians had been denied their rights in the period of 
military rule aptly described in the words of Justice Oputa in (biblical allusion, no 
doubt) as ‘the years of the locust’. An overly narrow interpretation of precedent 
by an unreformed, unaccounted for judicial body would put rectification of this in 
jeopardy.   
   On the international level, the country was in dire need of assuming its pride of 
place  in  the  comity  of  nations  as  the  foremost  black  nation  in  the  world 
considering its enormous potential in light of its human and material resources.
47  
More importantly, the country’s legal obligations under international human rights 
covenants  required  the  deployment  of  an  effective  mechanism  to  secure 
reparations  for  victims  of  gross  violations  of  human  rights  that  ought  to  be 
promoted  by  a  robust  engagement  of  the  judiciary  with  transitional  justice 
process. 
 3.5. Safety in a Cocoon: Ignoring International Human Rights Law 
   The  Court  ought  to  have  taken  cognisance  of  the  transitional  status  of  the 
country,  seized  the  opportunity  to  enunciate  and  identify  with  the  developing 
jurisprudence of the imperative for accountability and justice for victims of gross 
human  rights  violations  through  an  affirmation  of  the  right  to  truth.
48  Some 
scholars
49 are of the view that this right is guaranteed by Article 19 of the UDHR 
and Article 9(1) the  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Afrocan 
Charter).  While  the  former  has  come  to  assume  the  status  of  customary 
international law, Nigeria is party to the latter. 
    The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court) has been 
the most progressive of existing human rights mechanisms in its explication and 
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development of a jurisprudence affirming a right to truth for victims of human 
rights violations. The Inter-American Court, along with its sister mechanism, the 
Inter-American  Commission  on  Human  Rights,  faced  with  a  large  number  of 
‘enforced disappearance cases’
50 has stated in a number of its decisions that there 
is a right to truth for relations of victims of such disappearances.
51 The locus 
classicus on the matter is the case of Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras
52 where the 
Inter-American  Court  held  that  relations  of  an  individual,  who  was  arrested, 
reportedly tortured and then ‘disappeared,’ were entitled to have the report of an 
independent  and  transparent  investigation  carried  out  by  the  State  into  the 
disappearance. 
    Counsel to the Oputa Panel advanced the argument (without success) that it was 
properly set up under the African Charter. The Court held that for this to prevail 
there was the need for specific legislation setting up the Oputa Panel and investing 
it with powers to carry out an inquiry of the nature the Oputa Panel was meant to 
accomplish.
53 The constitutional panel
54 of the Supreme Court of Nigeria made 
only a dismal reference to international human rights law despite the country’s 
obligation in respect of the African Charter.                     
   The socio-political circumstances of the country at the time required the courts 
to adopt a reflexive jurisprudence in the determination of the Oputa Panel Case. 
The  Supreme  Court  of  Nigeria  in  particular,  ought  to  have  proceeded  on  the 
premise  that  the  issues  arising  from  the  case  transcended  the  question  of  the 
personal  rights  of  the  plaintiffs.  Regrettably,  like  the  Court  of  Appeal,  the 
Supreme Court preferred placing premium on how the ‘coercive’ powers of the 
Oputa Panel interfered with individual rights. A broader perspective commends 
the view that the issues involved may no doubt ‘offend’
55individual rights. Yet, 
they also border, even if implicitly, on the obligation of the country to ensure that 
                                                 
50 S Davidson The Inter-American Human Rights System (Ashgate Publishing Company Aldershot 
Dartmouth 1997). 
51 See for instance Neira Alegria v Peru Inter American Court H.R series No.20 (1995), 16 HRLJ 
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victims of human rights violations are provided with an opportunity to be heard 
and provided an effective remedy.    
   The decisions of the Nigerian Courts on the Oputa Panel arguably demonstrate a 
glaring disconnection of the judiciary with the transitional realities of the society. 
As mentioned earlier, Nigeria ratified the African Charter in 1982. The country 
had gone further to incorporate it into domestic legislation as far back as August 
1983. The Supreme Court of Nigeria is bound to respect international customary 
law as embodied by the UDHR. It also has a ‘double’ obligation in respect of the 
African Charter that is at once an international treaty and a municipal legislation. 
The  latter  reinforces  and  expands  the  limited  bills  of  rights  encompassed  in 
successive Nigerian constitutions including the current one of 1999.   
   The  decisions  of  the  Nigerian  courts  in  the  Oputa  Panel  Case  reflect  an 
impervious disposition against the current position of international human rights 
law regarding state obligations on victims’ right to truth and accountability in 
transitional societies. The attempt by counsel for the Oputa Panel to open the 
window  was  resisted  by  the  only  justice  who  did  not  go  beyond  a  cursory 
reference to it. The significance and historic nature of the case does appear to 
have been lost on the courts.  
   Ratification of international covenants by a state constitutes an undertaking to 
fulfil the commitments stated in them. A state voluntarily surrenders part of its 
sovereignty in ratifying international covenants. On questions of international law, 
treaty  obligations  and  human  rights,  the  decisions  of  the  United  Nations 
specialised committees and regional human rights institutions deserve more than a 
‘persuasive’ status. This is in line with state-party obligations under international 
law.  The  obligations  include  according  recognition  to  decisions  made  by 
mechanisms established for ensuring compliance with the instruments. It can be 
argued that decisions on covenants’ provisions by appropriate bodies ought to be 
regarded as canons to be observed by contracting parties. Otherwise, the whole 
field of international law will be rendered irrelevant.    
 3.6    Privileging Domestic Law over International Law 
   The foregoing further raise the propriety of the precedence sometimes accorded 
to  domestic  law  (ordinary  or  constitutional)  over  international  covenants.  The 
issue is particularly topical in jurisdictions like Nigeria and South Africa where 
the constitution requires that a treaty must be enacted by the national legislature in   130 
order for it to take effect as binding law in the country.
56 Nigerian courts have 
developed  an  ambivalent  jurisprudence  on  the  issue.  In  Gani  Fawehinmi  v 
General Sanni Abacha,
57 the Supreme Court of Nigeria held that the provisions of 
the African Charter can not prevail over the Nigerian constitution. In the lead 
judgment, Ogundare JSC conceded that the Charter as enacted under Nigerian 
Law  (Cap.  No.10,  Laws  of  the  Federation  of  Nigeria,  1990)  possessed  an 
‘international flavour’ and ‘a greater vigour and strength than any other domestic 
statute’. However he proceeded to hold that  
               But that is not to say that the Charter is superior to the constitution…Nor  
               can  its international flavour prevent the National Assembly…removing  
               it from our  body of municipal laws by simply repealing Cap No.10.
58 
 
With that, the constitutional (and highest) panel of the Supreme Court overruled 
the decision of the Court of Appeal. The latter had accorded special and decidedly 
higher  status  to  the  African  Charter.
59  The  Court  of  Appeal  had  decided  the 
international statute had superior status to other municipal laws. It is submitted 
that the position of the Court of Appeal which accords special recognition to the 
statute as an international covenant ought to be the correct statement of the law. 
The judicial position that state constitutions are superior to international law the 
same state contracted to adhere to, can not be valid. Such jurisprudence hits at the 
roots of international law. It is standard to find that treaties provide for the binding 
nature  of  their  provisions  on  state  parties  and  require  that  they  take  adequate 
measures for the implementation of their provisions. A good example is Article 2 
of the ICCPR 
               Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures,    
               each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the  
               necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with  
               the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other  
               measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in  
               the present Covenant.
60 
 
   In view of Article 2 of the ICCPR, it should not be open to municipal courts to 
override treaty provisions by domestic law. Cases of apparent or implicit conflict 
between  the  two  ought  to  be  resolved  in  favour  of  international  law.  This  is 
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consistent with Articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention.
61 Article 26 affirms 
the binding obligation created by treaties on contracting states. Article 27 provides 
that provisions of domestic law may not be invoked to justify failure to perform 
treaty obligations.  
   The Nigerian courts ignored the obligation of the country under the ICCPR. 
Article 2(3) provides that individuals whose rights or freedoms recognized by the 
covenant are violated are entitled to an effective remedy. The ICCPR similarly 
guarantees  to  an  individual  claiming  such  a  remedy  a  right  to  have  his  claim 
determined ‘…by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities or 
by any other competent authority provided by the legal system of the State’. The 
latter  clause  any  other  competent  authority  covers  a  Truth  Commission 
established  by  law  (like  the  Oputa  Panel)  with  a  mandate  inter  alia,  to 
‘investigate’  cases  of  rights  violations  and  ‘make  recommendations’  for 
‘appropriate compensation.’        
   The Oputa Panel clearly constituted the strongest if not the only mechanism 
chosen  by  the  government  to  comply  with  its  obligations  in  this  context  as 
discussed  earlier.  The  mandate  of  the  Oputa  Panel  addressed  virtually  all 
foregoing obligations. Only a handful of individuals (less than ten) were facing 
criminal  charges  at  the  time  for  some  of  the  atrocities  committed  during  the 
Abacha regime. To date, none of the trials has been concluded. Over 8 years of 
protracted trial of the former Chief of Army Staff, General Ishaiya Bamaiyi and 
four  other  minions  of  the  late  dictator,  General  Sanni  Abacha,  in  The  State  v 
General  Isahiya  Bamaiyi  &  4Ors
62  typifies  how  the  current  state  of  Nigeria’s 
criminal law and procedure can be exploited by powerful individuals to frustrate 
the administration of criminal justice in the country.  
   It is pertinent that in the context of the transition in Nigeria, the rights of victims 
to obtain a remedy thereby relied to a great extent on the truth-seeking process. It 
was quite open to the Supreme Court in particular, as the court of last resort, to 
have  taken  the  expansive  view  of  the  facts  and  law  and  come  to  a  radically 
different decision. Disappointingly, it took a rather restricted view of the issues in 
the case. The decision did not take cognisance of the fact that the nation was at the 
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threshold of history, in transition and desirous of making a decisive break with a 
past of human rights violations.  
     Truth Commissions have now acquired the status of a recognised mechanism 
for  addressing  past  human  rights  abuses  in  transitional  societies.
63  They  have 
taken  a  position  of  increasing  significance  alongside  other  transitional  justice 
mechanisms. They play an important role in efforts to restore the rule of law in 
post-authoritarian and post-conflict societies. The Supreme Court ought to have 
seized upon the reliance of the applicants on the fundamental rights provisions 
guaranteed by the constitution to consider the right of victims to a remedy as 
provided  by  the  foregoing  provisions.  This  would  have  provided  it  with  a 
balanced progressive jurisprudence on the matter.    
 3.7   Policy Considerations and Transitional Justice Claims 
   Apart from normative imperatives of international law, policy considerations 
should have been positively taken into account by the Court to the benefit of the 
defendants in the Oputa Panel Case. Nwabueze has made the important point that 
consideration  of  public  policy  may  contribute  positively  to  judicial 
determinations.  The  guiding  principle,  he  advocates,  is  that  public  policy 
considerations,  particularly  of  the  subjective  type,  be  subordinated  to  legal 
principles and ‘objective standards.’ He further suggests that ‘considerations of 
expediency’ in deserving instances ‘may justifiably inform the application of law 
by the courts in the solution to problems.’
64 Nwabueze’s postulation on the value 
of  public  policy  in  judicial  decision-making,  it  can  be  argued,  supports  the 
position that the Nigerian courts should have had advertence to the principle to 
decide the Oputa Panel Case in a manner cognisant of the societal expectations at 
the time in Nigeria’s socio-political history.  
   A crucial issue on which the Nigerian courts found for the applicants was the 
unconstitutionality  of  the  so  called  ‘coercive’  or  ‘compulsive’  powers  of  the 
Oputa Panel. These were the powers of the Oputa Panel to subpoena witnesses
65 
and  punish  for  contempt.
66  The  courts  held  that  those  powers  impugned  the 
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65 See Section 6 of the Tribunals of Inquiry Act.  
66 Ibid. Section 11.    133 
fundamental right to liberty guaranteed by section 36 of the 1979 constitution of 
Nigeria (now section 46 of the 1999 constitution). This aspect of the decision in 
the Oputa Panel case, even from the purely formal legal point of view, is curious. 
The right to liberty under the Nigerian  constitution of 1999 as well as earlier 
constitutions, and indeed in line with international human rights law and practice, 
can be and is in practice derogated from in defined circumstances. One context in 
which  such  derogation  might  take  place  concerns  reasonable  suspicion  of  the 
commission of an offence, which was precisely in issue before the Oputa Panel.            
   A Truth Commission has an extended form of inquiry as its core function. This 
core function can be easily frustrated or defeated if the truth-seeking body lacks 
the  power  to  summon  witnesses  and  issue  subpoena  for  the  production  of 
evidence. Such power is in state practice not at all novel for quasi-judicial bodies 
in the country in question. Similar powers are statutorily conferred and exercised 
with judicial sanction by professional disciplinary bodies in Nigeria.
67  
   By  way  of  comparison,  the  South  African  TRC  had  very  wide  powers  to 
summon  witnesses,  subpoena  evidence,  and  order  the  search  of  premises  and 
seizure  of  materials
  68  as  part  of  its  notably  ‘significant  procedural  powers.’
69 
Powers of similar purport were contained in the Ghana National Reconciliation 
Commission Act that established a subsequent truth commission.
70  It is doubtful 
that  a  truth  commission  without  such  powers  can  effectively  carry  out  its 
functions.
71 At the very least, the relevance of such a truth-seeking process will be 
diminished.  In  all  events,  the  Court  ought  to  have  positively  construed  the 
provisions of section 8 of the TIA that emphasised the fact-finding remit of the 
Oputa Panel. It provided that evidence taken under the Act shall be inadmissible 
against any person in any civil or criminal proceedings except in the case of a 
person charged with giving false evidence before the members. Section 10 further 
reinforced the protection granted to witnesses testifying before the Oputa Panel by 
                                                 
67 See for instance, the Medical and Dental Practitioners Act Cap 221 (now Cap M8, 2004) Laws 
of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 which establishes the Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria 
(MDCN).  The  Act  empowers  the  MDCN  to  enact  rules  of  professional  conduct  for  medical 
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68 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (PNURA) No.34 of 1995. See Sections 30, 
31, 32 and 33. 
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restating  the  rule  against  self-incrimination  as  the  standard  set  for  witnessing 
before a court of law.  
    In  contrast,  a  reflexive  jurisprudence  suggesting  a  constructive  engagement 
with the process of transition was enunciated by the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa  in  litigation  challenging  the  truth-seeking  process  in  the  country’s 
transition to popular democracy. The decision of the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa (the Constitutional Court) in Azanian Peoples’ Organisation (AZAPO) & 3 
Ors v President of the Republic of South Africa 4 Ors (the AZAPO Case)
72 stands 
out  in  this  regard.  The  applicants  sought  an  order  declaring  the  amnesty 
provisions in section 20 of the TRC Act void. They were particularly aggrieved 
that section 20(7) of the TRC Act extinguished criminal or civil liability of the 
perpetrator  for  the  amnestied  criminal  act.  The  absolution  from  liability  also 
extended to the state as well as any other body, individual or corporate, that would 
have been vicariously liable for the violation in question.  
   In approaching the issue, the Constitutional Court conceded that the provisions 
could be considered a limitation of the constitutional provisions on the right to 
seek  settlement  of  disputes  in  a  court  of  law  guaranteed  by  section  22  of  the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. In resolving the issue, the Court 
resorted to the constitution to determine whether there was any other provision 
that permitted a limitation to the right in section 22.  In the event there was none, 
it sought to determine whether the limitation could be justified in terms of section 
33(1) of that constitution which allowed for some limitations by ‘law of general 
application’  to  rights  provided  in  the  constitution.  However,  the  Court  placed 
premium on the fact that the society was in transition.  
    Thus, while the Constitutional Court recognised that  
               every human being must feel grave discomfort in living with a  
               consequence which  might allow the perpetrators of evil acts to walk the  
               streets of this land with impunity, protected in their freedom by an  
               amnesty immune from constitutional attack 
 
 it preferred to be guided by the dynamics of the transitional context when it stated 
that  ‘the  circumstances  in  support  of  this  course  require  carefully  to  be 
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appreciated.’
73  In  recognition  of  the  social  context,  the  Constitutional  Court 
emphasised the need to provide an environment conducive to the emergence of 
the truth. The Constitutional Court held that surfacing the truth could only be 
achieved where perpetrators were assured that they would not be liable to trials, 
criminal or civil for coming forward to give their testimonies. The question of 
amnesty as a part of the truth-seeking process, the Constitutional Court noted, was 
part of a ‘historical situation’ the country was confronted with in the process of 
transition to a democratic order.
74 
   Arguably, the Constitutional Court was aided in its decision by the fact that the 
operative constitution was negotiated for a society in transition. Thus it held that 
                The real answer …seems to lie in the more fundamental objectives of  
               the transition sought to be attained by the constitution and articulated in  
               the epilogue itself. What the constitution seeks to do is to facilitate the  
               transition to a new democratic order, committed to ‘reconciliation  
               between the people of  South Africa and the reconstruction of society.’
75  
 
But the purposive interpretation placed on the  constitutional provisions by the 
unanimous  decision  of  the  Constitutional  Court  was  central  to  achieving  the 
historic purpose.
76 This is particularly so when it is considered that Mahomed DP, 
delivering the lead judgement, concluded inter alia that his decision to uphold the 
amnesty provisions of the TRC Act was based on the ‘most comprehensive and 
generous’ view of the relevant constitutional provisions.
77  
   In this way the decision in the AZAPO Case upholding the constitutionality of 
the  amnesty  procedure  served  to  progress  the  truth-seeking  process  in  South 
Africa and this stands it in contrast with the Oputa Panel Case. However, it is 
noteworthy that though the Oputa Panel Case constitutes an example of negative 
interaction between the transitional judiciary and transitional justice mechanisms, 
it is by no means unique. The ensuing tension is similarly reflected in a few other 
legal challenges to the TRC. A notable reference is the decision of the Appellate 
Division  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  South  Africa  (now  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Appeal) in Brigadier Jan du Preez and Major Gen. Nick van Rensburg v Truth 
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74 Ibid. at 22.  
75  Ibid. at 38 per Mahomed DP. 
76  It  is  apt  to  note,  that  the  decision  in  the  Oputa  Panel  Case  was  heard  not  only  by  the 
constitutional panel of the Supreme Court of Nigeria; the highest in the country, but the decision 
was also a unanimous one.   
77 AZAPO Case note 72 supra at 44. 
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and Reconciliation Commission.
78 The TRC, pursuant to its powers to determine 
its  rules  of  procedure  under  section  30  of  the  TRC  Act,  sought  to  create  an 
informal  and  culturally-sensitive  atmosphere  for  victims  to  narrate  their 
experiences before the Human Rights Violations Committee (HRVC). One of the 
ways it hoped to achieve this was by excluding cross-examination.  
   Brigadier  Jan  du  Preez  and  Major  Gen.  Nick  van  Rensburg  challenged  the 
validity of section 30 of the TRC Act. They claimed it was in violation of section 
24 of the 1993 of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The 
TRC had caused to be served on them notices to the effect that ‘an unnamed 
witness would testify that they were involved in, or had knowledge about, the 
poisoning and disappearance of a person, also unnamed’ at stated location and 
date. They demanded prior service of the statements of the witnesses before the 
scheduled hearings, a request the TRC turned down. The case for the TRC was 
that the remit of the Committee was investigatory and not judicial and thus it 
ought not to be bound by the legal formalism of courts.  
   The Supreme Court upheld the objection of the Applicants on the premise that 
the TRC was obliged to observe the principles of natural justice notwithstanding 
the nature of the proceedings. Once the TRC received information that may be 
prejudicial to a person, it was under obligation to furnish the concerned individual 
with such information prior to its been heard publicly as information of that nature 
could lead to criminal proceedings. The decision significantly hampered the work 
of the TRC. It led not only to logistics problems but also the rather awkward 
circumstance  of  prior  exposure  of  the  Commission’s  report  to  alleged 
perpetrators.
79   
    Unlike the constitutional situation in South Africa, the 1999 constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria under which the truth-seeking process in Nigeria, 
reflected in the Oputa Panel Case was challenged by the generals, remains much 
contested. Initiated and imposed by the military as part of a transition to civil rule 
programme,  it  lacked  public  ownership.
  80  Again,  as  earlier  noted,  the  truth-
seeking process was initiated by executive action under an existing legislation as 
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against  the  purpose-designed  legislation  of  the  TRC.  This  may  have  piled  the 
stakes somewhat against the Oputa Panel.            
    The needs of the times, restoration of the rule of law, reparations for victims of 
gross human rights violations and transformation of societal institutions, required 
an activist consideration of the issues arising from the truth-seeking process. The 
Nigerian  courts  ought  to  have  broken  away  from  the  conservative  stance 
characteristic  of  traditional  commonwealth  judiciaries  and  opted  for  a 
jurisprudence reflecting not a ‘legalistic’ consideration of the issues in contention 
but an activist posture that is sensitive to the ‘ideals of the nation’.
81  
  The  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  could  have  been  different  if  it  took  a 
purposive approach to the legislation in question. Such an approach would have 
allowed it to uphold the establishment of the Oputa Panel for investigating past 
human rights violations as a measure for ensuring ‘order and good government of 
the  Federation  or  any  part  thereof’.  Section  4  (1)  of  the  Constitution  of  1999 
confers this power on the Federal Government of Nigeria. 
 
4.   TWO DECISIONS AND THE PURPOSIVE APPROACH: HOPES FOR TRANSFORMATION? 
 4.1.   The PDP Case: When Death is not to Die  
   Achieving institutional transformation presents ‘profound challenges’ to states 
in  transition.  How  to  deal  with  existing  state  institutions  with  a  record  of 
inadequacies  in  governance  or  even  outright  complicity  for  human  rights 
violations have also tasked transitional justice analysts.
82 The engagement of state 
institutions  with  the  context  of  transition  in  their  work  would  be  required  for 
desired transformation. Such a commendable recognition of and engagement with 
the transitional context of the country was displayed by the majority decision of 
the  Supreme  Court  (constitutional  panel)  in  the  earlier  case  of  Peoples 
Democratic  Party  &  1Or.  v.  Independent  National  Electoral  and  4Ors  (PDP 
Case).
83  
 4.1.1   A Lacuna, a Formidable Minority and a Slim Majority 
   The  case  emanated  from  the  transition  to  civil  rule  elections  which 
foreshadowed the current democratic dispensation in the country. The crux of the 
matter  was  that  following  his  victory  in  the  gubernatorial  elections  Adamawa 
                                                 
81Nwabueze note 64 supra at 75. 
82 Ni Aolain and Campbell note 2 supra at 200. 
83 (1999) 7 S.C Part II 35.   138 
State,
84  Atiku  Abubakar  (and  before  he  was  to  take  the  oath  of  office),  was 
subsequently  nominated  by  Chief  Olusegun  Obasanjo  to  run  as  his  vice-
presidential candidate on the platform of the same party, the PDP. They won the 
presidential election on that joint ticket.  
   The situation was thus that Atiku was no longer available to be sworn in as 
Governor  of  Adamawa  State.  The  electoral  body,  the  Independent  National 
Electoral Commission (INEC), indicated its intention to conduct a by-election for 
the office of Governor  and Deputy Governor in the State on the premise that 
Abubakar’s acceptance to run as vice-presidential candidate rendered the position 
of Governor–elect vacant. In a letter sent to him by  INEC, the electoral body 
averred that since he had not been sworn-in, his deputy could not ‘automatically 
take  over  the  position.’  Bonnie  Haruna,  Atiku’s  running-mate,  challenged  that 
move  in  court,  contending  that  he  ought  to  be  sworn  in  as  governor  in  the 
circumstances. 
   Faced with the situation where there was an obvious lacuna in respect of a key 
issue in electoral legislation in an all important transitional process, the learned 
justices reasoned that for the court to perform its constitutional functions 
               effectively and satisfactorily, it must be purposive in its construction of  
               the provisions of the constitution. Where the constitution bestows a right  
               on the citizen… we have the duty and indeed the obligation to ensure   
               that the inured right is not lost or denied the citizen by construction that  
               is narrow and not purposive.
85 
 
The Court held that the intention of the framers of the law was to provide for 
situations where for one reason or the other (the ultimate being death), the deputy 
governor should step into the office of the governor where the latter is no longer 
available  to  take  up  his  position.
86  The  Court,  with  a  split  decision  of  4  to  3 
(Uwais,  Chief  Justice  of  Nigeria  with  the  majority,  Justices  Ogundare, 
Mohammed and Uwaifo, strongly dissenting) thus abandoned the unambiguous 
provisions of the law and sought to discover legislative intent in a radical and 
implicit recognition of the unique situation of transition from decades of military 
authoritarian rule to civil democratic governance.  
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   Specifically, Uwais CJN, in the lead judgement decided that the provisions of 
section  37(1)  of  the  State  Government  (Basic  Constitutional  and  Transitional 
Provisions) Decree 3 of 1998, to the effect that 
                If a person duly elected as governor dies before taking and subscribing  
                the oath of allegiance and oath of office, the person elected with him as  
               deputy shall be sworn in as governor and he shall nominate a new deputy  
               governor from the same senatorial district as that of the deceased  
               governor who shall, with the approval of the House of Assembly of the  
               state be appointed as deputy governor. 
 
 must  be  liberally  construed.  Leading  the  majority,  he  maintained  there  was 
nothing sacrosanct about the word ‘die’ in the provision, thereby reversing the 
premise for the decision of the Court of Appeal, which had preferred the formalist 
(plain fact) approach. Rather, it should be liberally construed to accommodate a 
case where the elected candidate was ‘unavailable’ to be sworn in. It dismissed 
the plain-fact (formalist) interpretation approach adopted by the Court of Appeal 
as ‘narrow and restrictive’ and sometimes inappropriate to fulfilling or advancing 
‘the intention, spirit, objects, and purposes of the Constitution.’
87 
   The Supreme Court went on to hold that since in relinquishing his Governor-
elect status, Atiku Abubakar was irrevocably barred from reclaiming it, his action 
could, in the words of the Court, be ‘likened to permanent incapacity or even 
death.’  In  the  circumstances,  his  action  came  within  the  contemplation  of  the 
relevant provisions of the law.
88 For this proposition the Court relied heavily on 
the provisions of section 45(1) of the same law, which provides for the Deputy 
Governor  to  hold  the  office  of  Governor  where  the  latter  becomes  vacant  by 
reason of death, permanent incapacity or removal for any reason.  
   The majority judgment was strongly
89 criticised in the dissenting judgements as 
deliberate usurpation of the legislative function under the guise of interpretation. 
Ogundare JSC objected to what he rightly sensed was a ‘policy’ decision. The 
duty of the Court, he insisted was not to ‘determine what the legislature meant to 
say but what it actually said.’
90 The plain - fact interpretation according to the 
learned justice was the proper approach. It was not within the competence of the 
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Court  to  attempt  modification  of  unambiguous  provisions  to  ‘bring  it  into 
accordance with its own views as to what is reasonable.’
91 He averred that any 
gap in legislation must be left to the legislature to fill for the contrary would 
amount to ‘judicial legislation,’ which was not the function of a court. Note how 
this approach completely ignores the important issue of the rights of the Deputy 
Governor-elect. As noted above, this was a decisive point in the majority decision.  
    In the lead dissenting judgement, Ogundare JSC posited that there was in any 
event, no lacuna in the provisions of section 37(1) of the State Government (Basic 
Constitutional  and  Transitional  Provisions)  Decree  3  of  1998,  which  was  in 
contention.
92  Subscribing  to  these  views,  Mohammed  JSC  similarly  contended 
that  ‘policy,  expediency,  political  exigency  and  convenience’  ought  to  be 
excluded from constitutional interpretation,
93 thus implicitly (at the least) rejecting 
a reflexive jurisprudential approach to the transitional processes ongoing in the 
country at the time. In towing the line of dissent, Uwaifo JSC, expressly dismissed 
the majority’s preference for a ‘purposive approach.’ His position was based on 
what he (rightly) surmised was a radical change in the traditional jurisprudence of 
the Court 
                ...the line of decisions of this court on the preference for the literal  
               interpretation of statutes whose words are clear, precise and  
               unambiguous is intimidating and can not be ignored by sheer resort to   
               another principle of interpretation which may in a sense tend to overrule  
               or undermine those other decisions indirectly and without justification.
94  
 
This was despite his concession that the liberal or broad interpretational approach 
was  suited  among  others  to  ‘circumstances  to  cover  such  eventualities  due  to 
changing  times,  different  social  environments...not  fully  contemplated  or 
overlooked at the time the constitution was drawn up.’
95 He thus discounted the 
circumstances of political transition (arguably an inextricable part of the case), as 
not momentous (enough) to warrant a departure from the plain fact jurisprudential 
tradition of the Nigerian Supreme Court. 
                                                 
91 Ibid. at 93. 
92 PDP Case note 83 supra at 85 to 99. Uwaifo JSC expressed similar sentiments. See page 126-
28. 
93 Ibid. at 111. 
94 Ibid. at 123. Emphasis mine. 
95 PDP Case note 83 supra at 123.   141 
    In fairness to the dissenting judgement, it is noteworthy that the provisions of 
section 45 unlike section 37(1) in fact and by the concession of the Court applies 
after the Governor and  the Deputy Governor had been sworn in. Thus on the 
specific facts of the case, section 45 would be inapplicable. Yet, the Court in its 
majority  decision  took  the  view  that  since  the  legislation  in  issue  was  of  a 
constitutional nature, the document must be ‘read together as a whole.’ It thus had 
no problem in arriving at the decision that the rationale of the provisions taken 
together was to avoid a vacuum in the important office of Governor and ensure a 
‘smooth’ succession.’
  96 To hold otherwise in the context of a fragile transition 
with a highly sceptical public,
97 wary of ‘transitions without end’
98 and dashed 
hopes on an end to authoritarian rule, would have constituted a disservice to the 
role of law and the transition judiciary in a post-authoritarian dynamic.    
 4.1.2    Breaking Away from Tradition 
   A  fundamental  issue  in  the  PDP  Case  is  the  nature  of  the  rights  of  the  2
nd 
plaintiff, Bonnie Haruna; Atiku’s elected running-mate for deputy governor. The 
law  in  question,  the  State  Government  (Basic  Constitutional  and  Transitional 
Provisions) Decree, even as the title suggests, was constitutive of the transitional 
arrangements  going  on  in  the  country  at  the  time,  particularly  with  respect  to 
elections.  While  conceding  the  constitutional  nature  of  the  legislation,  the 
Respondents  argued  that  the  law  was  intended  to  provide  a  framework  for 
governance of the country in the transition period and not to create individual 
rights. 
   In  rejecting  the  contention,  the  Court  held  that  constitutional  legislation 
establishes rights that the courts must be ‘creative’ to protect and uphold. This 
approach  led  the  majority  to  hold  that  where  the  Governor-elect  abdicates, 
abandons or relinquishes his mandate, the Deputy Governor-elect (though elected 
on a joint ticket) does not thereby forfeit his right to the latter position.  This was 
so because they had each acquired individualised rights by their election, the one 
to be governor and the other, deputy governor.
99 The right so conferred was of a 
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public nature and did not inure to the benefit of an individual who was not elected. 
Quite  importantly,  the  Court  noted  that  to  hold  to  the  contrary  was  not  only 
‘fallacious but dangerous to the democratic process.’
100 I share this concern.   
   Regrettably, as earlier noted, the court failed to carry forward such a purposive 
approach  in  the  subsequent  Oputa  Panel  Case  particularly  with  regard  to  the 
rights of the victims of authoritarian rule. The judicial misdirection set the stage 
for  non-implementation  of  the  Panel’s  recommendations.  As  noted  earlier,  the 
government insisted that the outcome of the Oputa Panel Case incapacitated it 
from taking the submitted report forward. But it did not state the specific aspects 
of the decision that supported or mandated this position. In turn, the fact of non-
implementation of the Oputa Panel’s recommendations has been attended by dire 
consequences for transitional justice, social stability and economic development 
in Nigeria. The current bedlam in the Niger Delta, where whole communities had 
come forward with serious allegations of violations of human rights by the state 
and multinational corporations at the Oputa Panel but failed to obtain redress, is 
but one cardinal indicator of this.  
 4.2.   The ICPC Case: Federalism v Commonweal 
    The foregoing purposive approach to judicial interpretation was also adopted by 
the Supreme Court in another epoch-making case in the transition period. This 
was in Attorney General of Ondo State v Attorney General of the Federation & 35 
Ors (the ICPC Case).
 101   
 4.2.1   From the Doldrums of Infamy 
      At the dawn of the transition to civil rule, Nigeria had become a notoriously 
corrupt  country  occupying  the  non-enviable  position  of  second  most  corrupt 
nation in the world, according to Transparency International’s corruption index.
102 
The country has been cited as ‘the crowning example of governmental corruption 
and betrayal of the hopes of the citizenry in Africa.’
103 Combating corruption in 
the polity was clearly a policy imperative for an incoming administration intent on 
halting the downward spiral in the nation’s economic and social development, or 
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even  one  determined  to  move  the  society  towards  the  realisation  of  its  full 
potential. Then incoming-President, Olusegun Obasanjo recognised the enormity 
of the problem of corruption in the country. In his inaugural address to the nation 
at his swearing-in, he expressed the determination of his administration to tackle 
corruption which he described as ‘a full-blown cancer’ and ‘the greatest single 
bane of our society.’
104  
   To underscore the administration’s commitment to combating the scourge of 
corruption  as  a  major  policy  initiative,  the  anti-corruption  law  was  the  first 
executive bill submitted by it to the National Assembly (the federal legislature) 
for enactment. After stiff opposition from a considerable number of legislators, 
excision  or  tempering  of  some  perceived  ‘draconian’  provisions  and  public 
outrage at the obvious reluctance of the legislature to pass the bill into law, the 
National Assembly enacted the Corrupt and Other Related Offences Act No.5 of 
2000 several months later.
105    
   The explanatory memorandum at the end of the law states its purpose as the 
prohibition and prescription of punishment for corrupt practices and other related 
offences.  In  addition,  it  established  the  Independent  Corrupt  Practices 
Commission (ICPC, the Commission) to investigate and prosecute offenders. The 
powers  of  the  ICPC  extended  to  all  individuals;  public  and  private,  including 
corporate bodies in the country. The all-encompassing reach of the ICPC Act was 
bound  to  attract  jurisdictional  challenge  given  the  federal  character  of  the 
Nigerian  polity  and  the  general  discontent  with  previous  practice  of  military 
regimes to disregard the dynamics of federalism in governance and law-making.  
   The  attempt  by  the  Commission  to  prosecute  an  official  of  the  Ondo  State 
government set the stage for the inevitable challenge of the jurisdictional powers 
of the ICPC.
 106 By virtue of section 232 of the 1999 constitution and in line with 
Nigerian constitutional practice, the Attorney–General of Ondo State on behalf of 
                                                 
104 Nigeria World “Inaugural Speech by His Excellency, President Olusegun Obasanjo following 
his Swearing- 
In as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on May 29, 1999” available at:  
http://nigeriaworld.com/feature/speech/inaugural.htm 
105 In Nigeria’s federal legislative tradition, federal and state statutes are referred to as Acts and 
laws respectively. However, I use the term ‘law’ generically in this study to refer to both forms of 
legislation except where clarity demands specificity.  
106 In Nigeria, like other federal systems, there are federal (central), states and local authorities’ 
officials. ‘State official’ here refers to the narrower context of an official of a state government 
(constituent part), as against a ‘federal’ or ‘local authority’ in Nigeria’s thirty six-state federation.  
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the state government headed for the Supreme Court. The section confers on the 
Supreme Court, original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of any other court, on any 
dispute between the federation and a state or between states inter se once the 
dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence or 
extent of a legal right depends. This was one such case.   
   He  challenged  the  constitutionality  of  the  ICPC  Act  by  taking  not  just  the 
Federal Government (protagonist of the legislation) to Court but also all the other 
35 states in the country for the obvious reason that the decision in the case would 
automatically affect their interests. The relief sought by the Plaintiff was double-
pronged. First, the Plaintiff sought an injunction of the Court to declare the law 
invalid on the ground that the law lacked jurisdictional validity for purporting to 
create a commission with powers to prosecute public and private individuals for 
offences within the states and in state high courts.
107 Secondly, and of even more 
significance, it sought a perpetual injunction to restrain the ICPC and the Federal 
Attorney-General from exercising or applying any of the provisions of the law in 
Ondo State. In effect, the law would thereby be invalidated as a whole. Counsel to 
the Plaintiff canvassed precisely that in concluding his address to the Court.
108  
   The  case  for  the  Plaintiff  (and  some  of  the  Defendants  other  than  the  1
st 
Defendant)  was  basically  that  no  express  or  even  implied  provisions  in  the 
Constitution confer powers on the National Assembly to create a monolithic body 
with such an all-encompassing reach as the ICPC or the offences (of corruption) 
for which it was empowered to prosecute for the whole country. It was urged on 
the Court that the omission of a ‘general power to create and punish offences’ in 
the ‘scheme of enumeration’ (Legislative Lists) in the Constitution precluded the 
National Assembly from enacting the ICPC Act.
109 Thus the anti-corruption law 
and a fortiori the ICPC were ultra vires the National Assembly as ‘corruption’ is a 
residual  matter  within  the  exclusive  legislative  competence  of  the  state 
governments.  It  is  pertinent  to  note  the  similarity  of  this  argument  with  that 
proffered by the Plaintiffs in the (earlier) Oputa Panel case on the powers of the 
president to establish a truth commission for the whole country.
110 I will return to 
a juxtaposition of the two cases later.  
                                                 
107  In  line  with  common  practice  in  federal  political  systems,  state  and  federal  offences  are 
prosecuted in the state and federal courts respectively.   
108 ICPC Case note 101supra at 10-13. 
109  Ibid. at 44. 
110 Incidentally, the same counsel for the Plaintiffs (Generals) in the Oputa Panel Case note 5 
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   Less than half of the states, sixteen, filed briefs of argument in the matter. Not 
surprisingly, they were evenly split (8 each) in their support for or opposition to 
the case for the Plaintiff.  While thirteen completely abstained, 6 were represented 
at  the  hearing  but  were  precluded  from  arguing  a  position  due  to  procedural 
requirements that only parties who had filed a brief could canvass oral arguments 
before the Court.  
   At the core of the case for the 1
st Defendant (the Federal Government) was the 
argument  that  the  National  Assembly  was  vested  with  the  power  to  enact  the 
ICPC Act pursuant to its constitutional powers to make laws for the ‘peace, order 
and good government of the Federation.’ The 1
st Defendant conceded that the 
Exclusive  Legislative  List does not refer expressly to  ‘corruption.’  It however 
argued that the National Assembly is conferred with the power to legislate as it 
did on corruption by a  joint reading of several provisions of the Constitution. 
These include in particular the provisions of item 68 of the Exclusive List which 
provides that the National Assembly is empowered to legislate on ‘Any matter 
incidental or supplementary to any matter mentioned elsewhere in this list.’   
   The  1
st  Defendant  further  anchored  its  argument  on  a  joint  construction  of 
sections 15 (5), 88 (2) (a) and (b) as well as paragraph 2 of Part III and item 60 (a) 
of the Constitution. Item 60 (a), relied upon by the Federal Government provides 
that the National Assembly has the power to establish and regulate authorities ‘for 
the  Federation  or  any  part  thereof’    in  order  ‘To  promote  and  enforce  the 
observance of the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles’ contained in 
the Constitution. Section 15 (5) of the constitution tersely provides that ‘The State 
shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power.’ Finally, section 88 (2) (a) 
(b) of the constitution provides that the National Assembly shall have the power 
to ‘expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the administration of laws within 
its legislative competence.’     
   The Court sanctioned the legality of the  ICPC Act.  It noted that in view of 
section 4 (2) of the Constitution which provides that the National Assembly has 
the  power  to  make  laws  for  the  peace,  order  and  good  government  of  the 
Federation with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List, it 
was intra vires the National Assembly to enact the ICPC Act under Item 60 (a) of 
the Constitution as canvassed by the 1st Defendant. Uwais C.J.N stated that the 
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“Fundamental Objectives and Directives of State Policy” can only be enforced by 
legislation. He dismissed the argument that the anti-corruption law ought to be 
limited to public officers and the three arms of government alone since it forms 
part of the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. In 
identifying  with  the  social  realities  of  the  country  in  relation  to  the  challenge 
posed by corrupt and related practices, he declared that since 
               Corruption is not a disease which afflicts public officers alone…If it is to  
               be eradicated effectively, the solution to it must be pervasive to cover  
              every segment of the society...’
111  
 
4.2.2   ‘Policy United’ All the Way 
   Clearly, as noted by Professor Ben Nwabueze, one of the amici curiae, the task 
of  the  Court  in  the  case  was  ‘challenging  because  the  issue  impinges  on  the 
cardinal principles of Nigeria’s federal system.’
112 The ICPC Act in the view of 
the respected jurist was ‘subversive’ of the principles of federalism as enshrined 
in  the  Nigerian  constitution  and  in  violation  of  its  constitutive  doctrines  of 
autonomy and non-interference.
113 The confluence of constitutionalism and a key-
policy issue in a transitional context was bound to test the jurisprudence of the 
Court with resonance for the polity. 
      The special significance of the case and its policy implications were not lost 
on the Court. In a clearly uncharacteristic move (at least in recent memory), it 
invited three distinguished legal practitioners as amici curiae to address the Court 
on  the  case.  All  three  filed  separate  (advisory)  briefs  of  argument  with  two 
arguing against the legality and the third in support of the ICPC Act.
114 In an 
unbridled positivistic approach to the role of law in society, a highly regarded 
constitutional  law  jurist  and  retired  Professor  of  Law,  Benjamin  Nwabueze, 
argued  that  the  country  could  ‘cope  better’  with  corruption  which  had  a  long 
history in the polity, than for the Court to uphold a legislation that tampers with 
the federal structure of the country and could lead to ‘grave political danger.’
115 
The  Court  tilted  the  balance  in  favour  of  actively  working  against  corruption, 
viewing it as a more dangerous phenomenon in the polity. 
                                                 
111 ICPC Case note 101supra at 28. 
112 Ibid. at 17. 
113 Ibid. at 18-19. 
114 Ibid. at 91. 
115 Ibid. at 94. 
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   It is germane to an understanding of the case to note that there is an allocation of 
legislative powers between the two tiers of government in the second schedule to 
the  Constitution.  The  ‘Exclusive  Legislative  List’  itemises  the  exclusive 
jurisdiction of the federal (central) government while the ‘Concurrent Legislative 
List’ specifies the shared sphere of legislative powers between the two tiers. There 
is  an  unwritten  Residual  Legislative  List  that  is  constitutionally  deemed  the 
exclusive province of respective state governments on unlisted matters.    
   The learned Chief Justice displayed a utilitarian conception of the function of 
law to buttress his jurisprudential preference to sacrifice formalism (that could 
have accorded better recognition to the federal status of the country) at the altar of 
the (transitional) exigencies of the times when he further observed that ‘the aim of 
making law is to achieve the common good.’
116 He took the view that ‘state’ in 
section 15 (5) applied to both the Federal and State levels of government in the 
country  and  thus  the  power  to  legislate  on  corruption  could  be  regarded  as 
concurrent. 
   The point ought to be made however, that on a formalist construction of the 
foregoing  provisions  and  others  in  the  Nigerian  constitution,  it  may  well  be 
argued that the Plaintiff and most of the Defendants who adopted the position, 
brief and argument of the former, were on quite firm grounds. To buttress this 
position, the Court did find some merit in the case for the Plaintiff and the case for 
the latter succeeded in part even if minimally, in respect of certain provisions that 
it sought to be declared ultra vires the ICPC. Incidentally, these were only aspects 
of the law the Court adjudged impugned on the judicial powers and independence 
of  the  courts.  The  Court  applied  the  blue  pencil  rule  to  strike  down  those 
sections.
117   
   For  good  measure,  it  is  noteworthy  there  are  no  specific  provisions  in  the 
itemised list of legislative competencies in the Nigerian constitution conferring 
power  on  the  National  Assembly  to  enact  law  and  establish  a  monolith  anti-
corruption agency for the whole country, desirable as this may be. The Court only 
came  to  such  a  decision  by  applying  a  liberal  interpretation  and  imputing  an 
implied existence of such powers 
               Reading these provisions of the 1999 constitution together and construed  
               liberally and broadly, it can be easily seen that the National Assembly  
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               possesses the power both “incidental” and “implied” to promulgate the  
               Corrupt and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 to enable the State which  
               for this purpose means the Federal Republic of Nigeria, to implement the  
               provision of Section 15(5) of the Constitution. 
118 
   It is important to note here that the Court addressed the tension between the 
policy choice to combat corruption through a monolith institution like the ICPC 
and the fundamental principle of federalism clearly enshrined in the Constitution. 
Uwais C.J.N conceded the possible infringement of the ‘requirement of autonomy 
of  the  State  government  and  non-interference  with  the  functions  of  State 
government  (sic).’  But  he  was  quick  to  observe  that  such  interference  has 
constitutional support.  
   The learned Chief Justice waived ‘cardinal principles’ aside as ‘best ideals to 
follow or guidance for an ideal situation,’
119 again demonstrating the recognition 
of  the  transitional  circumstances  of  the  country  and  the  policy  considerations 
involved in the Court’s position on the matter. Ogwuegbu JSC was even more 
candid  in  his  admission  of  the  possibility  of  interference  and  a  compromise 
concerning the doctrine of autonomy at the core of federalism as the unanimous 
decision  constituted.  He  readily  sacrificed  the  latter  for  what  he  and  other 
members of the Constitutional Panel of the Court considered to be the overriding 
priority  to  ‘make  laws  for  the  peace,  order  and  good  government  of  the 
Federation.’ He was of the view that corruption constituted a threat to all of these 
and the ICPC Act was designed to combat the threat. In what can be regarded as 
poignant reflection of the letter and spirit of the judgement, he affirmed that 
               The Court is conscious of the history of corruption in Nigeria and should  
               not be at liberty to construe the ICPC Act or any Act …by the motives  
               which influenced the Legislature, yet when the history of the law and  
              legislation tells the court what the policy and object of the Legislature  
              were, the court is to see whether the terms of the Act are such as fairly  
               carry out the policy and  objective…Any legislation on corruption must  
              be of concern to every  Nigerian.
120   
The  Court  was  thus  acutely  aware  of  the  political  nature  of  its  decision.  The 
remarkable identification of the Court with the aspirations of the society and its 
preference  for  a  purposive  jurisprudential  approach  constituted  unparalleled 
exceptionalism in the history of judicial constitutionalism in Nigeria.  
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5. VALIDITY OF PURPOSIVE JURISPRUDENCE IN NIGERIA’S TRANSITION 
      Barak posits that the purposive judicial interpretational approach is the ‘proper 
system  of  interpretation’  of  the  constitution  and  statutes  alike  in  democratic 
societies.
121    If  we  agree  with  this  postulation,  then  the  purposive  interpretive 
approach is even more apposite for adjudication in transitional contexts where 
immense  national  and  international  resources,  are  usually  deployed  to  effect 
institutional transformation and restoration of the rule of law.  
5.1 Displacing Formalism in Transitional Contexts 
   A comprehensive reading of the judgements delivered by each of the six justices 
in  their  concurrence  with  the  lead  judgement  in  the  ICPC  Case  reveals  a 
purposive jurisprudence that identified with the peculiar historicity of corruption 
in  the  country.  Thus,  the  Court  waxed  strong  on  casting  its  lot  with  policy 
measures regarding one of the salient programmes stated in the inaugural address 
of  (then  incoming)  President  Olusegun  Obasanjo.  In  this  regard,  Uwaifo  JSC 
declared in his judgement  
               The issue of corruption and abuse of power has become international. It  
               is a declared state policy in Nigeria to combat it and so it has assumed a  
              national issue of high priority which is considered best suited for the  
              National Assembly to be addressed through a federal agency like the  
               ICPC.
122 
   Similar advertence to the foregoing principles and the ‘peace, order and good 
government’  provisions  adopted  by  the  Court  in  the  ICPC  Case  would  have 
served equally well to save the Oputa Panel Case from been determined along so 
narrow  lines  as  did  the  Court  on  that  occasion.  The  Court  in  coming  to  the 
decision to uphold the ICPC Act clearly made a policy decision to reject the black 
letter of the law. Formalists (especially) may strongly deprecate such an approach 
in normal situations as fostering uncertainty in the law. But that is precisely the 
point that the Court missed in the Oputa Panel Case. Transition contexts are not 
normal contexts. While certainty in the law requires the judiciary to be consistent, 
consistency in transitional societies ought to be in full awareness of, and attuned 
to, the social context.  
    Teitel’s contention that in transitional contexts, what makes law ‘positive’ is the 
‘popular perception in the public sphere’
123 is apt to the Nigerian situation. Thus 
                                                 
121 Barak note 14 supra at 26. 66-82. 
122 Barak note 14 supra at 116. 
123 Teitel note 24 supra at 2027. 
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the  adoption  of  a  liberal  purposive  approach  as  demonstrated  by  the  Supreme 
Court to the social realities of the country in its attempt to break with the past it is 
argued, is to be preferred to the plain-fact or formalist approach that may be the 
appropriate  course in the absence of social contingencies challenging the very 
foundations of societies in political transition. This is what Teitel considers as the 
‘social construction of the law’; one of the paradigmatic shifts from conventional 
understandings of the rule of law relevant to conceptions of law in transitions.
124  
   In the pre-transition period, Nigerian society had been victim of economic and 
financial  rape  leading  to  monumental  social  deprivations  perpetrated  by  the 
largely predatory ruling elite.
125 This deplorable situation was occasioned partly 
by weak legislation and law enforcement arrangements as well as a corrupt and 
compromised judiciary.  Bell, Campbell and Ni  Aolain, much like Teitel, have 
noted that the law as well as legal institutions suffer degradation in conflict (and 
repressive)  situations  that  impair  their  legitimacy.  Thus,  both  law  and  legal 
institutions must facilitate change as well as be changed themselves.
126 Perhaps in 
realisation of this, the  Court opted here for  a  ‘constructivist’
127 transformative 
model  of  adjudication,  and  actively  led  the  way  in  support  of  the  expressed 
popular  desire  for  checkmating  past  injustices  and  continuing  similar 
tendencies.
128 The attitude of the Court is well captured in the concluding remarks 
of Ogwuegbu JSC in the case. At the risk of descending into the adversarial arena, 
he candidly voiced what is no doubt popular opinion on the matter in the Nigerian 
society 
               I must also point out that all Nigerians except perhaps those who benefit  
               from it are unhappy with the level of corruption in the country. The main  
               opposition to the ICPC Act is I believe, borne out of fear and  
               suspicion.
129  
 
5.2   Deepening the Rule of Law in Transitional Contexts    
   There is also the sense in which the decision in the ICPC Case significantly 
deepens the rule of law in the country. This is in the way it has strengthened the 
hands of prosecutors who are reassured that no one will be above the law in the 
fight against corruption. The decision signals clearly that it would not be ‘business 
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as usual’ for corrupt public and private actors who had held the country hostage 
and taken it to ‘the nadir of the miasma of corrupt practices.’
130 Recently, the 
chief  prosecutor  and  highest  ranking  law  officer  in  the  country,  the  Attorney-
General of the  Federation, after coming under  strident public criticism for his 
perceived toleration of corruption by public officers, declared an all out war on 
corruption.  He  vowed  to  ensure  the  prosecution  of  all  established  cases  of 
corruption by public officers in the post-transition period till date. Prosecutors, he 
assured,  would  leave  no  sacred  cows  as  ‘governors,  ministers  and  any  other 
government official mentioned in those reports would be prosecuted.’
 131 In this 
regard it is noteworthy that recent research on public perceptions of institutional 
performance and legitimacy in the democratic transition in Nigeria indicates a 
‘growing approval for anti-corruption efforts.’
132  
   The  role  of  the  judiciary  in  adopting  a  purposive  approach  to  salient 
foundational issues in the anti-corruption project, with its notable impact on the 
rule of law, can not be divorced from such perceptions. This is particularly so 
granted that clamours for transparency in the management of public funds, on the 
one hand, and prosecution of erring corrupt public office-holders on the other, 
have assumed  centre-stage in the criminal justice administration system in the 
country in recent times than ever before.
133 A clear manifestation of the situation 
is the tremendous support (including again, judicial) for the establishment and 
activities of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), despite the 
clear overlap in the functions and powers of the two and the elaborate structural 
arrangements that have been made for their effective operations.  
   Teitel has stated that the judiciary, more than any other arm of government, is 
better positioned to facilitate change in transitional societies.
134 In the event there 
appears to be substantial political will in the other arms of government to design a 
policy to effect radical change, it would be counterintuitive for the judiciary to 
frustrate such policy initiatives.  
   Mass  public  support  for  an  anti-corruption  policy  in  the  Nigerian  context  is 
better appreciated against the background that the statute books have for decades 
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provided  some  of  the  severest  punishments  (including  death  sentence  in  some 
cases),  for  property  crimes  like  robbery,  stealing,  arson  and  related  offences 
generally considered crimes within the province of underprivileged felons. The 
anti-corruption drive with its seeming emphasis on ‘grand’ (as against ‘petty’) 
corruption
135  was  viewed  as  more  inclusive  if  not  specifically  targeted  at  the 
criminally-minded members of the upper strata of the society.  
   The decision of the Court in the ICPC Case constitutes a defining moment, a 
watershed in the country’s nascent anti-corruption policy. The enormity of the 
corruption scourge in the country is highlighted by the fact that - and again in 
contrast with the facts of the Oputa Panel Case is instructive - the ICPC was 
finalising  prosecutorial  arrangements  on  more  than  20  former  state  governors 
barely  4  months  after  they  left  office  and  lost  executive  immunity  from 
prosecution for official corruption and abuse of office.
136 At least one has been 
convicted following his impeachment and three others are currently on trial on 
similar charges.          
   The Court made a remarkable (albeit momentary) break with the past in the 
ICPC Case moving tangentially along some of the very lines it was to later reject 
in part or whole in the Oputa Panel Case. This approach comes through not only 
in the lead judgement but ran through all the separate concurring decisions in the 
ICPC Case. It is significant that the issue of ‘policy’ consideration was cited in 
the  latter  decision  with  unanimous  approbation  and  expressed  in  the  lead 
judgement rather than in reprobation and dissent that characterised it in the PDP 
Case. Recall that Ogundare JSC raised this point in condemnation of the majority 
decision in the PDP Case. He had stated that 
                It is not for the Court to determine what the legislature meant to say but  
               what it actually said. Nor is the court to read something into such  
               provisions on the grounds of policy.
137 
 
This is no doubt in obvious disregard of the dynamic role of law and the judiciary 
in transition. In implicit disavowal of its long-standing plain-fact jurisprudential 
approach, the majority of the Court did not refer to any of its earlier decisions that 
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137 PDP Case note 83 supra at 91. 
   153 
relied so heavily on ‘policy considerations.’ The Court indeed closed its eyes to 
formalist adjurations to keep the flow of the waters of law and politics pure and 
separate. 
5.3   Beyond Provincialism 
   Equally significant was the willingness of the Court to engage in a comparative 
juridical  approach  in  its  judgement  in  the  ICPC  Case.  It  analysed  with  much 
approval,  many  foreign  cases  from  other  federal  jurisdictions  bearing  on 
transition, emergency, and more generally, cases with significant implications on 
national life. It had hitherto demonstrated a judicial proclivity for ignoring even 
relevant international law obligations of the country in the context of the transition 
as with the Oputa Panel Case.  
   Thus, a good deal of the rationes decidendi in the ICPC Case were rooted in 
foreign precedents specifically from federal jurisdictions like the United States, 
Canada and Australia. This marked a departure from a fairly established tradition 
of insularity in which otherwise relevant foreign decisions were considered with 
suspicion and declared inapplicable in the country. It is significant to the extent 
that failure to benefit from and accord recognition to such decisions delivered in 
similar contemporary socio-political contexts (like the South Africa transitional 
experience), hampered the development of a robust human rights jurisprudence 
and culture in the country.  
   Advertence  to  comparative  law  constitutes  one  of  the  tools  to  achieve  an 
effective  discharge  of  the  duties  of  judges  in  a  democracy,  particularly  in  the 
context of an increasingly globalised world.
138 In the converse then, neglect of 
comparative perspectives may deny national courts of potentially perspicacious 
jurisprudential insights.   
5.3.4   Peace, Order and Good Governance to the Rescue    
   Another striking feature of the decision in the ICPC Case is the heavy store 
(rightly)  placed  by  the  Supreme  Court  on  the constitutional  provision that  the 
National  Assembly  had  the  power  to  legislate  for  the  ‘peace,  order  and  good 
government’ of every part of the federation. As I argued earlier, rejection of this 
provision  by  the  Court  in  the  Oputa  Panel  Case  constitutes  a  fundamental 
misdirection regarding the role of law in the context of transition. There is again 
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in this regard, the  circumstance that the series  of human rights violations, the 
investigation of which  formed the core of the remit of the Oputa Panel, were 
committed under various military regimes that ruled in a unitary fashion. Thus, a 
centralised  process  of  scrutiny  and  accountability  is  arguably  best  suited  to 
addressing transitional justice claims arising from them. No doubt, the shaky legal 
arrangements  of  the  Oputa  Panel  made  the  intentions  of  the  executive  less 
credible at best. However it would have better served the purpose of the rule of 
law and justice to victims of impunity to uphold the process than to chip away the 
basis of its legal validity through unrepentant and rigid plain-fact jurisprudence.  
   The foregoing position is reinforced by the fact that the TIA, which was in issue 
in the Oputa Panel case, started its life and was so upheld by the Court, as a valid 
Act passed by the National Assembly. It thus shared a critical element with the 
ICPC Act; it is meant to ensure the ‘peace, order and good government’ of every 
part of the federation without precluding state governments from enacting similar 
legislation.  
  In any event, the purpose it was made to serve in the establishment of the Oputa 
Panel was clearly for that. That the Court ought to have followed this purposive 
approach is underlined further by the fact that it appeared to have laid fairly firm 
foundation for transition jurisprudence in the majority decision in the earlier PDP 
Case. This is in spite of the unsuccessful attempt to retain it on the well-worn 
tracks of plain-fact jurisprudence.  But the Supreme Court failed to establish a 
required  and  important  line  of  consistency  when  it  upheld  the  jurisdictional 
argument against the Oputa Panel.  
 
6.  DISCORDANT TUNES 
   One of the important functions of judges in their interpretive role is the creation 
and  sustenance  of  ‘normative  harmony.’  This  ensures  individual  statutes  are 
creatively  interpreted  as  part  of  an  integrated  legal  system.
139  Failure  of  the 
judiciary, especially at the highest levels, to foster an integrated and consistent 
approach to the interpretive role particularly in the context of transition tend to 
jeopardise  the  critical  role,  outlined  for  the  transition  judiciary  by  Teitel.  The 
judiciary would then be failing in its role of ‘bridging the gap… between law and 
society.’
140 
                                                 
139 Barak note 14 supra at 35. 
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   I have contended above that there exists a public accountability gap with respect 
to the judiciary in the process of Nigeria’s political transition. It is pertinent to 
determine further whether the judiciary, faced with the challenging dynamics of 
law and justice in the context of transition, has itself become transformed, the 
accountability gap notwithstanding. It is possible to come to a positive conclusion 
at  first  blush.  Closer  scrutiny  however  suggests  differently.  The  jurisprudence 
emanating from the Nigerian judiciary in the post-military authoritarian period 
appear to be discordant at best.  
6.1   Ambivalence or New Directions? 
     An ambivalent disposition continues to characterise the decisions of the courts. 
This view of the matter could of course be challenged particularly in view of 
recent acclaim that has trailed a number of transition-related decisions delivered 
by the judiciary, the Supreme Court in particular. They centre on constitutional 
issues generated from a rash of election related cases in the heated political scene 
in  the  country.  A  good  number  of  them  have  been  described  as  ‘landmark’ 
decisions
141  for  which  it  has  received  plaudits  even  from  usually  critical 
quarters.
142  
   In  particular,  public  opinion  surveys  focusing  on  election  petition  tribunals 
which  adjudicate  the  highly  controversial  ‘civilian-civilian’  election  transition 
cases in the country, even suggest the judiciary has been the most ‘consistent’ 
branch  of  government  in  the  transition  period.
143  Others  have  described  the 
judiciary  as  ‘the  hero  of  Nigeria’s  democracy.’
144  In  view  of  these  examples, 
therefore,  ought  not  the  Nigerian  transition  judiciary  to  be  commended  for 
overcoming  its  previous  questionable  record  of  judicial  governance?  We  will 
examine further the growing incidence of judicial intervention in mediating the 
political  transition  later  in  this  research.  Suffice  to  say  at  this  point  that 
commendable  as  the  above  appraisals  may  be,  they  constitute  no  more  than 
flashes  in  the  pan  of  the  situational  circumstance  of  judicial  activity  in  the 
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File Stay of Execution of Judgment” The Guardian Online Edition (Lagos Sunday 11 February 
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142 See for instance D Iriekpen “Agbakoba, Falana Commend S’Court” This Day Online Edition 
(Abuja Friday 15 June 2007).  
143 H Shobiye “Poll Applauds Kogi Election Tribunal” Punch On the Web (Lagos 24 October 
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country. In this regard, it is important to consider the temporality of the foregoing 
decisions and other contemporary transition cases and the trends they reflect. In 
other  words,  what  does  the  analysis  of  the  foregoing  cases  tell  us  about  the 
judicial function in Nigeria’s political transition?   
  Consider that the Court in its decision in the Oputa Panel Case that was decided 
more than three years after the PDP Case,
145 seemed to have still been caught up 
in  its  old  plain-fact  jurisprudential  approach  despite  the  purposive  approach 
signposted by the majority decision in the latter. Further, it bears repetition that a 
seven-man Constitutional Panel unanimously decided the Oputa Panel Case in 
defiance, I have argued, of international law obligations of the country to victims 
of gross violations of human rights. The relapse displaced the purposive approach 
advocated by the constitutional panel of the Court in the PDP Case.  
   Even the commendable purposive approach of the ICPC Case decided on 7
th 
June  2002  was  clouded  by  the  Oputa  Panel  Case  and  despite  their 
contemporaneousness there was no reference in one to the other at all levels of the 
courts involved. The absence of cross-citation reflects a lack of coherence in the 
jurisprudential  outlook  of  the  Supreme  Court.  In  a  common  law  based  legal 
system, where precedent is at the nerve-centre of judicial-decision making, such 
lack of clear judicial direction necessarily impacts on the lower courts negatively. 
   Again, it is germane to recall that the purposive decision in the PDP Case was 
itself  seriously  threatened  at  the  time  and  was  only  achieved  at  the  closest 
possible split of 4/3. This was despite the obvious threat to the rule of law  a 
counter decision posed in the prevalent fragile political environment of a non-
negotiated transition.
146 It is important to note too that none of the cases made any 
explicit reference to the transitional status of the Nigerian society, momentous as 
this was in all three cases in particular, and the socio-political circumstances of 
the time. All of these suggest the absence of a coherent purposive jurisprudential 
approach that behoves a transition judiciary.  
   In  summary,  the  initial  post-transition  period  was  characterised  largely  by 
jurisprudential  ambivalence  and  lack  of  engagement  with  the  dynamics  of 
                                                 
145 The Supreme Court decided the PDP Case expeditiously on 11
th May 1999 on time for the 
inauguration of the Plaintiff on 29
th May 1999 and gave its full reasons on 16
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st January 2003. The Supreme Court did not at all advert to 
the purposive approach in the PDP and ICPC Cases when it decided the Oputa Panel case in 
2003. 
146 P M Lewis Growing Apart- Oil, Politics and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria 
(University  of  Michigan  Press  Ann  Arbor-Michigan  2007),  243-245  and  S  Akinrinade 
“Constitutionalism and the Resolution of Conflicts” (2003) 368 41, 47-50.   157 
transitional justice. It will be suggested that the courts later adopted a judicial 
attitude marked by relatively progressive and transition-conscious adjudication.
 147  
However, some inconsistencies challenge the proposition that there is a clear and 
coherent direction in terms of the jurisprudential approach of even the Supreme 
Court.  Thus  there  are  cases  of  both  judicial  approaches  in  the  two  strands. 
However, there are dominating elements of each approach in the initial and later 
periods to justify the case for a fairly distinct categorisation as advanced in this 
chapter. What appears certain though is the fact that the Court has now become 
more  conscious  of  its  powers  and  the  need  for  an  active  judicial  role  in  the 
country’s  troubled  political  transition.  The  transition-conscious  adjudication  is 
more  closely  considered  in  Chapter  Six  in the discussion  on  judicialisation  of 
politics in Nigeria.  
 
CONCLUSION 
   The need for all institutions of governance to participate in obtaining redress for 
human rights violations in post conflict societies is underscored by the necessity 
of a process of accountability to serve as the foundation for establishing the rule 
of  law  in  such  societies.
148  The  judiciary,  considering  its  usually  privileged 
stability  in  the  face  of  political  upheaval,  must  be  at  the  forefront  of 
institutionalising the rule of law particularly in post transitional contexts.  
   The enunciation of a radical, transformative jurisprudence by the judiciary in a 
post-authoritarian transition holds considerable promise for the restoration of the 
rule of law and at the institutional level, signals a definitive break from the past.
149 
Such judicial disposition is particularly important in transitional societies where 
the  executive  and  legislature  in  the  new  democratic  dispensation  may  owe 
avowed loyalty to or are actual protégés of the illiberal regime, thus potentially at 
the risk of derogating from the quantum of real representation of the common 
interest.  
   The judiciary in societies in transition can not remain aloof of the realities of the 
operating environment, even if only for the pragmatic necessity to maintain its 
relevance  in  society.  It  has  a  critical  role  to  play  in  mediating  conflict  and 
upholding  human  rights  through  a  robust  interpretation  of  law  in  transitional 
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societies moving way from the experience of abuse of power and misuse of state 
institutions. The need for the mediating role of the judiciary role in governance is 
even more acute in societies, like Nigeria, where the judiciary has been previously 
implicated in validating authoritarian rule and thus, undermining the rule of law. 
Proper  performance  of  the  role  will  enable  the  judiciary  to  earn  credibility, 
promote justice, foster peace and contribute to societal recovery and development. 
Such  a  proactive  role  is  of  particular  relevance  in  developing  and  transitional 
societies where the judiciary has been noted for enunciating ‘usurper friendly’ 
jurisprudence.
150 
    In  the  performance  of  its  adjudicatory  role  in  the  Oputa  Panel  Case,  the 
Nigerian judiciary opted for a conservative approach to the issues at stake in the 
emergent contestations. In its handling of the challenge to the powers of the Oputa 
Panel  and  its  work,  the  Nigerian  judiciary  not  only  failed  to  engage  with  the 
established international human rights standards on the right to truth and remedy 
for victims of gross human rights violations, but also the dynamics of a society in 
transition. The judiciary may not be faulted for not offering, of its own volition, to 
tell its truth about its role in gross human rights violations and misgovernance. 
But there are good reasons to expect it would allow the truth-seeking process to be 
carried out by another agency, in this case, the Oputa Panel, unhindered. Rather, 
the  formalistic  judicial  approach  to  the  truth-seeking  process  left  the  truth  in 
jeopardy and victims in despair.  
   The foregoing judicial attitude would appear due largely to a failure of self-
realisation on the part of the judiciary. The attitude has prevailed because of the 
judicial accountability gap identified in Chapters One, Two and Three above. The 
seeming faux pas of the Oputa Panel to integrate judicial accountability for past 
governance as part of the truth-seeking process, led to the absence of a conscious 
and  concerted  institutional  introspection  on  the  part  of  the  judiciary.  An 
accountability mechanism in the nature of the truth-seeking process represented 
by  the  Oputa  Panel  would  have  engendered  institutional  soul-searching  and 
facilitate a coordinated and consistent initiative of self-redemption which is still 
missing in the performance of the judicial role in Nigeria. 
                                                 
150 T I Ogowewo “Self-Inflicted Constraints on Judicial Government in Nigeria” (2005) 49 (1) 
Journal of African Law 39, 42. 
   159 
    In post-authoritarian societies, the public expect much of the judiciary. As the 
Nigerian experience demonstrates, in the spirit of newly restored constitutional 
supremacy, civil liberties, democracy and openness in governance, the judiciary is 
constantly  required  to  mediate  between  the  rulers  and  the  ruled  and  hold  the 
exercise  of  power  in  check  and  (more)  accountable.    Such  demanding 
expectations derive partly from the fact that it has the longest history of functional 
institutional  stability  compared  to  the  executive  and  legislative  branches  of 
government, since both are invariably trumped by military political-adventurism 
and  authoritarian  rule.  Ironically,  the  judiciary  typically  steeped  in  well-worn 
traditions and customarily exempt from popular public accountability mechanisms 
deployed  in  transitional  societies  may  be  slow  or  even  unwilling  to  take  on 
headlong the challenges of social transformation. It may be ill-prepared or even 
oblivious to these great expectations and its important role in the transitioning 
polity. 
   The discussion in this chapter on judicial constitutionalism in Nigeria’s political 
transition  suggests  a  combination  of  public-driven  factors  may  significantly 
impact on the state of judicial inertia in transitions. Such factors may reconfigure 
judicial synergy, redirecting the judiciary to the realisation that it cannot but move 
with the socio-political realities of the times. It will thus be primed to join the 
front seat in taking on a proactive role in governance and moving the transitioning 
state forward as evinced in the ICPC and PDP decisions. How well it proceeds on 
the path that takes forward this purposive approach is dependent on its ability to 
make a distinct break with a past tainted by complicit jurisprudence.  
   However, the potential of this public-driven initiative for judicial transformation 
is intrinsically limited and must be regarded with caution. This is because it is 
largely spontaneous, uncoordinated and not institutionalised as a matter of official 
policy.  It  is  doubtful,  as  evidenced  by  the  ambivalence  that  characterised  the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court discussed above (and further examination of 
the conduct of the judicial function in the post-authoritarian period that will be 
examined later), that it can evoke a consistent and permanent transformation of 
the judiciary in the country. This is because the demands of post-authoritarian 
adjudication  can  be  daunting.  The  challenges  of  grappling  with  mediating 
disputed institutional and individual claims have in fact become a critical issue in 
transitioning polities all over the world and its to these that we turn our focus in 
the remaining part of this research.   160 
Chapter Five 
THE JUDICIALISATION OF POLITICS: DIALECTICS OF A PHENOMENON 
 
INTRODUCTION 
   The existence of a gap in accountability of the judiciary for the past in Nigeria’s 
transition to civil democratic rule has been identified and analysed in previous 
chapters.
1 Thus far, the imperative of accountability of the judiciary in transitional 
contexts  has  been  advanced  on  two  cardinal  premises.  The  first  is  distinctly 
normative  in  nature.  Normatively,  there  is  the  imperative  of  comprehensive 
accountability as a measure of transitional justice claims. All institutions of state 
responsible for misgovernance are in the transitional justice paradigm required to 
account for their conduct. The other reason, of a hybrid character, can be located 
simultaneously  in  normative  and  political  considerations.  It  is  the  need  for 
transformation of complicit state institutions as a sine qua non for the reinstitution 
of the rule of law and sustenance of the democratic initiative in the transitioning 
society.  A  process  of  reform  would  require  a  holistic  evaluation  of  previous 
performance in order to identify operational strengthens and deficiencies to map 
out action points.  
   In this chapter, the focus is on the dialectics of the judicialisation of politics with 
particular reference to transitional contexts. The judicial role in governance has 
taken centre stage not only in developed democracies,
2 but also, democratising 
polities round the world.
3 A central feature of judicial powers in contemporary 
governance is the growing influence of courts  on the direction of politics and 
mechanisms for democratic accountability in the public (government) and private 
(individual)  spheres.  This  growing  incidence  of  active  and  (sometimes)  direct 
judicial participation in policy-making in transitioning polities further validates 
the  case  for  institutional  accountability  of  the  judiciary  (along  with  other 
institutions of the state) for its past role in governance in those societies. 
   In  other  words,  the  increasingly  decisive  role  the  exercise  of  judicial  power 
plays  in  policy-formulation  and  decision-making  in  contemporary  governance 
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the Past: Transitional Justice and Judicial Accountability in Nigeria” (2008) 30 (2) Law & Policy 
194, 207-219. 
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reinforces the importance of accountability of the judiciary for the past in societies 
in transition. The strategic position of the judiciary in governance raises the need 
for substantial scrutiny and accountability for its role in the authoritarian period of 
a society’s past which may be, as in the context of this study, one of authoritarian 
rule. This is important to legitimate its authority in the conduct of the moderating 
role almost invariably thrust on it in post-authoritarian societies. In view of its 
peculiar  institutional  design  that  mostly  shields  the  judiciary  from  scrutiny, 
especially of a public (or democratic) nature on a regular basis (in contrast to 
other  public  centres  of  power),  society  has  to  be  assured  that  the  judiciary  is 
properly constituted to exercise its expanding powers.    
   In this regard, it has been recognised that motivations other than holding power 
to account, or concern for the common good, may condition otherwise bold, even 
confrontational, decisions of the judiciary, trumping actions and policy initiatives 
of other branches of government. The operation of the judicial function based on 
such  an  institutional  outlook,  jeopardises  the  symmetry  of  ‘horizontal 
accountability’  which  judicial  activity  ideally  represents  in  such  contexts.
4 
Horizontal accountability is a form of accountability where a subordinate reports 
to, or is held accountable by, an external as against a hierarchical superior. This 
contrasts with the traditional, vertical form of accountability in which an agency 
reports ‘internally’ to a superior. Horizontal accountability is regarded as being 
more promising for achieving accountability and has now become an increasingly 
adopted form of accountability.
5  
   In  our  context,  horizontal  accountability  refers  to  the  situation  where  the 
judiciary actively participates in activating or monitoring legal mechanisms for 
the democratic accountability of the political branches.  In an ideal setting, the 
separation of powers anticipates that, democratic accountability mechanisms will 
operate  vertically  within  the  institutional  confines  of  the  respective  branch  of 
government.  In  other  words,  democratic  accountability  is  conducted  within  an 
individual branch of government without reference to another.  
   The judicialisation of politics in transitions to democracy suggests the judiciary 
increasingly  finds  itself  involved  in  governance  in  democratising  societies  in 
contexts  where  its  role  remains  under-defined,  and  its  motivations,  opaque. 
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Despite  this,  there  is  an  incremental  resort  (by  the  political  branches  of 
government  as  well  as  individuals),  to  the  judiciary  for  the  resolution  of 
administrative  and  policy  disputes  in  post-authoritarian  societies.  Newly 
established or rehabilitated constitutional courts in East Asia have been actively 
involved in emerging political controversies. They have played, and continue to 
play, notable roles in allocation of political offices, election oversight, corruption-
monitoring, transitional justice claims, human rights enforcement and legislative 
compliance with constitutional provisions and standards.
 6  
    A comparative evaluation of the process and parameters of judicialisation in 
South East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa (with 
particular  reference  to  Nigeria),  suggests  convergence  on  the  centrality  of  the 
judicial function in the institutionalisation of human rights and democratic ideals. 
Thus, judicialisation of politics has come to be recognised as an important, if not 
indispensable feature of political activity in the modern state.
7 However, this view 
of the judicial function in the democratic process appears, at least potentially, 
antithetical to the substantially well articulated and sustained counter-majoritarian 
view of the judiciary.   
   This  chapter  presents  a  brief  juxtaposition  of  judicialisation  of  politics  with 
democracy  and  the  rule  of  law.  It  highlights  the  existential  dynamics  of  the 
phenomenon in the contemporary society in general and transitioning polities in 
particular.  The  chapter  then  critiques  counter-majoritarian  objections  to  the 
democratic legitimacy of judicial review. There is a challenge of assumed solidity 
of the representative nature of the political branches around which such objections 
are  typically  crafted.  The  discussion  subsequently  focuses  on  an  analytic 
framework for the judicialisation of politics.  It further proceeds to an examination 
of comparative experiences of judicialisation of politics in transitioning polities. 
This is followed by an outline of the failed attempt at establishing a constitutional 
court in Nigeria before focusing on the Nigerian experience of court-packing and 
its impact on judicial independence. It emerges that there is a need for closer and 
more comprehensive attention the judicial function.  
 
2. JUDICIALISATION OF POLITICS, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 
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   In his pioneering work on judicialisation of politics, Shapiro placed the judiciary 
at the heart of governance much more than legal purists were ready to concede.
8 
The notable resurgence of the judiciary as a political force in transitioning polities 
in particular, validates Shapiro’s views on the nature of the judicial function in 
democracies.   
   Mature  democracies  have  not  been  immune  from  the  continually  extending 
reach of judicial power and its impact on governance in recent times. However, 
accounts of the judicial function, especially in transitioning polities disclose that 
judicial power has challenged and in some cases, strongly eroded parliamentary 
sovereignty.
9 From the Americas to Europe, through Africa to Asia, the story is 
the same; the judiciary is playing a decidedly more prominent role in shaping 
policy and governance than ever before.
10 For this reason, Hirschl draws attention 
to a ‘rapid transition to “juristocracy”.’
11  
   Pildes
12  and  Isaacharoff
13  both  refer  to  the  judicialisation  of  politics  as  the 
‘constitutionalization of democratic politics.’ Their terminological preference is 
easily  the  norm  in  scholarly  considerations  of  judicialisation  of  politics  by 
American legal and political theorists.
14 It appears to be preferred perhaps for its 
more  orthodox  origin  which  in-effectively  obscures  the  centrality  of  judicial 
governance  in  contemporary  democratic  experience.  After  all,  it  is  practically 
inconceivable  to  discuss  democratic  arrangements  without  some  form  of 
constitution  and  thus,  the  incidence  of  institutional  ‘constitutionalism’  or 
‘constitutionalisation.’  
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   Shapiro and Sweet have noted the ironic dialectic of the judicial function in 
democratic  societies.  Public  office  holders  in  the  political  branches  seek 
legitimacy by subjecting themselves to elections and control by the people they 
are to serve. Judges on their part claim to be ‘neutral servants of “the law”.’
15 In 
other  words,  unlike  other  government  officials  and  other  institutions  of  a 
democratic state, judges achieve legitimacy by claiming neutrality in the exercise 
of their powers and performance of their duties. Thus, their allegiance is to law 
and not the people law serves. But while it is indispensable that the judiciary 
upholds the law in an independent manner, Shapiro and Sweet make the important 
point that judges do have a lot to do with politics.  
   In transitioning societies, particularly authoritarian ones, the judiciary is usually 
the only one, of the three branches of government that has a record of institutional 
continuity through out the period of distortion in the exercise of state powers. The 
political branches suffer either suspension or abrogation at some points and only 
remerge  as  democratic  institutions  in  the  post-authoritarian  period.  They  are 
usually,  as  in  the  Nigerian  experience,  fragile  partly  due  to  their  chequered 
institutional  existence.  The  judiciary  thus  emerge  as  a  critical  player  in 
governance building on the privilege of institutional continuity and function as a 
mediator.  
   The  recognition  that  the  judiciary  plays  an  important  role  in  established 
democracies,
16  usually  through  horizontal  accountability  (despite  institutional 
continuity and relatively better developed accountability mechanisms), in a way 
explains the ascendance of judicial power in polities transitioning to democracy. 
This is because (as explained above), the displacement experienced by the other 
branches saddles the transitional society with fragile political institutions that are 
usually  ill–equipped  to  effectively  manage  the  resolution  of  inevitable  state-
society and inter-institutional disputes that arise in the context of transition. The 
judiciary easily becomes the choice forum for resolution of myriad contestations.   
   However,  the  growing  incidence  of  horizontal  accountability  in  established 
democracies does not fully explain the remarkable growth of judicial power in 
transitional  societies.  Some  normative  questions  regarding  the  validity  of  the 
judicial  role  in  policy-making  remain  unresolved.
17  Specifically,  does  the 
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experience of transitioning polities of the judicial function not challenge the rather 
well established objections to the tangential ascendance of judicial governance at 
the heart of the counter-majoritarian argument? Is the devolution of more powers 
to the judiciary not directly antithetical to the very principles of accountability and 
representation  at  the  heart  of  the  democratic  transition  project?  These  are 
important questions to which the discussion now turns. 
 
3. JUDICIALISATION OF POLITICS AND THE COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN ARGUMENT
18 
   Contemporary political and legal thought has witnessed a growing opposition to 
the  rise  of  judicial  power.  There  is  the  concern  that  judicial  governance  in  a 
democratic  society  is  contrary  to  notions  of  popular  sovereignty.
19  In  what  is 
regarded as the classic articulation of the issue, Bickel asserted it was contrary to 
democratic  precepts  to  allow  an  unelected,  minority  branch  of  government,  to 
upturn the decisions of elected officials.
20  
   On the counter-majoritarian view, through the instrumentality of judicial review, 
judges effectively impose the views of a faction on society as a whole. This is 
especially the case in the context of appointive judicial positions where political 
actors play an important role in their appointments.
21 For critics of the appointive 
system, the growing influence of partisan interest groups over the appointment 
process  constitutes  a  sore  point.  The  growing  influence  of  such  lobby  groups 
further  strengthens  opposition  to  the  considerable  powers  exercised  by  the 
judiciary  over  policy  issues.
22  The  influence  of  interest  groups  in  judicial 
appointments  (and  implicit  influence  on  the  direction  of  judicial 
constitutionalism)  is  acutely  felt  in  American  judicial  constitutionalism. 
According to Schor, this has led to the development of the view, in some quarters, 
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19 See for instance L D Kramer The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial 
Review (Oxford University Press New York 2004). But See L Alexander and L B Solum 
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that the easiest route to amending the American constitution is not by legislative 
majority, but getting ‘one’s partisans on the Supreme Court.’
23  
   The quest to check the growing power of the judiciary, the ‘counter-majoritarian 
difficulty,’ has reputedly remained at the centre-stage of American constitutional 
theory  for  over  five  decades.  To  combat  the  challenge,  Schor  suggests  a 
‘democratisation  of  judicial  review’  through  the  creation  of  appointive 
mechanisms that ensure ‘democratic majorities’ have a say in the composition of 
the  courts  or  over  their  decisions.
24  In  effect,  such  democratisation  meets  the 
challenge of the ‘undemocratic’ nature of the power wielded by a few (judges) 
over representative (executive and legislative) branches of government. 
     It  is  arguable  that  the  counter-majoritarian  objection  can  sometimes  be 
overstated. First, judges are themselves not any less representative or democratic 
in  certain  jurisdictions,  as  is  the  case  in  some  American  states  where  judicial 
offices are elective. Second, a certain amount of democratic representation is at 
play within appointive jurisdictions where judicial offices are filled through the 
instrumentality  of  (independent)  committee  recommendation,  executive 
nomination and legislative assent as is the case in some national jurisdictions.
25 
Nigeria  is,  at  least  in  theory,  one  such  jurisdiction.  This is  arguably  the  case, 
considering that the executive (represented by the president or governor) and the 
respective branch of the legislature (usually the upper chambers like the Senate in 
both America and Nigeria), are ordinarily deemed representatives of the people. 
They thus constitute a form of Electoral College for judicial appointment. 
   The foregoing position is objected to by critics of judicial review on the basis of 
‘comparative  legitimacy.’
26  Waldron  argues  in  this  regard  that  legislatures  are 
much more accountable to their constituents and more democratically elected than 
judges. The comparative legitimacy argument is not without considerable force. 
This is the case, especially if it is considered that an electoral college sometimes 
tends to offer such narrow representation as to be undemocratic, notably in the 
context of first past the post electoral practices.  
                                                 
23 Schor note 21 supra at 108. 
24 Ibid. at 113. 
25 For an account of the sometimes contentious process of confirmation of Supreme Court 
nominees in the United States see K  J McMahon “Presidents, Political regimes and Contentious 
Supreme Court Nominations: A Historical Model” (2007) 32 (4) Law & Social Inquiry 919(-(54). 
26 J Waldron “The Core of the Case against Judicial Review” (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1346, 
1392. 
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   However,  a  significant  flaw  in  the  comparative  legitimacy  argument  is  the 
neglect to take in to account the complexities that attend elections to political 
offices even in advanced democracies. Critical analysis of the electoral systems in 
a number of liberal democracies may not yield the rather presumed solidity of the 
counter-majoritarian dismissal of judicial review. It can be reasonably argued that 
there are differing levels of representation for both majorities and minorities in the 
various  electoral  systems  ranging  from  first  past  the  post,  preferential  voting, 
electoral colleges, to proportional representation. But the characterisation of the 
executive  and  legislative  involvement  in  judicial  appointment  as  an  electoral 
college assumes the political branches of government are themselves elected in 
free and fair, popular elections. The validity of the characterisation dissolves (or is 
at  the  least  diluted),  where  the  political  branches  are  not  elected  through  a 
transparent process. The lack of transparency however impacts on the legitimacy 
of  the  democratic  credentials  of  the  political  branches  and  their  representative 
claims as a whole.   
   Conceding the democratic legitimacy of the political branches does not however 
resolve the representation quagmire ‘haters of judicial review’
27 have set up in 
objection to judicial review. Kyritsis rightly argues that it is essential to identify 
what is the exact nature of ‘representative democracy’ which critics of judicial 
review  insist  it  devalues.  He  argues  that  the  legislature  (and  presumably  by 
extension, the executive) ‘represent’ the people under a ‘trustee’ as opposed to a 
‘proxy’  model  of  representation.  Under  the  proxy  system,  a  political 
representative is ‘like a conduit of the convictions of his constituents,’ without 
recourse to his own notions of the merits of the decision at stake. On the proxy 
model  of  representation  then,  ‘the  law  of  the  country’  (and  by  extension, 
government policy) is a concrete reflection of the actual will of the people.
 28 
   Conceivably,  representation  under  the  proxy  model  justifies  democratic 
objections to the legitimacy of judicial review, in as much as it could be regarded 
as  trumping  the  decisions  of  the  people  directly  carried  out  by  their 
representatives  in  the  political  branch.  But  Kyritsis  argues  that  the  reality  of 
representation in contemporary democratic practice is of the trustee model. Under 
the trustee model of representation, representatives take the views of constituents 
into consideration. However, they still maintain considerable distance from even 
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an  agglomeration  of  such  views  in  the  performance  of  their  representative 
functions. They exercise a wide berth and independence of thought and action on 
matters of legislation, policy and governance generally. 
29 This is the operative 
conception  of  representation  in  democracies  today.
30  Kyritsis  contends  that 
glossing over the elitist nature of representation in democratic practice, even (if 
not especially) in model democracies, is at the heart of over-emphasises on the 
undemocratic nature of judicial review.
31 While this may not directly address the 
argument against judicial review, it at least substantially weakens the comparative 
legitimacy argument. 
   Kyritsis’ model of representation and participation in liberal democracies finds 
support  in  political  philosophy.  It  broadly  fits  into  Ci’s  characterisation  of 
‘political  agency’  in  modern  democratic  practice.  Kyritsis’  proxy  and  trustee 
models  of  representation  substantially  aligns  with  Ci’s  postulation  that 
participation  in  liberal  democracies  is  reflected  in  ‘utopian’  and  ‘ideological’ 
discourses  respectively.  Like  Kyritsis,  Ci  argues  that  a  considerable  dose  of 
ideological rhetoric is employed in liberal democratic discourse to conceal the gap 
between representation and actual participation of constituents.
32  
   In  principle,  democracy  connotes  a  system  which  allows  the  people  to  rule 
themselves.  But,  as  Ci  emphasises,  ‘political  agency,’  the  form  representative 
governance  is  expressed,  may  be  considered  somewhat  antithetical  to  the 
aspirations of majoritarian participation in governance. This is because in practice, 
the people get an opportunity to appoint to positions of power, those who will rule 
them,  ostensibly  ‘in  their  name.’
33  But  for  the  most  part,  they  are  unable  to 
determine how this power is exercised. There thus remains a significant measure 
of domination, a condition democracy was conceived to obviate. On this view, 
representation as a salient feature of democracy in liberal democratic societies is a 
fiction  sustained  by  a  series  dynamics.
34  The  distance  between  the  ideal  of 
represented and the representative in democratic practice highlights the  debate 
about  the  weight  of  the  presence  required  to  determine  consent  in  a  liberal 
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democracy. This is what political theorists refer to as ‘the paradox of political 
representation.’
35  
   Further, it can be contended that the dialectic of judicial legitimacy, sets the 
grounds for opposition to the growing powers of the judiciary in determining the 
course of policy and governance. In matured democracies, the exercise of power 
is  usually  available  to  scrutiny.  Governmental  power  is  to  a  large  extent, 
accounted for in the public domain. However, experiential accounts and empirical 
evidence  in  contemporary  transitional  societies,  suggest  the  need  for  care  in 
applying  such  a  standard  as  evaluative  mechanism  for  the  judicial  function  in 
transitional polities. Deriving from this, the counter-majoritarian view on the rise 
of judicial power may have an important place in the socio-political scheme of 
matured  and  stable  democratic  polities.  It  may  conduce  to  the  needs  of  such 
societies  which  over  time,  have  developed  and  institutionalised  sophisticated 
mechanisms, and processes for scrutiny and accountability, regarding the exercise 
of state power. Substantive accounts of judicial intervention in the governance of 
transitioning  polities  through  adjudication  of  emerging  disputes  point  in  new 
directions.  
   Rather than the rise of judicial power constituting an erosion of the common 
(democratic)  will,  normative  and  context-specific  examination  of  the  judicial 
function, lean towards a positive role for the judiciary in the institutionalisation of 
democratic  values.  This  is  largely  the  case  in  the  ever-shifting  sites  of  such 
disputes which range from horizontal and vertical levels of political arrangements, 
electoral  contestations  among  political  actors  to  individual  and  group  (rights) 
claims by citizens against the state.  
   Waldron, notwithstanding his articulate opposition to judicial review generally 
and  the  ‘strong’  variant  decidedly,
36  implicitly  endorses  the  validity  of  the 
foregoing position. In a representative restatement of his views on judicial review 
in a recent article aptly titled ‘The Core of the Case against Judicial Review,’
37 he 
sets out four conditions which must be satisfied before a valid case can be made 
against  judicial  review.  He  stipulates  that  the  society  must  have  functional 
democratic institutions in ‘good working order,’ with a legislature elected through 
free and fair elections, conducted on the basis of universal adult suffrage and a 
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non-elected judiciary. The other two conditions are the requirement of societal 
commitment to individual and minority rights, and ‘persisting, substantial, and 
good faith disagreement’ within those committed to those rights.
38 He argues that 
objections to judicial review may not hold where any of these conditions is non-
existent. Thus, he sets up social prerequisites (‘assumptions’) that must be taken 
for granted in arguing a case against judicial review. In transitional polities, it is 
easily the case that one or other of these conditions does not exist. In fact, the 
absence of some or all of these conditions underwrites the democratic transition 
process.    
   For clarity, it serves to relate the foregoing discussion to the African experience 
of governance in the context of political transition. Governance in many African 
states has continued to be steeped in corruption and parochial considerations. In 
many  instances,  the  political  elite  secure  and  maintain  their  hold  on  power 
through  sham  electoral  processes  in  countries  that  are  still  recovering  from 
extended periods of social displacement deriving from authoritarian military rule 
or civil-conflict. In such societies, there is palpable disconnect between political 
office-holders and the people they purport to serve arsing from the legitimacy 
deficit that underwrites the ascendance and hold on power by many actors on the 
political scene. The Nigerian socio-political situation is a classic example of this 
untoward situation. I will return to this later. 
   The frequent breakdown of elite political consociation arrangements, in many 
developing countries, is another factor in support of judicialisation of politics as a 
force  for  democratisation,  and  construction  of  the  rule  of  law.  The  political 
struggle for power by the elite in fractious and multi-nation states, commonly the 
sites of democratisation and transition from conflict in Africa (and elsewhere), 
usually erodes, if not rolls back, the gains of democratic statehood. The recent 
experience of political crises in Kenya and lately, the dire situation in Zimbabwe, 
are sad commentaries on this dynamic.  In essence, the  fragility  of the power-
sharing and democratic culture in many transitioning polities, commends resort, as 
Teitel  has  pointed  out,  to  an  apolitical  institution  for  institutionalising 
constitutional and democratic behaviour, a culture of rule of law and respect for 
human rights.
39 In other words, the experiences of  the exercise of power by the 
political class and conduct of  state institutions in transitioning polities (notably in 
post-authoritarian contexts), supports the view that the judiciary is well suited to 
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act  as  the  stabilising  agent,  if  not  the  direct  purveyor,  of  representative 
democracy.      
   In articulating the transformative potentials of law at times of significant social 
and  political  change,  Teitel
40argues  that  the  role  of  law  undergoes  ‘normative 
shifts’ which distinguishes it from the conception and understanding of law in 
‘ordinary times.’
 41 In other words, there is a paradigm shift in the understanding 
of the workings of law and its place in a society in transition. This phenomenon is 
what  Teitel  called,  ‘transitional  jurisprudence.’
42  In  the  context  of  political 
change,  the  transitional  judiciary,  due  partly  to  institutional  fragility  of  the 
political branch, is usually faced with deciding difficult, time-bound important 
cases. Such cases usually have direct bearing on the process of transition. Thus, 
the judiciary is faced with what Teitel refers to as the ‘ambivalent directionality of 
law.’
43 Teitel’s analysis of transitional jurisprudence as being a distinctive and 
legitimate  conceptualisation  of  law  in  society  is  relevant  to  this  study  of  the 
judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court in the context of the political transition 
in Nigeria.  
   Dyzenhaus’  discussion  of  legality  in  times  of  emergency  in  his  book,  The 
Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency provides further support for 
this view. He suggests that constituting the rule of law in times of emergency 
involves a ‘rule of law project’ conducted through institutional dialogue between 
the  executive,  legislature  and  the  judiciary.  The  three  branches  engage  in  this 
dialogue  for  the  realisation  of  fundamental  constitutional  values.
44  This 
cooperative model accords an important role to the judiciary even as it recognises 
the  important  place  of  the  political  branches  in  the  institutionalisation  or 
restoration of the rule of law. 
  In  sum,  there  is  much  in  support  of  the  proposition  that  there  is  a  need  for 
reassessing  objections  to  the  legitimacy  of  active  judicial  participation  in 
governance. Despite conventional wisdom in political and constitutional thought, 
the view that the ability of the judiciary to alter the exercise of political power by 
elected  representatives  as  being  antithetical  to  ‘democratic  values,’
45  lacks 
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universal  validity  in  transitional  contexts.  The  political  and  constitutional 
experiences  of  transitional  societies,  suggest  the  need  for  a  reappraisal  of  the 
‘counter-majoritarian’ view of the place of the judiciary in a democratic society. 
An  assessment  of  the  Nigerian  experience  of  the  judicialisation  of  politics, 
examined  in  Chapter  Six,  provides  opportunity  for  further  explication  of  the 
position. At this point, it serves to set out the broad outlines of the concept itself 
for clarity of further discussion. 
 
4. JUDICIALISATION OF POLITICS: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
   The definition of judicialisation of politics proffered by Sweet goes to the heart 
of  the  judicial  role  in  transitioning  societies.  He  defines  it  as  the  ‘process  by 
which triadic law-making progressively shapes the strategic behaviour of political 
actors engaged in interactions with one another.’
46 Hirschl for his part maintains 
that the phenomenon is ‘multi-faceted.’
 47 He defines it as ‘the ever accelerating 
reliance on  courts and judicial means for addressing core moral predicaments, 
public policy questions and political controversies.’
48 
  
 These  are  no  doubt  perceptive  definitions  of  the  judicialisation  of  politics. 
However, definitions can be normatively constrictive. Further, there is the view 
that judicialisation of politics extends beyond noticeable judicial control of policy, 
to the internalisation of the formal procedures and language of courts by non-
judicial decision-making forums.
49 Thus, the conceptualisation of the outlines of 
judicialisation of politics in democratic and democratising polities provides an 
analytical template on which to conduct an evaluative study of the impact and 
significance of the phenomenon. This section focuses on that objective. 
   Perhaps the most discernible feature of judicialisation of politics is the extension 
of the scope of ‘judge-made’ law. This refers to the situation where judges play an 
active, if not dominating role in shaping state policy across a range of spheres. 
Such  active  role  derives  from  an  increasing  resort  by  the  other  branches  (and 
sometimes levels) of government as well as individuals to judicial resolution of 
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political disputes.
50 For politics and political players alike, a direct consequence of 
judicialisation of politics in this way, is an increased awareness of and attention to 
how the powers of judges impact policy decisions.
51 It is also identifiable in the 
resolution  of  tension  emerging  from  deficient  institutional  arrangements  and 
design (as we shall see later in the case of Nigeria), possible hallmarks sometimes 
of un-negotiated political transitions.     
   Between individuals or groups inter se, or individuals in claims against the state, 
judicialisation may be reflected by an exponential increase in the claims for the 
judicial recognition of sometimes untested, newly legislated, or even otherwise 
non-justiciable rights contained in some constitutions
52 like social and economic 
rights contained in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This 
is  easily  the  case  where  access  to  the  courts  has  been  liberalised  from  legal 
constraints  like  narrow  rules  of  legal  standing  to  sue,  particularly  in  societies 
recovering from some form of conflict or the other. Judicialisation of politics in 
this  regard  is  enhanced  by  the  complicity  of  state  institutions  (including  the 
judiciary  itself)  for  deprivation  of  the  rights  of  a  segment  of  society  at  some 
period past which has been disavowed in the democratisation process.  
   Availability of legal aid alongside social and legal mobilisation in the wake of 
constitutionalisation of civil liberties and other rights, promotes judicial shaping 
of policy. Reflections on this aspect of judicialisation of politics have recognised 
that  the  judiciary  in  transitioning  polities-  usually  confronted  with  fragile  or 
lopsided  economic  structures-  faces  the  daunting  task  of  balancing  centrifugal 
forces struggling for control of state and society. In that dynamic, the judiciary is 
called upon to determine the duty of the state to implement competing claims of 
constitutional rights (often-times of a socio-economic nature), intra-government 
disputes  and  claims,  state-society  obligations  and  a  host  of  divergent,  yet 
competing claims.  
   But the task of judges in governance in the present ‘Age of Democracy’
53 is 
decidedly complicated. Normatively, judges are required to uphold the letter and 
spirit of newly legislated or revived bills of rights and certain understandings of 
the  rule  of  law,  for  which  they  are  arguably  well-prepared.  Yet,  they  are 
challenged by formidable arguments of their lack of specialised expertise on the 
multi-layered,  multi-dimensional  effects  of  policy-prioritisation  and 
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implementation,  a  function,  purists  insist,  is  exclusive  to  the  executive  and 
legislative branches of government.  Against judicial intervention in this situation, 
it is argued that even if the lack of expertise is not conceded on the part of judges, 
it is still a strong point that social rights require policy decisions across the board 
for  reasonable  balancing  of  priorities,  something  the  case-by-case  judicial 
approach misses.  
   Justice Albie Sachs of the South Africa Constitutional Court clearly articulates 
the judicial dilemma in such societies in his reflections on the Grootboom Case.
54 
He noted of the central issue in the case; evaluating the duty of a local authority’s 
legal obligation to house thousands of displaced persons against the background 
of their trespass on private property
55 
               If we insist on money being provided for Mrs Grootboom’s community,  
              this requires taking money away from other items in the budget. Is that  
               not what parliament should be doing?... We have millions of homeless  
               people. When do we intervene, if at all, and force what could be massive   
               redirection of funds on the legislature and the executive?
56 
    
 In this regard, Sieder, Schojlden and Angell have made the important point that 
judicialisation of politics extends beyond constitutional powers of judicial review. 
Rather, the increased visibility of the judiciary is noticeable in the ‘resolution of 
political, social or state-society conflicts.’
57 
   There is something of a paradox in the increased visibility of judicial power in 
governance, considering the concept of separation of powers, and the inclination 
of political players to jealously guide their spheres of influence. Certainly, many 
of the political questions that have been judicialised had the tacit, if not express, 
support of the political class for that course of action.
58 If it is true that ‘the first 
instinct of power is the retention of power,’
59 what then drives the ceding of the 
power-space  by  the  political  branches  of  government  to  the  apolitical  judicial 
branch? In this regard Tushnet, in evaluating the relational dynamics of political 
and judicial power around the world has noted that the ceding of powers by the 
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political to the judicial branch has not always proceeded as a matter of deliberate 
choice on the part of the respective institutions.
60 This observation applies to the 
Nigerian experience too. As mentioned above, it has been deliberate in certain 
instances. At other times, it has been decidedly outwith the control of either party. 
   It has been argued that quiescence, if not outright deference of the executive and 
legislature to judicialisation of politics may have its roots in a desire to secure 
‘regime  legitimization.’
  61  This  is  especially  the  case  in  the  context  of 
democratising polities where reinstitution of the rule of law is a key issue in the 
transition. Equally so is the desire to obtain legitimacy in times of crisis where 
there is a legitimacy deficit, deriving from any of a number of dynamics (not least 
sham elections), of the political branches of government. I will argue later that 
legitimacy-deficit, as a propelling factor for judicialisation of politics, is germane 
to the Nigerian transition experience.  
   Related  to  the  foregoing  is  the  vacillation  of  the  political  branches  to  take 
decisive action on topical and sensitive issues in both matured and transitioning 
democracies. Pildes cites as an instance, the need for a legal framework to deal 
with terrorism in the United States and the attitude of the Bush administration to 
it.  Despite  its  relational  significance  to  ‘security,  liberty  and  international 
relations,’ Pildes notes of the attitude of the Bush administration on the issue that 
               …the executive branch did not seek to force Congress to share  
               responsibility for these difficult judgments, nor did Congress show any       
               interest in asserting such responsibility itself.
 62 
 
Gaps in crucial decision-making of this nature may derive primarily from attempts 
to avoid responsibility for decisions that may influence voters in an election year 
for  instance.  Despite  the  obvious  institutional  distortions  in  governance  that 
results, the political branches may be content to cede decision-making power and 
shift  responsibility  for  potentially  unpopular  decisions  away  from  themselves. 
Through such subterfuge, they turn away public displeasure towards the judiciary, 
making the courts a ‘convenient scapegoat’
63 for policy misadventures, while at 
the same time abdicating the very responsibility for which they are elected.  
   However, it is also the case that concessions of power to the judicial branch may 
be involuntary. It may result from the inability of elites to resolve contestations, 
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usually of a political nature amongst themselves. As the account of the Nigerian 
experience shows, this latter dimension may be quite significant in shaping the 
incidence of judicialisation of politics in democratising polities.   
   Moreover, in the nature of transitional experiences, gaps in political decision-
making may follow on obvious or perceived fragility of a polity yet recovering 
from a fractured existence arising from severe forms of authoritarianism or war. 
This dynamic as a propelling force for judicialisation of politics characterised the 
approach of the Obasanjo administration’s initial preference for referring claims 
for wider control of the country’s oil resources by the oil-producing areas of the 
country to the judiciary for resolution. It is instructive that the decision of the 
Supreme Court in the case in point, Attorney General of the Federation v Attorney 
General of Abia State and 35 Others 
64 came to be viewed as having created more 
problems than it solved. It generated social tensions and a political stalemate in 
the country that provoked calls for a political approach to the contestations in the 
case. 
65 The crucial point remains that in the thick of the agitation for increased 
control  of  territorial  resources  between  the  federal  and  (littoral)  state 
governments,  the  former,  wary  of  the  groundswell  of  opinion  towards  greater 
devolution  of  its  control  of  such  resources,  consciously  deflected  an  issue 
essentially for political resolution towards the judiciary. It thus played safe while 
simultaneously  advancing  an  image  of  a  democratic,  rule-of-law-abiding 
government. 
   In  sum,  judicialisation  of  politics  essentially  presupposes  a  more  visible 
presence  of  the  judiciary  in  political  and  social  life.  The  incidence  of 
judicialisation of politics results in the transformation of the legal and political 
culture in a polity. The courts emerge in the social milieu as the forum of choice 
for  ‘social  redress  and  rights  claims.’
66  This  has  been  singularly  noticeable 
phenomenon in transitions to democracy in post authoritarian societies of South-
East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and Africa. 
   
5.  COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES  
   In a study of the establishment and working of constitutional courts in political 
transitions  from  authoritarian  (one-party),  communist  or  military  rule  in  four 
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countries  in  South-East  Asia,  Ginsburg  observed  the  dramatic  rise  of  judicial 
review of legislative and executive action.
67 There is increasing judicial restraint 
on the exercise of political power in Taiwan, Korea, Mongolia and Thailand. All 
of these in a region reputed for the near-total absence of effective judicial review 
on  the  actions  of  powerful  executives.
68  In  the  aftermath  of  transition  to 
democratic  rule  in  these  countries,  the  (constitutional)  courts  have  become 
‘important sites of political contestation…to achieve social change.’
69  
    Judicial intervention and activity on various fronts have had deep resonance for 
governance in the region. The courts have struck at ‘elements of the old system,’ 
including  corruption,  while  providing  a  platform  for  the  resolution  of  conflict 
among political players. In the political transition of these countries, courts and 
judges  have  played  a  significant  role  ‘underpinning  and  facilitating 
democratisation.’
70  They  have  thus  become  active  participants  in  the 
democratisation project.
71 
  In Central and Eastern Europe, constitutional courts have taken on head long, 
some of the most vexed social and political challenges confronting the liberal 
democratisation  process  in  those  countries.  They  have  intervened  in  and 
moderated  the  course  of  post-totalitarian  transitional  justice  measures  like 
prosecution  of  alleged  violators  of  human  rights  and  lustrations,
72  all  with 
considerable  resonance  for  politics  and  governance  in  the  so-called  ‘velvet 
revolutions’ of Central and Eastern Europe.
73 Thus, the Constitutional Court of 
Hungary ruled in the Zetenyi Law Case,
74 that the law passed by parliament for 
the prosecution of communist political crimes was unconstitutional. It held that 
the  Zetenyi  Law  was  retrospective  and  in  violation  of  the  principle  of  legal 
security, one of the cornerstones of the rule of law.
  75 The decision effectively 
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blocked the prosecution of serious crimes committed during the communist era 
for been inconsistent with the newly amended Hungarian Constitution.
76  
   As  Priban  further  notes,  the  Constitutional  Court  of  the  Czech  Republic  in 
contrast, upheld the legitimacy of similar legislation in its review of the “Act on 
Lawlessness  of  the  Communist  Regime  and  the  Resistance  Against  It,” 
presumably in a manner that sought to balance the tension between impunity and 
retrospectivity.
77 More than that, the Czech Constitutional Court has played ‘an 
enormous role’ in the ‘re-modernisation’ of Czech society.
78 According to him 
‘The moralist and political vocabulary of the Court’s judgment’ has gone ‘beyond 
the  usual  limits’  employed  by  similar  courts  in  liberal,  well  established 
democracies.
79 The Court extended its purview beyond strictly legal contexts to 
explication  of  moral  and  political  requisites  for  a  society  based  on  law  and 
democracy.
80 The trend has been replicated in Poland and Unified Germany.
81   
   Teitel agrees with Priban that the jurisprudence of the constitutional courts in 
Central Eastern Europe have extended the traditional realms of judicial review.
 82 
She states that in the process, the courts have gone on to establish a ‘newfound 
source of political legitimacy.’
83 The legitimating function derives from the liberal 
locus  afforded  to  individuals  (and  presumably  groups)  to  actively  challenge 
political action, signalling a ‘new governmental openness.’
84 The constitutional 
courts have changed the ‘constitutional culture’
85 by limiting hitherto unbridled 
state power.  I will argue in Chapter 6 that despite scholarly scepticism on the 
democratic  credentials  of  the  activist  judicial  approach  (based  partly  on  its 
perceived  potential  of  fostering  legislative  irresponsibility),
86  the  judiciary  in 
Nigeria’s fragile transition is recognised to have taken on this role ascribed by 
Teitel to the constitutional courts in Central and Eastern Europe with significant 
impact on democratisation and governance in the country. 
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   The propriety of judicial review of rights and policy issues or in the language of 
this  discourse,  the  judicialisation  of  politics,  has  been  viewed  with  much 
scepticism by scholars like Sadurski.
87 But there  is hardly any  contention that 
constitutional courts in Central and Eastern Europe have generally given force to 
some rights provisions which for decades had not been worth the paper they were 
written  on.
88  They  have  also  limited  parliamentary  action,  striking  down 
legislation and policies they deemed out of tune with constitutional provisions.
89 
The courts have actively participated or sometimes taken the lead in setting an 
agenda of liberalism for the new government.
90  
   Not surprisingly, varying responses from the political branches of government 
and the public, have trailed the exercise of wide ranging powers of constitutional 
judicial  review.  The  responses  have  ranged  from  grudging  compliance,  to 
considerable resistance and emergence of serious tensions between the judiciary 
and  the  political  branches.  The  Mongolian  experience  demonstrates  this 
reasonably well.
91  
      In Latin America, judicialisation of politics in the region’s democratic 
transitions (from authoritarianism) has become one of the most important features 
of politics in the region.
92  From the 1980s onwards, the judiciaries of Latin 
America have become more visible and relevant participants in the determination 
of policy issues of a political, economic and social nature. Courts have 
increasingly been called upon to decide matters that were previously reserved for 
the political domain.
93 In Mexico for instance, the Supreme Court has been drawn 
into adjudication of political and economic policy cases.    
   Increased judicial participation in determination of policy has tracked (even if 
initially at a slow pace) the 1994 constitutional reforms which granted the 
Mexican Supreme Court more independence and expanded powers of judicial 
review. It has since boldly taken on a more public role.
94 In the process, the 
Supreme Court has made a noticeable shift away from over seven decades of 
reticence in governance in which it had more or less functioned as an extension of 
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the ruling party.
95 The judiciary in Brazil has similarly stamped its imprint on 
decisions on matters of policy in the country’s democratisation process. In view of 
the prominent position of the two countries as the largest in Latin America, 
analysts have expressed the view that it is necessary to take cognisance of judicial 
activities in accounts of ‘politics and policy reform’ in the region.
96  
   On the comparative front, the Constitutional Court of South Africa is unique. 
While similar courts elsewhere have been actively involved in shaping policy and 
governance in transitioning polities, it played a cardinal role in the constitutive 
process of transition from apartheid to popular democracy in the rainbow nation.
97 
With a view to address the inverse concerns of the parties that negotiated the 
South Africa transition through an institutionalised and independent forum, the 
Constitutional Court was vested powers that ‘had never before been imparted on 
any court.’
98 The Constitutional Court played an important role in the institutional 
design  of  a  new  nation  by  its  thorough  scrutiny  and  initial  rejection  of  the 
proposed provisions of the permanent constitution for South Africa.
99 It rejected 
attempts at limiting judicial review while it insisted on adequate safeguards for 
separation of powers as well as structural and fiscal federalism.
100   
   The  Constitutional  Court  further  required  the  incorporation  of  international 
human rights standards in the new constitution and sought to maintain critical 
balance  between  majoritarian  control  and  minority  rights.  It  thus  acted  on  the 
powers conferred on it by the Interim Constitution of South Africa, to ensure strict 
adherence  to  the  principles  agreed  by  the  negotiating  parties.
101  Further,  the 
decisions of the Constitutional Court on the Bill of Rights in the South-African 
constitution including those on economic and social rights as in Grootboom,
102 
have had significant impact on policy and governance in a country struggling to 
come  to  terms  with  a  harrowing  past  for  the  majority  and  forge  an  inclusive, 
egalitarian future for all. The South Africa Constitutional Court has been noted for 
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holding a delicate balance between competing interests that could threaten the 
body politic.
103    
   If the Constitutional Court of South Africa has been unique in its functioning, 
the impact of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, on socio-economic and 
political issues in the country, broke away from the received wisdom on a central 
feature  of  judicialisation  of  politics.  Established  by  an  authoritarian  regime,  it 
challenged the theoretical position that a democratic dispensation is sine qua non 
for judicialisation of politics.
104 The authoritarian regime in Egypt established the 
constitutional  court  essentially  with  an  economic,  rather  than  a  socio-political 
agenda. Confronted with economic depression at home, and international pressure 
from abroad, the government established the court to assure foreign investors of 
its commitment to economic liberalism and preservation of private property rights 
away  from  its  historical  record  of  nationalisation  of  private  corporations  and 
investments  in  the  country.  It  hoped  to  achieve  this  through  what  would  be 
regarded as an independent judicial review mechanism.
 105  
   According to Moustafa, the Supreme Constitutional Court not only effectively 
assisted  the  government  to  push  through  its  new  liberalised  economic  vision 
through  striking  down  socialist  oriented  legislations,  it  also  provided  an 
acceptable  forum  for  the  ventilation  of  hitherto  repressed  political  opposition 
views. It has also played a key role in securing property and advancing political 
rights of individuals and groups,
106 with the latter especially, to the discomfiture 
(sometimes outright consternation) of its authoritarian creators. Despite its rather 
moderate  activism,
107  its  decisions  opened  up  the  space  for  the  ventilation  of 
opposition views on an institutional platform, with the court acting as an interface 
between state and society.
 108 Its decisions on private property rights constituted a 
veritable outlet for policies desired by the government but from which it exercised 
considerable reticence in the apprehension of public outrage.
109  
                                                 
103 Isaacharoff note 13 supra at 1893. 
104 T C Neal “Why the Expansion of Judicial Power” in N C Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder The 
Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New-York University Press New-York 1995) 28 
105 T Moustafa “Law versus the State: The Judicialisation of Politics in Egypt” (2003) 28 (4) Law 
and Social Inquiry 883, 895-896. 
106 Moustafa note 107 supra at 914-921. 
107 Ibid. at 903-907. 
108 Ibid. at 894-903. 
109 Ibid. at 908-913.   182 
   In testimony to the visible power of the Court over policy, the government later 
adopted  various  extra-legal  measures  to  curb  its  progressive  jurisprudence.
110 
Notwithstanding these measures, the Court impacted significantly on the course of 
governance in the country. It substantially established its position as an institution 
not only for economic liberalisation as conceived by its creators, but the choice 
institution of resort for political emancipation.
111   
   In summary, it can be fairly asserted that distrust for inherited, complicit, state 
institutions in transitioning polities, has played a significant role in the sometimes 
uncritical  social  approval  of  newly  created  ones.  Constitutional  courts,  new 
institutions that they are, have arguably benefited immensely from what Teitel 
refers to as the ‘legitimacy of hope’ that surrounds institutions that offer fresh 
beginnings.
112  An  important  point  offered  by  a  nuanced  approach  to  this 
comparative analysis is the connection between the establishment of new courts 
and  institutional  accountability  for  the  exercise  of  power  in  the  pre-transition 
period. Although the various societies examined above did not directly engage 
with accountability of the judiciary for past governance as advanced in this thesis, 
the creation of powerful new judicial bodies signifies, at the least, considerable 
dissatisfaction with the existing judicial bodies.  
   Thus, behind the creation of these new courts is the desire to break away from 
the  perceived  or  actual  complicit  judiciaries  and  the  need  for  securing  the 
legitimacy  of  an  important  institution  to  participate  in  rebuilding  the  various 
societies.  Nothing  furnishes  support  for  this  view  more  than  the  commonly 
reported  cold  relationship  between  the  old  and  the  new  courts  and  the  public 
interest  and  (usually)  acclaim  the  work  of  the  latter  have  generated  within  a 
relatively short time. However, it is pertinent to reflect further on the assumption 
that  a  new  judicial  institution  is  the  only  viable  approach  to  ensuring  judicial 
promotion and protection of democratic tenets and the rule of law in transitioning 
polities. The absence of such courts in Nigeria’s transition offers an opportunity 
for such reflection. 
 
6. A STILL-BORN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: LEGACY OF A FAILED TRANSITION AND 
JUDICIARY 
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   Unlike most of the democratic transitions in Latin America, South East Asia, 
Central and Eastern Europe, and elsewhere in Africa, the Nigerian transition to 
democracy  did  not  lead  to  the  establishment  of  a  constitutional  court.  It  is 
significant  however  that  this  was  not  due  to  the  fact  that  the  idea  was  never 
considered. It is remarkable that in 1995, General Sanni Abacha (the country’s 
military ruler at the time), as part of his suspect transition to civil democratic rule 
programme,  toyed  with  the  idea  of  establishing  a  Constitutional  Court  in  the 
country. He was perhaps learning from Egypt, particularly since Nigeria was then 
in  a  similar  socio-political  and  economic  situation  both  at  the  national  and 
international  levels  that  surrounded  the  establishment  of  the  Supreme 
Constitutional Court of Egypt over a decade earlier.
113  
   The dictator was conscious of public disenchantment with the discharge of the 
judicial  function,  especially  with  regard  to  important  human  rights  and 
constitutional issues. Apart from the perceived failure of the judiciary, there was 
also the pariah status military authoritarianism finally earned the country under 
his jackboot-rule. He thus proposed the establishment of a constitutional court 
along  the  lines  of  the  South  African  Constitutional  Court.  He  went  as  far  as 
presenting the country with draft legislation for the creation of the proposed court.  
   The Abacha regime’s  plan for a  constitutional court in the country however 
drew  considerable  opposition  from  the  judiciary  and  some  respected  legal 
practitioners who felt it was at best, a subterfuge to deflect growing discontent 
with  its  ultra-authoritarian  bent.  The  preference  in  those  quarters  was  for 
restoration of independence to the institution as then constituted and return to 
democratic governance. It was felt that these were the essential elements for the 
restitution of the rule of law and constitutionalism in the country. Protagonists of 
the  position  argued  that,  the  failings  of  the  judiciary  derived  basically  from 
military authoritarianism. Only the exit of the military from governance would 
ensure judicial transformation. Or so went the argument.  
   There is some merit in the opposition to the idea of a constitutional court in 
Nigeria.  Considering  the  uninspiring  record  of  purported  military  transition 
initiatives in the country, the proposal may have been a ploy to foster support for 
Abacha’s dubious political transition programme. But it is equally true that the 
idea of a constitutional court did attract considerable support from a spectrum of 
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the society. It was felt in some circles that such a court could provide a strong and 
legitimate  forum  for  advancing  human  rights  and  moderating  the  political 
institutions in the exercise of their wide powers. The interest and support garnered 
by the proposal reinforces the growing recognition of the crucial role of courts in 
transitioning polities.   
   Whatever  the  merit  of  the  opposing  positions,  the  non-creation  of  a 
constitutional  court  is  not  sufficient  to  excuse  judicial  acquiescence  to 
authoritarian  rule  and  wide  spread  violations  of  human  rights  that  took  place 
during the period of authoritarian rule in the country. Rather, it can be argued that 
the non-establishment of a constitutional court to take on the important role of 
advancing human rights and transitional jurisprudence in the Nigerian context is 
particularly significant. It reinforces the normative argument for the imperative of 
accountability for the judiciary role in governance during the authoritarian period 
in the country as a requisite for future legitimacy of the judicial function in the 
polity.  
   If the dictator’s plans to establish a constitutional court had succeeded, it would 
have  significantly  altered  the  non-centralised  system  of  constitutional  judicial 
review in Nigeria. Post-independence,  all courts of superior records in  theory, 
maintained  a  constitutional  power  of  judicial  review  which  is  general  in  its 
application.  ‘In  theory,’  for  it  is  a  matter  of  historical  interest  that  successive 
military  regimes  variously  resisted  judicial  review  of  their  laws  and  executive 
actions. In the post-authoritarian period in Nigeria, the exercise of the power of 
judicial review has taken centre-stage within the polity even in the absence of new 
courts.  Whether  there  are  new  constitutional  courts  with  wide  powers  or 
rehabilitated ones with rejuvenated powers of judicial review, the incidence of 
court packing constitutes a source of concern on the exercise of judicial power 
and its role in governance in the modern state. 
 
7. COURT PACKING VERSUS JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
   Constitutional law scholars have expressed concern about the implications of 
the power to appoint judges (usually) exercised by the executive. Apprehensions 
surrounding abuse of this power is captured in the constant refrain of ‘court-
packing,’ in scholarly evaluations of the doctrine of judicial independence. Plainly 
stated, the oft-repeated concern is that a political authority, usually, a president or 
a governor, may utilise the opportunity of constitutionally vested powers to 
appoint cronies, or at least, sympathetic individuals, into judicial office,   185 
principally the highest hierarchically. The aim is to secure predictable judicial 
outcomes in the event of constitutional challenge of their policies.  
   According to Hirschl, hegemonic political elites, seeking to obtain advantage or 
security in new democratic settings through the judicialisation of politics, contend 
with  the  dilemma  of  judicial  empowerment.
114  He  similarly  identifies  the 
opportunity to exercise ‘general control’ over the processes of legal education and 
appointment of judicial officers as key predisposing factors to judicialisation of 
politics.
115 These are serious concerns. 
   No doubt, fears regarding abuse of appointive powers of the executive have in 
some cases been borne out by the experience in liberal and illiberal democracies, 
and more so in authoritarian societies at one time or the other. But, while ‘court-
packing’  remains  a  threat  to  the  decisional  independence  of  judges,  empirical 
evidence of its impact on conduct of the judicial function remains inconclusive 
and  mixed  at  best.  The  Nigerian  experience  furnishes  a  remarkable  example. 
Court-packing as a measure of executive interference with the judicial function, 
features in a rather subtle, albeit potent, manner in the Nigerian judicial system. 
This  was  peculiarly  true  of  the  appointment  of  judges  during  the  decades  of 
authoritarian military rule.  
   The manifestation of executive interference with judicial independence at the 
time can be traced to the peculiar workings of military rule. The (theoretically) 
federal polity was mostly administered in a unitary fashion, a phenomenon that 
has  generated  inter-governmental  tension  in  the  post-authoritarian  period. 
Notwithstanding the operation of a dual federal and state court system, the court 
system remains devoid of the structural parallelism characteristic of judiciaries in 
some other federal jurisdictions like the United States. The appellate jurisdiction 
is a purely federal affair. Appeals from both the federal high and state high courts 
proceed to the (federal) Court of Appeal and onwards to the (federal) Supreme 
Court. In terms of composition of the courts, judges were (and are still) usually 
appointed (promoted) from the federal and state high courts to the appellate courts 
by the Head of State (or president). This practice has assumed conventional status 
without constitutional or statutory moorings.  
   During  the  period  of  authoritarian  military  rule,  appointments  to  the  state 
judiciaries were made by state military administrators and at the federal level, by 
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the Head of State notionally on the recommendation (sometimes advice) of the 
appropriate  judicial  commission.  The  nomenclature  of  the  commissions  was 
typically,  ‘Judicial  Service  Commissions’  with  the  implicit  assertion  of  their 
independence and power in the judicial appointment process.  Depending on the 
respective  regime  however,  they  were  also  more  candidly  styled  ‘Advisory 
Judicial Committee,’ making clear just how much respect the military had for any 
indication  of  judicial  independence  or  liberalism  in  the  important  task  of 
constituting a prospective contender for power in the polity. The latter creation 
was specific to the federal judiciary under the regime of General Sanni Abacha.  
   Beyond nomenclature, judicial appointments were, in practice, at the discretion 
and control of the respective military ruler. Predictably, it was abused. At the 
‘entry’  point  into  the  superior  courts  system,  the  high  courts,  judges  were 
appointed largely from the office of the respective Attorneys General, federal or 
state.  Civil  servants-turned-judges,  trained  in  the  bureaucratic  tradition  of 
deference to superiors, constituted the face of ‘court-packing’ in the appointment 
of judges in Nigeria. Court of Appeal justices are then appointed from the ranks of 
High Court judges. In turn, the Supreme Court justices are appointed from the 
Court of Appeal. 
   The tradition of appointing mainly civil servants from the executive branch of 
government (state law offices), attuned to an instrumentalist view of the rule of 
law, substantially influenced the dispensation of justice by the courts in the period 
of authoritarian rule.
 116 A 2006 study commissioned by the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) indicates that this attitude has persisted in 
the post-authoritarian period.
117  
   It is reasonable to infer that the appointive tradition in the context of military 
regimes, arguably a subtle and incipient mode of court-packing, was a key factor 
in  the  judicial  legitimisation  of  authoritarian  rule  in  the  country  discussed 
earlier.
118 The ambivalence that characterised judicial output, in the immediate 
years of the post-authoritarian transition in the country, as discussed in Chapter 
Four,
119  can  also  be  partly  attributed  to  this  style  of  court-packing.  It  is 
reminiscent of the instance in the hey-day of military rule, where a Chief Judge of 
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119 See also H O Yusuf “The Judiciary and Constitutionalism in Transitions: A Critique” (2007) 
(1) Global Jurist (Advances Article) 1.    187 
a state in open court, declared that the state military administrator, who was the 
defendant (in his official capacity) in a case before him was akin to a Kabiyesi.
120  
   The marked turnaround and institutional independence lately discernible in the 
jurisprudence of the Nigerian Supreme Court (discussed in Chapter Six) presents 
a  remarkable  instance  of  the  sometimes  unpredictable  results  that  may  attend 
court-packing,  notably  in  a  transitional  context.  One  of  the  least  mentioned 
aspects of the Obasanjo administration in Nigeria
121 in relation to the judiciary is 
that it has an unprecedented record of appointments to the Supreme Court.  Of the 
16 justices now on the bench of the court, President Olusegun Obasanjo, through 
the incidence of expired judicial terms,
122 appointed 12 to succeed retired justices. 
The country’s first (and yet only) female Supreme Court justice, is included in 
that number.  
   Ultimately, as the various legal battles involving the federal government in the 
Obasanjo  era  demonstrated,  the  Supreme  Court  was  highly  involved  in  very 
political cases concerning the federal executive, headed by President Obasanjo. 
Cases went before the Supreme Court either as a court of original jurisdiction in 
disputes between the federation and the states, or as a court of last resort in final 
appeals.  In view of the varying complexities involved in individual cases, it may 
be  rather  simplistic  to  assert  that  the  composition  of  the  Court  in  this  way 
substantially influenced its decisions one way or the other. The sheer number of 
the cases involved would require rather extensive empirical case-by case analysis, 
outside the purview of this study to make precise and definitive claims on this 
aspect of the matter.  
   What is certain is the fact that on the whole, the federal government lost more 
cases than it won in that dispensation, usually with serious implications for the 
political and policy decisions of the federal executive under the leadership of the 
president. It is thus fairly safe to say that the impact of the opportunity for the 
administration to appoint a large number of justices in Nigeria’s post-authoritarian 
transition has not been a decisive factor on the adjudicatory preferences of the 
                                                 
120 King in Yoruba language, a major ethnic identity in Nigeria. Literally, it means ‘a person of 
unquestionable authority.’ The implication of the allusion is clear; the governor, like a regal 
monarch, can do no wrong. 
121 May 29 1999 to May 29 2007. This was the first civil administration in the country that 
governed through the eight-year constitutional limit in the country.  
122 Justices of the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court can optionally retire at 65 but must do so on 
their 70
th birthday. 
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Supreme Court. This is then an instance that hardly bears out the trepidation on 
the power of the political branch to appoint judges.  
   Indeed, a regrettable result of the judicialisation of inter-governmental disputes 
was  the  resistance  of  President  Obasanjo  to  implement  a  good  number  of  the 
judgements of the Supreme Court against the federal government. Consequently, 
his administration came to gain notoriety for its intransigence to implementing 
judicial decisions not in tandem with his wishes and this disregard for the rule of 
law led to substantial loss of valuable political capital by the federal government. 
Obasanjo’s  successor,  President  Umar  Musa  Yar’Adua,  acutely  aware  of  the 
prevailing discontent with the brazen disregard of the Obasanjo administration for 
enforcing  unpalatable  judgements,  has  not  spared  any  effort  to  adumbrate  his 
respect  for  the  rule  of  law,  especially  with  regard  to  complying  with  judicial 
decisions.
123  
   Whether  the  new  President’s  proclaimed  and  (and  so  far  relatively) 
demonstrated respect for the rule of law in this way is genuine, or a subterfuge to 
obtain legitimacy for his government in the light of the seriously flawed electoral 
process that brought him to power, is not clear.  What is certain is that his position 
on prompt compliance with judicial decisions has reflected quite positively on his 
administration.  This  development  reinforces  the  position  that  judicialisation  of 
politics, notably in the ‘new constitutionalism’,
124 is driven and maintained by a 
matrix  that  includes  (but  by  no  means  limited  to)  a  political  setting  that  is 
conducive.
125  By  new  constitutionalism  is  meant  the  increased  incidence  of 
constitutionalisation  of  human  rights  and  governance  issues  particularly  in 
transitional contexts leading to the emergence of more powerful judiciaries. This 
is partly due to the adoption of new constitutions or constitutional reforms which 
provide for a range of rights and extensive powers of judiciary review.
126    
                                                 
123 L Akande “Yar’Adua Canvasses Rule of Law on Etteh, Others- Raises Hope on Niger Delta” 
The Guardian Online Edition (Lagos Saturday 29 September 2007); M Onuorah and L Ughebe 
“Sweet Victory for Governor Peter Obi- To Remain in Office till 2010, Supreme Court Sacks Uba, 
Yar’Adua Pledges to Obey Verdict” The Guardian Online Edition (Lagos Friday June 15 2007).  
124 S Roesler “Permutations of Judicial Power: The New Constitutionalism and the Expansion of 
Judicial Authority” (2007) 32 (2) Law & Social Inquiry 545, 553, 560 and Hirschl note 2 supra. 
125 Hirschl note 2 supra at 482. 
126 Hirschl uses this term often but like most others, he does not clearly define its meaning. See for 
example Hirschl note 2 supra, R Hirschl “Resituating the Judicialisation of Politics: Bush v Gore 
as a Global Trend” (2002) 15 (2) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 191, R Hirschl 
Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard 
University Press Cambridge Massachusetts 2004), R Hirschl “The New Constitutionalism and the 
Judicialisation of Pure Politics Worldwide” (2006) 75 (2) Fordham Law Review 721 and R 
Hirschl ‘The Judicialization of Politics and the Rise of Political Courts (2008) 11 Annual Review 
of Political Science 93.   189 
   According to Hirschl, ‘judicial empowerment’ presents a ‘dilemma’ to political 
elites.
127 They desire to deflect criticism from themselves and probably secure or 
strengthen  their  legitimacy  through  the  process  of  judicialisation  of  political 
issues.  But  importantly  too,  they  harbour  the  hope  that  courts  will  reflect  or 
promote their ideological preferences in the process. The judiciary, he  asserts, 
does not disappoint the political class in this regard. In deliberations on overly 
political  issues,  judges,  he  claims,  tend  to  subscribe  to  ‘prevalent  worldviews, 
national meta-narratives, and the interests of influential elites.’
128  
   Hirschl’s analysis draws on the readiness of courts to utilise judicial review for 
upholding  political  and  civil  rights,  while  maintaining  a  lukewarm  (and 
sometimes even regressive) jurisprudence towards rights claims in the nature of 
social and economic rights and empowerment of the underprivileged in society, 
despite the constitutionalisation of those rights. While Hirschl’s views appear to 
be attractive propositions, it is useful to unpack them a bit in the light of the 
Nigerian  transition  experience  of  judicial  activism  in  transition  to  assess  their 
persuasiveness in this context.   
   First, the propositions are rather too sweeping in their reach. That courts may be 
influenced  by  the  social  realities  of  their  environment  may  not  necessarily  be 
objectionable. It does not have to be regarded as pandering to the political elite, 
unless of course judicial decisions or even a particular decision is clearly perverse. 
A contrary approach can only imperil the relevance of judicial power as a whole 
and judicial review of political action especially.   
   Second,  one  can  take  issue  with  the  assumption  of  determinability  and 
commonality of elitist interests implicit in Hirschl’s position.  It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to conceive the convergence of elitist interests in a fragmented society 
like  Nigeria,  where  the  elite  thrive  on  divisiveness  and  habitual  resort  to 
primordial sentiments to secure and preserve their hold on power.
129 The political 
elite  commonly  appeal  to  ethnic,  religious  and  other  sectional  allegiances  to 
secure and maintain their hold on power as well as shield themselves from public 
accountability in governance. Thus, it is perhaps more accurate to assert the non-
existence  of  any  previous  shared  narratives  in  the  country’s  experience  of 
                                                 
127 Hirschl note 2 supra at 480. 
128 Hirschl note 2 supra at 481. 
129 P M Lewis Growing Apart - Oil, Politics and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria 
(University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor 2007) 245-255. 
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statehood. It will be recalled that in Chapter Three, this latter point was earlier 
discussed in relation to identifying a basis for accountability of the judiciary.  
   Consequently, it is not easy to articulate to any reasonable degree of precision, 
what is to be regarded as ‘interests of influential elites’ as the different groups and 
even individual members of the ruling elite, economic or political (or even both) 
are  constantly  involved  in  contests  for  socio-economic  and  political  control. 
Though driven by a common motivation of securing a hold on power, the means 
required to achieve their objectives are hardly shared. Similarly the nature of the 
(usually  parochial)  interests  at  stake  is  predictably  divergent.  In  view  of  the 
complexity  of  the  political  contestations  among  the  elite  in  Nigeria,  the 
proposition  that  judicial  decisions  can  satisfy  or  accord  with  divergent  and 
sometimes, unwieldy interests of a class whose members are in constant struggles 
for ascendance and advantage over one another is, to say the least, problematic. 
    
CONCLUSION 
 
   All around the world, and especially in transitional societies, the judiciary is on 
the  march  of  power.  Judicialisation  of  hitherto  conventional  and  sometimes, 
constitutionally  entrenched  exclusive  zones  of  the  political  branches  have 
witnessed  decisive  incursions  from  the  judicial  branch.  The  judicial  force  has 
shown no visible signals of dissipation, much less abatement. A gentle breeze, in 
all probability, is all that is required to blow into oblivion, the famous ‘weakest 
branch’ sticker, legal and political theorists have, for so long, hung on the walls of 
the judiciary. 
   The  immense  powers  wielded  by  the  judiciary  over  key  policy  aspects  of 
governance,  especially  in  the  contemporary  new  constitutionalism,  strongly 
advises closer and more systematised scrutiny of the judicial function. This is 
even more pertinent in transitioning polities contending with what can be regarded 
as  reinvented  centres  of  power,  while  simultaneously  responding  to  the 
establishment of new judicial institutions which predictably attract considerable 
support from various publics.     
    In  democratising  and  established  liberal  democratic  societies  alike, 
protestations of deficient democratic credentials have surprisingly been ineffectual 
in  curbing  the  geometric  increase  in,  and  sometimes  preference  for,  judicial 
determination and control of public policy as well as highly political and moral 
questions. If anything, it seems to fuel it.      191 
   The impact of the judicial role in transitioning polities, from Central and Eastern 
Europe through to South East Asia, Latin America and Africa, briefly outlined 
above, commends the view that it is critical to the democratisation process that the 
judiciary be adequately positioned for the transition from an authoritarian past. It 
is only then that it can be expected to take on the serious challenges of definitive, 
purposeful judicial  governance required for strengthening the democratising or 
transitional polity. 
   In the diverse regional experiences evaluated in this chapter, newly established 
constitutional courts have played (and mostly continue to play) the role of the 
guardian  angel  of  democracy.  In  other  words,  the  courts,  through  judicial 
activism, are securing the core values of the constitution, promoting democratic 
aspirations of the people and securing human rights. While the exception in Egypt 
supports the need for rethinking assumptions on the right political circumstance 
for  viability  of  judicial  activism  in  governance,  it  nonetheless  reinforces  the 
undeniably growing powers of judiciaries all around the world. The framework 
outlined in this chapter provides a template on which to conduct an evaluation of 
the judicialisation of politics in the context of the Nigerian transition to civil and 
democratic rule.   
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Chapter Six 
COURTS TO THE RESCUE? THE JUDICIALISATION OF POLITICS IN 
NIGERIA 
   
INTRODUCTION    
   Nigeria’s political transition from three decades of authoritarian military rule to 
democracy constitutes a momentous aspect of the country’s political history. It is 
of moment for instance, that the country has witnessed its longest experience of 
civil  ‘democratic'  rule  in  its  post-colonial  history  from  the  culmination  of  the 
handover of power by the military on 29 May 1999 till date, after a series of 
aborted political transition programmes launched by successive military regimes 
at various times during the period of authoritarian rule.  
   Equally epochal is the 2007 general elections in the country. It marked the first 
successful ‘civil-civil’ political transition. By the civil-civil transition is meant the 
transfer  of  power  from  one  elected  government  to  another  devoid  of  military 
intervention  in  governance.  Recognition  of  the  salience  of  the  elections  is  of 
course  without  prejudice  to  the  fact  that  they  have  turned  out  to  be  the  most 
contested  in  the  country’s  chequered  electoral  history.  The  widespread 
contestations are no doubt a fall-out of the very suspect democratic credentials of 
the  elections.  The  level  of  concomitant  judicialisation  of  politics  electoral 
contestations  have  engendered,  has  contributed  in  no  small  measure  to  the 
exceptional expansion of judicial  power and its impact on governance in Nigeria, 
examined in this chapter.  
   However,  by  far  the  most  remarkable  feature  of  the  transition  from military 
authoritarianism  is  the  judicialisation  of  ‘pure  politics,’
1  leading  to  the 
phenomenal rise of judicial power in the country’s transition experience in the 
post  2003  period.  In  this  regard,  one  of  Hirschl’s  classifications  of  the  multi-
dimensional facets of judicialisation of politics is relevant. He observes that the 
judicialisation  of  ‘mega-politics’  (or  pure  politics),  as  a  type  of  judicialised 
politics, manifests in various forms. The manifestation of judicialisation of pure 
politics includes judicial monitoring of policies in economic planning, national 
security  and  other  prerogatives  of  executive  power  under  the  rubric  of  the 
‘political  question.’  Others  relate  to  restorative  justice  measures,  regime 
transformation and legitimation, as well as collective, fundamental existential and 
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identity  questions  of  statehood.  He  further  identifies  in  this  category,  the 
judicialisation of democratic electoral processes.
2  
   In the Nigerian experience, judicialised politics
3 has involved virtually every 
aspect  of  governance  described  above  by  Hirschl.  The  judicialisation  of  the 
process of democratisation, power contestation among the political elite, inter-
governmental  policy  and  legislation  issues,  have  all  had  profound  impact  on 
politics and governance. ‘Judicialisation of this type,’ Hirschl further observes, 
has  resulted  in  the  judiciary  adjudicating  and  deciding  ‘watershed  political 
questions’  not  expressly  provided  for  in  the  constitutions  of  the  respective 
countries.
4  Our  earlier  discussion  in  Chapter  Five  has  shown  there  is  ample 
evidence in the literature that the phenomenon has become widespread across the 
spectrum of advanced, liberal, young and aspiring democratic polities alike.
5 We 
also recall that even authoritarian societies are no longer completely left out from 
the incidence of the phenomenon.
6   
   Critical evaluation of the phenomenon in Nigeria highlights public as well as 
institutional responses to the judicialisation of politics as it takes centre-stage in 
the country’s transition to democratic rule, after decades of authoritarian rule. The 
Nigerian experience, it is argued, provides contextual foundation for suggesting 
the need for more attention by legal theorists to the relevance of public opinion in 
theoretical analyses of the judicial function. Such closer attention, it is contended, 
can only enrich the legal academy. 
Significantly, there is a shift in the judicial approach at the apex of the system 
(considered here) to the resolution of disputes, particularly political ones, in the 
period under examination. This represents a relatively marked departure from the 
initial reticent and ambivalent judicial attitude to the political transition in the 
                                                 
2 Ibid. at 727. 
3  In  this  chapter,  I  use  the  terms  ‘judicialisation  of  politics’  and  ‘judicialised  politics’ 
interchangeably.   
4 Hirschl note 1 supra at 728. 
5  See  for  example  J  Ferejohn  “Judicializing  Politics,  Politicizing  Law”  (2002)  65  Law  and 
Contemporary Problems 41, 43-44,  T Ginsburg Judicial Review in New Democracies (Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge 2003), C N Tate “Why the Expansion of Judicial Power” in C N Tate 
and T Vallinder The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New-York University Press New-York 
1995) 28; R G Teitel “Post-Communist Constitutionalism: A Transitional Perspective” (1995) 26 
(1) Columbia Human Rights Law Review 167; J Priban Dissidents of Law (Ashgate Dartmouth 
Hampshire 2002); W Sadurski Rights Before Courts: A Study of Constitutional Courts in Post 
Communist States of Central and Eastern Europe (Springer Dordrecht 2005); T Ginsburg and G 
Ganzorig “When Courts and Politics Collide: Mongolia’s Constitutional Crisis” (2000-2001) 14 
(2) Columbia Journal of Asian Law 309; H Klug Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism and 
South Africa’s Political Reconstruction (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2000). 
6 T Moustafa The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics and Economic Development in 
Egypt (Cambridge University Press Cambridge MA 2007). 
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country  discussed  in  Chapter  Four.  The  chapter  concludes  that  the  attempt  to 
rescue a troubled transition can be a very challenging and potentially integrity-
eroding task for an untransformed judiciary with an unaccounted past. 
 
 
2.     DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND JUDICIALISATION OF POLITICS IN NIGERIA 
   It is significant that in a recent restatement of his objections to ‘strong’ forms of 
judicial review (discursively the precursor of judicialisation of politics) Waldron 
concludes on contingent and exceptionalist premises. He recognised that certain 
‘pathologies’ which include ‘dysfunctional legislative institutions’ and ‘corrupt 
political culture’ could constitute attenuating justifications for judicial review.
7 
One can go on to extend this situational exceptionalism as valid, if not inevitable, 
justification for judicialisation of politics in transitioning societies.  
   Purist  protestations  notwithstanding,  Waldron’s  position  here  aligns  with 
Teitel’s proposition that the extra-ordinary circumstances that usually characterise 
transitions conduce to ‘hyperpoliticized adjudication.’
8 A substantive premise for 
this is that in such societies the institutional memory of the political branches has 
been weak largely as a result of the lack of opportunity to evolve into maturity or 
at  least  develop  steadily  due  to  intervention  of  the  military  or  other  forms  of 
imposition  of  authoritarian  rule.  This  is  the  experience  in  Nigeria  where  the 
military intervened barely five and a half years after independence. In other cases 
it may have been virtually obliterated as a result of high level conflict.  
   Hirschl  has  identified  four  key  dimensions  of  judicial  intervention  in 
contemporary  constitutionalism  that  delineates  the  course  of  judicialisation  of 
politics  around  the  world.  These  are  namely  in  the  area  of  ‘core  executive 
prerogatives;’  ‘foundational  “nation-building”  processes;’  ‘fundamental 
restorative justice dilemmas;’ and ‘political transformation, regime change, and 
electoral  disputes.’
9  I  argue  in  this  section  that  critical  evaluation  of  the 
democratic transition in Nigeria strongly suggests close affinity with Hirschl’s 
foregoing articulation of the directionality of judicial intervention in politics.  
2.1   The Judiciary in Institutional Reconstruction 
                                                 
7 J Waldron “The Core of the Case against Judicial Review” (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1346, 
1406. 
8 Ruti G Teitel, “Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation” Yale 
Law Journal 106 (7) (1996-7): 2035. 
9 R Hirschl “Resituating the Judicialisation of Politics: Bush v Gore as a Global Trend” (2002) 15 
(2) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 191, 192.   195 
   After more than four and half decades of its post-colonial existence, Nigeria 
remains one of a number of ‘divided societies.’
10 In such societies, ‘constitutional 
design’ plays an important role in forging a ‘common political identity.’
11 The 
reality  of  the  fractious  nature  of  the  Nigerian  state  commends  the  need  for 
institutional redesign that would facilitate the establishment of a cohesive society, 
utilising the much elusive transition moment. Thus, the judiciary, especially in the 
exercise of its powers of judicial review, has a pivotal role in the task of nation-
building in societies recovering from the vagaries of violent conflict or military 
authoritarian rule.  
   Hirschl  has  argued  that  most  instances  of  judicialisation  of  politics  in  new 
constitutionalism countries (transitioning polities) are propelled by the actions of 
‘hegemonic’ groups apprehensive of losing out in the power game. His argument 
appeals to the idea that while a number of variables foster judicial activism and 
thus, judicialisation of politics, a political setting that is conducive to it is the 
decisive factor. In Chapter Five, I have tried to show how several other factors 
and forces are involved that suggest a complexity that this description does not 
capture.  However,  one  feature  worth  pursuing  at  this  point  is  that  of  a 
predisposing political environment.   
   The predisposing and conducive political environment for judicialised politics in 
Nigeria  was  provided  in  part  by  the  enigmatic  prevalence  of  democratically 
elected but authoritarian executive presidency. The phenomenon, referred to by 
Prempeh as the ‘imperial presidency,’
12 which has continued to plague African 
countries,  despite  the  ‘new  wave’  democratic  transition,  found  extensive 
expression in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007.  It has led to an unprecedented 
incidence of judicialisation of politics in the country. It is significant to note that 
the trend towards judicialisation of politics has yet to abate. Additional fodder for 
the phenomenon has been provided by the seriously flawed electoral process that 
hallmarked the country’s epoch-making ‘civil-civil’ transition.  
   In this regard, the 2007 elections in Nigeria brought out in sharp relief, just how 
critical  the  role  of  the  judiciary  could  be  in  transitioning  societies.  The 
controversial electoral process has led to numerous litigations on the part of those 
                                                 
10 S Choudry “Editor’s Note 'Constitutionalism in Divided Societies” (2007) 5 (4) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 573. 
11 Ibid. at 574. 
12 H K Prempeh “Presidential Power in Comparative Perspective: The Puzzling Persistence of 
Imperial Presidency in Post-Authoritarian Africa” (2007) SSRN Working Papers Series available 
at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015369 (last accessed 11 February 2008). 
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who felt handed the short end of the stick. Many observers, local and international 
called for wholesale cancellation of the elections. Others urged recourse to the 
judiciary  for  the  resolution  of  the  disputations  arising  from  it.  The  option  of 
recourse to the judicial process, as would be extensively discussed later in this 
chapter,  was  largely  preferred  by  political  players  in  the  country.    The 
International Crisis Group brought the relevance of the expected judicial role in to 
focus when it noted that  
                Nigeria’s democracy has derailed. The April 2007 general elections were      
               supposed to consolidate the country’s evolution as a democracy,  
               facilitate the peaceful resolution of its many internal conflicts and  
               bolster its stature as a leading peacemaker and peacekeeper in Africa.  
               Instead, the conduct and outcome deepened long-running political crises,  
               pushed the country further down the road to failure as a democratic  
               state…The first step to defuse the tensions stirred by the elections is to  
               pursue electoral justice through the judicial tribunals provided for in the  
               Electoral Act. This will not be sufficient to restore government credibility  
               but is essential to give a clear sign of willingness to redress the irregularities  
               of the process.
13  
 
 An untransformed judiciary will most likely fall short of the crucial mediating 
role expected of it in a democratic crisis of the nature that confronted Nigeria at 
the end of the April 2007 elections in the country (or any other) in a period of 
transition.  
   The  Nigerian  situation  is  further  compounded  by  the  view  held  by  some 
respected  individuals  and  groups  (including  the  most  renowned  constitutional 
lawyer as well the country’s only Nobel Laureate) that the only viable solution to 
the flawed process is a complete nullification of the elections. Proponents of this 
position  advocate  a  political  rather  than  legal  resolution  of  the  debacle.  They 
argue  that  a  number  of  factors  would  incapacitate  the  courts  from  dispensing 
justice on the electoral petitions.
14 
   The judiciary is no doubt acutely aware of the demanding situation. Perhaps 
nothing better reflects the awareness than the public statement of Justice James 
Ogebe,  (then)  Justice  of  Appeal,  and  Chairman  of  the  Presidential  Elections 
Tribunal  sitting  over  several  petitions  for  the  annulment  of  the  President 
Yar’Adua’s election at the 2007 general elections. While appealing to judicial 
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May 2007 (Emphasis mine). 
14 C Ndujihe “The Patriots Opposes May 29 Hand-Over” The Guardian Online Edition (Lagos 
Saturday 26 May 2007). The position is not without some international support. See for instance 
“EU Parliament Wants Aid to Nigeria Stopped until Fresh Polls” The Guardian Online Edition 
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support staff on strike for better pay and conditions of service to call off the strike 
to enable the tribunal to conclude its work expeditiously, he said 
               The government is unstable now. You know that they have not been   
               able to do many things because of this case, and they will not be able  
               until they know their fate, so the longer it takes, the longer your matter  
               will linger. So, if we finish the case, they will know where they stand,  
               and will then be able to tackle many of the issues.
15    
      
   One can conveniently cite over a dozen remarkable cases of judicialisation of 
politics in the country in the context of the democratic transition at the inter-
governmental  level.
16  A  fairly  topical  representative  survey  would  include 
Attorney  General  of  the  Federation  v  Attorney  General  of  Abia  and  35 
Ors
17dealing with disputed claims between the federal and littoral States for oil 
resources derivable from the continental shelf of the country. Attorney General of 
Ondo State v Attorney General of the Federation & 35 Ors (the ICPC Case)
18 
dealing  with  the  establishment  of  a  monolith  anti-corruption  agency  in  the 
federation; Attorney General of the Federation v Attorney General of Abia and 35 
Ors  (No.2)
19  and  Attorney  General  of  Ogun  State  v  Attorney  General  of  the 
Federation
20 both dealing (again) with fiscal federalism and allegations of illegal 
withholding of funds by the Federal government. 
    Attorney General of Lagos State v Attorney General of the Federation
21 centred 
on disputations over the propriety of inherited  military legislation that confers 
ultimate planning powers on the federal government, possessed only of complete 
geo-political  control  over  the  federal  capital  territory.  All  the  states  of  the 
federation challenged the constitutionality of certain sections of the Electoral Act 
(promulgated  by  the  National  Assembly),  in  as  much  as  it  sought  to  make 
provisions for elections into local (government) authorities in Attorney General of 
Abia and 35 Ors v Attorney General of the Federation.
22   
   The disputations on the appropriate spheres of power and control in the country 
between the federal government on one hand, and the states on the other, were 
frequent. In the result, there was a seeming endless recourse to the judiciary for 
resolution.  Customisation  of  this  approach  to  governance  and  the  extensive 
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17 (2002) 4 SC Pt I, 1.  
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judicialisation of politics it generated attracted judicial notice and obiter dicta of 
the Supreme Court, the judicial venue for their resolution. 
   In one of the later cases, Attorney General of Abia & 2 Ors v Attorney General 
of the Federation & 33 Ors 
23 the Supreme Court observed that it was ‘yet another 
open quarrel between the State and Federal Government’ with which the Court 
had  become  ‘thoroughly  familiar.’
  24  The  Court  noted  that  the  cases  revolved 
around federalism and unitarism from the constitutional and political stand-point. 
This is not surprising given the context of the country’s un-negotiated transition. 
The transition away from military authoritarianism has forced to the centre stage 
of governance, tensions arising from the country’s de jure federal status that has 
witnessed a transformation to a de facto unitary state. Inherent tensions between 
the two leanings were accentuated by a government at the centre, headed by a 
former  military  ruler  who,  despite  his  internationally  recognised  status  as  a 
dictator-turned-democrat,  ‘defender  of  democracy,’
25and  African  statesman, 
relapsed  into  entrenched  authoritarian  understandings  of  the  rule  of  law  and 
governance in the country.
26  
   The conduct of governance at the centre in its interactions with the states and 
the tension it has generated is a stark reminder of the rather problematic operation 
of federalism in Nigeria in particular and Africa in general.
 27 As Adamolekun and 
Kincaid have noted, this derives not so much from the inadequacies of federalism, 
as from the botched attempts at democratic governance that has plagued post-
colonial Africa.
28 
   The legal contestations which have arisen from the foregoing state of affairs 
reflect the judicialisation of politics through the mechanism of ‘structural judicial 
review.’  It  is  defined  by  Stone  as  the  process,  in  federal  polities  with  written 
constitutions, whereby judges interpret and enforce constitutional provisions that 
relate to the basic structure of government.
29 They can be considered as arising 
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from the intersection of Stone’s structural and rights provisions
30 in the Nigerian 
Constitution. This aspect of judicialisation of politics is no doubt very important 
in the Nigerian experience of the phenomenon. 
   However, our analytical focus here will be directed at another line of cases. 
They share the critical element of judicialisation of highly political issues with the 
foregoing, but with the crucial addition of their engagement with the rights of 
individuals in the democratisation process as they intersect with wider issues of 
socio-political  rights  and  governance  in  the  polity.  This  analytical  preference 
provides opportunity for a more robust engagement with and reflection on the 
dimensions and nature of judicialisation of politics in the Nigerian transition.  
2.2   The Ladoja Case: The Godfather versus the People 
 2.2.1    The Socio-Political Background  
   The incidence of ‘Godfatherism,’ and here, I borrow a term that has become 
commonplace  in  political  parlance  in  Nigeria,  has  been  a  major  source  of 
corruption with grave consequences for the delivery of basic infrastructure, social 
and economic facilities and services in the country.
31 The trend is traceable to a 
culture  of  predation  in  governance  instituted  by  successive  military 
administrations and taken to new heights by the Babangida and Abacha regimes in 
the middle 80’s to the later part of the 90’s.
32 
   The concept of the ‘Godfather’ in Nigerian politics, refers to the situation where 
an individual, usually deriving from his privileged financial position, initiates and 
or ‘bankrolls’ the candidature of another for elective office. In quid pro quo, the 
latter, when he gets into office is beholden to the godfather, who naturally claims 
a stake in the appointments and dispensation of patronages of the public officer. 
Public  resentment  of  the  phenomenon  is  high  and  the  general  opinion  in  the 
country is decidedly in favour of ridding the political system of it.  For instance, a 
recent survey on what the demise of a number of prominent ‘Godfathers’ in a 
section  of  the  country  portended  for  democracy  found  that  it  would  enhance 
democratic consolidation in the polity.
33         
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   Godfatherism  thrived  in  many  parts  of  the  country  during  the  initial  civil 
governance period that ran from 1999 to 2003. Despite public condemnation, it 
has abided in various degrees.
34 However, the public outcry against it has, even if 
to a limited extent, emboldened some elected officers to throw off the yoke of 
their godfathers presumably to deliver on their mandates to the public. 
2.2.2.    Neither Impeachment nor Removal 
   In 2005, the malaise of Godfatherism in national life and governance came to 
the  fore  in  Oyo  State.
35  The  course  of  events  that  followed  resulted  in  Hon. 
Muyiwa Inakoju & 17 Ors v Hon. Abraham Adeolu Adeleke & 3Ors (the Ladoja 
Case).
36 The Executive Governor, Senator Rasheed Ladoja, fell out of favour with 
his  self-acclaimed  godfather,  Chief  Lamidi  Adedibu.
37  The  grouse  of  the 
godfather,  who  had  barely  rested  his  famed  military  apologist  stance  during 
decades of military authoritarianism in the country,
38 was typical. Following his 
election in 2003, Governor Ladoja had failed to allow him dictate appointments of 
key officials of his cabinet. Two years on, and midway into the four-year tenure, 
Adedibu was not enjoying the measure of patronage he reckoned his position as 
political godfather of the governor entitled him. He publicly declared he would 
make the state ungovernable for his (now estranged) protégé.  
   He made good his threat and the perceived loyalists of the Governor, including 
the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Assembly,  the  Deputy  Speaker,  1
st  and  2
nd 
Plaintiffs/Respondents (Respondents) and their families suffered physical attacks 
linked to the hatchet-men of Adedibu.
39 Not satisfied with the unyielding stance 
of Governor Ladoja, Adedibu instigated the Defendants/Appellants (Appellants), 
18  of  the  32  state  legislators,  to  impeach
40  the  Governor.
41  In  a  purported 
parliamentary session held by the Appellants on 13 December 2005 at a hotel in 
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the state capital, they suspended the procedural Rules of the House of Assembly. 
They subsequently passed a motion on 22
nd December 2005 for the investigation 
of  allegations  against  Governor  Ladoja.  These  actions  were  taken  without 
following  the  procedure  stipulated  by  the  Constitution.  The  Appellants 
subsequently  swore  in  the  Deputy  Governor  having  purported  to  remove 
Governor Ladoja, 4
th Defendant/Respondent. 
 2.2.3.     Courts and the Political Question 
   The  trial  high  court  rejected  the  complaint  of  the  1
st-  3
rd  Respondents  that 
Governor Ladoja (who at that point was not party to the suit) be reinstated. It held 
that  impeachment  was  ‘a  purely  political  matter’  over  which  the  constitution 
granted  exclusive  powers  to  the  legislature  as  part  of  its  internal  affairs. 
Impeachment  proceedings  were  not  justiciable.  According  to  the  court,  the 
jurisdiction of the judiciary over such proceedings was ousted by section 188 of 
the Nigerian Constitution of 1999. The Respondent appealed.
42 
   The Court of Appeal overturned the decision and its judgement was affirmed by 
the Supreme Court on a further appeal by the Appellants. The Supreme Court was 
provided  with  the  first  opportunity  to  pronounce  on  the  ‘troublesome  area  of 
law’
43 on the removal of governors in Nigeria’s jurisprudence.  Like the Court of 
Appeal, the Supreme Court faulted the action of the ‘Group of 18 legislators’ 
(Appellants)  for  non-compliance  with  the  laid  down  procedures  for  instituting 
proceedings to remove Governor Ladoja, who had by then joined the suit as an 
interested party. It declared his purported removal referred to as ‘impeachment’ 
by the parties and lower courts, a nullity. It clarified that the former rather than the 
latter term was the language of the constitutional provisions on the matter. 
   The Supreme Court affirmed that the power of judicial review vested in the 
courts by section 6 (6) (b) of the Constitution (contrary to the holding of the trial 
court), extended to determining whether a body vested with the exercise of an 
exclusive power acted in accordance with the law conferring such power. The 
Court was definitive that the legislature (in this case, the Oyo State legislators), as 
custodian of the Constitution, abused its powers by engaging in ‘patent violation 
and breach’ of its provisions. The judiciary as the ‘custodian of the construction or 
interpretation’ of the Constitution should be alive to check all acts of violations 
and ‘indiscretions’ of the legislature. The Court stated further that society and the 
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people ought not to be left helpless in the face of such breach, but should be aided 
by the judiciary.
44 
   The controversy in the Ladoja Case emanates from a pervasive but abnormal 
situation in an aspiring democracy. Critical to the evaluation here, it provided the 
judiciary with what can be regarded as the pace-setting case of judicialisation of 
politics in the country’s transition from decades of military authoritarian rule. The 
constitutional panel of the Supreme Court aptly seized the golden opportunity to 
intervene on the side of the rule of law and democracy in Nigeria’s political and 
constitutional history.  
   The  Court’s  approach  in  the  Ladoja Case  signals  a  movement  away  from  a 
‘coordinating  style  of  adjudication’  to  a  ‘redemptive’  one.
45  It  benchmarks 
judicial activism in the transitioning polity. In the nature of Ackerman’s analysis 
of  redemptive  adjudication,  the  decisions  of  the  appellate  courts  explicitly 
converged with the expressed will of the people over that of narrow and parochial 
interests in the country.  
   Crucial for Nigerian jurisprudence as a whole and transition jurisprudence in 
particular, the Court did not shy away from the ‘political question.’ The Court 
acknowledged the political character of the matter. Thus, it asserted that 
               …American jurisprudence has so much developed the political question   
               doctrine in their case law, so much so that it has taken a very firm root in  
               their legal system. The political question doctrine is still in its embryonic  
               stage in Nigeria. Let us not push it too hard to avoid the possibility of a  
               still-birth. That would be bad both for Nigerian litigants and the legal  
               system.
46 
 
   The ‘political question doctrine’ simply restated, is according to Hirschl, the 
principle of separation of powers that there are ‘certain types of political questions 
that a court ought to refuse to rule on’ for the reason that they fall exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of the legislature and the executive.
47 Here again, the Court 
alluded to the sometimes uncritical adoption of the American political and socio-
legal arrangements as the model for Nigeria’s legal system. Suffice it to say that 
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even the American Supreme Court, despite its assumed commitment to upholding 
the political question doctrine, has been known to take it on in certain cases.
48   
   Implied in the foregoing finding of the Court, is the position that the judiciary, 
through the instrumentality of constitutional judicial review, is set to take on the 
challenges of the stormy political scene in Nigeria’s democratic transition. As will 
become obvious below, the Court has adopted and is developing a jurisprudential 
tradition  of  judicialisation  of  politics.
49  The  judicial  approach  is  essentially 
constituted by an increasing incidence of intervention in institutional design and 
maintenance  of  democratic  political  processes  similar  to  what  is  happening  in 
various parts of the world.
50  
   It is significant that the Court unequivocally identified with the socio-political 
realities of Nigerian society at the material time. It decried, in no uncertain terms, 
the  proclivity  of  legislative  assemblies  in  various  parts  of  the  country  for 
removing  state  governors.  It  is  no  doubt  within  the  constitutional  province  of 
legislatures in most democracies to audit, monitor or censure executive action and 
this is also the case in Nigeria. However, observers of the Nigerian political scene 
would recognise the fact that the exercise of the prerogative by legislators has 
been  mostly  driven  by  parochial  interests  and  conducted  in  defiance  of 
constitutional process.  
   Removal proceedings against governors, usually for self-centred reasons on the 
part of legislators and in disregard for due process, had unduly heated the polity. 
The conduct of such proceedings constituted a cause for concern in the context of 
the  country’s  fragile  political  transition  from  authoritarian  rule  in  1999.  The 
situation  required  an  arbiter  capable  of  intervening  with  equanimity  in  the 
emerging political power contestations and its deleterious effect on governance. 
Already, in Oyo State, locus of the Ladoja Case, many lives and properties had 
been  lost  in  tensions  generated  by  the  flexing  of  political  muscles.  This  had 
occurred in some other states caught in political crises too. 
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   In  its  decision,  the  Court  restated  its  preference  for  substantial,  rather  than 
procedural justice, principally in matters that affect the stability of the country.  It 
said 
               The plethora of removal proceedings in respect of Governors is not only  
               frightening but is capable of affecting the stability of Nigeria. It is almost  
               like child’s play…Unless the situation is arrested, Nigerians will wake  
               up one morning and look for where their country is. That should worry  
              every good Nigerian.
51 
 
The Court thus adopted a quintessential transition jurisprudence marked out by its 
engagement with institutional fortification, in recognition of the unique role of 
law  in  societies  in  transition.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  Four,  these  were 
fundamental issues remarkable for their total absence or obscurity in the transition 
jurisprudence of the courts notably in the early period of the country’s transition 
from authoritarian rule.    
 2.2.4.     Checkmating Judicial Impunity       
   Another  important  feature  of  the  Ladoja  Case  is  the  judicial  attempt  at 
deliberate reformation of the conduct of judicial proceedings by the courts in the 
absence  of  legislation.  In  Nigeria,  the  transplantation  of  the  common  law 
adversarial system in the absence of socio-cultural foundations supportive of the 
conduct  of  its  litigation  practices  and  ethics,  had  led  to  a  culture  of  delayed 
justice. Control of the procedural aspects of trials was left (almost) entirely to 
counsel for the parties in litigation. A culture of instituting litigation to perpetuate 
impunity in the guise of preserving the sanctity of the judicial process had been 
perfected. The misuse of judicial process was prevalent amongst the privileged 
few  who  could  afford  the  relatively  exorbitant  cost  of  legal  services.  It  was 
unrelentingly employed to the discredit of legal process, and the courts as a proper 
resort for the resolution of disputes.  
   Instances abound of ongoing litigation that commenced with injunctive orders to 
stop all sorts of activities from university convocation ceremonies that involved 
the careers of thousands, commissioning of public utilities and services like roads 
and  water  projects,  communal  chieftaincy  ceremonies,  to  probate  and  will 
disposition  matters.  And  the  injunctive  orders,  sometimes  obtained  ex  parte, 
stayed in place for years. It was common practice for counsel, and or litigants to 
unscrupulously employ procedural or logistic ploys to delay cases, criminal and 
civil,  without  decisive  judicial  intervention.  The  situation  was  exacerbated  by 
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years of neglect of the judicial institution and reluctant commitment to law reform 
by successive military regimes. In a sizeable number of cases, litigants were either 
frustrated in the pursuit of justice, or in some cases, enjoyment of the fruits of 
litigation. It was not unusual for litigation to last up to 15 years in the courts. The 
result was a predictable loss of confidence in judicial resolution of disputes, resort 
to self-help and impunity.  
   Given the foregoing state of litigation and resolution of disputes through the 
courts, it is quite significant for the rule of law and restoration of confidence in the 
judicial process that trial and appeals in the Ladoja Case were decided within a 
year.  The  decisive  element  was  the  determination  of  the  courts  to  ensure 
expeditious  hearing  of  the  case.  The  conduct  of  the  judiciary  in  the  matter  is 
certainly commendable considering the fact that it had to contend with the designs 
of the Appellants to delay the trial and appeals in the case. The Supreme Court 
determinedly saw its way through ‘the cocktail or harvest of motions’ deliberately 
filed by the Appellants to frustrate the hearing of the matter on the merits
52 and 
‘frustrate the course of justice.’
53 It also rejected the prayer of the Appellants to 
have the case sent back for trial in the high court. In this regard, the Supreme 
Court was right when it stated that  
               Although the judicial process is slow most of the time, almost taking a  
               snail’s pace, this, is one case which the judiciary must take the fast lane  
               in the relay race and has in fact, taken the fast lane.
54  
 
   It  is  relevant  to  note  here  that  delay  in  the  determination  of  the  case  and 
effluxion  of  time  held  real  promise  of  a  fait  accompli  for  the  Appellants. 
Maintaining the status quo was entirely satisfactory to their designs. They had, 
after all, sworn in the  deputy  governor as a new  governor under the  guise  of 
constitutionalism and the rule of law. In this regard, the designs of the Appellants 
were not lost on the Court.  
   It rightly noted that acceding to the request to remit the case to the lower court 
would ensure the matter would not be concluded before 29
 May 2007 when the 
office in contention was due to be filled through elections. All this was happening 
in the backdrop of public condemnation of the brazen subversion of democracy 
and the rule of law. The public violence that followed the inauguration of a new 
governor  notwithstanding,  the  erring  legislators  further  had  the  support  of  the 
                                                 
52 Ladoja Case note 36 supra at 37. 
53 Ibid. at 38. 
54 Ibid. at 38. 
   206 
police  who  were  complicit  in  the  matter,  acting  ostensibly  on  ‘orders  from 
above.’
55     
   Despite  its  federal  political  arrangement,  the  Nigerian  Police  Force  (NPF), 
federally established and controlled, is the only police force in the country. The 
Inspector–General of Police is appointed by and takes orders from the President. 
In this case, it was no secret that then President, Olusegun Obasanjo was himself 
beholden to Chief Lamidi Adedibu, the estranged godfather. Following newspaper 
reports  of  the  President’s  failed  intervention  to  settle  the  political  differences 
between ‘father’ and ‘son’, he cast his lot behind the ‘father.’
56 
   Thus,  the  ongoing  litigation,  rather  than  serving  as  a  legitimate  forum  for 
resolution of the important constitutional questions in issue, was presented by a 
minority but powerful political clique as vindication for trampling on the will of 
the people and the rule of law. An unwary judiciary, especially in the nature of the 
Nigerian  judiciary  in  the  decades  past,  would  have  served  to  perpetuate  this 
patently illegal design, further discrediting the judiciary, the legal process and the 
rule of law, in what can be regarded as a form of judicial impunity. 
 2.3    The Obi Tenure Case - Speaking Law to Power 
   If the Supreme Court in particular and the judiciary in general, had aspired to 
steer clear of the political process after the inevitable judicial intervention in the 
resolution of election petitions arising from the 2003 general elections, they soon 
found  unfinished  business  in  Peter  Obi  v  Independent  National  Electoral 
Commission  &  6  Ors  (  Obi  Tenure  Case).
57  The  background  to  the  suit  is 
inextricably  linked  to  another  intriguing  chapter  in  the  annals  of  election 
manipulation in the country’s politics.  
   Peter Obi, Governor of Anambra State, filed a suit at the Federal High Court in 
a pre-emptive move to stop the planned gubernatorial polls by the 1
st Defendant as 
part  of  the  scheduled  general  elections  all  over  the  country.  Emeka  Ngige, 
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candidate of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the party that had dominated 
the political landscape in the country since the inception of civil rule in 1999, had 
been  wrongfully  declared  winner  by  the  1
st  Defendant  and  inaugurated  as 
governor  in  a  massively  rigged  election.  The  Plaintiff,  candidate  of  the  All 
Peoples Grand Alliance, (APGA), successfully challenged the action of the 1
st 
Defendant  in  court  and  reclaimed  his  mandate.    His  victory  was  reluctantly 
enforced  by  the  PDP  government  at  the  centre,  following  exhaustion  of  the 
appellate process. Interestingly, the 1
st Defendant issued him with a certificate (of 
victory at the polls) backdated to 2003. He was sworn in on 10 March 2006, three 
years after the elections in which he had received the majority of the lawfully cast 
votes.  
   Apparently  relying  on  the  certificate  of  returns,  the  1
st  Defendant  sought  to 
organise  fresh  gubernatorial elections in the state, as part of the 2007 general 
elections in the country. In his summons filed on 28 February 
 2007, the Plaintiff 
sought declarative and injunctive reliefs that (a) his four year tenure as governor 
began to run from the date he was sworn in, 17
 March 2006,  (b) the 1
st Defendant 
could not conduct gubernatorial elections in the state proposed for 14
 April 2007, 
as he was yet to run the course of the constitutionally stipulated four-year term, 
after taking the oath of office and (c) the 1
st Defendant should not proceed with 
the proposed election since the office would not be vacant by that date. He relied 
heavily  on  section  180  (2)  (a)  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Nigeria, 1999. The subsection is to the effect that the governor shall vacate office 
at the expiration of a period of four years commencing from the date the Oath of 
Office and Oath of Allegiance are administered. The other defendants applied to 
and were joined in the matter as interested parties.  
   The court of first instance, the Federal High Court declined jurisdiction on the 
matter  on  the  premise  that  it  was  an  election  matter  for  which  exclusive 
jurisdiction  is  vested  in  the  Election  Petition  Tribunals.  Meanwhile,  the  1
st 
Defendant proceeded to organise the election in contention despite the ongoing 
litigation. The Plaintiff further appealed to the Court of Appeal which delivered 
its judgement on 22
nd May, 2007, seven days before the planned swearing in of 
Andy Uba of the PDP, who had purportedly been elected the incoming governor.  
   The  Court  of  Appeal  dismissed  the  appeal  and  affirmed  the  decision  of  the 
Federal High Court. Peter Obi further appealed to the Supreme Court the same 
day.  After  the  filing  of  the  appeal,  but  before  the  hearing  of  the  matter,  the 
Supreme Court expressed displeasure that the 1
st Defendant had, in disregard for   208 
the judicial process, held elections for the office of governor in Anambra State. 
The Court warned that it would not hesitate to order that anyone sworn in as 
governor  vacate  the  office  immediately  in  the  event  it  determined  that  the 
elections were wrongly held.    
   The constitutional panel of the Court (comprised of seven justices) delivered a 
unanimous verdict in favour of the Plaintiff on 14
th June 2007, the same day it 
took arguments in the matter. The Court ordered that the new incumbent, sworn in 
on  29
th  May,  2007,  Andy  Uba,  should  vacate  the  office  of  governor  and  the 
Plaintiff be reinstated to continue in office until 17
th March 2010, when his four 
year tenure will expire. The Court held that the purported election was in futility 
as there was no vacancy to be filled as at 14 April, 2007, when the election was 
held. It then adjourned to 13 July, 2007 to give full reasons for the judgment. In 
the lead judgement, the Court held that the fulcrum of the case was constitutional 
rather than electoral, a critical misdirection in law that led the trial court and the 
Court of Appeal to decline jurisdiction in the matter.  
2.3.1.     Towards a New Constitutionalism 
   The Obi Tenure Case has several implications for constitutionalism, policy and 
transition  politics  in  the  country.  The  most  obvious  for  those  familiar  with 
Nigerian general election practices, is the fact that it re-configures the electoral 
landscape in the country. It is relevant to an understanding of the case to note that 
it  has  been  the  political  convention  in  Nigeria  for  the  gubernatorial  elections, 
constitutionally organised by a national electoral body, to be held on the same day 
nationwide. This approach to electoral arrangements, supported by an unbroken 
chain of repetition, has taken on the semblance of an immutable convention. The 
contention  in  support  of  this  position,  call  this  the  ‘truncation  argument’,  had 
included the need for uniformity, obviate chaos and save costs. All of these were 
in fact vigorously canvassed by counsel to the INEC, 1st Defendant in the matter.  
   In rejecting the truncation argument, the Court observed that holding elections 
at different times in a federation like Nigeria is an affirmation of, rather than 
anathema  to  the  practice  of  federalism.  The  judgement  furthered  notions  of 
reasonable independence of action and autonomy inherent in the concept. Thus, 
the Court affirmed that the convention is a product of expedience and imposition 
through  the  series  of  democratic  transition  programmes  organised  by  various 
military regimes, rather than compliance with a constitutional requirement. It was 
this historicity, rather than a constitutional provision, that cloaked the practice 
with  certain  seeming  inviolability.  The  Court  went  further  to  assert  that  any   209 
positive  provision  for  such  uniformity  of  practice  would  be  contrary  to  the 
principle  of  federalism,  a  pivot  of  the  country’s  political  foundations.
58  The 
judgement decisively took Anambra State out of the national electoral calendar, 
with  the  Court  throwing  overboard  any  possible  advertence  to  fiduciary 
considerations or social expedience of uniformity, in preference for upholding the 
rule of law. More importantly, the decision rid the country of one more vestige of 
imposed unitarism, from a legion of authoritarian legacies.  
  2.3.2.      Timely Intervention  
  As one commentator observed, the timing of the decision in the Obi Tenure 
Case, expeditiously determined by the courts, constituted a signal to the society 
that  the  judiciary  was  primed  to  ensure  justice  in  electoral  matters  in  the 
country.
59 The Court demonstrated commendable responsiveness to the need for 
timeliness in the matter, progressing a new direction away from delayed justice 
that hallmarked judicial activity in the country during the years of authoritarian 
rule.  
   The  expedition  deployed  by  the  judiciary  in  the  hearing  of  the  case  is 
commensurate with the critical need for preventing the breakdown of law and 
order that has remain a constant feature of elitist power wrangling in the country’s 
political transition. While there is a need for timely dispensation of justice in all 
manners of legal disputation, it takes on particular urgency where the resolution 
of such disputes directly impacts on the stability of the polity, the safety of lives 
and property, thus reinforcing one of the most important reasons for the existence 
of the modern state.  
   Considering the volatility of political related matters, delay on the part of the 
judiciary  can  only  elicit  further  loss  of  confidence  in  an  institution  that  had 
hitherto  been  viewed  as  complicit  in  the  country’s  chequered  experience  of 
democracy.  The judicial handling of the Ladoja Case and Obi Tenure Case along 
with a number of others that have followed them, have renewed public hope in 
the electoral and judicial process, while constituting a signal to the political class 
that impunity would not be tolerated in the democratic transition. 
 2.3.3      Checkmating Electoral Impunity  
   In the political realm, the Obi Tenure Case constitutes positive affirmation that 
the highest level of the judiciary is committed to deepening democratic ethos and 
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combating the scourge of electoral manipulation that has bedevilled the country’s 
political transition. This may be just as well. At no other time in the country’s 
limited history of elections, has it witnessed such undisguised manipulation and 
determination by a ruling party to foist a fait accompli on the political process.   
   No  doubt  invigorated  by  the  attitude  of  the  Supreme  Court,  the  Electoral 
Petitions  Tribunals  in  the  country  have  displayed  unusual  boldness  in  their 
adjudication of electoral disputes arising from the much discredited 2007 general 
elections. At the last count, the elections of twelve governors had been nullified.
60 
A number of legislators have gone the same way at both the state and national 
levels, the most prominent of which is the President of the Senate. His case was 
made more interesting by the fact that he stood to lose his prestigious number four 
position in the country.  Further, he was the third of the three senators from his 
state,  to  have  their  elections  nullified  by  the  National  Assembly  Elections 
Petitions Tribunal for gross electoral malpractices. 
61  
   Fresh elections have been ordered all over the country, to the relief and acclaim 
of aggrieved political actors and the general public. This trend inevitably directs 
keen public attention at the judiciary. The development has put out the judiciary 
as the institution at the forefront of the social reconstruction of a society with 
debilitated  institutional  structures.  The  judiciary  has  engaged  in  the  process 
through  its  insistence  on  procedural  and  substantive  fairness  by  the  political 
branches, in keeping within the ground rules they have laid for securing power 
and conduct of governance. 
   The situation that developed in Kogi, a north-central state in the country speaks 
loudly  to  the  reaches  of  judicialisation  of  politics  in  Nigeria’s  transition, 
engendered by unbridled struggle for power among the political elite. The Kogi 
State Governor was sacked by the Election Petitions Tribunal for gross procedural 
irregularities that attended his election, the most conspicuous being the exclusion 
of a leading opposition candidate. After he unsuccessfully exhausted the appeal 
process, he had to vacate office along with his deputy. In line with constitutional 
provisions,  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Assembly  assumed  office  as  acting 
governor preparatory to holding another election to be held within 90 days of the 
decision.  
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   The unsettling aspect of the matter however, is the fact that at the time, the 
election of the Speaker had in fact been nullified too by the state election petitions 
tribunal. His continued stay in the legislature is only premised on his pending 
appeal at the Court of Appeal. In other words, his assumption of office was on a 
tenuous line of legitimacy sufficient enough to distract him from even the most 
basic affairs of governance. It is difficult to expect the acting governor would 
administer the state constructively in a situation that he could be thrown out of not 
just his acting position, but the house of legislature altogether, in the not unlikely 
event  the  decision  against  him  was  affirmed  on  appeal.
62  The  drama  of  the 
judicialisation of pure politics continued unabated even after the conduct of the 
first ever court-ordered gubernatorial election in the country’s electoral history. 
Following the declaration that the dismissed governor won the freshly conducted 
polls, his key opponent immediately returned to the Elections Petitions Tribunal 
to challenge the results.
63 
   Related to the foregoing is the position of the Supreme Court that the illegality 
constituted by the three year tenure enjoyed by Chris Ngige should not be allowed 
to interfere with the right of the Plaintiff to hold office for the constitutionally 
stipulated tenure of four years though the former was sworn in on the day the 
latter ought to have come into office. On the face of it, this should be considered a 
logical consequence, flowing from the judgement of the Court that the Plaintiff’s 
tenure was illegally usurped by the swearing in of Chris Ngige in the first place. 
But the matter is more  complicated when it is considered that Ngige is not a 
defendant in this case and the rights of a third party, the 5
th Defendant, Andy Uba, 
elected governor while the case was in progress would be adversely affected. In 
this  regard  it  is  important  to  observe  that  notwithstanding  the  Supreme  Court 
decision in the Obi Tenure Case, success in a claim for illegally abridged tenure 
does not automatically entitle the claimant to the effluxed period. Rather, whether 
the court on a decision of such a nature will grant a reclaim of the deprived term 
will depend on the specific facts of the case. And this is well demonstrated by the 
position of the Court in another tenure case decided by the same panel
64 on the 
same day as the Obi Tenure Case.   
 2.4     Ladoja (No. 2) – Between Sympathy and the Law 
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   The  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  Senator  Rashidi  Adewolu  Ladoja  v 
Independent  National  Electoral  Commission  &3  Ors,  (Ladoja  No.2),
65  a 
contemporaneous tenure matter with the Obi Tenure Case, could in a way, be 
regarded  as  a  denouement  of  recent  judicialisation  of  politics  in  Nigeria’s 
transition.  It  served  to  define  the  limits  of  perceived  judicial  activism  in  the 
adjudication  of  disputes,  in  the  sometimes  complicated  terrain  of  transition 
politics  in  a  democratising  polity.  The  Court  insisted  on  a  rather  conservative 
constitutionalism, demonstrated in this case by supposed judicial deference to the 
political  branches.  This  is  a  jurisprudential  custom  the  Supreme  Court  has 
continued  to  struggle  with,  even  as  it  sometimes  displays  remarkable  radical 
departures from a deeply-rooted juridical tradition.   
   The  Plaintiff  was  illegally  removed  as  governor  in  the  in  the  Ladoja  Case 
discussed above.
66 Following his success at the Supreme Court, he was reinstated. 
Meanwhile, he had lost eleven months of his tenure during the forced vacation. 
Obviously following the lead of the Obi Tenure Case, the Plaintiff filed a suit at 
the Federal High Court urging it to determine whether the eleven months during 
which he was illegally removed from office formed part of his four-year term. He 
sought  injunctive  and  declaratory  orders  restraining  the  1
st  Defendant  from 
holding gubernatorial elections in the state until he had completed uninterrupted 
four-year tenure. He similarly relied on section 180 of the Constitution. Again, 
like the Obi Tenure Case, he also lost his bid at the trial and Court of Appeal.  
 2.4.1      No to Tenure-Elongation - The Court is Plain   
   In a rather terse consideration of the claim which the Court considered a case for 
tenure-elongation, rather than completion of an interrupted term canvassed by the 
Plaintiff,  the  constitutional  panel  of  the  Court  unanimously  declared  it 
unmeritorious. According to the Court, the Constitution did not confer a power on 
it to extend the four year tenure of a governor who had been improperly removed. 
While it was ‘in sympathy with Plaintiff/Appellant’s cause,’ acceding to his claim 
it  reasoned,  would  ‘do  much  violence  to  the  constitution,’
67  because  the 
circumstances  of  the  case  was  not  contemplated  by  the  framers  of  the 
Constitution. Apparently justifying a distinction between this case and the Obi 
Tenure Case, the Court reasoned that 
               In awareness of the possibility that an occurrence may prevent a     
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               Governor from being sworn in on the same day as his counterparts in the  
               country, Section 180 (2) states that tenure be computed from the date the  
               oath of allegiance and oath of office is taken. There is no similar  
               provision to protect a Governor improperly impeached.
68 
    
   The Court maintained that in the event the wording of the applicable section is 
clear, (as it found), it was only within the province of the legislature to alter them. 
Thus, the justices restated the role of the courts, as has been the wont of judges 
everywhere, (even when they arguably do actually legislate or create new laws), 
that their employment was ‘the singular task of deciding what the law is.’
69  
   In sum, the position of the Court is essentially that the de jure effect of the 
Plaintiff’s removal was that it never occurred. In other words, he is deemed in law 
not to have left office for one day, notwithstanding the fact that his deputy had 
been sworn in and exercised executive powers in a substantive, rather than acting 
capacity during the period.
70 The justices declined the invitation to read the words 
‘uninterrupted,’ four year term canvassed by the Plaintiff, into the provisions of 
section  180  (2)  (a)  of  the  Constitution.  In  that  way,  the  Court  maintained  its 
customary  preference  for  the  literal  interpretation  of  the  Constitution  and 
statutes.
71 
 
3.       THE JUDGE IN THE COURT OF THE PEOPLE 
   Jurists are wary of advertence to public opinion in analyses of judicial activity.
72 
A  distinctive  insularity  characterises  conventional  legal  analysis  of  law  to  the 
exclusion of other elements with a bearing on the shaping of social behaviour. It is 
commonly  the  case  that  there  is  little  or  no  advertence  to  public  opinion  on 
judicial activity in the works of leading legal theorists. The general consensus 
would appear to be the propriety of inadvertence to public opinion since it is 
usually regarded as fluid rather than stable, political rather than legal in nature. 
The streams of the legal and the political, in the way it relates to the judicial 
function, must be kept apart. Although the commonly presented premise for the 
reserved attitude is the  need for judicial integrity  and independence, it is also 
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possible  to  detect  in  it,  certain  deep-rooted  arrogance  that  attaches  to  western 
notions of the institution of law and its place in society.  
   Lawyers everywhere have built and sustained an aura of uniqueness around the 
theory  and  practice  of  law.  Consequently,  the  enterprise  of  law,  lawyers  and 
judges  are  variously  held  in  awe,  admiration,  and  sometimes,  despised  and 
condemned in society. Judges and courts, without doubt, are a major, if not the 
major  expression  of  the  nature  of  law  and  the  legal  institution  in  the  public 
domain.  Thus,  guarding  its  integrity  is  a  major,  even  self-preserving, 
preoccupation of those in the business of law. This is especially the case in an era 
of increased interaction between law and politics, with a corresponding increase in 
the power and relevance of lawyers in society.
73 
   Granted it is desirable, even essential for legal analysts to insist on measures 
that  protect  the  integrity  of  the  judiciary.  In  part,  this  is  a  mechanism  for 
reinforcing  judicial  fidelity  to  law  and  the  decisional  independence  of  judges. 
Admittedly too, it is the case that the institution of law is unique. But as Friedman 
counsels, it is not sufficient a premise on which to exclude the equally important 
force of politics.
74 And this is even more the case with constitutional law which 
conditions and is in turn, conditioned by politics.  
   Public opinion is generically regarded as political but it is still relevant to accord 
it more recognition as a measure for assessing judicial performance. After all, 
governance at various levels (including the private sphere) in the contemporary 
period,  is  being  continually  subjected  to  increased  democratic  accountability 
measures  of  scrutiny,  even  in  previously  illiberal  societies  in  Latin  America, 
Europe,  Africa  and  Asia.  An  exclusivist  normative  approach,  characteristic  of 
conventional legal analysis results in an impoverishment of scholarly analysis of 
judicial  review  in  legal  discourse.
75  It  also  undermines  the  relevance  of 
institutional  accountability  which  is  a  topical  socio-political  issue  in  post-
authoritarian polities.   
    Empirical  research  conducted  largely  outside  the  legal  academy  strongly 
suggests judges, especially at the highest levels, pay considerable heed to public 
consensus  on  contentious  cases  before  courts.
76  Judges  after  all  are  not 
superhuman, assuming that is a desirable quality in the endeavour of adjudicating 
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the  affairs  of  fallible  beings.  They  live  in  society,  are  aware  of  events  and 
opinions around them, and can be reasonably expected to be influenced by their 
environment.
77 Ignoring all of these realities in analyses of judicial activity can 
hardly constitute scholarly virtue.   
   In  all events,  even if  legal theorists are disposed to maintaining  a demurred 
attitude  towards  public  consensus  as  an  important  evaluative  mechanism  for 
judicial  performance,  there  remains  the  peculiarity  of  constitutionalism  in 
transitioning paradigms. Constitutionalism, at the core of which is the  judicial 
function, can not productively ignore politics in the event (as is the case), that 
institutional redesign, viability and fortification constitute integral objectives of 
democratisation.  Thus,  evaluative  considerations  of  the  judicial  function  in 
transitioning polities in particular would be more productive with the adoption of 
a  robust  approach  that  integrates  law  with  politics  as  suggested  by  ‘positive 
scholarship.’
78 This is even more so if societies with well established democratic 
systems can only ignore political considerations in assessing judicial review at 
great costs.
79  
   In the Nigerian context, there is ample evidence to suggest that the traditional 
approach of diffidence to public opinion that characterises juristic considerations 
of judicial activity may soon change. A plausible reason for this is the active 
involvement  of  legal  practitioners,  mainly  (but  not  exclusively)  counsel  to 
political contenders in the power tussles, in making public statements and granting 
press  interviews  on  decisions  in  the  myriad  of  cases  before  the  courts.  Their 
colleagues in the academia may not now be so averse to adverting, at least in part, 
to public opinion in their analyses of the judicial function in Nigeria’s democratic 
transition. The current willingness of legal practitioners in the country to assess 
judicial performance in the transition period outside the narrow confines of legal 
fora, but rather, in the media, may soon extend into scholarly literature on judicial 
governance in the country. Already, reports indicate this trend. Law professors, 
respected  constitutional  lawyers,  frontline  legal  practitioners  and  socio-legal 
commentators  have  joined  the  fray. 
80  There  has  been  a  flurry  of  public 
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commentary  by  a  cross-section  of  Nigerian  society  on  the  phenomenon  of 
judicialisation of politics in the country’s transition to democracy.
81 It has also 
been subject of interest abroad.  
   Ignoring public opinion in legal analyses of the activities of the judiciary, no 
matter the traditional normative objections, is arguably counterintuitive. This is 
especially the case in the context of transitioning polities with otherwise fragile 
legitimate and democratic political institutions. Taking the Nigerian experience as 
a reference, the judicialisation of politics has had a profound impact as an avenue 
for  legitimating  democratic  transition.  This  has  been  virtually  inevitable  in  a 
society made highly sceptical and suspicious of government intentions following 
on  endless  civil  rule  transition  programmes,  over  which  huge  resources  were 
purportedly expended.
82 Public response to the conduct of judicial governance is 
thus very relevant to scrutiny of the transition process from both the legal and 
political perspective.  
   It is relevant to consider public evaluations and perceptions in the legal analysis 
of  the  judicial  resolution  of  the  disputations  in  the  socio-political  sphere,  in 
Nigeria’s transition.
83 The acuteness of the potential departure in a transitioning 
polity, from the socio-political norm in a liberal democratic setting, justifies this 
rather  extensive  quotation  of  the  views  of  a  commentator  on  the  Nigerian 
experience 
               All over the country, most governors cannot govern because of their  
               precarious political positions. Their hold on power is very tenuous. To  
               survive, they are now hostage to invidious political forces. To survive,  
               they have opened the patrimony of the people to those who are  
               blackmailing them because they know that if they try to assert  
               themselves before the tribunals give their verdicts, those who rigged  
               them into power will tender  the same evidence in court… In which part  
               of Nigeria has there been any meaningful governance in the past nine  
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               months?
84 
 
 In fact, the attempt to resist overtures of the nature mentioned above, has landed 
one governor in trouble at the election tribunal leading to the nullification of his 
mandate, no thanks to the damning evidence produced against him by his now 
aggrieved  ‘godfather.’  The  situation  thrown  up  by  the  circumstances  of 
transitioning societies on judicial review suggests the need for re-examining the 
normative parameters for evaluating judicial activity by legal theorists. 
   Even the Nigerian judiciary, nurtured and developed in the conservatism of the 
British legal system (a by-product the country’s colonial legacy), recently openly 
indicated  its  acknowledgement  of  the  importance  of  public  perceptions  of  the 
judicial role in a transitioning polity. The Presidential Elections Petitions Tribunal 
(the Tribunal) broke away from a long-standing tradition of prohibiting live media 
coverage  of  judicial  proceedings  in  the  country.  In  recognition  of  the  intense 
public interest in judicial proceedings on the contentious 2007 general elections in 
the country and the petitions challenging the presidential elections in particular, it 
allowed live-coverage of legal proceedings. The Tribunal allowed national and 
international organisations in the print and electronic media to its verdict on the 
consolidated  petitions  challenging  the  victory  of  incumbent  President,  Umar 
Yar’Adua. The only limitation was the express condition that faces of the judges 
or their pictures must not be displayed in any report.  
   The Tribunal premised its decision for the innovative action on the need for 
Nigerians and the international community to have first hand, timely access to the 
verdict as well as demonstrate its transparency.
85 This action on the part of the 
judiciary can be regarded as an unequivocal endorsement of the view that the 
judiciary,  like  the  political  branches,  must  demonstrate  sensitivity  to  public 
yearnings without compromising institutional integrity. Palpable tension had built 
up in the wait for the decision all over the country. Shortly before delivery of the 
verdict, the Inspector General of Police, the country’s top cop, had in fact warned 
of an impending breakdown of law and order. Over 10,000 policemen had been 
deployed to volatile areas in the country.
86 This was not surprising, as it was the 
first time in its history that the election of an incumbent president was under such 
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serious  judicial  challenge.
87  Though  a  separate  matter  altogether,  the 
administrative response on the part of the judiciary furnishes another reason for 
devoting more attention to the part played by public opinion in legal analysis of 
judicial activity. 
   In the light of the foregoing, it is worthy of note that the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria has recently been nominated ‘Man of the Year’ by Daily Independent,
88 a 
respected  national  daily,  no  doubt  in  recognition  of  its  cardinal  role  in  the 
stabilisation of a floundering political transition and upholding constitutionalism 
in  the  country.  The  Supreme  Court,  in  particular,  has  received  commendation 
from home
89 and even unusual quarters abroad.  
   On the home front, the profile of Supreme Court in governance in the country 
has  become  widely  writ  in  the  public  psyche  like  never  before.  As  respected 
professor  and  former  dean  of  law  of  one  of  the  foremost  law  schools  in  the 
country put it, the Court has sent out a signal that it is the ‘sentinel…guard for 
democracy  and  good  governance.’
90  On  the  international  scene,  a  number  of 
observers  including  the  United  States  Congress  and  the  London  based  The 
Economist  have  applauded  its  demonstration  of  independence,  redirecting  the 
country’s democracy away from the precipice and upholding human rights.
91  
  However, as will be adverted to shortly, just how much of a transformation has 
taken place in the country’s post-authoritarian transition remains highly debatable. 
But before consideration of that aspect of the discussion, it is germane to evaluate 
to the institutional arrangement for judicial reformation and accountability in the 
democratisation  process  in  the  country.  It  is  quite  instructive  that  the  exiting 
military administration tacitly agreed to the urgent need to reform the judiciary 
during its long hold on power by including provisions for establishment of the 
National Judicial Council in the ‘transition’ constitution. 
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4.    INSTITUTIONAL  TRANSFORMATION  SANS  ACCOUNTABILITY?  THE  CASE  OF  THE 
NATIONAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL  
      Given the rot that had bedevilled the Nigerian judiciary in the authoritarian 
period as discussed in Chapter 3, it is no surprise that the ‘transition’ Constitution 
of 1999 sought to make institutional arrangements for reforming the judiciary. 
This is captured in the establishment of the National Judicial Council (NJC), a 
centralised body for the appointment, discipline and promotion of judges in the 
country. The creation and activities of the NJC, particularly as it relates to the 
discipline of judicial officers, is relevant to the focus on accountability  of the 
judiciary in this research. 
   Established as one of fourteen “Federal Executive Bodies” by section 153 of the 
Constitution, the NJC has very wide ranging powers on recommending judicial 
officers for appointment across the spectrum of the superior courts of records in 
Nigeria. It similarly has powers to recommend their removal from office. Further, 
it  has  full  disciplinary  powers  over  judicial  officers  of  all  superior  courts  of 
record. It also has powers to ‘deal with all other matters relating to broad issues of 
policy and administration’
92 of the judiciary. 
   It is important to note that the constitutional listing of the body, headed by the 
Chief  Justice  of  Nigeria  (CJN),  as  a  federal  executive  body  can  be  quite 
misleading. The creation of the body has been traced to the recommendations of 
the Eso Panel of Inquiry set up in 1993 by the Abacha military regime on the 
reorganisation and reformation of the Nigerian judiciary referred to earlier.
93 In 
terms of composition, sixteen of its twenty three members are judicial officers, 
judges and justices of the High Courts, Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.
94 
The other seven are legal practitioners of ‘high professional standing’. Of this 
latter group, five, nominated by the Nigerian Bar Association only participate in 
the  deliberations  regarding  the  recommendation  of  persons  for  judicial 
appointment.
95 The other two members who are not ‘jurisdictionally’ restricted 
are nominated by the CJN. Thus, the pre-eminent body is essentially a judicial 
affair. 
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   In practice, the ‘recommendatory’ powers of the NJC have been potent, if not 
decisive,  in  the  appointment  and  dismissal  of  judges.  Its  recommendations  on 
judicial  appointments  have  been  the  most  important  factor  in  nomination  of 
judicial officers by the executive for screening and ratification by the legislature 
all over the country since the return to civil rule in 1999. It has been quite active 
in investigating complaints (petitions) of judicial misfeasance and recommending 
appropriate action on the part of the executive. On its recommendation, a large 
number of judges have been suspended or dismissed from office thus, within three 
years of its operation over 50 judicial officers had been investigated for corruption 
or other judicial misfeasance.
96 By the end of 2005, more than a dozen had been 
dismissed as a result of its findings.
97 And a couple of others have since been 
similarly dealt with. To date only justices of the Supreme Court have completely 
escaped the axe of the NJC.  
   However, the NJC has been criticised for high-handedness, failure to observe 
fair-hearing and selectivity in its recommendations. In some cases, its decisions 
have been challenged for eroding rather than affirming judicial independence.
98 
Joseph  Otteh,  Director  of  Access  to  Justice,  a  leading  NGO  committed  to  an 
independent legal and judicial system in Nigeria made the point very well when 
he noted that  
               Although the Council is making an important difference in the fight to  
               control corruption in the judicial estate and strengthen the independence  
               of the judicial branch, many might believe that the signals coming from  
               the Council is now mixed, and that the Council is missing opportunities,  
               compromising consistency, and undermining its own authority.
99   
 
Interestingly, save in one instance however, judicial challenges to its decisions 
have been unsuccessful.
100  
   From the perspective of cohesion, the predominant composition of the body by 
judicial officers is one of the NJC’s strongest points. But it is easily one of its 
Achilles heels too. Despite its acclaimed role in sanitising the judiciary, leading 
members  of  the  NJC,  including  the  highest  echelons  of  the  judiciary,  have 
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themselves sometimes been mired in allegations of bribery and corruption.
101 It is 
useful  to  recall  in  this  regard  that  the  judiciary,  like  all  institutions  of  civil 
governance  in  the  country,  had  suffered  serious  institutional  decay.  The 
administration of justice had come to disrepute from 30  years of authoritarian 
military rule.
102 Virtually all the judicial officers on the membership of the NJC 
(all of whom are there by various statutory permutations, notably their specific 
headship of levels of courts), were appointed to the bench by one or the other 
previous military administration in the first place.  
   It  is  pertinent  to  reiterate  that  judicial  officers  were  exempted  from 
administrative lustration applied to some public office-holders. The last military 
regime  headed  by  General  Abdusalam  Abubakar  (July  1998-May  1999),  had 
retired serving military and police officers in government who had held political 
positions, as part of the transition measures and the demands for a break with the 
past.
103 Thus, the NJC, since its inauguration in 1999, has by default been securely 
in the hands of the ‘old-guard’ in the judiciary. This is a body of judicial officers 
who had held office during a part of the authoritarian period. The judiciary as an 
institution,  it  has  been  argued,  bears  complicity  for  political  illegitimacy, 
corruption  and  misgovernance  for  which  it  was  not  brought  to  account  in  the 
transition to civil rule.
104  
   Thus,  not  only  the  spectre  of  the  unaccounted  past,  but  well-founded 
apprehensions  of  unchanged  ways  foreshadows  the  work  of  the  NJC.  Not 
unexpectedly, critics have identified inconsistencies in its operational procedures 
as well as a lack of courage in its approach to some cases.
105 All of these have cast 
a serious slur on the institutional accountability measure which the NJC represents 
(as far as its disciplinary powers are concerned) in the post-authoritarian period. 
The continued unsatisfactory state of affairs with regard to the rectitude of judicial 
officers  takes  us  back  to  the  thrust  of  the  research,  namely  that  a  publicly 
accessible  mechanism  of  accountability  in  the  nature  of  a  truth-commission  is 
well-suited to institutional scrutiny of the judiciary in transitions.    
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  It is not the argument that the truth-seeking process discussed earlier
106 should 
have  taken  the  place  of  a  body  like  the  NJC.  Nor  is  it  the  proposition  that 
subjecting  the  judiciary  to  public  accountability  would  have  cured  all  its 
institutional short-comings. Rather, the contention is that ventilating the judicial 
role  in  the  authoritarian  period  through  the  truth-seeking  process  would  have 
facilitated  acknowledgement  of  its  role  in  the  suffering  that  the  authoritarian 
period brought on the Nigerian society.  Perhaps more importantly, it would have 
facilitated a robust public engagement with the judiciary in the critical task of 
institutional  reconstruction  which  it  has  inevitably  found  itself.  Surely,  the 
incidence of widespread judicialisation of politics all over the world has dispelled 
any  hitherto  existing  doubts  as  to  the  ramifications  of  the  judicial  function  in 
society and its direct implications for governance in contemporary times. In the 
light of this reality, serious attention ought to be directed at the judicial function in 
societies in transition even in the same way as it is in liberal democracies. 
   As  it  is,  the  accountability  gap  on  the  institutional  role  of  the  judiciary  in 
Nigeria during the country’s authoritarian period haunts the judicial function. It 
has  continued  to  challenge  its  attempts  at  self-transformation  and  regulation 
constituted by the establishment of the NJC. The task of the NJC is not made any 
easier by the fact that it is a creation of  a constitution foisted on the country 
through an un-negotiated transition. It is thus no surprise that the NJC, even with 
best intentions, falls short of transforming the judiciary to a transparent institution 
in the country.  
   At a level of evaluation, the operations of the NJC and its continued struggle to 
sanitise the judicial institution (a task which has continued to prove Herculean), 
has  served  as  a  constant  reminder  of  the  judicial  accountability  gap  in  the 
transition  period  in  which  the  judiciary  has  been  saddled  with  great 
expectations.
107  The  NJC’s  apparent  inability  to  curb  the  level  of  judicial 
misfeasance eight years after its establishment gives cause for concern. Just when 
public confidence in the judiciary had improved considerably with the judicial 
interventions  in  the  run-up  to  the  controversial  2007  elections,  the  NJC  was 
saddled with investigating petitions on allegations of alarming sleaze on the part 
of  some  judges  of  the  Electoral  Petitions  Tribunals  in  various  parts  of  the 
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country.
108 Of further significance to this study, keen observation of the Nigerian 
socio-legal scene suggests judicial misfeasance is sometimes a product of political 
interference and defective legal and political (structural) arrangements.
109 These 
implicate the need for a holistic approach to judicial transformation. It has been 
previously  argued  that  a  publicly  accessible  accountability  process  is  better 
adapted to that objective.  
   The claim made here on public accountability of the judiciary as part of the 
transitional measures is a relatively modest one. Essentially, it is a route which is 
unlikely to have waived or obviated the need for a body in the conceptual nature 
of the NJC. Rather, it concedes the relevance of the NJC, designed as a permanent 
body  for  the  rigorous  monitoring,  accountability  and  administration  of  the 
judiciary. The truth-seeking process and the opportunity for public accountability 
it portends, would have provided a forum for constituting the NJC (or any such 
similar  body),  in  a  manner  that  would  have  better  secured  its  potential  for 
institutional transformation for which it is conceived. This would have been the 
case granted the benefit of a public-led inquiry into the judicial function in the 
past.  
   In  sum,  the  NJC  could,  at  the  least,  have  been  constituted  as  a  more 
representative body  along societal aspirations for social reconstruction. Such a 
body would arguably assist in better fortifying the judicial institution against the 
vagaries of judicialised politics which potentially challenges any judiciary, drawn 
as the Nigerian courts are, into mediating highly contested political choices and 
questions.  A  closer  examination  of  how  the  judicial  function  has  fared  in  the 
following  circumstances  serves  to  make  clearer  the  point  being  made  about 
accountability  of  the  judiciary  and  proper  positioning  of  the  judiciary  in 
transitions. 
 
5.      TURNING THE TABLES? POLITICISATION OF THE JUDICIARY IN NIGERIA 
   The  purist  ambition  to  insulate  law  from  politics  has  largely  been 
unsuccessful.
110  The  gravitation  of  power  from  the  political  branch  has  been 
accompanied  by  immense  pressure  on  the  judicial  function.  It  is  perhaps 
presumptuous to expect the political elite would not explore avenues to control a 
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visible contender for power like the judiciary. As Ferejohn observes, it is logical 
that the political branch, in the knowledge that judicial officers who they appoint 
could become not only their regulators in the public sphere, but in fact, determine 
their future personal status, would maintain more than a passing interest in the 
high stakes of judicial composition.
111  
   The  price  the  judiciary  pays  for  its  potential  to  control  the  fortunes  of  the 
political elite is the retention by the latter of the power to check judicial power 
through  a  number  of  measures  including  the  naming  of  judges,  control  over 
legislation  delimiting  judicial  jurisdiction  as  well  as  the  enforcement  of 
judgements.
112 On a related note, Domingo has observed that the judicialisation of 
politics can in turn rebound with dire consequences for the rule of law.
 113 In the 
main, it can result in the politicisation of the judiciary with serious impact on its 
decisional independence.  
   The Nigerian judiciary, not atypical of accounts of contemporary transitioning 
experiences witnessing judicialisation of politics, faces the challenges of the other 
side of the dynamic, politicisation of the judiciary. It is to be expected that the 
political branch, having lost or voluntarily conceded some hitherto coveted power 
to  the  judiciary,  will  be  keen  on  obtaining  reasonable  control  of  the  latter  to 
protect its institutional interests in governance.    
   One  of  the  forms  politicisation  of  the  judiciary  can  take  is  the  abuse,  or 
perceived  abuse,  of  appointive  judicial  power  as  a  mechanism  for  obtaining 
desirable political results from the judicialisation of politics by the ruling elite. 
The  disquiet  that  results  from  this  dynamic  and  its  potential  for  eroding 
confidence  in  judicial  independence,  featured  prominently  in  the  controversy 
generated by the recent nomination of the Chairman of the Presidential Election 
Petitions  Tribunal  (the  Tribunal)  to  the  Supreme  Court  by  President  Umar 
Yar’Adua.  The nomination of Justice James Ogebe of the Court of Appeal was 
submitted by the presidency to the Senate for confirmation only hours before the 
Tribunal  announced  the  one  week  date  for  delivery  of  its  verdict  in  the 
presidential election petitions challenging the victory of President Yar’Adua. His 
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predecessor had done the same under similar circumstances and the Tribunal ruled 
in his favour.  
   Not unexpectedly, the opposition cried foul.
114 His nomination, along with that 
of  another  Court  of  Appeal  Justice,  to  the  Supreme  Court,  was  on  the 
recommendation of the NJC. Reports indicate the nomination had been submitted 
by the NJC to the President over two months earlier. It nonetheless raised serious 
concern and fuelled conspiracy theories, particularly in view of the fact that the 
Senate, dominated by the ruling party of the President, referred the matter for 
consideration of the relevant committee on the day the Tribunal was delivering its 
verdict.
115  The  situation  was  further  compounded  by  the  judgement  of  the 
Presidential Election Petitions Tribunal in favour of President Yar’Adua. From 
whatever  perspective  this  is  viewed,  the  timing  of  the  announcement  echoes 
apprehensions on the effect of the power of the political branch to appoint judges.  
   In  general,  concerns  have  been  raised  over  the  impact  of  the  power  on  the 
decisional independence and integrity of judicial officers. In Nigeria, the most 
prominent of the concerns centres on judicial ineptitude and corruption (or simply 
apprehensions of it), especially in the lower courts and throughout the system.
116 
It  is  instructive  that  the  recent  decision  of  the  Presidential  Elections  Petition 
Tribunal has not escaped the allegations of corruption that dogged the steps and 
seriously  compromised  the  adjudication  of  the  2003  elections  in  the  country. 
There are serious allegations from certain quarters that the five-man panel that sat 
over the Presidential Election Petitions had been severely compromised through 
financial inducement.
117 This is quite apart from the rather untidy timing of the 
elevation of the Chairman of the Tribunal to the Supreme Court discussed above.  
   While the veracity of such damaging claims of judicial ineptitude remains in 
doubt, the opposition parties decried the Tribunal’s decision for being perverse.
118 
In  agreement,  the  leadership  of  the  Transition  Monitoring  Group,  a  national 
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coalition  of  some  leading  non-governmental  organisations  that  monitored  the 
elections  alongside  international  observers,  dismissed  it  as  ‘A  Charter  for 
Dishonest  Elections.’
119  The  persistence  of  real  or  imagined  corruption  in  the 
judiciary  is  a  product  of  the  existential  continuity  of  the  institution  in  the 
transition process.  
   Not unrelated to deep-seated public distrust for the judiciary, especially at the 
lower levels, is the preference for ‘appellate justice.’ By this is meant the high 
tendency to appeal unsatisfactory judgements by a party in litigation. Litigants 
commonly treat the trial courts as ‘clearance houses’ for obtaining justice through 
the judicial process. It is typical to find the response to a ruling by an unsatisfied 
party expressed in similar refrain to that of a party chieftain recently that ‘The 
beauty  of  this  whole  thing  is  that  the  ruling  ignites  the  appeal  process.’
120  In 
recent times, this propensity has led to an attendant high volume of appeals in the 
appellate dockets in the country.  
   The attitude is generally that it is easier to influence the court of first instance 
almost  invariably  presided  by  a  single  judge.  Even  in  cases  like  the  electoral 
petitions matters composed of 3 or 5 member-panels, the attitude was the same. It 
has for instance been the position of all parties to the consolidated presidential 
elections petition that irrespective of the outcome, there will be ultimate appeals 
to the Supreme Court. This is despite the composition of the Tribunal by 5 Justice 
of the Court of Appeal. And it was no surprise that the Petitioners immediately 
appealed the decision.
121 Thus the Supreme Court appears to be the lone judicial 
institution  that  currently  enjoys  the  new-found  confidence  in  the  judiciary  in 
Nigeria’s transition. 
   However, public confidence in the integrity of even the Supreme Court itself 
must not be overstated. Apart from the relative infancy of such confidence, the 
Supreme Court itself has not been spared the vagaries of adjudicating politically 
charged cases. It was nearly brought into disrepute in its upholding of the Court of 
Appeal findings that a then serving-governor, James Onanefe Ibori, was not an ex-
convict in the Ibori Case. This was a very controversial case which centred on 
serious allegations that a serving governor was an ex-convict, and was thus unfit 
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to hold office in line with constitutional provisions. Critics of the decision were 
aggrieved that the Supreme Court upheld the finding that there was not enough 
proof in the case to support the claim that the governor was an ex-convict. It was 
criticised  for  ignoring  the  fact  that  the  judge  who  convicted  him  had  given 
evidence at the trial of the matter and positively identified that Governor Ibori was 
the  accused  he  convicted  some  years  back.  It  was  generally  believed  that  the 
Court  had  been  improperly  influenced  by  the  Presidency  who  supported  the 
governor against all odds.  
   It was further alleged by the complainant in the case that the Chief Justice of 
Nigeria who presided over the case and some of the other justices who sat on the 
panel,  had  collected  a  bribe  from  the  governor.
122  Surprisingly,  the  disturbing 
allegation made in open court, did not earn him a citation for contempt. Rather, 
the  Court  invited  Interpol  to  investigate  the  matter  but  nothing  untoward  was 
discovered against the justices.
123 This particular case still hounds the Court as it 
recently  emerged  that  the  ex-governor  as  well  as  his  wife  had  in  fact  been 
convicted of similar  crimes alleged by  at least two other courts in the United 
Kingdom.
124 
   Again, the Court has become an unwitting victim of the intrigues that sometimes 
characterise the conduct of the political process which renders adjudication of 
cases  from  it,  a  daunting  task  for  even  the  highest  levels  of  the  judiciary. 
Recently, some justices of the Court became defendants in a suit before the high 
court for alleged unfair conduct and verbal attack (in open court), on a party in 
Re: Peter Obi vs. Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) & 7Ors 
(Re:  Peter  Obi).
125  The  case  challenges  the  decision  of  the  Court  in  the  Obi 
Tenure  Case  discussed  above.  It  came  to  light  through  depositions  before  the 
Court that one of the Appellants had collected a substantial amount of money 
from the Respondent to abandon his claims but failed to do so.  Irked  by this 
development, he was called out at the hearing for identification and berated as an 
opportunistic  individual  who  had  perfected  the  art  of  making  money  through 
contesting  elections,  challenging  the  winner  through  litigation  after  losing  and 
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receiving gratification for withdrawing his case. The Court then struck out his 
application.  Aggrieved  at  the  ‘unguarded  statements’  of  the  justices,  he 
approached a high court claiming huge damages for denial of fair hearing, and 
bias on the part of the Supreme Court Justices.
126 The implications of a case like 
this on judicial authority is better appreciated in the light of the fact that it would 
likely end up for final determination in the same Supreme Court, presumably by 
another panel of the Court. Will the Court find itself in breach of the principles of 
fair-hearing? This would be an interesting test-case. 
   At the state level, executive and political interference with the judicial process 
has  given  cause  for  concern  as  to  the  sustainability  of  judicial  independence. 
Governors have been known to remove judges who they perceived independent 
and non-deferential to the executive.
127 Take the example of political indiscretion, 
again in Kogi State referred to above. Recently, the Chief Judge was purportedly 
removed by the acting governor following a resolution of the legislature. He had 
delivered a judgment in which he declared the political arrangements made by 
state executive for the scheduled local government councils’ elections illegal in a 
suit  filed  by  the  political  opposition.  His  hurried  removal  on  widely  believed 
trumped up charges of financial misappropriation was accompanied by executive 
rebuff of his ruling. The state bar, thoroughly miffed by the unbridled abuse of 
political power, insisted on his reinstatement and vowed to boycott the courts.
128 
He was reinstated three days later.
129  
   In  certain  vindication  of  critics  of  judicial  involvement  in  overly  political 
processes,  there  are  indications  that  public  reaction  to  judicial  decisions  on 
electoral  cases  is  placing  a  lot  of  undue  pressure  on  the  judiciary.  It  will  be 
recalled that the 2007 general elections in the country had led to unparalleled 
levels of litigation on electoral matters in the country. As stated earlier, this is 
traceable to the widespread discontent with the election considered to be the worst 
in the country’s history. It is thus no surprise that the courts to which recourse 
have been had for resolving the disputes arising from the elections will be the 
focus of intense public attention. But this focus sometimes presents a dilemma for 
                                                 
126 Funso Muraina “Politician Slams N500M Suit on Supreme Court Judges” This Day Online 
Edition (Abuja Friday 22 February 2008). 
127  Editorial note 98 supra. 
128 R O Agbana “AC, NBA Chapter Demand Reinstatement of Kogi CJ” The Guardian Online 
Edition (Lagos Thursday 3 April 2008). 
129 S Egwu “Sacked Kogi Chief Judge Reinstated” Daily Trust Online Edition (Saturday 5 April 
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the judiciary. The public response to the judicial handling of these cases may be 
lacking in objectivity. As one observer succinctly puts it 
               …most judges… are increasingly being labelled not according to the   
               erudition of their judgements but whether, in the perception of  
               Nigerians, their verdicts affirm the vote of no confidence which they had  
               already passed on Obasanjo’s eight year misrule. Thus whenever the  
               tribunals uphold any election, it attracts condemnation while annulments  
               attract spontaneous  applause.
130 
                
Thus,  there  is  the  potential  for  the  widespread  judicialisation  of  the  electoral 
process to result in the undermining of judicial authority, the very antithesis of 
seeking judicial intervention in the first place.            
   In sum, the foregoing instantiations of political interventions in and public focus 
on the judicial process draws attention to the fault lines of the country’s judicial 
institutional  design.  These  have  become  accentuated  by  factors  relating  to  an 
accountability  gap  (both  judicial  and  administrative)  of  its  governance  in  the 
period of authoritarian rule. Institutional positioning of the Nigerian judiciary, in 
the context of a volatile democratisation process, leaves it quite predisposed to 
politicisation.  Further,  the  persistence  of  real  or  imagined  corruption  in  the 
judiciary  is  a  product  of  the  existential  continuity  of  the  institution  in  the 
transition process. This will arguably remain the case as long as the matter of 
accountability  of  the  judiciary  for  complicity  in  misgovernance  during  the 
country’s  authoritarian  past  remains  completely  ignored  or  under-addressed  at 
best.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  The  cases  analysed  here  demonstrate  how  political  players,  in  a  struggle  for 
hegemony, ascendance and control of power, encourage or even actively initiate 
the process of judicialisation of politics. They reinforce an important feature of 
judicialisation of politics in the new constitutionalism, the predilection of political 
branches  of  government  in  matured  and  young  democracies  alike  for  ceding 
political decisions to the judiciary for varying strategic reasons.  
   The discussion above suggests the Nigerian Supreme Court in particular has 
taken a strategic position in the task of democratic institutional building and the 
reinstitution of the rule of law in the country to the acclaim of the public in the 
country.  The  account  also  discloses  that  the  judiciary,  in  the  course  of  its 
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numerous interventions, has not only been drawn into overly political disputes 
that overreach its jurisprudential preferences, but  is itself still challenged by the 
institutional dysfunctions carried over from the authoritarian era.  
   It emerges from the analyses of the Nigerian experience that the tentative lines 
of the direction of judicial activity in the country can be drawn from the position 
of the Supreme Court.  It would however be simply misleading to consider its 
position as representative of the current state of the judiciary as a whole. Despite a 
few commendable handling of critical and overly political matters, the manner of 
adjudication and independence of the lower courts remain quite unsatisfactory. In 
particular, the lower courts have yet to catch on to a consistently progressive role 
in the country’s political transition. The Supreme Court itself is still enmeshed in 
controversies  that  speak  to  the  dilemma  of  an  unscrutinised  past,  a  feature  of 
transitional justice in Nigeria and elsewhere.  
  The Nigerian experience also indicates that a number of situational dynamics, 
prominent among which is the ceding of power to the judicial branch by political 
actors for strategic reasons, situates the judiciary as a powerful force for social 
reconstruction,  entrenchment  and  stabilisation  of  democratic  ethos  in  post-
authoritarian transitions. But the culmination of the dynamics leads back to the 
need for closer scrutiny of the judicial function in transitional societies. 
   Accounts of the Nigerian experience of the judicialisation of politics suggest the 
need  to  devote  more  attention  to  the  role  of  public  opinion  in  analytic 
considerations  of  the  judicial  function.  While  it  is  crucial  to  protect  the 
institutional integrity of the judiciary, public opinion along with other political 
considerations which, in practice, significantly impact on judicial activity, ought 
to be given more detailed and systematised consideration by the legal academy in 
evaluations of the judicial function. The keen public focus on and preference for 
the  judicial  resolution  of  power  contestations  among  the  political  elite;  itself 
deriving  mainly  from  the  divisions  within  their  ranks  or  the  need  to  secure 
legitimacy  for  the  exercise  of  power  secured  through  deficient  democratic 
processes, commends the view that the insufficient attention to public opinion in 
legal analysis, provides an incomplete empirical account of the role of judicial 
review. Incidentally, this thesis also omits a complete empirical account on the 
Nigerian experience. Nonetheless, legal theory will be more in tune with socio-
political reality and enriched by the adoption of a robust approach to analysis of 
the judicial function in general.   231 
   The judiciary in transitional societies, and even in well established democracies, 
is certainly on the march of power. But the political branches which voluntarily or 
unwittingly ceded some of the powers to it may fight back. The voluntary ceding 
of critical policy-making powers is usually a strategic move to achieve certain 
advantages  like  legitimacy  or  deflection  of  public  disaffection  for  unpopular 
policies.  Consequently,  while  the  political  branches  may  facilitate  or  at  least 
support the judicialisation of politics, an alteration of the balance of power which 
may result, is usually not welcome.  
   Institutional distortions may result from the response of the political branches to 
the active participation of the judiciary in determining highly political matters. 
These  tend  to  jeopardize  the  very  foundations  of  the  rule  of  law,  ordinarily 
consolidated by judicial activism. In the event that the judiciary, deriving from its 
institutional nature, lacks both the power of the sword and the purse, political 
power-resurgence of this nature challenges the propriety of devolving so much 
governmental  power  on  the  most  unlikely  branch.  From  experiential  accounts, 
aspiration  of  judicial  rescue  of  a  troubled  transition  and  consolidation  of 
democracy is a daunting yet vital task.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
   Utilising  the  specific  experience  of  political  transition  in  Nigeria,  this  study 
identified  an  important  but  mostly  neglected  aspect  of  transitional  justice:  the 
need to scrutinise the role of the judiciary in  misgovernance. Specifically, the 
thesis focused on the need for institutional accountability for the judicial role in 
upholding  and  legitimising  authoritarian  rule  as  part  of  transitional  justice 
arrangements  in  the  post-authoritarian,  democratising  polity.  The  position  was 
canvassed that neglect  or failure to include the judiciary, a major actor in the 
exercise of state power, in the process of accountability for misgovernance and 
gross violations of human rights, leaves a major gap in accountability for the past. 
This has potentially wide ramifications for the present and the future.  
 The study raised normative questions about the propriety of the accountability 
gap that is thus created. Perhaps more importantly, it argued that this failure also 
threatens  the  transformation  of  the  state  and  its  hitherto  complicit  institutions. 
This latter point is the case, it was argued, because the judiciary served, even if 
unwittingly, as an instrument of oppression in the period of authoritarian rule. 
Yet, as shown by various accounts of the contemporary experience of governance, 
the judiciary has come to assume an important position in the determination of 
rights  claims,  government  policy  and  socio-political  reforms  instituted  by 
countries in transition.  
   The assumption by the judiciary of a strategic institutional role in governance in 
post-authoritarian  societies  is  usually  externally-driven.  The  ascendance  of 
judicial power in governance in such contexts is usually facilitated by the need for 
the resolution of emergent, sometimes novel, disputes and contestations within the 
political branch of government. In many cases, the judiciary becomes the forum 
for the resolution of key political disputes and moral questions generated partly by 
the chequered institutional memory and experience of the political branch. In light 
of  this  situation,  it  is  reasonable  to  assert  that  there  is  merit  in  paying  more 
attention to the salience of accountability of the judiciary in post-authoritarian 
societies in particular and transitional contexts in general. Thus the current neglect 
of  critical  perspectives  on  accountability  of  the  judiciary  is  at  the  least,  an 
undesirable gap in transitional justice theory and practice.  
   It  was  intended  to  demonstrate  that  public  accountability  for  the  previous 
judicial role in governance is crucial during transition moments in a society. It 
was argued that in transitional societies, such accountability can be legitimately   233 
and viably pursued through the mechanism of the truth-seeking process as part of 
a holistic approach to taking stock of the past. Such a public process is easily 
accessible and accords with certain understandings of the rule of law. The primary 
advantage of the public accountability process as represented by the truth-seeking 
mechanism in the context of a transitioning society is the opportunity it provides 
for  securing  comprehensive  accountability  of  governance  during  a  period  of 
authoritarianism.  
   The argument has been made in this thesis that there is something seriously 
disturbing to find that judges who swore an oath to defend the Constitution going 
against that oath. The violation of the judicial oath to defend the Constitution 
includes the act of legitimating unconstitutional (military) governments as in the 
case of Nigeria. The same goes for according recognition to, and upholding of 
laws imposed by military usurpers. At the least, the question of the source of 
judicial  power  to  act  comes  up  for  scrutiny  in  the  circumstance  that  military 
usurpation of power somehow overturns the very Constitution which presumably 
grants such powers. Worse still is the realisation that the military, in the exercise 
of  usurped  powers  legitimised  by  the  judiciary,  commit  gross  human  rights 
violations over a considerable period of time as is the case in Nigeria. With such a 
record, the judiciary undermines its own institutional integrity. On this view, the 
judiciary ought, as a matter of principle, to be made to give an account of its 
stewardship to the society.  
   Accountability of the judiciary for its past role in governance is an important 
task  that  has  to  be  undertaken  in  the  short  term  before  collective  amnesia 
develops.  The  judiciary  should  not  be  allowed  to  seek  protection  from 
accountability through reliance on traditional normative doctrines of institutional 
independence or immunity for  at least three reasons. First, these doctrines are 
generally conceived within the construct of settled, democratic societies. Second, 
there is the need for comprehensive accountability to fulfil the obligation of the 
right of the society to  know what went wrong in the past. Third, institutional 
accountability for the past facilitates transformation, one of the key aspirations of 
transitioning societies. Thus, where a mechanism like the truth-seeking process is 
available, the judiciary, like the other two branches of governance, ought to go 
through it. 
   A key foundational premise for institutional accountability as advanced in this 
study is that the role of the judiciary is of a critical nature as the third estate of the 
realm at all times. It is fast becoming counter-intuitive, if not indeed, a flight from   234 
experiential  accounts,  to  regard  the  judicial  branch  as  the  weakest  arm  of 
government. The wave of judicialisation in contemporary times has opened up 
new thinking about situating the judiciary in the constellation of power in the 
modern state. The experience in democratising polities has similarly reinforced 
and  in  some  cases,  directly  suggested  the  judiciary  now  exercises  immense 
powers on political matters. These all point in the direction of a need to pay more 
attention  to  the  role  of  the  judiciary  in  governance  and  corresponding 
accountability for its exercise of powers at all times. This, as argued earlier, is 
even more the case in democratic societies.  
   It has been shown that the gap in the accountability for the judicial role in a 
society’s past is one that ought to be addressed. This is in view of the centrality of 
the judiciary both in authoritarian and post-authoritarian societies in particular and 
post-conflict  contexts  in  general.  It  is  now  imperative  that  transitional  justice 
processes accord an important place to accountability of the judiciary for its role 
in the past. As revealed by the consideration of the role of the judiciary in the 
authoritarian  and  post-authoritarian  period  in  Nigeria,  the  significance  of 
accountability of the judiciary in transitional societies can not be overstated. This 
stems from critical analysis of specific cases reflecting the sometimes decisive 
role  the  judicial  institution  plays  in  governance  in  contemporary  society.  The 
situation  can  hardly  be  otherwise.  The  judiciary  is  after  all,  the  third  in  the 
conventional legal and political conceptions of state institutions.  
  The  prevalent  phenomenon  of  judicialisation  of  politics  in  liberal,  advanced 
democratic societies as well as democratising polities sharply draws attention to 
the  need  for  more  scholarly  scrutiny  on  the  judicial  function.  The  need  for 
accountability of the judiciary for its role in past governance takes on an even 
more urgent imperative in post-authoritarian contexts where, as is wont to be the 
case, it bears institutional complicity  for  gross  violations of human rights and 
impunity. The burden it carries from the past affects its performance and raises 
concern on the legitimacy of its exercise of power in the present and future.  
   This research highlights that a notable feature of the judicialisation of politics is 
the  ability  and  willingness  of  courts  to  limit  legislative  action  according  to 
constitutional principles and the values of the rule of law. While the Nigerian 
experience has not significantly diverged from this paradigm, the account of the 
judicialisation  of  politics  in  the  country  discloses  it  has  had  more  profound 
resonance for governance in the way it has impacted upon executive actions in   235 
governance. The phenomenon has been distinctly discernible in adjudication of 
disputes on the intersection of individual rights with public interests in a troubled 
transition from authoritarianism.  
   The  impact  of  the    judicial  role  in  transitioning  polities,  from  Central  and 
Eastern Europe through to South East Asia , Latin America and Africa, outlined in 
this study, supports the position that it is critical to the democratisation process to 
ensure the judiciary is properly positioned for the transition from an authoritarian  
past.  It  is  noteworthy  that  in  virtually  all  of  these  cases,  new  courts  were 
established  to  take  on  various  socio-political  and  other  challenges  of  diverse 
transitional societies. While the creation of such courts at first blush appears to 
elide the need for accountability of the judiciary, it can be argued that it actually 
speaks to recognition of the questionable role of the judiciary in past governance. 
In other words, the creation of new constitutional courts signals the need for a 
mediator  unburdened  by  a  complicit  institutional  past.  The  recognition  of 
perceived or actual institutional complicity of inherited judicial structures would 
appear partly responsible for the usually uneasy relationship between them and 
the newly created courts.  
   In  societies  like  Nigeria  where  new  courts  were  not  created,  the  case  for 
accountability of the judiciary for the past is even more compelling. The judiciary 
ought to be made to give an account of its role in past governance as part of 
transitional  justice  measures  to  achieve  comprehensive  accountability  and 
institutional transformation. It is only then that it can be expected to take on the 
serious  challenges  of  definitive,  purposeful  judicial  governance  required  for 
strengthening the democratising transitioning polity.  
   With respect to the Nigerian experience, the research discloses that the tentative 
lines of the course of judicialisation of politics in the country can be drawn from 
the position of the Supreme Court, considering its pride of place in the judicial 
system. But it would be simply misleading to read off it, the current state of the 
judiciary in the country as a whole. The outline of the judicialisation of politics in 
the Supreme Court differs from what is seen in the courts below. Despite some 
commendable  handling  of  critical  and  overly  political  matters,  the  manner  of 
adjudication  and  independence  of  the  lower  courts  continue  to  give  cause  for 
concern.  The  Supreme  Court  itself  is  still  enmeshed  in  controversies  as  to  its 
integrity and its jurisprudence remains ambivalent at critical moments. All these 
speak  to  the  dilemma  of  an  unscrutinised  institutional  past,  a  feature  of 
transitional justice with regards to the judicial function in Nigeria and elsewhere.   236 
   In  democratising  as  well  as  established  liberal  democratic  societies, 
protestations of deficient democratic credentials have surprisingly been ineffectual 
in  curbing  the  geometric  increase  in,  and  sometimes  preference  for,  judicial 
determination and control of public policy as well as highly political and moral 
questions. The immense powers wielded by the judiciary over key policy aspects 
of  governance,  especially  in  the  contemporary  new  constitutionalism,  strongly 
suggests  the  need  for  closer  and  more  systematised  scrutiny  of  the  judicial 
function.  
   Experiential  accounts  strongly  suggest  that  newly  established  constitutional 
courts have played a significant role in deepening democracy. The courts, through 
a  particular  form  of  judicial  activism  and  sometimes  very  controversial 
jurisprudential preferences, are securing the core values of the constitution and 
securing human rights in transitioning polities. Courts have played (and continue 
to play) a central role in shaping the direction of key political and moral issues 
which go to the foundations of the existence of their societies.  In the Nigerian 
case,  the  judicialisation  of  politics  has  taken  on  remarkable  prominence  in 
governance. The voluntary (and sometimes involuntary) ceding of powers by the 
political branches has witnessed the judiciary becoming the choice mechanism for 
resolving the debacles arising from a legacy of a dysfunctional system created in 
the  course  of  almost  three  decades  of  military  authoritarianism.  And  yet,  the 
judicial institution itself has been hitherto under-scrutinised in terms of its role in 
the  past  and  its  position  in  the  transition  to  democracy.  This  thesis  has 
endeavoured to begin to rectify that gap. But given the high stakes involved in the 
Nigerian polity, it has been argued here that more remained and remains to be 
done.     
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